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ABSTRACT 
INVESTORS’ RIGHTS, TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION IN EQUITY BASED ISLAMIC 
FINANCE: AN EXPLORATION INTO ISLAMIC PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE GCC 
Muna Ahmed Al Mannai 
 
 
Islamic principles encourage the use of risk-sharing modes of financing and private equity is one of the 
organizational formats that uses these instruments. However, there has been no in-depth study on 
Islamic private equity (IPE) that examines the issues arising in implementing equity-based financing. 
IPE involves an investment where Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) and investors are bound together 
by a contractual relationship that is greatly influenced by trust. Private equity relationships involve 
investments in different projects and ventures on a risk-sharing basis with not much known, especially 
about the post-investment period. Furthermore, private equity is considered to be one-sided agreements 
since there is no room to negotiate pre-investment, little or no voting power post-investment, a process 
to resolve conflict of interest matters is lacking and accounting is off the balance sheet. All of the above 
gives rise to a potential conflict of interest and makes the availability of market information essential to 
the investors. Thus, enhancing the transparency and flow of information can be the strategic factor in 
developing the Islamic private equity market (IPE). Moreover, in IPE investors depend highly on the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) supervision and oversight for ensuring Shari’ah compliance, yet the 
independence of SSB is questioned.    
Given the above, the aim of the study is to explore the relationship between the investors and IFI 
investing in IPE across the GCC, reflecting on investors’ rights and compliance with the principles and 
goals of Shari’ah. The study followed an inductive approach, using athe mixed model, combining 
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis techniques. Participants: investors (Islamic and 
conventional), IFIs and Shari’ah scholars, were selected using sampling and judgmental techniques. 
The results were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The findings indicate 
that transparency and investor communication is lacking and IFIs need to improve on the disclosure 
mechanism towards their investors. The governance of the investment structure and of the IFI 
management, the ability to negotiate, and the independence of Shari’ah supervision and review are 
some of the key issues that would need to be addressed/strengthened to enhance the investors’ 
confidence. Regulations are to be navigated towards enhancing transparency, publicity and 
accountability. The desire is not only for regulations on the availability of information, but also to ensure 
they are enforced and consequences may result from non-compliance. In addition, in introducing an 
independent set-up, SSB independence can be enhanced. Furthermore, with the concept of IPE 
investment being a contractual agreement, an effective supervision, contract enforcement and legal 
system is required.     
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Chapter One: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
 
Starting in the mid-1970s, Islamic finance is a fairly new concept and is continuing to grow and 
expand globally. Reacting to the growth of the industry, regulators are catching up on the 
challenges in regulating and supervising Islamic financing. The Islamic Financial Service 
Board (IFSB) was established in 2002 with a mandate to provide standards and guidelines for 
the supervision of Islamic banks to be applied internationally. Since its establishment, it has 
developed guidelines on capital adequacy, risk management and corporate governance. Its work 
continues as it identifies the various areas that require guidance and supervision on the different 
types of Islamic finance and on “issues that have not been addressed in other international 
standards” (Archer & Abdul Karim 2007:3). Archer & Abdul Karim (2007:3) maintain that the 
main challenge for the IFSB is “to develop a framework that is common and applicable to all 
jurisdictions” (Archer and Abdul Karim 2007). As these guidelines/standards are in the infancy 
stage, in comparison to the international standards applicable to conventional banks, they have 
not been adopted by all regulators in different jurisdictions.  Some central banks believe that 
Islamic financial institutions should be regulated and supervised completely differently from 
conventional banks, whilst others believe that they should be the same as conventional banks 
with some modifications (Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal 2004).                                                                          
 
However, it is difficult to compare Islamic finance to their conventional counterparts, even 
though the issues of corporate governance, risk management, and capital adequacy are common. 
They differ mainly in the contracts used for carrying out various activities such as the 
mobilization of funds and financing different assets. There is a lot of project financing involved 
(mostly private investments) and hence, the emphasis on risk associated with Islamic financing 
differs from conventional financing. Greater investment and operational risk management is 
required, as the risk is not only associated with debt holders but also with equity investors. The 
risks to be addressed are based on the investor-entrepreneur relationship along with the debtor-
creditor relationship. Thus, the relationship between the investors (equity owners) and IFIs 
(entrepreneurs) and their rights needs to be maintained: a balance has to be struck between the 
IFI’s (entrepreneur’s) interests and the investors’ interests while meeting Shari’ah principles. 
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Although the profit-loss and risk sharing methods of financing (musharaka and mudaraba) are 
the preferred modes of Islamic financing for their contribution to the economy, most of the 
current Islamic forms of financing are in the form of debt-type modes (such as murabaha and 
ijarah). This is due to the fact that the partnership form of financing is not clearly understood 
by the participants in the industry and in particular the investor. One particular area in which 
equity-based modes are used more extensively is the private-equity segment. Prior to the 
financial crisis in 2007, the size of the private equity market in the MENA and North Africa 
region had reached more than US$6.2bn. With the financial crisis, the market had dropped to 
US$700m by 2009 (EMPEA, 2015). Notwithstanding the sharp drop, the market started to pick 
up and is reported to have reached US$1.09bn in 2014 (EMPEA, 2015). However, the rise was 
short lived and the total funds raised in the MENA region continued its drop from US$992m in 
2015 to U$582m in 2016, the lowest in four years (MENA Private Equity Association, 2016). 
The slowdown was due to the drop in oil prices and the uncertain conditions in the market, 
leading private equity investors to adopt a wait and see approach. The figures reported include 
all private equity, both conventional and Islamic. Recent market information, specifically on 
Islamic private equity is not available.  
 
1.2 MOTIVATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is motivated by the growth in private equity form of Islamic financing, particularly 
in the Middle East region. The Islamic private equity financing is modelled on the conventional 
equity model. Even though the Islamic private equity sector reflects key features of Islamic 
financial contracts, there is very little research carried out on it. The conventional private equity 
model, the non-leverage version of the model, is well suited to the concept of Islam and the 
profit/loss-risk sharing principles and directing money into the real economy.  Although, the 
economic tools of analysis such as scarcity, choice, opportunity cost, marginal efficiency of 
capital, discount rate and profit might be the same as in the conventional equity model, they are 
looked at from a different perspective in Islamic financing. The Islamic financing system views 
them from the dimensions of economic, social and moral aspects (Abdul Mannan, 2002:215).  
 
For such a form of financing to grow, especially at a time when the countries of the GCC1 
region are working on developing their countries and its infrastructure, and where there will be 
potential opportunities to contribute to the real economic developments through the use of such 
																																								 																				
1 GCC-Gulf Cooperation Council Countries.	
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investments, there is a need to improve the overall regulatory environment to increase 
confidence in private equity financing. Confidence is obtained through increasing the 
awareness and understanding of the process of investment, and the data availability of the 
private equity market. 
 
Private equity, as the names suggests is a private market, where even in the conventional system 
not much data is available in comparison to other investment sectors of the financial market. 
Among others, there is a lack of adequate disclosure and transparency in the private equity 
markets. In this regard, associations such as The European Private Equity, the Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA), the British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVCA) and 
the Institutional Limited Partners Associations (ILPA) have been established to counter issues 
that impact private equity such as information, transparency, risk management and corporate 
governance. 
 
For private equity to succeed as a form of Islamic financing as being both permissible and valid 
from a Shari’ah perspective, and not to be suppressed by the conventional system, it would 
need to fulfil the form or “content” and substance or “spirit” of Shari’ah. It is possible that 
something is Shari’ah compliant, yet it is inconsistent with the broader Shari’ah objectives. 
There are many measurements for maintaining the Shari’ah form of compliance, such as: the 
investment activity (halal), the investment decisions (financial ratios), type of share issue 
(limitation on preference shares), and profit/risk sharing ratio. However, little (or comparatively 
less) is discussed on the Shari’ah substance: being valid and conforming to Shari’ah principles 
from the aspect of Islamic values/morals, which mainly deal with the relationship between the 
investors and the IFI (Abdul Mannan, 2002:213-215). These would include issues such as 
avoiding Gharar, which among other things means “misleading, deception, beguiling and 
delusion” (Nehad & Khanfar, 2016:3), avoiding Jahala or ignorance due to lack of 
disclosure/transparency, and moral hazard that affect the investor’s rights. 
 
From my experience, during my work at the central bank, the popular form of Islamic private 
equity financing that offers High Net-Worth Investors (HNWI) the opportunity to invest is not 
simple and straightforward. The mechanism of raising capital for such financing is made by the 
IFI which creates a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to pool the HNWIs funds. The IFI pools the 
HNWI’s funds by selling to the HNWIs portions (at times the majority/all) of their ownership 
in the SPV they created. The IFI, using the SPV, then invests in local/overseas project 
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companies. The SPV created is usually incorporated offshore, where the home regulator has no 
authority, and is not consolidated into the IFI financial accounts. The HNWI have no or minimal 
governance rights that are usually associated with equity ownership. In addition, the 
information flow and level of investor awareness appeared opaque. As a capital market 
regulator, where investor protection is key, such matters were of concern. This is where the 
motivation for this study is generated. Does the process (investors’ expectations, entering into 
partnership, investing, initial and on-going reporting, etc.) of private equity investments taken 
up by IFI meet and conform to the Islamic substance of the format of such financing? This is 
particularly with regards to transparency and investors’ rights. 
 
The private equity financing relationship is characterised by information asymmetry. There are 
two levels of information asymmetry that can appear in a principal-agent framework (Abdlkhail 
& Presley, 2002:112): 
1. Pre-investment: adverse selection problem whereby one party to the contract has less 
information than the other which can be mitigated by full disclosure of the proposed 
investment.  
2. Post-investment: moral hazard occurs after the contract is signed and the agent acts in 
ways that enhance his interests at the cost of the principal. This problem can be resolved 
by ensuring transparency on the progress of the investment in accordance with the plan 
and by providing information on any failures in meeting targets. 
 
The IFI and the investor have a principle-agent relationship and such a relationship gives rise 
to agency problems. The agency problems arise due to the parties involved having different 
goals which leads to conflicting behaviour. The agent’s/IFI’s interest is to maximise income 
(as it effects his performance fees), while the principal’s/investor’s interest is to maximise 
returns (Saam, 2007). Moreover, with such a private industry, not much is known about the on-
going relationship between the investment/fund managers and the investors after they have 
entered/contracted into a private equity relationship. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, 
no research has studied the information related issues in Islamic private equity relationships. 
Past and recent studies have mainly been on conventional private equity and on the buyout 
model (Harris, Jenkinson & Kaplan, 2013; Gompers, Kaplan & Mukharlyamov, 2015), or on 
the values and returns of private equity (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Cumming & Walz, 2010; 
Kaplan, 2005; Metrick & Yasuda, 2010; Komala, 2016). With regards to studies on Islamic 
private equity (IPE), there does not appear to be much research, other than in general, such as 
the IPE structure versus the conventional or on the industry and how to structure it, conducting 
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due diligence and dealing with business issues (Chatti & Yousif, 2010; Siddiqui, 2010; Elsiefy, 
2014). In view of the relationship, most studies (including conventional ones) performed in the 
past on pre-contractual relationships examine how to arrive at an agreement that satisfies both 
parties. However, the post-contractual relationship is opaque and less transparent (Müller, 
2008:5). Furthermore, Müller (2008) identified such a gap in the research area and accordingly 
undertook to study the on-going relationship between the financial institution and the investor 
(conventional). Yet, although her study was based on primary data, (unlike most of the other 
studies) the group of investors under study were institutional investors only. In addition, even 
though the Islamic model is based on the conventional model, most studies have been confined 
to the USA, UK, European and somewhat less in the Asian regions. Studies on IPE and the 
first-hand experience of investors (inclusive of individuals) in the GCC region are lacking. 
 
Information, disclosure and transparency are important elements in the development and 
growth of financial markets in general and more so in the Islamic financial market due to the 
main elements of Islam stated above. On-going monitoring, updating and being transparent 
improves confidence, builds trust and helps in maintaining the flow of finance, which in turn 
would reflect positively on the growth of the Islamic finance industry and the economy. 
Therefore, for such an industry to grow and be Shari’ah compliant2, while maintaining the 
Shari’ah principles, and to overcome the technical challenges associated with the Islamic 
contracts that govern the mobilisation of funds, greater transparency, disclosure and 
understanding are required, even if it is a private form of investment. Furthermore,  
“The uniqueness of such [financing] should lie not only in integrating economic, social 
and moral dimensions in every transaction but also in controlling their results and 
directing their consequences to achieve the desired economic and social welfare within 
the framework of the totality of the human situation at an earthly macro level and the 
dual notion of accountability (life on earth and life Hereafter) on the spiritual level” 
(Abdul Mannan, 2002:214). 
 
Thus, with the intention of assisting the growth in this industry and such a form of financing, 
the aim of this PhD research is to study, within the GCC region, the issues arising in the 
relationship between the investors (both institutional and individual) and the IFI investing in 
IPE that affect the investor’s rights and their compliance with the principles and goals of 
Shari’ah. As indicated, in an agency relationship the investor (principal) only knows what the 
																																								 																				
2 The definition of “Shari’ah compliant” versus “Shari’ah based” is discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.6.5.	
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agent informs him of which leads to issues related to information asymmetry (highlighted above) 
and raises the following question: what kind and how accurate and/or complete information 
does the principal/investor receive? Hence, the interest in exploring the Islamic private equity 
relationship. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES   
  
 
The aim of this research is to explore the areas of weakness in the relationship between the 
investors and Islamic private equity firms in the GCC and suggest ways in which these can be 
strengthened. In this regard, the status of the issues related to transparency, Shari’ah, and 
regulation in the private equity relationships between the investors and firms will be examined. 
This will be done by collecting information through surveys with key stakeholders, which 
includes Islamic private equity firms, investors and Shari’ah scholars. Since this is one of the 
first studies on Islamic private equity finance, the study will provide insights into the 
weaknesses and strengths of this sector with the intention of suggesting policies to promote the 
growth of this industry. Moreover, to have a richer understanding of the issues, some insight 
from conventional investors’ experience in private equity is also explored. 
 
In an attempt to realise the aim of the study, the following research objectives are formulated: 
1. To review the literature on private equity (PE) and identify the issues arising in the 
relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity (IPE) firms. 
2. To identify certain specific issues related to agency problems and investors’ rights from a 
transparency, Shari’ah and regulatory perspective. 
3. To ascertain the views of investors regarding the specific issues (transparency, Shari’ah, 
and regulation) in IPE and assess their awareness of such issues. 
4. To examine the operations of IFI (acting as an IPE firm) related to the specific issues of 
transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation. 
5. To come up with some recommendations with regards to transparency, Shari’ah and 
regulations on improving the investor and IFI (acting as an IPE firm) relationship in IPE. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The research questions were sub-divided into three themes: transparency and information, 
Shari’ah and regulation of the private equity market. Accordingly, research questions were 
formulated to assist in framing the path of the study in order to achieve the aim and objectives 
of the research. 
 
A. Transparency and Information 
A1. How do the FI and investors handle the pre-investment stage? 
A.2. What are the pre-investment regulatory requirements? 
A.3. How do the FI/investors handle the post-investment stage? 
A.4. What are the post-investment regulatory requirements? 
A.5. What are the investors’ views on the investment relationship? 
A.6. What are the issues of concern in the framework of PE with regards to transparency and 
information? 
 
B. Shari’ah  
B.1. What is the FI/investor’s/Shari’ah scholar’s level of Shari'ah understanding? 
B.2. How is Shari’ah compliance maintained? 
B.3. What are the Shari'ah regulatory requirements? 
B.4. What are the issues of concern in the framework of PE with regards to Shari'ah? 
 
C. Regulating Private Equity Market 
C.1 What are the views of investors and IFIs on regulating the PE market? 
 
Further details of the research questions and sub-questions are covered in Chapter 5, section 
5.2.2.3. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH SCOPE 
 
While Islamic private equity initiatives exist in different parts of the world, the study focuses 
on the GCC countries due to the following reasons. Private equity had grown very rapidly in 
the GCC prior to the financial crisis, and although it is a reasonably new asset class in the GCC 
region, not much information is available in the market on private equity in general. It is a form 
of investment that is “driven by a closed network resulting in a restricted information flow… 
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the information environment still relies heavily on informal sources” (Strategy &, 2010:3). 
Moreover, the IPE projects that took place in the region prior to the crisis were 
offered/promoted by IFI to investors in the region. The investors who participated were from 
the region, rather than specifically from just one country. Thus, it was considered that by 
widening the scope of study to include the six GCC countries, the researcher would be able to 
get a better insight into the investors’ experience who invested in IPE. 
 
Furthermore, while acknowledging the importance of the different aspects of governance and 
management of private equity operations, the focus of the research is on the relationships with 
the investors. Investors form a focal point in the study, as in private equity they play a major 
role even though it is not an active one. Nevertheless, they are the capital contributors. They 
play an important part in the relationship and in the development of this industry. Without their 
confidence and their awareness, the stakeholders’ awareness progress towards development in 
this market will be slow. The greater the awareness of the issues of concern experienced the 
clearer the route for the parties/stakeholders towards advancing the private equity market in 
general and IPE in particular. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
As the purpose of the study is to explore issues arising in the relationship between the investors 
and the IFI, an inductive approach was taken up. The social constructivism and interpretive 
method, whereby the researcher’s own experience was bracketed out3, was employed. The 
triangulation method with a mixed model of combining qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis techniques was used in the research. The data was collected through 
surveys using both the sampling and judgmental technique: sampling through networking and 
judgmental through approaching experts related to the area of study. The respondents were 
from the GCC region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE.4  
 
The sample was divided into three categories of respondents: investors, Islamic financial 
institutions (IFI) and Shari’ah scholars (ShSc). The first two were selected due to being part of 
the investment relationship to be studied, and the third (ShSc) was selected due to the study 
being related to IPE. Also, the ShSc’s input into the Shari’ah matters relevant to the research 
																																								 																				
3 At the time of undertaking the research, the researcher was working at the Capital Markets Directorate at the 
Central Bank of Bahrain.	
4 Stated in alphabetical order.	
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was of importance. Moreover, as the IPE is similar to the conventional private equity (CPE), 
investors that invested in conventional private equity were also included within the sample of 
investors. The total sample size constituted 51 investors (35 IPE and 16 CPE), 15 Islamic 
financial institutions and 13 Shari’ah scholars who were interviewed. While investors 
responded to a set of questions from a questionnaire, the IFI and ShScs were interviewed. 
Details of the process of research and fieldwork are covered in Chapter 5, section 5.4. 
 
The methods of analyses carried out were descriptive and inferential, whereby textual and 
content analysis was done on qualitative information and non-parametric statistics were 
performed on data that could be quantified. Details of the analytical methods used are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 5, section 5.5. The results and findings of the surveys are presented in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
 
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
 
Following the introduction of the research aim, the questions and methodology above, this 
section provides a brief overview of the chapters of the thesis/research study. The thesis is 
divided into 10 chapters, of which the current chapter is the first. Chapters 2 to 4, in meeting 
the first objective of the study, set the basis of the research by reviewing the related literature 
to identify the issues arising in the relationship between the investors and IFIs investing in IPE. 
After which the appropriate research methodology and the research design was decided in 
Chapter 5. Chapters 6 to 8 report the results and findings of the three groups of participants 
under study. The findings are contextualised with the literature in Chapter 9 and Chapter 10 
reports on the conclusion and recommendations of the research. A brief overview of the 
chapters is given below.  
 
Chapter 2 - Private Equity in Conventional Finance (A Literature Review) 
 
The chapter defines and gives a brief overview of private equity as a form of investment. It 
looks into the various forms and the legal structure of private equity. The chapter then discusses 
the various theories related to the private equity form of investment. This chapter sets the basis 
upon which the Islamic private equity form of investment is compared to. 
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Chapter 3 - Private Equity in Islamic Finance: Principles and Features (A Literature 
Review) 
The chapter starts by giving an introduction to Maqasid AlShari’ah and the Shari’ah principles. 
It then also provides an overview of the Islamic economy and Islamic finance. After presenting 
various forms of contracting in Islamic finance, the chapter then looks into the similarities 
between investing in conventional private equity (CPE) and Islamic private equity (IPE). The 
chapter concludes with the challenges facing IPE. 
 
Chapter 4 - Private Equity Regulations: Principles and Status in the GCC (A Literature 
Review) 
This chapter provides an insight into the various regulatory frameworks and different types of 
regulations in the market. It then looks into the regulations and governance of the private equity 
market, in addition to the Shari’ah regulations and governance. This is followed by a closer 
look at the private equity regulations and governance in the GCC. 
 
Chapter 5 - Research Methodology  
The research framework, methodology and methods undertaken in the study to address the 
research questions are discussed in this chapter. It also provides an insight into the fieldwork 
undertaken and the challenges and obstacles faced during the research. 
 
Chapter 6 – Investors’ Approach to Islamic Private Equity Investment: Results and 
Analysis 
This chapter presents the results and the findings of the investors’ response to the questionnaire. 
It displays the relevant descriptive and inferential analyses that were performed on the 
responses of the open- and closed-ended questions of the questionnaire.  
 
Chapter 7 - IFI Approaches to Islamic Private Equity Investment: Results and Analysis 
The responses of the face-to-face interviews conducted with IFI were analysed and presented 
in this chapter. Specifically, the qualitative results and findings of textual and content analysis 
derived from the interviews are discussed. 
 
12		
Chapter 8 - Shari’ah Scholar Role in IFI Investing In Islamic Private Equity 
Investment: Results and Findings 
This chapter presents the results and findings of the responses of the face-to-face interviews 
conducted with Shari’ah scholars. It shows the results and findings of the textual and content 
analyses that were performed. 
 
Chapter 9 - Contextualisation the Results and Findings 
In this chapter the results and findings of the participants in the study were interpreted and 
cross-referenced with the theories and literature reviews covered in the earlier chapters. The 
chapter shows how the research questions were addressed in the empirical part of the thesis by 
presenting, discussing and interpreting the results.    
 
Chapter 10 - Conclusion and Research Recommendations 
The chapter gives an overall conclusion of the study drawn from the contextualisation and 
interpretation of the previous chapter. It reflects on the implications and recommendations 
derived from the study, the limitations, the possible future research and puts forward the 
researcher’s suggestions.
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Chapter Two: 
PRIVATE EQUITY IN CONVENTIONAL FINANCE 
(A LITERATURE REVIEW) 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Any form of development and growth within an economy, whether it be building bridges, 
recreation centres or starting up or expanding a business requires financial capital. Whether it 
be governments, firms or individuals they are not necessarily able to afford the required capital 
or even at times have the apt knowledge (the technical and legal knowhow, and the network 
connections). Private equity is a form of finance through which some of these deficiencies can 
be treated. Notwithstanding the dips the global private equity market encountered, following 
the financial crisis, it kept regaining momentum. Aggregate capital raised through private 
equity globally has, after having experienced a fall in 2003 to U$$74bn (from U$207 in 2000) 
and then again in 2009, dropping to U$208bn from a peak of U$408bn, has regained its drive 
and reached U$347bn at the close of 20165 (Prequin, 2017).  
 
Private equity offers a source of capital/finance without placing an obligation such as 
guarantees and payment of fixed interest on the seekers of the funds. It provides assistance 
through the exchange of capital and guidance, in return for a stake in the company/partnership, 
sharing in the growth and returns generated from the investment. However, since the supporting 
role that the private equity form of financing offers, and because its methods are not well known, 
especially among entrepreneurs and in particular small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), 
they fail to capitalise on such a form of financing. 
 
This practice of investment partnership between a provider of capital and a 
business/entrepreneur owner (Labib, 1969), originates from the Muslim medieval period and 
despites its upturns and downturns, it looks to be a growing industry in the coming years. In 
their attempts to level with global developments, emerging markets are working to develop 
their infrastructure (government) and economy (entrepreneurs and government) to support 
growth. This requires offering opportunities to institutions and individual investors, and the 
																																								 																				
5 The data covers all private equity investments, both conventional and Islamic. The researcher was unable to find 
information specifically on Islamic private equity.	
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private equity market (whether conventional or Islamic) to grow; provided that awareness and 
information about such a form of financing is improved and made more available. Therefore, 
to grasp and extend the achievements of the past, there is a need to increase knowledge and 
provide greater transparency on Islamic private equity financing, along with studying, 
identifying and improving any drawbacks that have occurred or may occur.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
This chapter examines the literature on private equity in the conventional system, since the 
Islamic private equity forms have been derived from the conventional. The chapter starts by 
defining private equity and how the investment is transacted, to get a better understanding of 
the process of such an investment. This will help later when I come to study the private equity 
set-up practiced by Islamic Financial Institutions (IFI). It then reviews the issues generated 
from such a form of investment. After which it looks at the theories behind the possible causes 
of the identified concerns.   
 
The discussions on literature on the different theories dealing with the problems faced by such 
investments, starting with the agency problems, followed by knowledge sharing and procedural 
justices, and interactionism are presented. The chapter then looks into the literature review of 
the contract theory, since the transaction/relationship is a contractual one, before it ends with a 
conclusion. 
	
2.2 DEFINITION AND BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
In this section private equity is defined and its legal structure and the relationship between the 
investment parties are presented. The section also touches on Alternative Investment Schemes, 
since this appears to be the way that most regulators are moving towards, especially after the 
recent financial crises (2007/2008), of which private equity is considered to form part of such 
schemes. 
 
2.2.1 Private Equity 
 
Private equity deals with investing in non-public companies. It is basically where investors, 
usually private and public institutions, and High Net Worth Individuals (HNWI) invest in the 
private company with large sums of money for a reasonable period of time. These companies 
are usually in need of funds, either due to being new start-ups with new technologies, or already 
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established companies that require some injection of working capital to grow, or companies 
that are experiencing difficulties and need to be bailed out and turned around. 
 
Various stages of funding are labelled differently. Investing in start-ups is referred to as Venture 
Capital. While injecting working capital is known as minority equity investment, investment in 
mature companies is referred to as Growth Capital. Leverage Buyouts (Cumming & Walz, 2010) 
is where equity investment from private investors, along with some debt leverage is used to buy 
a company, turn it around, improve on its balance sheet and its management, and then sell the 
company off as an exit strategy. There is also a form of Mezzanine Capital, which has a debt 
structure rather than equity, whereby the investors invest in subordinated debt or preferred stock 
of the company, without taking voting control of the company.  
 
Nowadays, most investments of private equity are made through Private Equity Funds (PEF) 
or Private Equity Funds of Funds (PEFF) as investors do not have the time and/or knowledge 
of various potential investing markets (Cendrowski et al. 2008) (Müller 2008). In the PEF the 
investors with the managers come together in a form of partnership. The funds are pooled into 
a separate legal identity created by the investment manager as a result of the partnership with a 
specific purpose for a set investment mandate. In the PEFF, the investors rather than investing 
in the asset class directly, by partnership they invest through the intermediary, the investment 
manager (the private equity firm) (Talmor and Vasvari 2011).  
  
The private equity firm/fund (whether by acting as a vehicle or by creating a vehicle) pools the 
funds and acts as a General Partner or an Investment Manager in return for a management fee. 
The Private Equity Firm with the pooled funds from the investors, and at times some of its 
funds, works on achieving the mandates of the investment, which could be acquiring an interest 
in a company. “Once the target amount of capital has been raised ... The private equity 
investment managers then seek high-growth companies to invest in, following the investment 
strategy they proposed to the institutional investors” (EVCA, 2007:10). 
  
Those that invest in private equity realise their investments usually in one of the following ways: 
selling the company to the public through an initial public offering, selling the company to 
another company (a strategic buyer), merging with another company, and recapitalisation and 
changing the capital structure of the company (Cendrowski et al. 2008).  Whereby the portfolio 
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company raises debt or issues other securities to pay the shareholders (the private equity 
owners). 
 
2.2.2 The Legal Structure 
 
The private equity fund is usually set up in the form of a limited/closed company with a limited 
life (a Special Purpose Company), where the company is not required to have a board of 
directors or to hold yearly meetings (Cendrowski et al. 2008). Usually the private equity firm 
is referred to as the General Partner (GP) and the investors are referred to as Limited Partners 
(LP). They are referred to as Limited Partners as their liability is limited to their capital 
investment. The LP and GP come together through an agreement/contract that is signed 
between them. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Structure of a Private Equity Investment Vehicle 
	
The terms of the contract between the GP and the LP usually cover: the terms of the partnership; 
the management fee; the performance incentive; the hurdle rate of return; the transfer interest 
of the fund; investment commitments made by the LP; and the investment restrictions set on 
the GP. 
 
The term of the partnership is usually between 8 to 12 years. It may be less, around 3 to 5 years, 
depending on the selected investment and the exit strategy. The management fee is in the range 
of 1.25% to 3% of the collected capital. In addition to the management fee the GP receives an 
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incentive fee, which is also referred to as carried interest, as it is a fee used to carry/hold the 
GP interest on the investment. This carried interest usually ranges between 15% and 25% of 
the gain made on the capital. The remaining 75% to 85% is distributed between the LPs on the 
basis of their contributions. The hurdle rate is the benchmark rate set based on the percentage 
gain made above the capital invested, and once reached, the incentive/performance fee is 
trigged. The hurdle rate is usually around 7% to 8% above the capital invested.  
 
The GP manages the funds, and has the day-to-day management of the portfolio companies, or 
at times it outsources it to expert firms, while having some of its people in management or on 
the board of the portfolio companies. They are restricted to the type of investments as per the 
requests made by the investors at the time of the agreement. However, the LPs are more passive 
and have limited involvement in the daily management of the portfolio companies. The 
agreement usually sets the schedule (time and amount) for when the LPs would need to provide 
the funds.  
 
Investment in private equity is illiquid. Once in the investment, the LPs cannot sell and usually 
cannot transfer their share of the equity. Some private equity investments allow transfers, but 
with restrictions. Thus, the LPs can usually only realise their investment through the exit 
strategy taken up by the private equity firm. 
 
2.2.3 The Relationship between the Limited and General Partners 
 
As mentioned earlier, the LPs usually hand over the management of the investment to the GP.  
In order for the LPs to do so, the LPs need to see that the GP’s interests are in alignment with 
their interests. This is usually achieved through the following (Talmor and Vasvari 2011). 
• Reputation: The LPs look into the experience and skills of the investment team of the 
GP. The track record (performance and diversity) of the GP is very important. Today 
most of the PEF have around 200 professional employees, from various fields of the 
private equity industry, ranging from Financial Experts, Accountants, to Investment 
Strategy Consultants. 
 
• Equity Interest: The GP needs to show some form of commitment and that is usually 
done by the GP investing in the portfolio companies. “The LPs prefer that any 
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commitment and investment is made in real cash and not from the recycling of 
management fees” (Talmor and Vasvari 2011). 
 
• Incentive scheme: It is important that the various forms of payments that the GP 
receives are transparent to the LGs. Usually, the GP receives a management fee, and a 
carried interest fee (as mentioned earlier above), which is set based on performance 
above a set hurdle rate. With all the fees set and determined at the outset, the LPs have 
certain comfort when making and selecting investment decisions.  
 
• Direct control mechanisms: LPs seek partnerships where they are able to place 
protective mechanisms that affect the incentives of the GP, and can place a cap on the 
risk/returns performance of the GP’s decisions. LPs seek to set covenants that have 
restrictions on the investment decisions, beyond a certain threshold, so as to limit the 
risk the GP might take in the investment.  
 
In addition to the LPs and the GPs there are other market participants involved, that the partners 
seek, that help to bring the investment together. There are advisors and agents that act as 
intermediaries. Some of which are: Investment Banks offering advice on matters such as the 
structure, pricing, and timing of the investment to both parties (LGs and GP); Placement Agents, 
who help in the fund raising process, in return for a fee (0.5%-2% of the funds raised); and 
other advisors, such as Legal Advisors that provide advice on the contracts of the transaction. 
 
2.2.4 Collective Investment Schemes  
 
Collective Investment Schemes (CIS), also known as mutual funds, are schemes or financial 
intermediary funds whereby investment companies (acting as a financial intermediary) offer 
investors an opportunity to pool their funds for investments, in return for a portion of the fund’s 
performance, proportionate to their share of pooled funds, in return for a fee.  Investments are 
made in various schemes such as real estate, hedge funds and private equity, rather than the 
straightforward (mutual fund) stocks and bonds type instruments that are traded in a financial 
market. Investments are made in various sectors of the industry (Real Estate, Technology), with 
various investment purposes (growth (capital appreciation), income (dividend), balanced 
(growth and income)), the specifics of which are disclosed in an offer document, prepared by 
the investment company.  
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A CIS is set up as a legal entity, either as a trust or a corporation, with a board of directors 
(BOD), who are mainly independent, and have a fiduciary duty/obligation to the entity. The 
BOD contracts with a management company (the creators/sponsors of the fund) to set up and 
manage the shareholders’ pooled funds, who are also known as the Investment Advisors (IA) 
of the fund. The IA receives an annual fee in return for his services, based on a percentage of 
the average net assets of the fund. There are other parties involved in the operation of CISs that 
form part of the requirements placed by the Regulators of such a market. The CIS does not have 
employees of its own; they contract with independent parties to perform the roles required for 
the organisation and operation of the CIS. In addition to the BOD and the IA, CISs are required 
to have an Administrator, a Custodian, and a Transfer Agent. The Administrator overseas the 
performance of the services provided to the fund (accounting services, payments, meeting 
regulatory filing requirements and providing reports to shareholders). The Custodian’s role is 
to protect the assets, and is usually a qualified bank.  While the Transfer Agent performs the 
role of record keeping of the shareholders’ accounts.   They maintain the shareholders’ 
ownership balances, and calculate and distribute dividends (Pozen 2000).    
 
For a CIS to be offered a prospectus (offering document) is required, with detailed disclosure, 
which is registered with the regulatory authority and where a no objection to use the documents 
is obtained. Shareholders are entitled to receive regular (semi and annual) reports on the 
performance of the fund. Shareholders have the right to vote on major decisions to be made by 
the fund, such as changes in the terms of the Investment Advisor’s contract, and changes to the 
investment objectives/policies/purpose. CISs can be set up as a result of funds pooled from 
public investors or funds from institutional and high net worth investors. 
 
There are two types of funds: open-ended or closed-ended. With the closed-ended funds, once 
the funds have been pooled, and the investment has been made, the fund issues shares/units that 
are then traded on an exchange for the life of the fund. The price of the fund is determined as 
the market value in the secondary market. While with the open-ended fund, the fund remains 
open to pooled funds and the redemption life of the fund is open. It is not traded in the secondary 
market, and the investor (share/unit holder) can redeem his portion of ownership at the net asset 
value (NAV) with the investment company. 
 
The investment companies that manage the pooled funds receive fund management fees.  Under 
the closed-ended fund, the fee is taken once, for their efforts in setting up the fund; and after 
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that the fund is traded in the secondary market. However, under the open-ended fund, two 
management fees are taken. One at the time of setting up the fund (known as front-end load), 
and the other at the redemption/exiting of the fund (known as back-end load). The redemption 
fee reduces over time, so as to discourage early exiting from the fund. These fees are considered 
sales incentives rather than management performance incentives. The investment company 
charges an annual management charge for administrating the fund (Solnik and McLeavey 2003).  
 
Private equity is considered an alternative form of collective investment scheme, with the 
similar concept of pooling investors’ funds. As such, the CIS (similar to private equity) faces a 
potential conflict of interest arising from the fiduciary relationship between the parties involved 
in the organisation and operation of the CIS. However, the CIS are more regulated in that they 
have regulatory obligations to meet in setting up and running the CIS than in private equity.  
The regulations related to private equity will be reviewed later in Chapter 4 of the Literature 
Review. 
 
2.3 THEORIES ABOUT THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS 
 
This section looks into the various theories that arise due to the fiduciary relationship between 
the parties investing in private equity. It first examines the agency theory and the asymmetry 
in the agency relationship, since the parties in private equity investment take up arrangements 
similar to those of the principle-agent relationship. Subsequently, the formal and real authority 
theory is discussed, reflecting on the matter of power and control that arises in the private equity 
relationship. Furthermore, following on from the asymmetry in the relationship, both in terms 
of information and power, leads to how such a conflict of interest in decision making can be 
handled. As such, the study of the knowledge and procedural justice theory was looked into. 
Moreover, with the private equity investment relationship, it is not purely a question of structure 
and governance but also involves social interaction; hence, theories related to interactionism 
matters on how individuals act, react and communicated with one another are studied. The 
chapter ends by looking into the contractual theory, since the private equity relationship is based 
on a contractual agreement between parties. 
 
In the private equity investment, several issues arise that are related to the fiduciary relationship 
between the parties. The parties in the private equity investment take up an arrangement similar 
to that of the principal agent relationship. This relationship is based on a contractual agreement 
between the parties, where one party (the agent/GP) undertakes some actions/activities on 
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behalf of the other party (principal/LP). In such relationships, the main issue is the alignment 
of the self-interest, risk levels, and goals of the parties involved. This alignment is characterised 
by information asymmetry, which gives rise to moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus, to 
gain a better understanding of the principal-agent relationship, their related theories will be 
discussed in this section. 
 
2.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
The agency theory is based on the assumption that both of the parties are utility maximisers 
seeking their own interests, where the principals are considered risk neutral, in that they are 
able to diversify their investments into other investments, and the agents are considered risk 
averse, since the agent’s services and income are tied in the current investment (X.-B. Zhang, 
Zhang, and Chen 2007).  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) examined the agency problem through a study of their concerns on 
“the survival of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial share 
of the wealth effects of their decisions” (Fama and Jensen 1983b). This problem or cost, 
according to them, arises due to the attempt at separation between ownership and control.   
“These [Agency] problems arise because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced.   
Agency costs include the cost of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts 
among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because the cost of 
full enforcement of contracts exceed the benefits” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a: 327). 
These contracts specify the rights, performance criteria, risks, payoffs and benefits between the 
agents (parties involved). Usually the risk borne within these contracts is by those “who 
contract for the rights to net cash flows”, the investors. Fama and Jenson (1983b:302) refer to 
this risk as “Residual Risk” and the residual risk bearers as “Residual Claimants”. According 
to their view, for the residual claimants to control the residual risk there needs to be separation 
between ownership and control, in order to minimise the conflict of interest that might arise 
with the managing agent.   
 
They consider that there needs to be separation between the “decision management” and the 
“decision control”. They look at the decision process as being: initiation, ratification, 
implementation, and monitoring. According to Fama and Jensen (1983b), initiation (the 
proposal and the structure of the contract) and implementation (the execution of the decisions 
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made) are considered as part of the decision management; whereas ratification (the choice of 
decisions made) and monitoring (the performance measurements and the linked rewards) are 
considered as part of the decision control. However, Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy (1999) 
maintain that the management decision process only has two steps: initiation and ratification.  
Their view is more simplistic in that the subordinate initiates the exploration for project 
proposals, and the superior ratifies the selected project.  
 
According to Fama and Jensen (1983b), one of the ways to reduce the agency problem is by 
restricting residual claimants to decision makers. However, by doing so the benefits of 
specialisation and efficiency are lost. Also, it means that the decision makers need not only 
possess wealth but must also be specialised and familiar in the area of investment, to be able to 
make proper decisions. This is fine (restricting residual claimants to decision makers) when the 
“technology involved does not involve important economies of scale that lead to large demand 
for specialised decision skills” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a: 333), as in such instances the savings 
from the agency cost outweigh the benefit that would have been obtained from separating (and 
specialising) decision and risk bearing functions.   
 
However, in more complex technical/specialised organizations specific knowledge is essential 
in decision making. In such instances, according to Fama & Jensen (1983a), the Residual 
Claimants are better off delegating the decision functions to various agents and the decision 
making can be diffused among the various levels of the organisation, with an independent 
multi-member board of directors/trustees at the top of the hierarchy/control system. That is 
possible with proper internal controls and when various agents are independent; along with 
having an incentive mechanism that rewards agents for “initiating and implementing decisions 
and for ratifying and monitoring the decision management of other agents” (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b:322). In such a way, by making use of the experts at various steps in the decision process, 
the conflict of interest aspect in the decision being made by the agent (management) is reduced, 
in that the decision is not made by the individual but by opinions given by independent experts. 
This expertise might be costly, yet it outweighs the benefit gained from allowing “valuable 
knowledge to be used at the points in the decision process” (Fama and Jensen 1983b). Baker et 
al. (1999), on the other hand, argue that rather than delegating formal authority within the 
organisation as suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983b), it should be in between. They believe 
that in order for the subordinate to have formal delegation rather than just managing the asset, 
the subordinate should be allowed to have ownership of the asset.  
 
23		
Band (1992:457), in line with the above thinking, believes that the “Board of directors is one 
of the governance mechanisms that limit the agency’s self serving behavior”. Citing Pearce and 
Zahra (1991), he identifies four types of boards of directors by looking at them from the 
perspective of the board’s relationship with its executive management. These are: Statuary 
board, caretaker board, proactive board, and participative board. Whereby the types ranging 
from full decision making and control (statutory) lie with the board which is similar to Fama 
and Jensen's (1983b) thinking, to equal decision making and control with the executives 
(participative) and so spreading of ownership which is in line with Baker et al. (1999).  
 
While the separation of control and decision making proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983b) 
introduces agency costs, it also produces risk sharing benefits. This separation, according to 
Klein (1983), is not necessarily positively correlated (as claimed by Fama and Jensen 1983b) 
to the size of the organization: “small organizations are more likely to exhibit no separation of 
residual claimants from decision makers” (Klein, 1983:371). Whereas in large organizations 
“the cost of obtaining [risk-sharing] benefits is essentially zero because nothing is forgone” 
(Klein, 1983:373). The structure of private equity investment, where the project-specific 
information required for decision making rests on a few people, is considered a non-complex 
organisational setup in which “the costs of separating decision management from decision 
control are high” (Fama & Jensen, 1983a:346). Moreover, in investments of private equity, not 
only would separation appear to be costly, but also since it is not a public investment, the Board 
Members are generally chosen/selected by the internal mangers (GP) and the independence 
factor is diluted.  
 
2.3.1.1 Asymmetry in the Agency Relationship  
 
Agency problems mainly arise due to the agent having private information that the principal 
does not have or is not aware of. This gives rise to adverse selection, whereby the principal 
cannot differentiate between a good or bad agent, and to moral hazard where the agent uses the 
information to maximise his utility and interest. Zhang & Zhang (2009:388) highlighted that 
Muller (2008), like Kut and Smolarski (2006), believe that the “principal and agent are different 
interest groups in private equity investment” and that the “information asymmetric is the root 
of the agent’s problem in private equity investment”. Thus, with the specific features of private 
equity investment, where independence is limited and asymmetry subsists, information 
communication becomes a critical factor and one of the main issues of this relationship. 
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Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996) explains that this relationship is controlled by the GP (the agent) 
and is limited due to the personal and professional reasons of the GP. From a personal 
perspective, the GP being the owner of the investment idea desires the freedom to determine 
one’s decision and seeks to enjoy the power of “information advantage” over the LPs. In 
addition, if a regular exchange of information does not exist, the GP is not forced to relay a 
negative or delay in performance of the investment project to the LPs. While from a 
professional perspective the GP sees the act of maintaining a regular flow of information as 
costly and time consuming. 
 
Saam (2007), on the other hand, considers there to be three main asymmetries in the 
principal/agent relationship. The first being information asymmetry, which following on from 
the agency problem is the sharing of information problem. The flow of information within the 
relationship between the agent (GP) and the principal (LP) is usually limited, due to the similar 
explanation given by Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996) above. He then goes on to add a second 
asymmetry in that both the GP and LP have different risk preferences as they have different 
attitudes to risk. The GP’s (agent) attitude is more outcome based, whereas the LP’s (principal) 
attitude is behaviour based. As a result of their attitudes their goals are different.  The agent 
seeks to maximise income, whereas the principal seeks to maximise returns, leading to 
asymmetry in goals, which is the third inequality in the agency relationship. 
 
The normative agency problems that arise from the agency relationship are moral hazard and 
adverse selection. The moral hazard problem is basically due to the conflict of interest, different 
risk and goals (intentions) between the parties to which it is not disclosed and the adverse 
selection is mainly to the agent holding back private/personal information from the principal. 
Spremann (1990, cited in Zhang & Zhang, 2009) adds another type of agent risk, “holdup”, to 
the two known in the normative agent set of risks. Holdup is where the agent uses the “gaps or 
deficiencies in incomplete contracts, where not every future state is predicted in his favor” 
(Zhang & Zhang, 2009). Moreover, Kaplan & Stromberg (2004, cited in Zhang & Zhang, 2009) 
consider “control risk” in addition to holdup, where agents and principles do not agree on the 
“operating decision-making”, as a fourth agent risk. 
 
Further studies have shown that the simple normative agency that starts with mainly two 
problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) and considers additional issues (holdup and 
control problems) has developed into what is known as the positive agency theory (Saam 2007) 
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with four agency problems: hidden action, hidden intention, hidden knowledge/information, 
and hidden characteristics. By studying them, various mechanisms such as incentive systems 
and monitoring systems can be considered, and precautionary steps such as signalling, bonding, 
and screening solutions can be taken, depending on the situation.   
	
Waterman & Meier (1998) add a new perspective to the asymmetry features of the principle-
agent relationship. They consider the principal-agent model as a “more dynamic” model and 
that information asymmetry and goal conflicts are not constants, but variables. Numerous types 
of the principle-agent relationship exist, along with there also being multiple principals and 
agents, and as such these components, information asymmetry and goal conflicts change as the 
relationship progresses. As Crémer (2010:380) states, “at the outset, neither the principal nor 
the agent know anything about either of the quality of the agent or his cost parameter”, and so 
keeps an “arm’s length” relationship, however, over time the principal learns and gains 
information, and develops and expands his resources, through his interaction in the relationship. 
They suggest a model with eight scenarios (cells) that the principal-agent goes through, not 
necessary in all cases, as their relationship evolves.   
 
Looking at the agency problems generated by the agency relationship from the above 
perspective has been criticised as still being narrow. Band (1992) considers the agency theory 
“ignores the ways in which exploitation can be structurally encouraged by the asymmetric 
distribution of power”. Both Perrow (1986) and Saam (2007) look at the asymmetry of power 
when looking at the agency problem and solution mechanisms. According to them, power is 
the “intervening variable” and it depends on which party (principal/agent) has the greater power 
to influence/action and change the “belief, attitude or behaviour” of the other party 
(principal/agent). Saam (2007:836), however, considers that “the Principal possesses 
quantitatively more power bases than the agent”, which is not the case in the private equity 
relationship. Power is of importance, but in the private equity set-up, it lies more in the hands 
of the GP (Agent) rather than the LP (Principal). Usually it is the GP of private equity who 
brings forward the offer, and the contract/agreement is drawn up by the GP, and the LP 
accordingly subscribes to the offer. The LP “has very little control over what the capital is used 
for and usually very little right to replace management - or other such remedies - subsequent to 
poor performance” (Spindler, 2009:329). 
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2.3.2 Formal and Real Authority Theory 
 
Having identified power as an important variable in the agency relationship leads to who has 
authority in the relationship. There are two forms of authority: formal authority and real 
authority (P Aghion and Tirole 1997).  We would consider those with ownership of the assets 
to have formal authority and those who have “an effect control over decisions, on its holder” to 
have real authority.  This brings us back to Fama & Jensen (1983b) separating decision and 
control. The principals (LPs) might have formal control being the owners of the funds, but by 
delegating the management of the private equity to the agent (GP), the agent has the real control 
(Aghion & Tirole 1997). 
 
There are benefits to delegating formal authority. Such delegation “increases the agent’s 
incentives to acquire information” and hence “reduces the principal’s overload” (Aghion & 
Tirole 1997:3). It also “facilitates the agent’s participation in the contractual relationship”, 
however, by delegating the principal loses the selection process of “choice project” (Philippe 
Aghion and Tirole 1997). Moreover, if the objectives of the parties are “sufficiently dissonant” 
the principal also faces the problem that the agent might not be keen to provide/communicate 
information to the principal due to his fear of the principal taking ownership of the agent’s 
(GP’s) investment. Riordan (1990, cited in Aghion & Tirole 1997:4) argues, “information 
allows principals to expropriate the agents’ specific investment”. Further, Aghion & Tirole 
(1997:3) assert that:  
“The communication of information is then strategic and depends on the authority 
relationship. In particular, less communication may take place if the principal has formal 
authority because the agent is concerned that the principal might abuse [agent’s] authority 
once [the principal] is well informed.” 
The agent will communicate information to the principal if he sees any gain in doing so and on 
“the degree of congruence between the principal’s and the agent’s objectives” (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997:18). The principal by delegating his formal authority to the agent ensures the agent’s 
participation/effort. Aghion & Tirole (1997) see that the delegation of formal authority to the 
agent increases the agent’s initiative and participation, which is positively proportionate to the 
agent’s private incentive/benefits. The agent’s initiative is inversely proportionate to the 
principal’s interference, as the greater the principal’s interference the less the agent’s 
participation/effort and as a consequence, there is a fall in the expected returns for the principal. 
The role of authority interchanges depending on the situation. Under delegation, “the 
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independent agent”, if informed, picks his preferred project and cannot be overruled by the 
principal. That is the agent, rather than the principal, who now has formal authority. 
 
On the other hand, while Baker et al. (1999) agree with Fama & Jensen (1983b), in that “formal 
authority resides at the top”, and on the concept of separation between decision management 
and decision control, they also agree with Aghion & Tirole (1997) with regards to delegation, 
yet to them delegation would be informal rather than formal. The view of Baker et al. (1999) is 
that formal authority is “inherently non-contractible” and that the superior delegates his rights 
to the subordinate as a form of incentive. The superior gives informal delegation to his 
subordinate, even after instances where bad decisions were made, and the superior had had the 
ability to override such a decision, but does not do so. This is because they believe not only as 
Aghion & Tirole (1997) do, that by doing so would encourage the subordinate to improve on 
his project selection and such benefits offset the cost of poor projects, but also that the superior 
behaves in such a manner because he seeks to maintain his  “reputation” as a delegator. Their 
expectation that the subordinate will improve in his selection of projects and is not tempted to 
shirk or seek self-interest, is based on him wanting to build his reputation with his superior. 
Thus, they model their delegation authority “as informal, arising from commitments enforced 
by reputation” (Baker et al., 1999:18). 
 
2.3.3 Knowledge Sharing and Procedural Justice Theory 
 
The information seen above is an important factor and the lack of it, or the asymmetry of 
information between the parties has an adverse effect on the agency relationships. However, 
what is also important is the form by which the information is shared, whether it is compulsory, 
due to formal requirements, or voluntary (by the individual self). Sharing information may be 
compulsory at times, but if the individual is not voluntarily cooperative and willing, then the 
quality of the information and the effort by the individual is not as good. Kim & Mauborgne 
(1998) consider trust and commitment as essential towards voluntary cooperation. If the 
principal can show the agent that he trusts him, then the principal will most likely gain the 
agent’s commitment and voluntary cooperation, which is similar to the thinking of Baker et al. 
(1999) with regards to the reason for continuing to give informal delegation, in the expectation 
of maintaining commitment.   
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 “Procedural justice […] is concerned with individuals’ reactions to decisions in which they are 
personally invested but that they cannot directly or fully control” (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 
1996:547). According to Kim & Mauborgne (1998), in most cases, having agreed upon the 
process for decision-making, then their execution is a form of mechanism that deals with the 
conflict of interest that may arise between the agent and the principal. The agent by accepting 
and implanting such procedures gains the principal’s trust and the potential moral hazard, 
because the possible conflict of interest, is reduced. Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996) also view 
procedural justice as influencing principal agent behaviour, and that it produces greater 
commitment and trust, and in some instances there is less monitoring by the principal. They 
studied it from the angle of the principal and his behaviour and commitment to the investment.  
They performed a laboratory experiment as well as a field study where they used procedural 
justice theory to see the investors’ (principals’) reaction to the entrepreneurs’ (agents’) 
feedback. They looked at it from the aspects of the fairness of procedural justices, the timeliness 
of feedback, trust and the commitment of the investors. They concluded that “feedback, 
influence, and procedural justice are important determinants of investor [principal] behaviour 
and attitudes” (Sapienza & Korsgaard, 1996:571).   
 
To handle the agency problems through either separating decision control from decision 
management (Fama and Jensen 1983a) or through the delegating of authority (Aghion & Tirole, 
1997), with both parties acceptance relies on the procedural justice agreed between them. Kim 
& Mauborgne (1998) “build a bridge between procedural justice and voluntary cooperation 
[and trust]”. When the principal and agent are both involved in setting the strategic decision-
making process and where the process is clearly understood, the expectation is clearly a sense 
of belonging and loyalty leading to willingness to “override personal self-interest on behalf of 
the [relationship]” (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998:327).    
 
Kim & Mauborgne (1998:333) build on the “intellectual and emotional recognition theory of 
procedural justice”. The theory is built on multiple sources: self-interest concerns, group-value 
concerns and proper human conduct concerns. Procedural justice is valued because it 
“recognizes individuals for their intellectual and emotional worth irrespective of their 
hierarchical level” (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998:332). Therefore, if the agent can be made to feel 
valued for his intellect and expertise this could lead to voluntary cooperation of information 
sharing and commitment by the agent. By having fair procedures (procedural justice), it “can 
serve as a key feature of a new social contract” (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998:336) between the 
agent and principal that goes beyond self-benefits. Leventhal (1976) agrees with Kim & 
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Mauborgne (1998) on the participation in the decision-making, however, where Kim & 
Mauborgne (1998) look at it from the intellectual and emotion aspects, Leventhal (1976)  
“conceptualizes” procedure fairness in seven elements. He believes that there should be 
procedures for all steps in the chain of the relationship, with the ability, at the end of the chain, 
to alter the procedures based on experience. The seven sets of procedures are: selecting of agent 
procedures, setting ground rules procedures, gathering information procedures, decision 
structure procedures, appeals procedures, safeguards procedures (measures set to ensure “the 
decision-making body does not abuse its power”(Folger & Greenberg, 1985:146), and change 
mechanisms procedures (measures set to ensure “the possibility of correcting unfair situations” 
(Leventhal, 1976:21).  
 
Having fair procedures also demonstrates some form of communication between the parties 
concerned (principal and agent). With procedural justice, as per Leventhal (1976), there are six 
rules that could be used to test the fairness of the procedures. These rules are: “consistence”, 
“bias suppression”, “accuracy”, “correctability”, “representatives” and “ethicality”.  This 
means the procedures need to be fair to all; applicable to all; and to be consistent with moral 
and ethical values. 
 
Rawls (2005), on the other hand, while in line with the concept of accepting the outcome 
“provided procedures has been properly followed” (Feinberg, 1972:1026), talks of three forms 
of procedural justice. They range from perfect procedural justice to imperfect procedural justice 
to pure procedural justice. The perfect form is based on their being an independent criterion to 
what constitutes a fair and just outcome and where having procedures guarantees fair 
achievable outcomes. With the imperfect form it is also based on the independent criterion, yet 
no procedures guarantees a fair achievable outcome. However, in the pure form of procedural 
justice there is “no criterion to what constitutes a just outcome other than the procedure itself”. 
In the principal-agent relationship, we would consider the imperfect form. Since there is no 
guarantee that the outcome will always be favourable to both parties, the fairness of the process 
makes it acceptable to both parties to enter into the relationship and to accept the risks involved. 
 
As can be seen, it all depends on the fairness of the procedures. So the question arises: what 
determines fairness? Following on from Leventhal (1976) above, where he has given six rules 
to test fairness, Rawls (2005) proposed three models upon which the fairness of the procedures 
is determined. The first is the outcome model in which fairness is based on outcome. The 
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principle of this model is that the fairness of the process depends on the procedure generating 
the right result. However, there are limitations to this model, in that it is not always the case 
that equivalent outcomes are always generated/arrived at by following the fair procedures. 
 
The second model is the balancing model. This is where fairness is achieved by balancing 
between cost, procedures and the benefits of the procedures among the parties involved.  Even 
by attempting to balance the costs and benefits, there are times when some procedures/fairness 
are compromised. The third model is the participation model in which fairness is achieved by 
allowing those involved/affected to take part in decision-making, and creating and agreeing on 
the process to be used to make decisions. In the case of the principal–agent relationship, this is 
the management agreements. 
 
There are various theories with regards to procedural justice, and some of them believe that fair 
procedures lead to a fair outcome. Looking at it from this context, this can also be applied to 
the principal-agent relationship in that if an agreed process of decision-making with regards to 
operating the company/project is in place and if it is followed by the agent, then whatever the 
outcome (good or bad) it will be accepted by the principal. The principal would not suspect that 
the agent might have made conflicting decisions. There would be some form of trust. 
 
2.3.4 Interactionism Theory  
 
The interactionism theory looks at the behaviour of individuals, how they act, react and 
communicate, as a result of their interaction with one another or within a group (Turner 1988). 
Thus, it needs to be looked at with relevance to the issues pertaining to the agent-principal 
relationship and can be discussed under the different headings given below. 
 
2.3.4.1 Moral Hazard and Ethical Considerations 
 
Following on from the agency problem, a way in which the GP can maintain the LP’s trust and 
continuous financial support is by maintaining the information and feedback flow with the LPs. 
This is based on the fact the GP, by reducing the lack of information (information asymmetry) 
barriers, gains the trust of the LPs (Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996).  
 
31		
According to the agency theory, self-interest behaviour (adverse selection) is affected by the 
quality and quantity of information shared between the parties in the relationship (organization). 
Moral hazard comes in when one of the party’s reactions is based on self-interest or when he 
decides to shirk while hiding his actions by holding back information from the other party. The 
agency theory is based on the general belief that one will always act in his self-interest, as this 
is part of human nature. However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, when looking 
into human nature there is also the aspect of ethical behaviour to consider. “Ethical 
considerations are good predictors of [agent’s] behaviour when moral hazard exists” (Tuttle, 
Harrell, & Harrison, 1997:20).   
 
Having looked into the concept of trust and fairness (procedural justice), it is expected that 
some form of loyalty starts to form and the parties involved (more specifically the agent) 
develop a sense of belonging, an obligation to act in the interest of their company (project). The 
agents with whom the moral hazard behaviour is feared becomes “socialized into the 
organizational role” (Tuttle et al., 1997:12). As such, this brings another variable to the basic 
equation of the principal-agent theory. Ethical consideration is a dimension in the process that 
needs to be considered when decisions are implemented in a relationship (organization).  
 
According to Tuttle, Harrell, & Harrison (1997), ethical decisions vary according to the 
individual’s understanding, to the individual’s community’s (society) acceptability, to its 
legality and to its morality. Studies were conducted to see an individual’s behaviour.  
Classifications of the study were based on two categories: normative and contextual.  Whereas 
normative is based on how individuals are expected to behave under “normative standards and 
justifications of morality” (Tuttle et al., 1997:12), contextual is how individuals actually behave 
given the circumstances. Tuttle et al. (1997) introduced the “factor dimension” to measure 
ethical aspects. The measuring factor had three dimensions: moral-equity, relativism, and 
contractual dimension. Under the moral-equity dimension the individual looks at it based on 
whether his behaviour is acceptable, fair and moral with one’s self.  With relativism, the 
individual looks at his actions relative to the guidelines of his society’s system, relative to his 
culture. And in the third dimension the individual compares his actions to his contractual 
obligations. Thus, basically, it is a process that starts within one’s inner self, the nucleus (own 
values) and moves outwards to the immediately outer circle (his community), and then further 
out to what is on paper (the agreement). It was found that “individuals rely on patterns of criteria 
in evaluating situations that are similar to their pattern of criteria in estimating their own 
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behaviour” (Tuttle et al., 1997:13) and the individual would “use more than one rationale in 
making ethical judgments” (Reidenbach & Robin, 1990:639). 
 
There were other findings where agents would place their self-interest first, but that was with 
agents of low levels of “moral developments”. This means at least two things. The first is that 
“the agency theory assumption that behavior is motivated solely by self-interest may be invalid” 
(Chang & Yen, 2007:356) and “integrity” plays an important role. This is because it is only 
related to a certain category and not across the board. While at the same time, being “agents of 
[…] moral development” suggests that there is room for development of one’s agent, possibly 
through socialising him within the organisation (relationship). This leads to the need to 
“incorporate an ethical perspective in [agent] compensation” (Chang & Yen, 2007:357) when 
drawing up the agreement. 
 
2.3.4.2 Trust and social culture 
 
A social relationship works on reducing the gap between the principal and the agent. It works 
on building a form of understanding between the parties in the relationship. This understanding 
is arrived at through considering: individual differences, social economics perceptions, and 
ethical values. It is what is known as trust, and what is also known as “soft moral bonds” 
(Sztompka 2003). Although in the literature there are various definitions of trust, in general, it 
is where some risk exists in entering the relationship and there is “mutual confidence that no 
party to the exchange will exploit the other’s vulnerability” (Sabel, 1993:1133). The idea of 
mutual confidence relates to the culture, the belief in one another, the lack of need for some 
form of precautions and the belief in the word agreement/handshake. “Trust culture 
accumulates and codifies into rules those prevailing, lasting experiences with various type of 
trust” (Sztompka, 2003:99). Different societies with different cultures have different levels of 
trust. There are cultures that are considered high trust societies, such as the Far East, and 
cultures of low trust societies such as the West (Sztompka, 2003:81). 
 
According to Beccerra and Gupta (1999), there are two bases of trust that we need to consider: 
“differences in attitude” which is the equivalent to moral hazard in the agency theory; and 
“subject evaluation of the other person in the relationship” (Beccerra and Gupta, 1999:182), 
which is adverse selection when considering the agent in the agent/principal relationship.  They 
group trust into three properties: “attitude-focused trust, behaviour-focused trust, and 
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competence”. This is similar to Saam’s (2007) three asymmetries stated earlier: information 
asymmetry (competence), different risk preference (attitude), and conflicting goals (behaviour). 
These differences can be reduced through the process of trust building, which we can also 
consider as the basis for the sources of trust. On the other hand, Sztompka (1997) believes that 
the basis of trust is three-dimensional rather than two-dimensional. His model comprises 
“reflected trustworthiness” (characteristic of the individual), “basic trustfulness” (accumulated 
personal experience in relationships) and “culturally generated trust” (“human collectivities) 
which is pooled cultural capital from which individuals can draw in their actions (Sztompka, 
1997:8). The first two are similar to Beccerra and Gupta’s two dimensions, and then he goes 
on to add a third, which is related to culture. In that the individual will react/behave based on 
the pooled “social facts [believes]” of his surroundings.  
 
Das and Teng (1998:503) offer four trust building techniques, which are “risk taking, equity 
preservation, communication and inter-firm adaptation”. They see that by the investor 
(principal) taking the risk and investing with the partner (agent), this exhibits to the partner that 
he has trust in him. They propose that profit distribution needs to be “kept on an equitable 
basis”. In that the partner “contributing the most resources (both tangible and intangible) to the 
alliance should get the most from it” (Das and Teng, 1998: 504), so as not to feel that he is 
being taken advantage of. Furthermore, communication is essential towards trust building, 
since it is from “continued interaction, from which partners further develop common values 
and norms” (Leifer & Mills, 1996, cited in Das & Teng 1998:505). And with “bilateral 
adaptation”, whereby demonstrating “flexibility and willingness to accommodate deviations 
from the contract” (Das and Teng, 1998:505), the trust building process can develop as it shows 
that partners are “acting for mutual interests rather than self-interests” (Das and Teng, 
1998:505).  
 
On the other hand, Doney, Cannon, and Mullen (1998) offer five steps to the trust building 
process. The first step of the process is considered “calculative” and profits sharing. By doing 
so, one can satisfy self-interest without the need to deviate from the common goal. The second 
is “prediction” where one bases his trust on reputation/track record, and expects the past actions 
(that created this record) will be “mirrored” in “future behaviour”; the principal undergoes the 
prediction process. The third is “intentionality” in which the intentions of the other party are 
assessed and when both parties share similar values it is easy for the other to understand his 
partner. The fourth is “capability” relating to the competence factor. By having the appropriate 
expertise, it is easier to believe/trust that the competent partner would fulfil his word and goal 
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as agreed. The fifth is “transference” whereby the individual seeking to enter into a relationship 
does so through networking and friends. “Trust is transferred from a trusted ‘proof source’” 
(Doney et al., 1998:606). Their steps are similar to Das and Teng (1998) in one way or another 
when analysed and aligned (risk taking—prediction, equity preservation-calculating and profit 
sharing, communication-transferee, inter-firm adaptation-intentionality). However, they also 
consider proficiency and experience (competency) as an addition factor. They also consider 
that the spread/depth of each step depends on the parties’ culture and values, whereby 
similarities would widen the spread and differences would shrink the particular step/process.  
 
Different cultures have different meanings of trust and control. For example, in the Far East 
(China) any claiming of legal rights or placement of some form of control mechanism may be 
translated as a lack of trust in the partner (Child et al., 1997, citied in Inkpen & Currall, 
2004:597). Looking at the trust building process, while Beccerra and Gupta (1999) agree with 
Das and Teng (1998) on the following concepts: profit sharing, the risk taking and the bilateral 
adaptations, they also take in cultural values as another step in the equation of the trust building 
process. However, Das and Teng (1998) do not ignore the cultural aspect, as to them “cultural 
blending” is a form of control mechanism of the trust level, which leads to confidence in the 
partnership cooperation, rather than being part of the building process.  They regard trust as 
“expectations about positive motives” and confidence as “certainty about cooperative 
behaviours” (Das and Teng, 1998: 494). They view trust and control as contributing factors to 
confidence, and with an adequate level of control mechanisms, a high level of confidence can 
be achieved, even with low levels of trust. Trust and controls “supplement each other as a key 
source of partner cooperation” (Das and Teng, 1998:493). And as an outcome of a study 
undertaken by Das and Teng (1998), partnerships take place through confidence development 
and “trust and control are two distinct sources of confidence” (Das and Teng, 1998: 508). 
 
Sztompka (1997) is a great believer in the role of culture in trust. It acts as a “social resource” 
and has many benefits: it “liberates and mobilises human agency” (Sztompka, 1997:9), 
“encourages sociability ... and enriches the network”, “encourages tolerance”, “strengthens the 
bond of an individual with the community” (Sztompka, 1997:10), and finally reduces 
“transactional cost”. He believes that trust is built through culture. To him there are seven 
circumstantial conditions necessary to harvest the culture of trust, which is developed and 
embedded with time and changes according to the events that the social group/society goes 
through. The conditions are circumstantial in that he looks at the structure of the collective 
individuals’ surrounding mechanics of order. He starts with the “normative certainty”, then 
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“transparency of social organisation”, followed by “stability of the social order”, then 
“accountability of power”, to “enhancement of rights and obligations”, to “enforcement of 
duties and responsibilities” and ends with “safeguarding of dignity, integrity and autonomy of 
each societal member” (Sztompka, 1997:14). His beliefs are similar to those mentioned above, 
yet his view is more from a comparatively macro level. As stated earlier, his model is three-
dimensional. 
 
Manigart, Korsgaard, Folger, & Sapienza (2002) in accordance with Das and Teng (1998) see 
trust (“psychological contracts”) and control (“formal legal contractual agreements”) as having 
“different roles in a partner relationship”, whereby control is triggered when the trust level is 
not sufficient enough. Although they share their views that trust and control are supplementary 
but only for “parties faced with a potentially large agency problem [principal]”.  Whereas, for 
“parties faced with smaller agency problems [Agent]” they see trust to be a “substitute for 
control” (Manigart et al., 2002:13) in that agents are prepared to give up control over principals 
when trust is high in the relationship. However, the principal needs to bear in mind that such 
initial “sacarifices” will need to be compensated with time. In the event it is not, then most 
likely agents would “retaliate by withholding effort or information” (Manigart et al., 2002:13) 
and as suggested by Sitkin and Roth (1993, cited in Das & Teng 1998:501), the “effectiveness 
of the legalistic remedies […] for building trust” form a “negative relationship”. 
 
Granovetter (1985) and Shapiro (1987) consider the sources of trust to also act as opportunities 
to abuse trust. They work as a double-edged sword. This is based on the principal’s deficiencies, 
as he enters either into a “contentful agency” (Mitnick, 1984, cited in Shapiro1987:628) 
relationship due to his lack of experience or into a “practical/structural agency” relationship, 
where he has the capabilities but prefers to delegate and “enjoy the economies of scale and 
spread risk” (Mitnick, 1984, cited in Shapiro 1987). This brings us back to the agency problems 
that we mentioned earlier. As such, it is these sources that also “provide the opportunity and 
means for its abuse” (Shapiro, 1987:625) since they are the main reasons for the principal to 
delegate the agent once he has entered into the trust relationship. 
 
Principals attempt to reduce the abuse of trust by attempting to take precautionary steps by “risk 
spreading and making insurance-like arrangements” (Shapiro, 1987:643) that imitate “personal 
social control” and “often entrust a second tier of agents […] to be the gatekeepers to and 
watchmen” (Shapiro, 1987:639), which could actually “escalate problems of abuse”. These 
36		
steps increase the “physical and social distance” and although they may “foster the development 
of vigorous and effective intra-agency control” (Shapiro, 1987:644), they could also lead the 
agent to slack and be careless. Furthermore, the agent as a “repeated player”, in comparison to 
the principal, who is usually a “one shotter”, has real authority over the agenda of the 
relationship (Shapiro, 1987). 
 
Moreover, the principle can place performance controls, but the question is whether the 
principal is capable of monitoring and measuring the agent’s performance. Is he 
capable/competent enough to enforce proper governance? Hence, there rises a need for a 
contractual agreement for the “impersonal [outside the social ties] trust” (Shapiro, 1987), which 
is based on “procedural regulations”. These norms/standards, “structural arrangements” set 
thresholds on the agent to abide by to maintain the “goal in congruence” and to avoid 
“performance ambiguity”. Das and Teng (1998) agree with Parkhe (1993, cited in Das & Teng 
1998) who suggests having “ex-ante deterrents” and “ex-post deterrents”. Ex-ante deterrents 
are arrangements that should discourage opportunistic behaviour such as the division of “equity 
ownership” arrangements. The ex-post deterrents are to have arrangements such as “checking 
devices”, “accounting examination, cost control, arbitration clauses, and lawsuit provisions” 
(Das and Teng, 1998: 507). However, most importantly for such arrangements to work it is 
necessary to avoid any “cultural clashes” and to build on “cultural blending” and how 
“members process information and react to the environment” (Das and Teng, 1998:507). The 
procedural arrangements and the cultural clashes are similar to Sztompka's (1997) thinking, as 
mentioned above, but he looks at the setup on a larger scale, the “social organisation”, i.e., the 
relationships between the individuals in the society.  
 
These procedural impersonal trust arrangements are looked at, and as long as the basic specific 
procedures are taken, any undesirable outcomes due to errors or bad decisions are acceptable. 
They are “reputable” (Zuckerman, 1977 cited in Shapiro 1987) errors versus “disreputable” 
errors, which are negative outcomes when procedures were not followed in the first place; and 
then the intentions were not good in the first place. As Granovetter (1985) stated, these 
institutional arrangements “do not produce trust but are a functional substitute for it”.  
 
The positive aspect of having procedural regulations is that they do not need to be set/agreed 
on by the principal-agent, but can be put in place by the industry regulators, to be 
practiced/implemented by the participants (principals and agents). If government regulations 
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are considered structural, a way of facilitating compliance to procedural norms, then procedural 
norms could be looked at as an acceptable industry practice. 
 
However, as Das and Teng (1998) have suggested, there is a cost element involved, which 
needs to be weighed up in order to reach an “optimal combination of trust building and control 
mechanisms” (Das and Teng, 1998:508). We need to take care of these procedural norms while 
attempting to reduce conflict of interest and to protect the principal so he does not constrain the 
agent’s ability and limit his performance. Such a complex situation is described well by Shapiro 
(1987:651): 
 “The paradox of trust is akin to the choice between Type I and Type II errors. Should the 
procedural constraints of trust be set so narrowly that desirable agency behaviour is deterred 
or so flexible that inappropriate behavior is tolerated?” 
Sztompka (1997) agrees with Das and Teng (1998) in that these structural procedural 
arrangements need to be weighed up; however, unlike them he does not look at cost and 
constraints to be variables to be weighed, but his variables are application and enforceability.  
The enforcement of these arrangements needs to be consistent in its application, yet prudently 
enforced, in order to build trust and avoid the development of distrust, by giving the benefit of 
the doubt. All in all, despite all this, the “engine of social complexity” (Shapiro, 1987: 652), 
impersonal trust continues. 
 
2.3.4.3 Social Capital and Social Network Embeddedness 
 
The culture and values among societies influence their economic actions. They are embedded 
in their social relations and engender an acceptable standard of behaviour. The level of 
confidence among the various types of relationship varies depending on the level of 
embeddedness and the “connectedness”, the social network between the parties. These closely 
embedded relationships form a valuable intangible asset of social capital that is not exhausted 
by use. On the contrary, its value/power grows the greater the social connections (Johnson and 
Droege 2004). Their value is in that by analysing the social structure is a “key to understanding 
how existing institutions arrived at their present state” (Granovetter 1985:505). Social 
relationships within societies form an important part in their economic life, through bonding 
within the same group and bridging within mixed groups.  
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Moran (2005) views social capital to have two dimensions: one being “structural”, the “network 
configuration” of the relationship, while the second is “relational”, the quality of the 
relationship. To him the relational embbededness is a more important dimension. Contrary to 
what one would expect, he sees that the more “unacquainted” one’s contacts are the more one 
will benefit from such a relationship, as one is likely to gain “access to different and thereby 
non-redundant sources of information and resources” (Moran, 2005:1131). This form of 
relationship is formed from “interpersonal trust” and having common characteristics such as 
“integrity”, “competence” and “predictability” (Moran, 2005:1140). According to Moran 
(2005), it is the “relational” dimension that needs to be measured when seeking a substitute for 
trust.   
 
Das and Teng (1998) believe that “informal” “social”/“clan control” stimulates appropriate 
behaviour. These “soft measures” of goals and norms-sharing generate interpersonal respect 
and increase the level of trust. Moreover, Granovetter (1985) agrees with the concept of 
embeddedness and the important role of social capital. However, he looks at it from the 
perspective of “under or over socialized” human actions. When analysing embeddedness, he 
looks at the “institutional arrangements” which have developed over time as acceptable 
procedural norms; the “general morality” and the reputation that one seeks to maintain; and the 
“networks of relationships” one generates. Procedural norms are important, yet they are 
“undersocialized” in that they still do not “discourage malfeasance”, while reputation is 
considered “oversocialized” in that it is also over estimated at times as it still does not dissuade 
“malfeasance”, if the opportunity benefit for doing so is greater than the cost. This 
embeddedness “do not produce trust but instead is a functional substitute for it” (Granovetter, 
1985: 489). Together, they meet the purpose of maintaining order. Although Granovetter 
considers “institutional arrangements” as “undersocialized”, Williamson (1975, cited in 
Granovetter 1985) and Arrow (1974, cited in Granovetter 1985) on the other hand, believe that 
societies over time have established certain arrangements (contracts/agreements) that are 
“essential to the survival of the society or at least contribute greatly to the efficiency of its 
working” and that “some degree of trust must be assumed to operate” (Granovetter, 1985:489). 
 
Johnson and Droege (2004) believe, as do Alder & Kwon (2002, cited in Johnson & Droege, 
2004), that although the principal-agent relationship is a chain of contracts, there are also three 
relationships that exist among the parties. These are: “market, authority [hierarchical] and 
social”. They believe that “social reciprocity [social relations], rather than direct compensation 
[market relations], forms the basis of exchange”. Johnson and Droege (2004:327) then go on 
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to say that “social capital differs from market relations [authority]”, and that the social 
relationship is viewed in relation to the “national cultural characteristics” (2004:332). It is seen 
that national cultural characteristics reduce the self-interest notion in certain cultural 
environments (non-Western societies). This is similar to what Perrow (1986) meant when he 
criticised the agency theory for ignoring power, social power. 
 
Wright, Mukherji, & Kroll (2001) also criticise this relationship as being too narrow as it 
“discount[s] contingencies that may be more reflective of realities in economic relationships” 
(Wright et al., 2001:414). In other words, the theory assumes a certain set of behaviours (moral 
hazard and adverse selection) of the parties involved, and does not take into consideration the 
possible of the parties’ unified cooperation. In that behaviour could vary in various settings and 
societies with different values and beliefs. 
 
2.3.5 Contract Theory 
 
The contract theory is a combination of the incentives, information, reputation and economic 
institutions (the laws and customs) (Bolton and Dewatripont 2010). The principal agent 
relationship is a chain of contracts, and as seen above, there are three relationships that exist 
among the parties: market, authority and social. The social relationship has been looked at in 
the previous section, where the contract between them is one based on trust, culture and customs. 
The relationship with the authority is related to the laws, rules, regulations and their 
enforceability (the legal system). This is an important issue when looking into a contract and 
which is assumed to be well-functioning. However, the main relationship that is of concern and 
pertains to the principal-agent relationship is between the market participants (in this case the 
LP and GP). That is trying to reach an efficient optimal combination, ensuring allocation 
efficiency and trade off of the incentives, hidden private information (adverse selection) and 
hidden action (moral hazard) (Bolton and Dewatripont 2010). 
 
Risk is also a factor to consider, since it differs between the parties: the principal (LP) is 
considered risk neutral (to a certain extent), while the agent (GP) is considered risk averse. In 
addition to having different risk appetites, their objectives also differ: the agent seeks to 
maximise income, whereas the principal seeks to maximise continuous wealth. Guang-ming 
(2011:187-189) explains that in the contractual relationship between the principal and agent, 
the principal’s aim is to design a contract that will provide an incentive to the agent to 
behave/act on his own accord, in a way that will be to the benefit and interest of the principal, 
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and “reflect the risk sharing requirement” of both parties. The incentive contract is to consist 
of two portions. One is fixed, while the other portion is to be based on the output and the sharing 
of profits. The aim is to reach an optimal combination that will provide an incentive, yet 
maintain the level of risk to be taken by the agent; since high returns could mean high risks 
(Guang-ming, 2011:187-189). Sung's (2001) formula, which is not too different from Guang-
ming’s, to obtain “optimal efficiency” when designing a contract, is to consider the information 
asymmetry problem before and after contracting and moral hazard that could arise after 
contracting simultaneously.  
 
According to Sung (2001), for the agreement to be attractive to the agent, it should be designed 
in a way that it provides the agent with some control over the project and the output, yet at the 
same time allows the agent to be risk averse. He sees that the optimal contract can vary. This is 
due to reasoning that an “efficient manager [agent] tends to prefer safer projects than an 
inefficient manager [agent]” (Sung, 2001:33). As such, to induce some form of risk taking by 
the efficient agent, the incentive should be more sensitive to the expected compensation portion 
rather than the fixed portion. He considers that the “optimal contract depend not only on the 
final output but on the managerial forecast of the firm’s future profits” (Sung, 2001: 33). 
Whereas, Kaplan & Stromberg (2004) advise that in looking into the contract design and the 
risk factors, it is more important to study the internal risk factors, such as the quality of the 
management, the management’s track record and monitoring cost, rather than external risk 
factors (“market size”, “competition”, “exit condition”), or the risk sharing requirements. In a 
sense they advise looking into those risk factors that are within the control of the management 
than those that are not, since they consider them to be more related to moral hazard and 
information asymmetry. 
 
Moreover, although Harris & Raviv (1979) also look at incentives when seeking an optimal 
contract, they however, link incentives to “the possibilities for acquiring information” rather 
than risk attitudes (Harris & Raviv, 1979:231). The “Pareto-optimal [incentive] contract” 
depends on the “monitoring technology” (Harris & Raviv, 1979:232), and thus purposes a 
contract of two parts. The first part is to be constructed on monitoring the agent’s behaviour 
and the second part is to be constructed on payoffs to the agent based on the outcome of the 
monitoring. This is based on that at the initial stage, the information on the agent’s actions is 
limited, and thus it is difficult to determine a payoff and so by adding monitoring into the 
equation, it acts as a motivation variable towards determining the agent’s payoff.   
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Ross (1973) agrees with the concept that “the principal ... is dependent on the desire to motivate 
the agent” (Ross 1973). He also believes that the agent is at a comparative informational 
advantage over the principal, and that the actions of the agent cannot be taken for granted, and 
some form of monitoring is required. However, he questions the economic viability of 
monitoring, and as such sees the use of fees as a form of “communicating mechanism”, 
especially when dealing with multiple agents (Ross 1973). Therefore, he looks at the Pareto-
optimal possibilities to motivate, however it might not necessarily be Pareto-efficient. Thus, 
not necessarily offering a first best contract, “one that results in the realization of an efficient 
outcome” (Sappington, 1983:4), which is in line with the thinking of Dybvig, Farnsworth, and 
Carpenter (2010) to go for a second best or third best contract, which are basically more inclined 
to offer the agent greater portions of the excess returns to incentivise greater effort from the 
agent. This is required since prior “communication information” (Dybvig, Farnsworth, and 
Carpenter 2010) is not always available, restricting the likelihood of obtaining optimal output 
from the first best contract. 
 
Hirshleifer & Suh (1992) maintain that the type of contract to draw up to obtain an optimal 
contract, without “controlling the project perfectly” (Hirshleifer & Suh, 1992:310), depends on 
whether the project is observable or unobservable. They segregate between projects that have 
“monitoring institutions” (Hirshleifer & Suh, 1992:330) (such as shareholders, independent 
directors) and those that do not. Accordingly, the contract is designed in a way that would 
provide the appropriate balance between motivating work and motivating project choice: If no 
monitoring institutions are available “it becomes more important to motivate the choice of risky 
projects” (Hirshleifer & Suh, 1992:333), and so greater option-based compensation is proposed. 
Whereas, if monitoring institutions, which act as proxies to the investor, are available, then less 
option based compensation is proposed, as the concern about project selection is lower. They 
term their contracts as concave or convex contracts, and the concavity or convexity varies 
according to whether the project is observable or unobservable.  If the project is unobservable 
then they recommend a convex contract (a contract where the manager’s compensation scheme 
is set to induce and motivate the manager to select a risky project over a safe project. 
Alternatively, when the project is observable they recommend a concave contract (a contract 
that will induce and motivate the manager to select a less risky project). Concave and convex 
terms are derived from the form of functional relationship between returns and fees, and the 
marginal utility of such a relationship. However, Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder (2008) prefer to go for 
“rigid contracts” where payoffs are fixed/limited than the “flexible contract” with variable 
payoffs perused by agents, so as not to distort or promote less than the best effort by the agent 
and to avoid “inefficient shading activities” (Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, 2008:25).   
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Grossman & Hart (1986), on the other hand, believe that in order for one party (agent) to 
spread/reduce his risk in an investment project and to encourage risk sharing, he would need to 
offer the second party (investor/principal) some “ownership rights over the assets [project]” 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986:717). This view is also taken up by Cestone (2001), who along with 
Dewatripont and Titole (1994, cited in Cestone, 2001) looks at the capital structure and control 
rights, “when monetary incentives are not sufficient to discipline manager [agents]” (Cestone, 
2001:4). However, he warns that care is needed while providing/designing the control rights, 
and that the LP interference is limited. Formal control and real control needs to be handled 
delicately, and the “overall formal control enjoyed by the investor [LP] and the riskiness of her 
claim should be negatively correlated” (Cestone, 2001:15). According to him when designing 
an optimal contract the “cash-flow rights and control rights are [to be] allocated independently, 
and yet [...] follow a joint pattern” (Cestone, 2001:24). Controlling the LP interference while 
giving him control rights can be achieved by offering the LP convertible preferred stock6 
(limiting his involvement rights, so as not to jeopardise the GP’s plans during implementation 
of the project) that is converted into common stock as each target is realised. 
 
Conversely, Aghion & Hermalin (1990) look at restrictions to enhance efficiency. Their belief, 
in line with Ross (1973), is that there is usually one party that is better informed than the other, 
and he uses this to his advantage by giving signals to the other party that could have a negative 
effect on the other party’s decision process: “…one way to signal a good project is to promise 
a large payment to the investor if the project fails” (Aghion & Hermalin, 1990:382).  The 
interpretation of such a signal is that the investor will be tempted to go with such a project, 
thinking that the entrepreneur will not be making such a risky statement if the project is not that 
good, and thus, the investor is misled by such a statement. Aghion and Hermalin believe in 
imposing certain legal restrictions in the regulations on the terms of the contract, such as 
“prohibiting signalling…prohibiting the [agent] from exposing [himself] to excessive risk, may 
enhance welfare” (Aghion & Hermalin, 1990:382). The intention of such a restriction is to 
increase the efficiency of the terms of the contract. However, care needs to be taken so as not 
to have laws that are rigid. The reason being is that not all relationships are the same, and so in 
the writing up of these regulations some form of flexibility needs to be incorporated to allow 
for the various types of relationships. Nonetheless, this is not to be confused with the density 
																																								 																				
6“Unlike in public settings, in private equity preferred stock refers to a security that awards liquidation rights to the 
investor if the company does not achieve a threshold performance level…we refer to the group of securities as 
convertible preferred stock to avoid confusion with preferred that only has preferential voting rights” (Lerner and 
Schoar, 2005:226).	
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of a contractual contract, upon which it is usually used to recognise a suitable agreement. While 
examining the relationship between the terms of the contract and returns, a study by Caselli, 
Garcia-Appendini, & Ippolito (2012) found that companies with better returns were those that 
had “covenant-heavy contracts” (Caselli, Garcia-Appendini, & Ippolito, 2012:2). The reason 
being that GPs of projects with positive prospects are prepared to take on covenants because 
“they are less likely to be constrained by them”. Their study also revealed that there is “a 
negative association between the appointment of insiders and the target firm’s [project] 
profitability” (Caselli, Garcia-Appendini, & Ippolito, 2012:3). Whereby as a mechanism to 
reinforce weak agreements and to maintain close monitoring, some form of board governance 
(related to the LP, such as directors) is placed on the target company.  
 
Gompers & Lerner (1996) seek to regulate the GP behaviour through the use of covenants and 
restrictions to be imposed in the contract. The LP, once he has entered into the relationship, due 
to his limited liability, his participation in the day-to-day management is restricted. He is also 
restricted in the event he wanted to sell and exit the project, thus the major solution is “legal 
actions trigged by a violation of the covenants” (Gompers & Lerner, 1996:746). The number 
and kind of covenants are determined by the availability of capital inflow in the market (the 
“supply and demand conditions”) and “the need for oversight” (Gompers & Lerner, 1996:493). 
In addition, explicit covenants are only inserted in the contract when the benefits of inhibiting 
such actions outweigh the cost of negotiating and enforcing them. Gompers and Lerner divided 
the covenants “into three broad families: those relating to overall management of the … 
[project], the activities of GPs, and the permissible types of investments” (Gompers & Lerner, 
1996:480). Gompers & Lerner (1996) also, in a similar way to Kaplan & Stromberg (2004) 
who suggested looking into the internal risk factors and the characteristics of management, 
view reputation as an import characteristic to consider. They rationalise that the GP is seeking 
a long-term relationship with the LP (for reinvestment in other future projects) and so will 
endeavour to maintain his reputation. Thus, they perceive an inverse relationship between 
reputation and the need for covenants.   
 
Likewise, Black & Gilson (1998) have a similar line of thinking, and view reputation as an 
“implicit contract” term (Black & Gilson, 1998:263). They also propose to consider exit 
strategy covenants. They view it as another form of incentive, since the type of exit strategy 
affects the gains obtained by the GP. In an IPO exit, the GP gets a “call option on control” 
(Black & Gilson, 1998:261) upon the success of the company/project; he receives cash along 
with tradable securities, versus receiving only cash through an exit strategy of a sale to another 
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private company. Furthermore, the LP can obtain some form of control, while providing a form 
of incentive, by committing to provide the required capital in instalments/stages. That way the 
GP, in order to maintain the inflow of investments will be performing with the LP’s interests 
in mind, and the LP will be able to gain some form of monitoring over the project.  
 
With all the above views and the various ways of drawing up contracts to arrive at an acceptable 
optimal contract, they are still considered incomplete. This is because it is not possible to 
consider all the possible scenarios/factors that could affect the project, so as to tie them to the 
performance and payoffs. It is also considered costly and time consuming (which is also a form 
of expense) to be able, in advance, at the ex-ante stage of a contract to think of all the 
possibilities/contingencies that could occur in the ex-post contractual relationship before 
signing the contract, let alone the cost of writing them all up. Moreover, there are also ex-ante 
(drafting and negotiating) and ex-post (set-up, maintaining alignment of the task, and 
enforcement) transaction costs that need to be considered simultaneously when planning a 
contract. Chung (1991) suggests that this incompleteness in the terms of the contract can be 
diminished by having at the ex-ante stage initial simple contracts with terms that provide for 
renegotiation, so that the parties can revisit them ex-post.   
 
Both Hermalin & Katz (1991), in agreement with Chung, encourage having renegotiation in 
contracts. They consider renegotiation in a contract to “serve as a natural mechanism for 
incorporating an unverifiable signal into an agent’s compensation scheme […] allows the 
parties to use this unverifiable signal to improve risk sharing” (Hermalin & Katz, 1991:1752). 
They also consider renegotiation as providing a “second instrument” to achieve the desired 
goals. They see that “the initial contract creates incentives, while the renegotiation contract 
provides insurance” (Hermalin & Katz, 1991:1738). Maskin & Tirole (1999) however, 
although they agree on the point of having short-term contracts that are then open to 
renegotiation, also believe in the irrelevance theorem. Whereby, the parties involved need only 
look at the payoff contingencies, rather than the physical contingencies, since that is what 
matters. Nevertheless, there is still some concern with regards to “incentive-compatibility: will 
it be in each agent’s interest to specify these details truthfully?” (Maskin & Tirole, 1999:84).   
 
As such, the idea of an incomplete contract theory has emerged, in that many “contracts are 
vague or silent on a number of key features” (Tirole, 1999:741). This incompleteness, while 
being a solution, also “entails the loss of contractual flexibility” (Al-Najjar, 1995:435). Al-
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Najjar offers two solutions to regain flexibility. One is to have ambiguous terms that are wide 
in meaning, such as “every reasonable effort” (Al-Najjar, 1995:435), and the other is to 
supplement the contract with other forms of governance, such as “reputation, conventions, 
property rights over physical assets, or the legal system” (Al-Najjar, 1995:435), as do Hart & 
Moore (1999).   
 
Tirole (1999) sees that it is not a matter of “debate between incomplete and complete 
contracting” or simple or complex contracts, but more the need to design a “balance decision 
process” (Tirole, 1999:771), to have a form of structure. Incentives might vary depending on 
the agent, “but would not change the basic point”. Principals must consider, design and agree 
on the decision process of the matters that they are more likely to disagree on with the agent.  
This point is important as it sets the ground for a more efficient enforcement. The parties may 
be able to settle disputes between them based on the agreed decision process, and avoid 
situations where the judge “may not enforce the letter of the contract” (Tirole, 1999:761).  
Moral hazard and adverse selection can also exist among judges: moral hazard in that they may 
not take the initiative to understand the details of the case; and adverse selection in that they 
might not have the appropriate training/education, in addition to them having their own 
preferences based on previous “legal precedents and principals, […] regardless of what the 
contract says or what the parties want” (Tirole, 1999:761).   
 
Lerner & Schoar (2005) in quoting Grossman & Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990), state 
that the allocation of control rights is important in drawing up contracts, so in the event the 
“courts were unable to enforce […] the parties will be able to reach a second-best arrangement” 
(Lerner & Schoar, 2005:226). Grossman & Hart (1986:717) believe that by providing for the 
distribution of property rights and that of residual control rights earlier on, the parties will be 
protecting the surplus and the distributions of ex-post contracts, should any obstacles be 
encountered at the time of renegotiation. On the other hand, Hart's (1988:133) views combine 
those of Harris & Raviv (1979) with the concept of the need to establish incentives and allocate 
“return schemes” and those of Lerner & Schoar (2005). Also, those of Grossman & Hart (1986) 
on the need to allocate ownership and the residual control rights (which are not necessarily the 
absolute right of the owner of the property/asset), as if they are not classified this can cause a 
hold-up at the time of renegotiation. 
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On the other hand, Aghion & Bolton (1992) explain the use of ownership and control in a 
different way. They recommend reviewing the governance structure of the relationship, and in 
seeking to protect the investor’s claims, they offer three governance structures. They advise 
starting with providing the agent full “Entrepreneur Control”. However, if this does not work 
well then they recommend moving across some of the control to the investor “contingent 
control”, and if such partial control is not satisfactory, then the investor is to have full “investor 
control”. These controls are provided for via the financing structure to be adopted by the 
company to be set-up. So as in the event of entrepreneur control, the appropriate financial 
contract would be non-voting equity, where under contingent control it would be partial voting 
and/or debt, and for full investor control it would follow the full voting equity structure. 
 
According to Lerner & Schoar (2005), what affects the structure of a private equity deal is not 
the “contracting constraints” in the country of transaction, but rather how acquainted the private 
equity participants are with the “contracts in its domestic market” (Lerner & Schoar, 2005:234). 
They observe that the financial structure of a private equity deal depends on the level of 
enforcement and the type of law. Nations under common law and high enforcement usually use 
“convertible preferred stock with covenants” (Lerner & Schoar, 2005:223), whereas nations 
with civil law and low enforcement usually use “common stock and debt, and rely on valuation 
and returns” (Lerner & Schoar, 2005:223). Djankov et al. (2003, cited in Lerner & Schoar 
(2005)), in agreement with Lerner & Schoar (2005), view that countries with long time frames 
to resolve contract disputes usually use debt, versus those countries with short time frames that 
usually use preferred stocks. This is derived from the concept that if the investor is comfortable 
with the legal system of that country, he is willing to forgo controlling interest (common stock), 
since he can attain minority shareholder protection through other contractual means. 
 
In the agent-principal relationship of private equity, the principal has sufficient wealth vis-à-
vis the agent whose financial wealth is limited and is seeking an investor (the principal). In 
such a relationship, where moral hazard and limited liability exists, one would expect that the 
bargaining power would lay in the hands of the principal as is the understanding of Pitchford 
(1998) and many others. Yet in the practical relationship of the private equity industry, it is the 
agent who is the GP and the principal is the LP. It is the agent who has the bargaining power 
and makes a take it or leave it offer to the principal. Whereby the agent prepares a Private 
Placement Memorandum (PPM), enclosing the details of a proposed private equity partnership 
to potential investors. It is the PPM that forms the contract and the agreement terms of the 
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partnership.  It is a unique PMM (does not vary from one investor to the other for the same 
project) that is offered to all potential investors with little or no room for negotiation.  
 
2.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has previewed the relevant literature on private equity in general and in particular 
within the conventional system, which is essentially a form of investment contract/agreement 
entered into by two parties: the agent (GP) and the principal (LP). In such a relationship two 
main problems arise: moral hazard and adverse selection, and the aim is to arrive at the most 
efficient contractual agreement that would govern this relationship, and to minimalise these 
problems. There are various variables involved that are either behavioural based or outcome 
based, which affects the agenda of the relationship between the parties. With the explicit 
variables ranging from: risk attitude, goal conflict, availability of information, outcome, 
outcome measurability, payouts, and type of governance structure. While the implicit variables 
range from social expectation, to social connectedness, culture,  reputation and trust.  
 
The literature also indicates that the private equity relationship is fairly complex. Whereby the 
management and running of this investment lies in the hands of the one with real authority, 
rather than the one with formal authority. It lies in the hands of the agent (GP), due to his 
position and involvement in the market, and as such he has greater power (real authority) to 
control and direct the handling and running of the deal over the principal (LP), the owner of the 
funds and formal authority, who permits such control based on reputation and trust. As such, 
in examining the relationship between the investor and the financial institution, and in seeking 
to answer the research questions, the study will be based on the multiple theories discussed in 
this chapter. However, even though Islamic private equity is based on the conventional, 
indicating that the theories with regards to the relationship are similar, yet, it is to be noted that 
being an Islamic form of financing, there is an Islamic aspect involved. “Islamic economics 
brings a social dimension of living into focus” (Siddiqui, 2004:5). Whereby, certain behaviours 
are not acceptable and could make the relationship non-compliant or void. There is an emphasis 
on morality and its role in steering behaviour away from “individualism”/“self-interest” 
(Siddiqi, 2004:5). Matters related to Shari’ah principles and the expected behaviour are 
examined in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: 
PRIVATE EQUITY IN ISLAMIC FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND FEATURES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter examines the literature on private equity in Islamic finance. The chapter first 
provides an overview of the Sharia’h (Islamic law) concepts and reviews the Islamic system, 
before moving on to the private equity and Islamic finance. Discussions on Islamic law start 
with Maqasid Al Shari’ah, the Shari’ah principles/objectives. Maqsad (maqasid - plural) means 
the end goal that one should be seeking, which mainly revolves around the realisation of human 
well-being as an individual within his society/community/economy. Hence, the maqasid 
represents the overall infrastructure of the system, upon which the Islamic economic system 
functions. The chapter discusses the basic principles of an Islamic economic system to provide 
a broader perspective of Islamic finance in general and private equity in particular. The 
literature write-up of this chapter will be an explanation, elaboration and informative rather 
than a discussion of theories. 
 
3.1 MAQASID AL SHARI’AH AND FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES: A BRIEF 
OVERVIEW 
 
This section starts with the introduction of Shari’ah and outlines maqasid al Shari’ah and their 
nexus within the Islamic law and then examines some basic Shari’ah principles governing 
financial transactions. 
 
3.1.1 Maqasid Al Shari’ah 
 
In simple terms Shari’ah (being derived from the word Tashri’a, which means to 
promulgate/legislate) is a “code of law…that regulates the conduct of human beings in their 
individual and collective lives” (Ayub, 2008:21). Maqasid, which are the principles upon which 
if applied and adapted, the Islamic code of law can be maintained, and the benefits and welfare 
of the society/economy as a whole can be preserved (Chapra, 2008, Laldin, 2008a).  Shari’ah 
and its objectives are “the rules of life for Muslims economically, socially and religiously” (El-
ashker & Wilson, 2006:35) that are derived from four basic sources. The two primary sources 
being the Quran (the holy writings of Islam revealed by God to the prophet Mohammed (pbuh) 
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and the Sunnah/Hadith (sayings and activities of the prophet Mohammed) (Ahmed, 2011a:19). 
Rulings from these sources are mainly to do with ‘ibadah, the religious rituals, and “cannot be 
changed according to the change of time and place or circumstances” (Laldin, 2008a:7). The 
other two sources are based on scholars’ reasoning (ijtihad) of the Quran and Sunnah. Ijtihad 
is used when there is no direct reference to an issue in the primary sources. The injunction is 
arrived at based on the use of an analogy (qiyas) to a similar matter/issue in the primary sources 
and consensus (ijma). The rulings derived through ijtihad are more flexible to keep pace with 
time and circumstances and are known as fiqh. They are established whilst bearing in mind 
enhancing public interest (maslaha) and preventing public harm (mafsada).     
 
The Islamic view does not separate between obedience (religion) and welfare (almaslahah), as 
they are considered to be complementary and to balance one another. As such, fulfilling the 
Maqasid is considered a way of life (Atia, 2011:119). However, hitherto looking into the 
different classifications of maqasid, it needs to be made clear that for one to accept, understand 
and implement the maqasid at the individual level, there are certain characteristics that need to 
exist, as without which maqasid have no meaning and are difficult to realise.  These 
characteristics are sound human instincts (alfitra) and the ability to reason/rationalise (alt’aleel) 
that compels the individual to be attracted to the good and to ward off the bad (AlHassni, 
2005:323). 
  
An individual with human instincts that are unblemished has the basic prerequisite to accept all 
aspects of religion and faith. If these instincts are enriched by the ability to reason and 
rationalise, then he/she is able to accept the set of boundaries/values (natural/personal, religious, 
authoritative) to be bestowed upon him/her, setting the grounds for preserving the Shari’ah 
principles/maqasid. After this, co-operation with one another, in its spiritual and real form for 
the benefit of all, is required to maintain its existence throughout the community/society within 
which humans live, without which these codes of law have no meaning nor serve their purpose 
(AlHassni, 2005:323, Atia, 2011:28).  
 
The classification of maqasid al Shari’ah is based on the principal objective of the “realisation 
of benefit to the people, concerning their affairs both in this world and the hereafter” (Laldin, 
2008a:14). Shari’ah is divided into three basic ordinances: principles on beliefs (Al-ahkam al-
i’tiqadiyya), principles on behaviour (Al-ahkham al-akhlaqiyya), and principles on transacting 
(Al-ahkham al-‘amaliyya), also known as fiqh. These principles are established on: mutual 
consultation (shura), equality, justice, and preventing harm (Laldin, 2008a:44-46). The 
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fundamental intention is to enhance social welfare. These sanctions and principles of Islamic 
law are similar to “today’s notions of human rights, development, and civility” (Auda, 2008:1, 
Atia, 2011:119). 
  
The basic traditional classifications of maqasid al-Shari’ah are based on the various levels of 
need, and they are: “necessities (dururiat), needs (hajiyat), and luxuries (tahsiniyyat)” (Auda, 
2008:3), which can be said to be an analogy to Maslow’s hierarchy of human objectives (Auda, 
2008:4). The necessities, according to some (such as Al-Ghazali), revolve around the protection 
and development ‘hifz’ and to some (such as Al-Shatibi) observance ‘ri’ayah’ of human well-
being with regards to: faith (din), intellect (‘aql), posterity (nasl), wealth (mal), and the human 
self (nafs) (Malik, 2015). The necessities (dururiat) are based on the preservation of these five 
basic elements of human development. Neglecting these “will lead to total disruption and 
disorder” (Laldin, 2008a:18).  The needs (hajiyat) are enhancements of the five basic elements 
of the human development, that if ignored does not lead to total disruption and disorder, but 
“leads to hardship” (Laldin, 2008a:29). The luxuries (tahsiniyyat) are embellishments that if 
overlooked cause discomfort. Over time, Ibn al-Qayyim expanded the range of categories 
further, from serving the individual to capturing the entire society/community and covered 
freedom, justice and equality, “ensuring welfare, as the utmost maslahah to be preserved 
through shari’ah” (Malik, 2015). 
 
The contemporary view of maqasid classifies the elements/needs into three classes: general, 
partial and specific.  For example, the element need of faith (din), since it is a wide spectrum is 
classed as general maqasid, and each of the five pillars7 of faith are classed as partial maqasid 
and the details for within each of the pillars are classed as specific (Auda, 2008:5, Atia, 
2011:49). Although the developments of faith, intellect, prosperity, wealth and human self are 
essential, they are not always at the same level of need nor are they of the same degree of 
importance. On the contrary, there are times when they diverge and times when they are 
complementary. It depends on the circumstances (the maslaha) and objectives (the maqasid); 
some might have precedence over the other, and in other instances they can be complementary. 
As such, the needs can take an interrelated, “over-lapping” (Auda, 2008:4) form to that of a 
hierarchy8, as it encloses the whole economy and society, and becomes part of a whole.   
																																								 																				
7 The five pillars of Islam are: the Islamic Oath (alshahadtain), prayer (al-salah), fasting (al-sawm), alms giving to 
the poor/needy (Zakat) and pilgrimage (haj). For a discussion on the five pillars of Islam see (Abuznaid 2006) and 
(Keller 2002). 	
8 An example of the needs being interrelated is if one looks at Salah (prayer). It is one of the pillars of Islam and is 
considered an essential element/necessity (dururiate) of faith (din). And in performing prayers, there are certain 
procedures that must be maintained, for the prayer to be accepted and considered correct. However, there are times 
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Figure 3.1 - Structure of Maqasid AlShari'ah: Interrelated (Left) & Contemporary (Right) 
 
   
Islam is not an “ascetic religion” and “allows a person to satisfy all his needs (both necessities 
and comforts) to increase his efficiency and well-being” (Chapra, 2008: 21). As such, as 
technology develops and living standards change, needs are also expected to change. They are 
mainly related to mu’amalat (transactions) that are related to political, economic (banking and 
financial), and social activities, especially since these activities have greatly developed since 
the times of the Prophet (pbuh).   
 
3.1.2 Transactions as per Shari’ah Principles  
 
Upon the development of the area of mu’amalat, the doing of business and financial activities, 
there are certain Shari’ah principles that need to be preserved. The first three are more universal, 
while the remaining three are more related to the dealings with one another. The first is the 
“continuation of wealth” (Laldin, 2008b:78) and trying to enlarge the circle of those involved 
or those that can benefit, so as not to “concentrate the wealth in a few hands” (Laldin, 2008b:78). 
The second principle is “continuity of the investment wealth” (Laldin, 2008b:79) whereby the 
																																								 																				
when certain procedures can be eased, to remove hardship, such as reducing the number of rakat or being able to sit 
rather than stand. Thus, this easing could be considered as hajiyyat/needs that can be undertaken without 
tabtil/voiding the duriyat of performing prayers. Another is the element/need of posterity (nasl), where marriage is 
an important need for the continuation of posterity (nasl). Furthermore, in order to preserve the marriage (nikah) 
adultery is forbidden and is considered a dururi/necessity. Moreover, the way women dress whereby they are to 
avoid revealing parts of their body (so as not to attract the attention of men other than their husbands) is considered 
as a hajiya/need). In addition, it is preferred that women do not over beatify themselves (which is considered 
tahsiniyyant/luxury) to outsiders, to prevent jealously and jeopardise the marriage. Thus, this makes the need and 
luxury important issues complementary and they form part of the necessity/dururi (Al-Shatibi, 2007:5-19;  Baza, 
2008:205). In other words, they are interrelating rather than “strict hierarchy” levels (Auda, 2008:4).	
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wealth that is available should be invested for the economy to continue to develop and expand 
along with maintaining the first principle of reaching out to as many as possible within a society. 
These two principles lead to the third of “achieving comprehensive communal prosperity” 
(Laldin, 2008b:79) with the aim of spreading social harmony. The fourth is “financial 
transparency” (Laldin, 2008b:80) and maintaining disclosure to prevent any ambiguity, 
misunderstanding and exploitation while dealing or doing business with one another (Gait & 
Worthington, 2007:7). The fifth is “validation of ownership” (Laldin, 2008b:80), whereby one 
cannot sell something without owning it in the first place, and a transaction needs to be directly 
or indirectly asset based (Gait & Worthington, 2007:7) (with the exception of services). The 
final principle is that profits and revenues that are earned need to be generated based on work 
performed, thereby making the “pursuing of work obligatory” (Laldin, 2008b:87). 
 
Based on the above principles the following are prohibited in an Islamic economy. Hoarding 
and the storing away of wealth is prohibited, as it goes against the principle of the continuity of 
investment and the availability of capital liquidity that an economy needs in order to grow and 
develop. “Squandering, extravagance and stinginess” are also banned (Laldin, 2008b:86). In 
living their lives humans need to be moderate in spending to safeguard capital and economic 
growth. Competition is encouraged and monopoly is down casted, as it “diminishes economic 
freedom” (Laldin, 2008b:88). Irresponsible activities that have a negative impact on the 
individual and society, such as “gambling, casinos, production of alcohol” (Gait & Worthington, 
2007:24) are considered haram and dealing in them is forbidden.  
 
Riba (usury) is prohibited in Shari’ah. There are two basic forms of Riba that have been referred 
to in the Qur’an and Sunnah: riba al-nasi’ah and riba al-fadl. Riba al-nasi’ah is taking interest 
(extra money) on the money that is borrowed. It is prohibited because it places constraints and 
hardship on the borrower. Riba al-fadl relates to the unequal exchange of goods. It would 
include exchanging an inferior good for one of a greater quality, when dealing on the spot with 
a homogeneous good (Laldin, 2008b:84). This form is forbidden as it goes against the principles 
of transparency, continuation of wealth and earning a return without any effort. Maysir 
(gambling/speculating) is also prohibited by Islamic law. Islam does not discourage taking risks; 
on the contrary, it is against accumulating gains based on taking chances rather than work 
performed. Such dealing and contracts are also prohibited as they “result in a zero sum effect, 
where at least one party will end up as a loser by mere chance” (Sultan, 2009:29) and no new 
wealth is created; it is only transferred from one to the other.   
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Islam is also against gharar which relates to ambiguity in contracts whereby in transactions 
“consequences are concealed” (Gait & Worthington, 2007:10). It is against the uncertainties in 
contracts, as it leads to conflict and moral hazard issues, and provokes members to have 
dishonest behaviour, with “the risk of litigation and disputes as a result of ambiguity to the 
contract” (Sultan, 2009:27). Consequently, in order to avoid nullification, a contract has to 
“encompass[…] the full disclosure of information and removal of any asymmetrical 
information” (Gait & Worthington, 2007:7). 
 
Having preserved the principles and avoided the prohibitions, transactions in an Islamic system 
can be completed by taking into consideration: the redistribution of income (Zakat) and having 
a supporting legal framework. Zakat is to be considered because it is a form of “a social self-
help system” (Durrani & Boocock, 2006:152). It is the giving from one’s income to another, 
without the intention of “depleting the resources of the rich” but in order to improve on the 
living standards of the poor within the society to create “social and economic equity” (Gait & 
Worthington, 2007:13). While a proper legal and supervisory framework must be considered 
in order to maintain compliance with Shari’ah. Rules and regulations are required to protect 
those within the Islamic system from “haram and hardship” (Ayub, 2008:25), and to prevent 
“selfish atomistic behaviour” and to preserve “God-given freedom… to ensure freedom to all” 
(Naqvi, 1981:69).  
 
3.2 THE ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
 
Economics is defined as “the study of how societies use scarce resources to produce valuable 
commodities and distribute them among people” (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2005:4). In the 
conventional economy, the understanding is that man’s wants are unlimited and cannot be met 
by the limited resources. While the Islamic economy is based on the belief that resources are 
amanah/trust from God and man is accountable for the proper use of these resources: “on the 
production side he should seek efficiency, and on the distribution side he should strive for social 
justice” (El-ashker & Wilson, 2006:35).  
 
The Islamic economy works on the basis of combining ethics and economics. Thus, utility-
maximisation, consumption, production and distribution need to be balanced to achieve “total 
welfare and not just (Pareto-optimal) marginal welfare” (Naqvi, 1981:65). Those in the 
conventional economy prefer markets with minimal government intervention based on the 
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assumption that market forces by themselves are expected to “create harmony, and lead to 
efficiency and equity” (Ayub, 2008:37). Their efficiency concept is based on assumptions that 
are not easily achievable. Their assumptions are based on that a perfect market exists and that 
individual preferences and social interests are aligned. They also assume that the “rest of 
society …deal with the problems of externalities, inequalities, and instability, without the aid 
of [corporation and authorities]” (Dusuki, 2008:105). The conventional system encourages the 
“laissez faire” form of market, with little government intervention and the “unbridled profit 
motive” concept (Ayub, 2008:37). However, such a system cannot withstand time because 
“profit motive in the absence of any ethical norms finds loopholes for misdeeds, injustice and 
corruption” (Ayub, 2008:37). Whereas, in the Islamic system the state, as a “social authority” 
is expected to take measures for the proper “functioning of market forces”, the “prevention of 
exploitation”, and the ensuring of “social justice”, whereby the “Holy Qur’an gives the Islamic 
State the necessary legal authority to do so” (Ayub, 2008:39). Islam has Shari’ah 
principles/rules that are “religion-based, valuation-orientated, morality-judged and spiritually-
bound” (Ayub, 2008:37). These principles/rules set limits/boundaries on the individual’s 
behaviour to sustain the welfare of society, and to “protect economic freedom without harming 
either buyers or sellers” (Presley & Sessions, 1994:585) in working towards the ideal Islamic 
state of social welfare through its guidance on the proper use and allocation of resources (Gait 
& Worthington, 2007:5, Naqvi, 1981:66). 
 
The Islamic economy seeks social welfare as well as economic welfare. All members of society 
are to be given equal opportunities to access resources, disregarding their income state, as it 
hinders “resource allocation opportunity and efficiency” (Yusof, Kashoogie & Kamal, 2009: 
7). It is the efforts made and the different abilities of the individual that distinguish the outcome. 
Cooperation and risk sharing is fostered because it unites the members of society. It helps “blunt 
the impact of economic shocks, disappointments and suffering for individuals by dispersing 
their effects among a large number of people” (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2013: 198). To cater for risk 
sharing, contracts are drawn up, whereby the obligations of the parties and breaches of the terms 
are identified. Contracts are to be exchange based and not interest based, both sharing the ex-
ante and ex-post risk of the transaction, as per their share in the deal and property entitlements 
are identified. Returns are based on the economic activity of the capital. No trade/exchange is 
to take place without the parties having ownership of the goods and services to be exchanged. 
As such, the activities of the financial sector are reflected in the real economy.  
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Money in the Islamic economy is a tool and is not considered as capital that can earn profit in 
itself. Profit needs to be generated/earned in return for some effort being inputted or risk and 
responsibility being taken by those involved. A capital owner is not entitled to earn profit on 
his capital, just for owning the capital; he needs to take on some form of economic activity 
(either investing and producing himself, or to partner with someone who manages, and as such 
is taking on some risk), for him to be Islamically entitled to the profits when they are generated. 
The Shari’ah principle for the Islamic economy is based on productivity, and wealth is a 
combination of “property (mal) and the effort together” (Ayub, 2008:33). Islamic financial 
transactions in investing activities are mainly partnership based, and over time are expected to 
have positive rippling effects on the economy.9   
 
3.2.1 The Islamic Economy and the Individual  
 
The Islamic economy, however, does not work independently of faith. For an economy to grow 
and sustain growth, faith along with wealth is required. Wealth provides the resources, capital 
and productivity that is needed, and faith acts as the disciplinary hand that maintains the human 
consciousness for proper conduct. “Moral growth and economic growth go hand in hand, 
reinforcing each other” (Chapra, 2008:34). Although income growth and wealth contribute to 
the development and the meeting of the human needs (the needs mentioned above), it does not 
satisfactorily complete the Islamic concept without the inclusion of the moral principles, the 
maqasid al-Shari’ah (mentioned above). Thus, the authorities in an Islamic economy, while 
planning and designing for the development of their economy, also need to consider the 
financial aspects, the development of the individuals within the economy.   
 
Based on the fact that individuals “are the end as well as the means of development” (Chapra, 
2008:27), then those running the economy (governments/authorities) need to direct the 
individuals within their economy on to the proper paths that fit with the times therein. Areas 
such as education, health care, safety, and basic infrastructure need to be developed within an 
economy for the successful development of the individual’s basic needs. The basic pillars upon 
which economic planning is to be based are: faith, intellect, self, posterity, and wealth.  Faith 
needs to be at the forefront because it acts as a “moral filter” (Chapra, 1995:7) and wealth at 
the end as “it is a means … for realizing human well-being” (Chapra, 1995:8). The aim is to 
																																								 																				
9 Those that are equity based and on the asset side of operations (Musharaka and Mudarabaha), with no form of 
debt effect (such as Tawarruq).	
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change the individual’s “behaviour, life-style, tastes, preferences, attitude towards the creator, 
other human beings, resources at their disposal, and the environment” (Chapra, 2008:27) 
through educating, guiding, and regulating. 
 
Those responsible for development need to work on strengthening faith, values and rules of 
conduct, so as to develop the individual’s moral obligation with one another and within a 
society, to arrive at a lifestyle where the rules that govern it are “unconditionally accepted and 
observed by everyone” (Chapra, 2008:29). Through working on the development of the 
individual’s intellect, self, wealth, and posterity in conjunction with faith and the concept of 
equal opportunity of wealth, individuals can be enriched and social harmony can be maintained, 
which is the goal of the Islamic world. 
 
3.3. ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
Continuing from the basic rules of Islam (Ahkami-tiqadiyya [aqidah], akhlaqiyya [akhlaq] and 
‘amliyya [fiqh]) discussed under section 3.1.1 above, and the belief that Shari’ah principles 
offer a way of life, the relationship between the banking and financial system and Islam  can 
be seen in Figure 3.2 below.	
Figure 3.2-Relationship Between Islamic Banking & Finance System in Shari’ah 
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As can be seen above, the Islamic finance activities are a sub-part of the Islamic economic 
activities. This is because the “economic man” seeks a source of income (working/producing) 
and seeks to increase his income and wealth, as finance helps to mobilise and channel the 
various resources (such as capital, skills, services, etc.) available in the economy among the 
participants, while adhering to the boundaries of Shari’ah. 
 
The main Shari’ah principles that are related to Islamic finance are the prohibition of riba, 
gharar and maysir (Gait & Worthington, 2007:7). Though these prohibitions have been 
mentioned earlier, the researcher would like to elaborate a little further on gharar before 
proceeding to the next section. The reason being is that gharar, an analogy to excessive risk 
(not the speculative trading type of risk) and uncertainty of the conventional system, is a state 
that is difficult to determine and at times difficult to avoid.   
 
Gharar “is a kind of uncertainty… it means, deception or misrepresentation, which includes 
exposing oneself or others or his property or others to jeopardy” (Al-Saati, 2003:6) and can 
lead to dispute. There are three basic classifications of gharar (Al-Dhareer, 1997:12): the first 
being “doubtfulness”/uncertainty of the probability of something happening; the second being 
“ignorance” and the third combines the first two meanings of “unknown and doubtful”. In an 
economic system there are usually exogenous and endogenous variables/uncertainties. Gharar 
in contracts/transactions, like uncertainty cannot be completely prevented from occurring, and 
it is also affected by endogenous variables. While the exogenous variables occur due to changes 
of elements from outside of the economic system and cannot be avoided (e.g., taste, habits, 
technology and external events such as floods, earthquakes, etc.), the endogenous variables are 
related to contracts/transactions (such as appropriateness of the parties, the quality of the goods) 
that occur due to changes in the factors from within the economic system that can be reduced 
through performing proper due diligence (Al-Saati, 2003:4).   
 
Thus, since gharar cannot be completely shunned, and some gharar is to be tolerated, the jurists 
have classified the “degree of permissibility of gharar” (Al-Saati, 2003:9) as: “prohibited 
gharar”, “permissible gharar”, “acceptable gharar”, and “mandatory uncertainty”. The 
prohibited gharar are transactions with excessive gharar (uncertainties), that “include the idea 
of voluntary and deliberate gharar taking” and those “with no value added or created from the 
transaction” (Al-Saati, 2003:10). While “permissible gharar” is the existence of some 
uncertainties such as “selling what is hidden in the ground”; where such transactions are for the 
benefit ‘maslaha’ of the general public. There is also the “acceptable gharar”, where 
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uncertainties arise due to exogenous and endogenous variables, such as changes in technology 
and in consumers’ taste. Finally, the “mandatory uncertainty” is the uncertainty that is based 
on the concept of “revenue goes with liability”, which is the main prerequisite to a valid contract 
(Al-Saati, 2003:9-14). 
 
In meeting the systemic and dynamics of an Islamic financial system, stability, growth and 
economic welfare are to be considered (Yusof, Kashoogie & Kamal, 2009). As such, risk is to 
be spread rather than concentrated. Just as resources are to be allocated efficiently and equitably, 
so are economic risk and gains (Maghrebi & Mirakhor, 2015). In promoting stability and 
equitable growth, equity/risk sharing financing is considered the ideal form of financing over 
debt/interest financing. Whereby the burden is not placed on one party and where both parties 
can benefit: no claiming of fixed returns when losses are incurred, and no losing out when large 
profits are made (Yusof, Kashoogie & Kamal, 2009). By following the sharing mode of 
financing, not only is stability achieved, but it also encourages greater involvement of members 
of society and entrepreneurship is incentivised, than in a system that fosters the interest based 
mode of financing (Yusof, Kashoogie & Kamal, 2009). 
 
Islamic finance/investment can be classified into three basic forms. The first being a profit/risk 
sharing partnership (such as in musharakha and mudarabah), and the second is based on sales 
contracts with an anticipated/fixed return (such as in murabaha, istisna, and salam), while the 
third is based on the assigning of usufruct rights (such as ijara) (Kahf & Khan, 1992:32, Atai, 
2010:3).  
 
Furthermore, in dealing in Islamic finance, understanding of the ownership rights needs to be 
clear. The owner of the rights is entitled to the proceeds that are generated from the rights, in 
addition to the owner being the “sole bearer of all responsibilities and risk” (Kahf & Khan, 
1992:32) of such rights. 
 
3.3.1. Islamic Financial Contracts  
 
Under Islam, the main business concept is to “share rather than transfer the risk” (Durrani & 
Boocock, 2006:157), and therefore, the mechanism of sharing in profits of business/investment 
involves a form of agreement/contract, in order to avoid any ambiguity. Contracts are the basis 
of Islamic financial activities and there are four main components that dictate an Islamic 
contract. The first is the Intention (Al-niyya) to enter into a legal binding relationship. This 
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involves the “meeting of both minds based on mutual satisfaction…and goodwill” (Hassan, 
Kayed & Oseni, 2013:58-59). The second is the Form (Sighah) of the contract. For there to be 
a contract/an agreement there needs to be an offer and acceptance in return, which forms the 
relationship. The third is the Parties of the Contract (Al-Aqidan). Those making the offer and 
acceptance need to be competent and have the capacity to enter into such an agreement. The 
fourth component is the Subject Matter (Al-Ma’qud Alaih), which needs to be in line with 
Shari’ah, and the essential details of the subject and related rights and benefits of the parties 
are to be clearly stated. The parties then conclude the terms and conditions of the agreement in 
a concluding meeting, which is referred to as majlis al-aqd (Hassan, Kayed & Oseni, 2013:58-
59). 
 
In Islam, productivity is an important feature of the infrastructure it is aiming to achieve, and 
as such when interpreting this feature in the Islamic finance activities, the transactions that are 
based on profit/loss sharing principles are the most applicable. These principles are based on 
the following. If all parties are participating in the capital then the profits are shared according 
to agreed terms but loss is borne in proportion to their injected capital (Musharakah). However, 
where not all members are participating in the capital, in that the others are handling/managing 
the business/project only, then they share the profits between them based on a pre-agreed 
percentage, while the loss is only borne by the capital provider on a pro-rata basis (Mudarabah). 
This is because the managing member’s loss is his/her time and effort spent (Gait & 
Worthington, 2007:12). Both are forms of partnership. The capital provider in both forms has 
similar obligations (in providing the capital agreed on), but it differs to the manager (mudarib). 
The mudarib in the role of managing the investment has obligations towards the other 
partners/capital providers, in achieving mandates and reporting. The obligations on the mudarib 
are covered under section 3.4.1 below. 
 
Parties are expected to enter into investments together, not through speculation, but after 
forming proper due diligence on the type of investment for the proper allocation of their funds 
and resources (Zaher & Hassan, 2001:159). Islamic contracts are considered as economic 
relationships and have a moral/ethical as well as a value effect. This is similar to the concept of 
outcome-based agreements (rewarding the principle) and behaviour-based (alignment of 
interest) agreements, discussed under Chapter 2 (section 2.3.1.1). The Islamic finance contract 
is considered a combination of both (behaviour/ethical and outcome/value) (Aljifiri & 
Khandelwal, 2013: 85). Moreover, under Shari’ah, all types of transactions between parties 
require there to be a written contract between the parties, so as to preserve the rights of all 
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parties involved.10 Thus, “an economic relationship without a formal contract can be considered 
null and void in Islamic Finance” (Aljifiri & Khandelwal, 2013: 81). As per           Ul Haque & 
Mirakhor (1986:4), “The core notion of contract is understood in Islamic Law as meaning that 
the rights and duties between the two parties are specifically determined and fixed by their own 
voluntary and actual agreement”. This in turn designates the importance to having a transparent, 
well-defined contract which covers the allocation of responsibilities, monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms, so as to avoid exploitation and injustice to any party.  
 
Islamic financing contracts are entered into in order to meet an individual’s or a party’s specific 
requirements. The following are the commonly used basic Islamic financial contracts that act 
as the basis for other elaborate transactions. 
 
Debt Based Fixed Income Instruments 
Murabaha 
Murabaha is considered a “price-deferred sale” (Ahmed, 2012:381) contract. This transaction 
is based on assisting individuals/institutions (customers) with finance for the purchase of a 
good/tangible asset. In simple form such a transaction is conducted, whereby the Islamic 
Financial Institution (IFI) purchases from the supplier the asset that the customer is interested 
in and then sells it to the customer. The customer pays for the asset through instalment payments, 
where the overall cost would consist of the original cost plus a mark-up, and the components 
of the cost are clear and transparent to both parties involved. The mark-up is what the IFI is 
entitled to, for its efforts in the purchase and sale, and for bearing the risk of temporary 
ownership of the asset being purchased, which needs to be within reason, and does not change 
throughout the payment period. 
 
Tawarruq (An application of Murabaha) 
It is a form of providing liquidity to the client (mustawarriq-client/the seeker of funds). There 
are three types of tawarruq: Classical, contemporary and reverse (Hassan, Kayed & Oseri, 2013, 
96-97). The classical definition is that the mustawarriq buys a commodity on deferred payment 
and sells the commodity for cash at a lower price to a third party, with the intention of getting 
access to cash. While, in the contemporary definition, which is also known as organised 
																																								 																				
10 Holy Quran Surat Al Baqarah (2:282).	
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tawarruq, the mustawarriq buys a commodity on deferred payment from the IFI, and sells the 
commodity via the IFI (acts as an agent) for cash at a lower price to a third party, usually 
performed simultaneously on the spot market.  There are three contracts involved, two of which 
are considered murabaha contracts: the one for cash, between the IFI and the seller and the 
other for deferred payment between the IFI and the mustawarriq. The third contract is the 
agency contract between the mustawarriq and the IFI to sell the commodity on his behalf.  
Whereas, reverse tawarruq is the same as the organised tawarruq, but the roles are reversed: 
the IFI acts as the buyer of the commodity (mustawarriq). 
 
The organised form of application has faced some controversy in recent years, due to the fact 
that it moves the transaction from the equity to the debt market, and creates greater debt than 
the cash it generates. This debt effect leads to “inefficiency” and “inequity” (Siddiqi, 2007:2) 
within society. “Therefore, the financing facilitated by tawarruq, like its counterpart, leading 
in the conventional system, is free and unhinged from the real sector of the economy” (Siddiqi, 
2007:3). Thus it is not in-line with the understanding of the Islamic economy and Islamic 
finance. Consequently, in 2009 the International Council of Figh Academy ruled (OIC 
Resolution 179 (19/5))11 organised and reversed tawaruq as “impermissible”.  
 
Istisna 
Istisna is considered an “object-deferred sale” (Ahmed, 2012:381) contract. It is used in 
construction and manufacturing, whereby the funds are pre-provided to the customer by the IFI 
for the construction of a building/project, in return for providing the material and building/work 
(Atai, 2010:6). The IFI either owns the property at the end, or leases, or sells it thereafter to the 
customer on a deferred cost plus markup basis as in Murabaha. Istisna is a form of long-term 
working capital financing, and is exempted from the two Shari’ah principles where the asset 
under consideration needs to be in existence and to be owned prior to entering into a transaction 
(due to the ‘maslaha’, and the benefit of the general public - an example of ‘permissible 
gharar’). 
 
																																								 																				
11 OIC Resolution 179(19/5) in relation to Tawarruq: “….the classical tawarruq, which is permissible, provided that 
it complies with the Shari’ah requirements on sale (bay).  ... It is not permissible to execute both tawarruq (organised 
and reversed) because simultaneous transactions occur between the financier and the mutawariq, whether it is done 
explicitly or implicitly or is based on common practice, in exchange for a financial obligation.  This is considered a 
deception, i.e. in order to get the additional quick cash from the contract. Hence, the transaction is considered as 
containing the element of riba” (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 2009).	
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Salam 
Salam is used to provide finance for the purchase of a good which is delivered at a later date 
and is considered an “object-deferred sale” (Ahmed, 2012:381) contract. It is a form of 
financing used mainly in agriculture. It is also a form of working capital financing, but is 
considered short-term rather than long-term, and is thus also exempted from the two Shari’ah 
principles of existence and ownership due to permissible gharar. 
 
Asset Backed Instrument 
Ijara and Ijara wa-Iqtina 
These are forms of Islamic leasing. In ijara the IFI leases to the customer the desired asset for 
a pre-agreed upon lease payments, for a certain period of time, after which the asset is returned 
to the IFI. This is similar to operational leasing in the conventional system.  However, with 
ijara wa-iqtina, the customer has the right to own the asset, if he so seeks, at the end of the 
lease period. This is similar to the capital lease of the conventional system. The IFI needs to 
ensure that the assets that are being leased have the productive life of the leased period, and the 
customer needs to ensure that the asset is not mishandled. The profit that the lessor earns is in 
the form of rent. 
 
Partnership Based Instruments 
Musharakah 
This is a joint-venture/partnership agreement between two or more parties who enter into a 
business activity/project with the purpose of making profit. The parties provide the capital, not 
necessarily in equal portions, and management/labour is agreed between them, where not all 
need to actively participate. The profits are distributed as pre-agreed ratios and the losses are 
borne by all, in proportion to their capital contribution.   
 
Mudaraba 
It is also a form of partnership agreement, but more private equity (capital growth). Whereby 
capital is provided by one or more members (capital owners: rab al-mal), and management is 
entrusted to another (non-capital provider) party who acts as a manager (mudarib) with the 
purpose of making profit. Profits are based on a pre-agreed percentage, and losses are borne 
only by the capital providers. 
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There are various contracts in Islamic law, and a summary of those related to banking and 
finance are stated in Figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Contracts of Islamic Law (Selection) 
	
 
The Islamic financial contracts that are considered “strongly Islamic” are those that are based 
on principles that “conform to Islamic objectives in both form and substance” (Haron & Azmi, 
2009:145). Of those financial contracts stated earlier, musharakah and mudarabah are the two 
that are considered strongly Islamic, since they meet the Islamic objectives of  “permit[ting] 
risk sharing between providers and users of funds” (Haron & Azmi, 2009:145). Hence, it is 
encouraged to use the profit/loss sharing (PLS) and profit sharing (PS) forms when 
investing/financing and to use the other forms of financial contracts when “risk-return sharing 
cannot be implemented” (Haron & Azmi, 2009:145). 
 
3.4. PRIVATE EQUITY AND ISLAMIC FINANCE 
 
The two forms that are considered as partnership venture investments in Islamic finance are the 
musharakah (Sharika al-aqd, contractual partnership) and the mudaraba forms of financial 
contracts. For a financial contract to be Islamically valid, certain “essential elements and 
necessary conditions” (Sultan, 2009:43), in addition to the general Shari’ah principles 
mentioned in the earlier section above, must be fulfilled. Therefore, in the next section the 
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essential elements and necessary conditions for those partnership venture types of contracts are 
covered before proceeding to the setup of Islamic private equity. 
 
3.4.1. Mudarabah Contracts  
 
As mentioned earlier, the mudarabah contract is a partnership agreement that follows the PS 
principle. The essential elements/components and necessary conditions/criteria of the contract 
are outlined next. 
 
The main components/features that shape the mudarabah agreement need to be clearly stated 
and known. The involved parties’ role (the capital provider and the manager) both need to be 
identified. The type of project to be entered into along with the amount of capital to be used 
needs to be stated. The profit ratio needs to be determined, and for it to be an agreement there 
needs to be an exchange of an offer and acceptance. These are the essential elements of a 
mudarabah contract (Sultan, 2009:43). 
 
The necessary conditions revolve around the elements of the contract and in clearing any 
possibility of any ambiguity that may arise. The amount and form of capital needs to be clear.  
Capital cannot be in the form of debt, and if tangible assets are used, they need to be valued 
and the monetary value needs to be stated. Furthermore, since the profits are shared and losses 
are only borne by the capital provider, then the expenses that will form part of the agreement 
need to be clearly defined, in addition to clearly defining the profit distribution ratio. The profit 
ratio cannot be of a fixed amount or tied to capital. The mudarib does not receive a service fee, 
but his percentage of profit may be higher than the other partners, if agreed by all parties, to act 
as an incentive. Furthermore, the parties may agree to vary the percentage ratio beyond a certain 
threshold of profits generated. Additionally, profits that are generated should first be used to 
offset any losses that are being incurred in any part of the business, prior to being distributed 
(Sultan, 2009:55-56, Usmani, 2008:50-51). 
 
The mudarib is obliged to work towards achieving the mandates of the contract, and to handle 
the funds in the best way possible (within the agreed boundaries), using his expertise and skills, 
and not to misuse the funds for his own interests and expenses. He is to use Shari’ah compliant 
transactions while realising the business/project. The mudarib has an obligation to the rab al-
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mal (capital provider) to provide him with information, and to update him with the activities 
and developments of the business. The mudarib is permitted to create a reserve fund, which he 
is able to use to even out the revenues, and accordingly use to pay dividends to the investors 
across reporting periods. However, if losses are incurred, the losses have to be offset using the 
reserve fund, prior to paying out to the parties as per the agreed ratios. 
 
3.4.2. Musharakah Contracts  
 
The musharakah contract, as mentioned above is a partnership agreement that follows the PLS 
principle, and the essential elements and necessary conditions are as follows. 
 
The essential elements of musharakah are similar to those of the mudarabah agreement, with 
the exception that the parties involved are all involved in the capital as partners or shareholders. 
Hence, in addition to identifying the parties, the capital, the project to be ventured into, and the 
profit ratios all need to be stated in the agreement; in addition to there also being an exchange 
of an offer and acceptance between the parties venturing into the business together (Sultan, 
2009:48). 
 
The necessary conditions of a musharakah contract require that the capital cannot be in debt 
form, but can be in tangible assets, where they have to be valued and their monetary values 
need to be stated. No partner can provide a capital guarantee to another partner, and the capital 
contribution among the parties need not be equal. Furthermore, there might be some partners 
that are also contributing to the managing of the business, and in such a case, their role needs 
to be clearly identified; they will act as mudaribs, and the conditions and duties of the mudarib 
will apply, along with them being partners. The profit distribution ratio needs to be determined 
by the parties before entering into the agreement, bearing in mind that the profit entitlement 
cannot be a fix amount, and the percentage rate cannot be tied to the capital invested, with the 
exception of the sleeping partners. For them their percentage portion of the profit cannot exceed 
their ratio of the invested capital (Sultan, 2009:55-56, Usmani, 2008:50-51). Conversely, one 
of the partners can be appointed to manage and can be paid a fix fee, provided that it is based 
on an independent contract to that of the musharakah contract. The parties may also appoint an 
outside party (rather than from among them) to manage under a Wakala (agency) contract, 
based on set terms and conditions. In such a case he is paid a fixed fee that is paid out of the 
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musharakah expenses. Furthermore, the parties have the liberty to adjust the contractual 
provisions in line with the business conditions.   
 
3.4.3. Musharakah and Mudarabah intermingled 
 
This is a situation where the manager (mudarib) is interested in investing some of his funds 
into the invested project. In such instances the musharakah’s necessary elements and conditions 
apply, with the addition of the following conditions. The mudarib needs to obtain the 
permission of the rab-almal (capital provider) before mingling his funds with those of the rab-
almal. The profit generated is divided in proportion to the two funds, and the mudarib will 
receive all the portion of profit generated from his fund along with his agreed portion of the 
contractual fund. 
  
3.4.4. Islamic Private Equity 
 
Following on from the two basic forms of partnership that are used in Islamic finance, the 
following are the basis of the Islamic private equity process (Yunis, 2006:67-68): 
- A special purpose vehicle is established, whereby the Articles of Association of the 
vehicle cannot allow for any prohibited/haram or speculative activities, which is based 
on tangible Shari’ah acceptable assets; 
- The common form of legal structure is a limited partnership. Where the investors will 
act as Limited Partners (LP) and the fund raisers will be the General Partners (GP), 
whose role is to invest, monitor, and exit the investment; 
- A prospectus covering the terms and details of the investment is prepared.  The 
memorandum should cover as a minimum: the objectives, the investment approach (in 
line with Shari’ah principles), the exit strategy, the opportunities and risks, the 
management and the board, the legal and tax matters, and terms of 
investment/subscription; 
- Using the prospectus offers are made to the investors; 
- The investors’ funds/assets are pooled into the vehicle, that has been set up for such 
purpose; 
- The funds are invested based on partnership structures, such as mudarabah and 
musharakah.  
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Figure 3.4 - Simple Mudarabah Structure 
 
	
Figure 3. 5 - Simple Musharakah Structure 
 
 
3.5. Contrasting the Islamic and Conventional Private Equity 
Although today’s Islamic private equity (IPE) has been established based on the conventional 
private equity (CPE) model, there are some similarities and some differences between the two 
approaches of private equity investments. The following section will attempt to provide an 
insight into the most prominent ones. 
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3.5.1 Similarities of Islamic and Conventional Private Equity 
 
Both the Islamic and conventional private equity are set up in the form of a partnership, 
normally similar to limited and general partners. The capital committing providers take up the 
role of financiers as well as investors, and they are usually institutional investors as well as high 
net worth individuals. Furthermore, since the funds will be locked up for a reasonably long 
period, that could run to 8 years or more, then for the investment to be attractive to both 
approaches it needs to demonstrate that it has the ability to generate some cash-flow during the 
investment period, in addition to having a persuasive exit strategy, where and when the 
investors will be able to generate a return on their investment (Yousfi, 2012:7-8). The “technical 
operational” aspects of administration and monitoring the project are similar in both methods 
(Ahmed, 2004:3). 
 
Both approaches function on the basis of a partnership and accordingly follow the principal 
agent relationship. Thus, they both face moral hazard, adverse selection, and asymmetry of 
information problems that are associated with such a relationship. 
 
3.5.2 Differences between Islamic and Conventional Private Equity 
 
The differences arise from the aspect of the need for IPE to be Islamic. By this, the partnership 
needs to be in line with the Shari’ah principles and its related Islamic business ethics. Even 
though characteristics such as truthfulness, trust and competence are desired and sought in CPE, 
yet in the IPE it is a pre-requisite for it to be Islamically accepted (Durrani & Boocock, 
2006:151). First and foremost, the target investment/project needs to be halal (not in prohibited 
sectors) and it needs to serve some form social and economic benefits. The IPE is financed 
following the PLS principles (mentioned above, section 3.1.1). The mudarabah method is 
similar to the conventional venture capital financing, whereas the musharakah method is more 
similar to the conventional private capital growth financing.   
 
Furthermore, they face operating differences, in that as per Shari’ah requirements, they are not 
permitted to take interest-based leverage; unlike its CPE counterparts, where their working 
capital can be through interest-based debt (Yousfi, 2012:19). Although in some instances IPE 
is allowed to take on board some debt (when investing in conventional stocks), and if the debt 
is in the form of interest-based loans, the debt to equity ratio cannot exceed 33% (Yousfi, 
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2012:19). Both approaches face various risks, such as market and liquidity risks, and the IPE 
is restricted in the way that it cannot overcome them by hedging against these risks. For instance, 
the CPE is able to go down the road of options, futures and diversify, while the IPE is not 
permitted to do so. In entering the trusted contractual agreement, the IPE is obliged to stay in 
the investment until maturity, even if it is making a loss. As such, the IPE face higher risks than 
their CPE counterparts, and so there is a greater need for them to be selective in their 
investments. Moreover, the CPE and the IPE contracts are similar in that they both have an 
outcome element but they differ in that with the IPE the ethical element should be paramount, 
unlike in CPE where it is an expected behaviour (Dusuki, 2006). 
 
Due to the importance of compliance with Shari’ah, IPE in their structural set up are required 
to have a Shari’ah Supervisory Board. Their role is to make sure that the investment/project is 
in line with Shari’ah right from the selection of the investment to its exit. Such a board is not 
required in CPE. When coming to the supervisory issue, the regulations are not clear for both 
parties, but more so for IPE, and they vary from one country to another. At least with the CPE, 
although disclosure might be an issue, there is some form of harmonisation and standardisation 
in certain areas of regulations/supervision (Yousfi, 2012:12-20). 
 
3.6. CHALLENGES FACING ISLAMIC PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Although IPE is an encouraged form of doing business since risk is shared rather than 
transferred, it still faces many challenges. This section identifies some of the challenges that 
such a method of financing faces.  
 
3.6.1. Arrangement Structure of IPE 
 
Under IPE it is either the structure of mudarabah or musharakah that is used, and in both modes 
issues relating to the principal agent relationship of moral hazard and asymmetry of information 
arise, but more so in the former than the latter. The mudarib, which acts as an agent in the 
mudarabah and in the musharakah (when the management is allocated to certain partners), may 
act in his self-interest once the financing has taken place. The mudarib usually seeks to run the 
venture with minimal or no interference from their partners, and monitoring becomes 
uneconomical for some, more so with the high net worth individual investors than the 
institutional investors. It is more risky with mudarabah than musharakah, due to the fact that 
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mudarabah is a non-binding contract. That is, the capital provider trusts the mudarib with his 
funds, who acts as an agent and with his consent. As such, any loss is to be borne by the capital 
provider (AAOIFI, 2008:245).  
 
As an incentive to the mudarib, the Shari’ah standards allow for the mudarib partner of the 
musharakah to receive remuneration provided it is in a separate contract to the musharakah 
contract. This is so if anything should happen to terminate the managerial agreement it would 
not affect the partnership agreement. However, this is not the case with the mudarib in a 
mudarabah contract as the mudarib entered the agreement with this being his role and 
responsibility and his contribution to the venture. Nonetheless, the mudarib’s expenses (within 
reason) can be covered by the mudarabah’s funds (AAOIFI, 2008:240). 
 
In the CPE, the above agency problem does exist, and it is overcome by introducing 
preference12 and convertible shares in the financing as an incentive. Although preference shares 
(of different classes and rights) are not permitted in Shari’ah, convertible shares are 
permissible. 13  Moreover, to overcome the agency problem IPE permits different profit 
entitlement (that is greater than the percentage of the injected capital), upon exceeding a certain 
threshold, to act as an incentive (provided all parties agree).  
 
In musharakah there is a form of buy-back known as diminishing musharakah, whereby the 
entrepreneur of the venture buys back the other partners’/investors’ equity portion, as profits 
are generated. The exit strategy is another challenge, since the investors’ return on investment 
																																								 																				
12 Reference to preference shares in CPE: “Unlike in public settings, in private equity preferred stock refers to a 
security that awards liquidation rights to the investor if the company does not achieve a threshold performance 
level…we refer to the group of securities as convertible preferred stock to avoid confusion with preferred that only 
has preferential voting rights” (Lerner and Schoar, 2005:226).	
13  Convertible shares are permissible in Shari’ah, however, they are not structured in the same way as the 
conventional, as it involves bay al-‘inah and discounted bay al-dayn and is considered to lead to riba. Islamic 
convertible bonds are structured using three contracts: Al-wadiah contract, Kafala contract, and al-qirad contract. 
“Since Al-Wadiah is not a loan (al-Qirad), it is likely that some contractual return can be guaranteed based on mutual 
consent (ta’awun) if and only if the investment is profitable…the distributive scheme of Al-Wadiah can help provide 
an incentive to asset-owners cum investors to take minimal risk but to be assured of some returns when some profits 
are indeed realized” (Rosly and Omar 1999). An agreed upon profit ratio is contracted between the owner (investor) 
and the Custodian (issuer) in an Al-Wadiah contract. And in order to offer an Islamically acceptable call option (i.e. 
a price free conversion option which acts as a sweetener in the conventional), a separate contract from Al-Wadiah is 
entered into: a Kafala contract. This is where a third party on the concept of ta’awn (for a service fee from the issuer) 
enters into a Kafala contract with the owner/investor, where he guarantees the conversion of the Al-Wadiah contract 
into stocks. The third party will warrant selling the Al-Wadiah at the conversion price (which is below the market 
price). Then the owner/investor purchases stocks with the cash proceeds at the conversion price, through an Al-Qirad 
contract. In the Al-Qirad contract the distribution of profits is not assured and it is based on performance (Rosly and 
Omar 1999).   	
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is heavily dependent on being able to exit from the investment/venture. The form of exit needs 
to be stated in the contract. Other than diminishing musharakah, there are a few permissible 
ways, such as initial public offering (IPO), acquisition, and secondary sale that may reflect 
positively on the returns, if the venture exists through such methods, yet this requires a well-
developed and operating financial market (both private and public). 
 
3.6.2. Legal Structure of the IPE 
 
The usual legal set-up in such an approach is that of limited liability whereby claims can only 
be made to the company and cannot reach out to the personal assets of the parties involved.  
This introduces a challenge especially when a few partners, who are mainly sleeping partners, 
provide the funds and the business is run by the activities of a single/few partner(s). Claims can 
arise due to the managing partner’s behaviour that the venture is unable to settle.    
 
Furthermore, this legal set-up (of a vehicle where the funds are pooled, in order to form a single 
entity for the purpose of making it easier to manage and administer the venture), is usually 
established in another jurisdiction, other than where the managers, parties or the 
investment/project are located, which makes it even more difficult to monitor and oversee. The 
laws of the jurisdiction where the entity is established/registered govern the legal structure, 
which might not be in alignment with the laws of the jurisdiction that the parties are from, 
making it even less effective to control or regulate such an entity.  
 
There is also the matter of investors’/shareholders’ protection and entitlements such as 
investors’ rights and “upholding property rights, respecting the consistency of entitlement with 
the rights of ownership, linking transactions to real life activity, [and] transfer of property rights 
in sales”. In addition to the contract, the “documents, processes and operations” are the legal 
axioms that need to be endorsed, not in the “form and words” but in the “object and meaning” 
of the Islamic law (Ahmed, 2011:150-151). Under the current Islamic laws and regulation 
environment, there are two main challenges. The first is the familiarity (not only knowledge, 
skills and expertise, but cultural and language) of those transacting and involved with the 
Shari’ah principles and the Islamic law. The other is the endorsement of such investor’s rights 
issues in the national laws which are also of concern to the parties and participants involved in 
the transaction, especially as there is little experience in endorsing such cases pertaining to the 
Islamic law. The concern and fear of the participants arises from the aspect that “there is no 
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explicit mention [in the Islamic laws and regulations] of shareholder’s rights as stated in the 
contemporary corporate law framework” (Ahmed, 2012:387). 
 
In mudarabah once the covenants are agreed upon and the agreement is signed, any subsequent 
changes cannot be made without the agreement of both parties. So if the venture does not go as 
planned the mudarib cannot easily persuade his partner to make any changes. While in 
musharakah the terms and covenants of the contract can be agreed on to be adjusted in phases, 
as the venture progresses. This constraint on the flexibility of the covenants of the mudarabah 
is to protect the capital provider from being at the mercy of the mudarib. 
 
3.6.3. Transparency of the IPE 
 
As seen above, the asymmetry of information is of concern in financial transactions. The 
concern arises in that in both mudarabah and musharakah not all parties are aware or have the 
same level of information. In mudarabah, the mudarib manages the business without any 
interference from the capital provider/financier (rab-almal/investor), and so the main channel 
of information to the investor is from the mudarib. Also in musharakah, although all parties 
are involved, and the non-managing parties can be on the advisory board, the information they 
receive is also from the managing partner. Furthermore, in practice, upon subscription the 
investors sign a proxy to the managing partner. As such, the restriction in authority places the 
need for more disclosure (Aljifri, 2013:83). There is an essential need for transparency and 
detailed specific disclosure clauses to be covered in both the covenants of the contract, and in 
the regulations that will enforce such requirements to be part of the contract, let alone 
monitoring its compliance. 
 
Furthermore, the documentations involved in such transactions are few. And in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding, ambiguity, loss of rights and to prevent any disputes, proficient due 
diligence is required in drawing up the related contracts. There is also the issue of these 
documents meeting the Shari’ah scholars’ approval and the regulations of various jurisdictions. 
This can turn out to be very costly and time consuming, and can be reduced by having 
acceptable standardised documents that could be made available for use, which can be tweaked 
to suit specific arrangements (Khan 2011).  
 
73		
3.6.4. Shari’ah Knowledge and Understanding  
 
The Shari’ah principles are not understood by all market participants. There is a lack of those 
who are knowledgeable about Shari’ah and finance at the same time (Jaffer, 2010:19).  Scholars 
and jurists who are experienced in fiqh al-muamalat and Islamic commercial jurisprudence are 
in short supply. Furthermore, this deficiency in transacting the Islamic way is also applicable 
to market practitioners. The practitioners that are involved in dealing in Islamic transactions 
are not professionally qualified. They lack the correct awareness and in depth understanding of 
the basic Shari’ah principles and lack an appreciation towards the Shari’ah requirements 
(Abdull Mutalip, n.d.). Most of the professionals handling the deals, in such an industry, are 
from the conventional system, and their knowledge of the Shari’ah way of transacting is more 
experience rather than in-depth study/academic.   
 
On the supply side, the high net worth investors whose knowledge on the Shari’ah way of 
transacting is shallow, in that it lacks an in depth understanding of the basic Islamic principles, 
and the spiritual social reasoning behind the prohibitions. There is a lack of “cultural acceptance 
of Islamic products” (Bose & Mcgee, 2008:14). Their understanding is gained from networking 
more than anything else, which gives rise to certain misunderstandings about certain Shari’ah 
concepts (such as with there not being a difference between interest and mark-up and the social 
harm it can have). Furthermore, the deficiencies in some of the transactions (with regards to 
them being fully Shari’ah compliant) that the industry has been experiencing (such as tawarruq, 
and certain sukuk issuance (Bose & Mcgee, 2008:10;  Jaffer, 2010:4-5), along with being more 
familiar with the conventional system, has given rise to confusion and doubts in investors, 
resulting in less trust when investing in such Islamic investments.   
 
The Shari’ah compliant way of financing is a culture that needs to be developed from a top-
down approach, embracing all members, not just those of the industry, but also society, as is 
understood from the literature review of the earlier sections of this chapter.  
 
3.6.5. Shari’ah Perspective 
 
The maqasid al-shari’ah imposes both legal and social obligations on those practicing Islamic 
methods. The “legal requirements can be deliberated in terms of form and substance and the 
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social aspects can be recognised in the role played by the [financial institutions]” in meeting 
the market needs of different segments of the society (Ahmed, 2011:155).   
 
Having the proper documentation in place can allow them to conform to Shari’ah. However, 
the challenge lies in meeting the substance and social aspects of the obligation, which is usually 
not easily reached or seen. With regards to the substance, this feature is related to legal 
characteristics that need to be maintained during implementation, and since it is not tangible, it 
can easily be distorted in application. With regards to the social aspect, it is the ability to service 
all segments of the market and fulfil the needs of all group classes (rich, middle and poor). Due 
to these concerns and doubts, the terms “Shari’ah compliant”, “Shari’ah based” and “pseudo-
Islamic” (Ahmed, 2011a:150) have arisen. The table below gives a summary of the various 
positions and their corresponding requirements.     
 
Figure 3.6 - Shari'ah Requirements and Product Categories 
Product Type Legal Social 
Form Substance Market Segment Needs 
Pseudo-Islamic  ? ? ? 
Shari’ah Compliant   ? ? 
Shari’ah Based     
Source: Ahmed, 2011:156 
 
Therefore, an IPE can be pseudo-Islamic if it only meets the legal form and it can be considered 
Shari’ah compliant if it meets both the legal form and substance, yet ignores the market 
segments and does not offer assistance to those in need in the market, and it could be considered 
Shari’ah based when it realises all goals; the legal and the social.  
 
3.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter reviewed Islamic private equity in the context of the Islamic financial system and 
Shari’ah. Everything revolves around the Shari’ah principles that are not there to preserve and 
punish, but to serve as a set of values and systems to be followed. As the Islamic system is 
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considered a code of life, religion and management of daily life are not to be considered as 
unrelated but rather to act as complements. By succeeding in one’s daily life in this world a 
person correspondingly works for success in the world hereafter. 
 
The individual is not to work in isolation, but to work within the society; working for the benefit 
of oneself through benefiting others in the society. The thinking should be to maximise 
welfare/social outcomes rather than to maximise profits. The aim is to create a system that 
would remove/reduce hardship and protect the rights of all, including the minority.  
 
Islamic finance is a faith based blending of economics, ethics, and Islamic law and also must 
comply with national laws/regulations. Whereby the dealings have to be real and based on 
transparency, equality, and risk sharing. As such, equity is the favoured form of transacting, as 
debt in the long-term can only lead to imbalance and harmful outcomes. Actions are observed 
both externally (what can be seen) and internally (what cannot be seen); and intention, of which 
substance is an analogy, forms a vital component in Shari’ah.   
 
Islamic private equity might be similar to the form of the conventional private equity, yet it has 
to preserve the above-mentioned Shari’ah parameters. Hence, meeting the structural and legal 
format is not sufficient for the structure/venture to be fully acceptable by Shari’ah. The whole 
cycle of the venture needs to be followed and monitored. There needs to be an on-going process 
of checking and monitoring to make sure that transparency, disclosure and investors’ rights are 
being preserved, so as to maintain the legal requirements, both form and substance, and the 
social Shari’ah requirements, so that it can be considered fully Islamic, i.e. Sharai’ah based.  
 
As participants progress further down the road of IPE, several deficiencies relating to corporate 
governance principles have come to float lately. Some of which are difficult to resolve (such as 
risk management, hedging strategies and innovative instruments), due to the Shari’ah features 
involved and demanded, while others can easily be seen to by the supervisory and regulatory 
institutes. Standards and regulations regarding legal rights, investor protection, transparency, 
and disclosure (those that protect the society and the individuals, reduce agency problems, and 
uncertainty (gharar), and also form part of the pre-requisites to being Islamic) are but some 
that need to be available, enhanced and enforced even when dealings are related to the private 
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market. There is the matter of exit strategies that can also be developed, so as to encourage this 
form of investment/financing.  
 
Even though the conventional approach has similar deficiencies towards investor protection, 
(such as: moral hazard, adverse selection, asymmetry of information - as discussed in the 
previous chapter), there lies a greater need to develop the rules and regulations of the Islamic 
approach. The reason being, such shortfalls in the conventional approach do not affect the legal 
status of being non-compliant, considering that no such dealing takes place in the public market. 
However, as discussed above, these deficiencies cannot be ignored with the Islamic approach, 
and need to be resolved for the legal status of the transactions not to fall short of being Shari’ah 
compliant.
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Chapter Four: 
PRIVATE EQUITY REGULATIONS: PRINCIPLES AND STATUS IN THE 
GCC  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Carrying on from the previous chapter, several deficiencies relating to corporate governance 
principles can be identified. Matters that protect the society and individuals, reduce agency 
conflict and uncertainty such as investor protection, transparency, and disclosure are of concern 
and cannot be ignored in Islamic private equity for it to be Shari’ah compliant. Thus, there may 
be a need to introduce some form of discipline in the conduct of the parties involved in private 
equity. 
 
However, as private equity, unlike the public equity market, is considered a private market and 
does not deal with public investors, it is not expected to affect systemic risk. As a result, it may 
be argued that it does not require much regulating. Nevertheless, following on from the 
financial crises this view is starting to change, and regulators, as well as some industry 
participants, are starting to see the need for more transparency in the private market, especially 
private equity. This is because private equity firms are different from conventional privately 
owned businesses (Morris & Phalippou, 2012:79). Contemporary private equity firms manage 
funds on behalf of pension schemes, financial institutions, endowments, and high net-worth 
individuals, which all fall under the definition of sophisticated/qualified/accredited investors. 
  
Before proceeding with the chapter and the regulatory environment for private equity, to give 
an indication of the size and nature of the private equity in the region, the following is a brief 
synopsis of the private equity market in the MENA14 region.15 According to the MENA Private 
Equity Association report16, the private equity growth slowed for 2015/2016, after having 
experienced some growth in 2013/2104, following the drop post the previous peak in 2008 
(U$7.113bn). Recovery from the effects of the financial crisis was short lived, due to the recent 
																																								 																				
14 MENA - Middle East and North Africa. 	
15  The researcher was unable to obtain data specifically for the GCC market on the Private Equity market.  
Furthermore, the researcher was unable to obtain data specifically on Islamic private equity. The data obtained 
(stated above) includes both conventional and Islamic private equity. 	
16 As per the MENA Private Equity 2015 Report: “Investment information is necessarily not fully comprehensive 
as it is estimated that up to 30% of PE and VC transactions in the MENA region are not announced, and not all 
announced transactions include details regarding the size of the investment”. 
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drop in oil prices, the economic slowdown and the regional instability in the region. Although 
the number of investments reached 244 (175 in 2015), the total value of investments had 
dropped by 25% (U$1.1134bn-2016, U$1.487bn-2015). As per the MENA report17, of the GCC 
countries UAE (62%) had experienced the greatest private equity investment activity during 
2016, while KSA experienced the greatest drop in value of investments of 38% (21%-2015, 
9%-2016). Most of the other countries took a slower approach with “a wait and see” attitude. 
The number of divestments during the year was 14 (21-2015) with an estimated18 value of 
U$462m (U$1,379m-2015). Consumer driven sectors, such as retail, healthcare, transportation, 
food & beverage and education were the popular investment sectors. Investors’ preferences 
were towards the deal by deal transactions (specific investment) method of raising funds, as 
opposed to the pooling of funds method. As per a survey conducted by the MENA Association 
on the GP sentiments going forward for the PE market, 33% of the GP see the main 
impediments to doing PE deals in the region as the capital market regulations and foreign 
ownership restriction. This was followed by a need for more effective enforcement of 
agreements and minority shareholders’ protection (20%) (MENA Private Equity Association, 
2016). 
 
In this chapter, regulation on private equity will be examined. The chapter will first start to look 
at the framework and types of regulations, followed by the overall regulations on private equity. 
After which, the Shari’ah regulations on private equity will be viewed. The chapter will then 
view the GCC market regulations on private equity in general and Islamic private equity in 
particular. 
 
4.2 FRAMEWORK AND TYPES OF REGULATIONS 
 
Regulations are usually a set of orders or directives that are set in place to control operations 
and conduct in the market economy. Black (2002:26) defines regulation as “the sustained and 
focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined standards or purposes with 
the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve 
mechanisms of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification”. The 
regulatory framework is based on three levels (pillars) (section 4.2.3), and together they are 
“complementary and mutually reinforcing” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:15) in stipulating 
																																								 																				
17 As per the MENA Private Equity Association 2016 Report: “Private equity is defined to include houses that have 
a General Partner/Limited Partner structure, investment companies and quasi-governmental entities that are run by, 
and operate in the same way as, a private equity house”. 	
18 Estimated, due to lack of information in the market on exit value.	
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order into the market. Moreover, there are different ways of how the market participants deal 
in the market (relationship versus rule based), depending on the development of their market 
economy, as can be seen below. The discussion below is in relation to the private market and 
private equity in particular.   
 
4.2.1 Relationship Regulation versus Rule Based Regulation  
 
The level of enforcement depends on the types of regulations/enforcement mechanism that exist 
in that particular market. Depending on whether it is an emerging/“catching-up” (Li, 2003:669) 
or developed economy, the form of enforcement mechanism will vary. Economies, where the 
“information structure” (Li, 2003:656) is well developed is considered to rely on market based 
governance, while those economies where the information structure is not as advanced rely on 
relation based governance. Market efficiency relies on how effectively “noise” (caused by the 
irregularly and uncertainty of information) can be reduced in a market; where noise can only 
be reduced by having a developed informational structure, that is “universal … shar[ed]” (Li, 
2003:656). “The information infrastructure includes accounting, auditing, notary, and rating 
agencies, and legal cases and codes, which develop and accumulate slowly” (Li, 2003:655-656). 
 
Most economies start with relation-based governance and move towards rule-based governance 
as economies develop. In relationship-based governance, transactions are based on a personal 
basis with implied contracts and are enforced-based on personal relationships and sanctions. 
The checks and balances of the state in the form of rules are not sufficiently available, or if they 
exist, are not implemented effectively due to lack of clear and commonly understood rules to 
offer the protection and comfort required, and are “only ink on paper” (Li, 2003:667). On the 
other hand, a rule-based market is where information is widely available, rules are well 
established and an effective monitoring and enforceable legal system exists. Market (rule)-
based governance might appear costly, however, as the market grows and transactions become 
more numerous and complex, the marginal cost of transactions on a personal basis increases 
and outweighs the benefits gained from such a personal relationship transaction. As the market 
evolves, market-based governance benefits from the economies of scale can be gained from 
having a reliable monitoring and enforceable mechanism (Li, 2003:655-656).  
 
Parties involved in private equity (especially venture capital) face a great deal of risk.  
Consequently, they have decision factors to consider, prior to deciding on their investment.  
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These decision factors are based on a network of commercial organisations known as 
“economic institutions” (Zacharakis, McMullen, & Shepherd, 2007:691). Economic 
institutions represent “the ‘rule of the game’ that provide incentives and reduce uncertainties in 
assessing the cost of transacting” (Zacharakis et al., 2007:691). These rules of the game 
(decision factors) include a long spectrum that varies from human capital to arm’s length 
(impersonal)-based transactions. The information used in the decision factors might be the same 
but it is weighed differently, depending on which point of the spectrum their market is at 
(Zacharakis et al., 2007:692). At one extreme, in relation-based markets, where the enforcement 
of contract and property rights is weak and relies on “national culture” (Zhou & Peng, 2009:2) 
more weight is given to the information available on human capital and trust (“informal rules”) 
when making decisions (Zhou & Peng, 2009:1). For example, “trust in the entrepreneur is 
necessary to compensate for the lack of a strong rule of law” (Zacharakis et al., 2007:695).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, in markets with an effective legal mechanism and strong 
enforceable property rights, decisions are made on the basis of the information available in the 
market itself, such as size, growth, technology and rules (Zacharakis et al., 2007:695).  There 
are also economies where venture capital decisions are made based on both human capital and 
market information; this is still under the transformation stage from one form to the other. The 
progress from one end of the spectrum to the other takes place over an extensive period of time, 
where the length of time depends mainly on three variables. The first variable is the availability 
of the necessary rules to govern all transactions; while the second is the strength of enforcement 
of those rules, and the third is the resistance and acceptance of adapting the rules (Peng, 
2003:282).  
 
4.2.2 Principle-based Regulation Verses Market-based Regulation 
 
Principle-based regulations are based on international standard setting organisations that 
provide the general outline of the rule or matters to be regulated and leave the details to the 
regulators to develop their own systems and internal control to meet such principles.  Although 
this might give the regulator the freedom to form its own system and structure of regulations it 
also works as a ‘double edged sword’. On the one hand it provides the regulator with the 
principle/value of concern, yet on the other hand, it does not provide sufficient details that can 
help him to deal with the matter, and which in turn affects effective enforcement. Transforming 
these principles into functional rules requires “the exercise of a good deal of judgment, and the 
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various actors in the regime may have quite distinctive and divergent approaches to making 
such judgment” (Baldwin, Cave, & Martin, 2013:304). The various actors coming from 
different backgrounds, with different assumptions and various values, can affect 
communication and interpretation and thus the final formation and implementation of the rules. 
It also requires expertise and resources, which not all regulators (being at different stages of 
development) might have (Baldwin et al., 2013:305).  
 
Moreover, principle-based rules set by international organisations, such as the ones set by the 
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) and the Islamic Financial 
Service Board (IFSB) for the securities and financial market, are not considered “freestanding” 
19  (Pistor, 2002:115) rules in that they usually rely on another set of rules for their 
implementation and enforceability. They are considered “dependent rules” (115) in that they 
depend on other rules, where additional amendments are required to already established rules 
to make them compatible: “further reference to other rules, legal concepts, or entire bodies of 
law needs to be made” (Pistor, 2002:115). With regards to the IOSCO principles, “the efficacy 
proposed by the rules will depend on the scope and quality of the general framework for 
commercial law” (IOSCO, 2003:5). Furthermore, they are set based on the concept of the 
“lower common denominator” ((Pistor, 2002):109). These principles are set by international 
organisations, with members from various countries with backgrounds of different legal 
systems and rules. Consequently, when arriving at an outcome, the selection/outcome will be 
based on those most compatible to their pre-existing legal models and rules. They might not 
necessarily be the most efficient to all members.  
 
Market-based rules are based on set rules and standard templates arrived at from the supply and 
demand side of the market needs. Specific rules and standard templates are easier to implement 
and more cost effective. Even though it overcomes the deficiencies of the principle-based rules, 
it has its weaknesses as they are formed by the market/industry participants taking into 
consideration their interests which might not take into consideration the interests of other 
stakeholders. For the stakeholders to benefit effectively, an “independent evaluation and 
accountability” (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:93) is required. Market-based rules lead to 
standardisation, and although they might provide some form of certainty and efficiency, they 
can lead to issues, if ignored, which could lead to systematic risk (even if non-prudential). One 
of which is that changes can occur in the economy/market over time and the market participants 
																																								 																				
19 As opposed to the accounting rules, the International Accounting Standards (IAS) are considered ‘freestanding’ 
because they “can be derived from reading the IAS alone, and no further reference to other rules, or entire bodies of 
law needs to be made” (Pistor, 2002:115).	
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might act selfishly and adapt to the changes in such a way to “protect themselves, but not the 
system as a whole”(Andenas & Chiu, 2014:93). These types of behaviour could lead to lack of 
“regulatory capture” (Carpenter and Moss 2013) and to market failure. The other issue arises 
when implementing the set standard rule, whereby it loses its spirit and becomes more of a 
‘box-ticking’ form of implementation. Hence, regulatory supervision is required to overcome 
such behaviour. 
 
4.2.3 Framework of Regulation 
 
Governance of the private equity market is based on three main pillars: “company law”, 
“contractual mechanism”, and “best practices”/“soft regulations”(McCahery & Vemeulen, 
2008). The company law regulates “registration and formation, organisation and operation, 
distribution of powers and decision-making, exit and dissolution, information and disclosure, 
fiduciary duties and liability protection” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:5). Contractual 
mechanisms such as “joint venture agreements and shareholder agreements” are used by 
businesses to curtail the deficiency in the regulations in the company law, with regards to the 
specific requirements of certain forms of business structures (private equity/venture capital) 
(McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:55,12). Best practices provide the business with a “well-tailored 
framework of legal mechanisms and norms”, filling the gap that has not been covered in the 
other pillars (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:5,11). 
 
The company or corporate law is a “standard set of rules that represent different points on the 
continuum of types of firms” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:23). These range from 
organisations in which the owners retain significant control over organisations where control is 
given fully to outsiders (shareholders). As we move along the spectrum, and more parties are 
involved and interact with one another, the need for contractual agreements become important. 
These agreements work as a way of aligning the interests and rights of the parties involved. 
And as markets expand and globalise, norms/standards/best practices (codes/guidelines) are 
promoted to reflect professionalism. 
 
Usually codes and guidelines, known as “soft regulations”, are more effective. At times they 
are informative and assist industry players in performing their role more effectively; they 
provide more detail on certain conduct, which assists enforcement players (Smith, 2012: 378, 
399). They are also more flexible than legislation. They can easily be updated, and new ones 
introduced, to reflect the social and economic changes that occur in the market, while legislation 
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cannot easily be changed (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:198) (Morth, 2004:194-195) (Smith, 
2012:387). Furthermore, it is “closely related to socialisation, identity-building” (Morth, 
2004:195) that they can act as a form of a disciplinary mechanism within the industry, from the 
aspect of maintaining integrity and reputation by abiding to these codes.   
 
Figure 4.1 - The Legal Governance Framework 
 
 
4.2.3.1 Industry-based versus National Oriented Regulations 
 
The private market is a different market to the public/listed companies market, with different 
forms of relationships between the owners, investors and managers. The partnership contracts 
involve control and benefit rights, which at some time during the relationship will require 
effective governance and enforcement. It is the “governance mechanisms” that are of great 
importance. These are the mechanisms that are “triggered by stakeholders, those internal and 
those external to the [business]” (Smith, 2012:382). It is not enough to have legal accountability, 
as provided by the company law, but there needs to be accountability in terms of self-regulation, 
and the norms of so-called ‘best practice’ (Smith, 2012:382).      
 
Along the “formal… system of control” (Smith, 2012:381), “informal” systems are required.   
The spectrum of formal to informal ranges from: the state/company law (legal regulation) at 
one end, to business ethics at the other end, where codes of conduct and best practices lie in 
between. With the legal regulation being at the centre, its dispersion is centralised to that 
particular state/sector; while business ethics and best practices are decentralised, and are more 
dispersed. Business ethics is mainly behaviour based on culture, society, the individual and his 
integrity. While best practices are codes/standards/norms (also known as soft regulation) put in 
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place by the industry, or in liaison with the industry, and they cross: boards, societies, and 
cultures. Thus, they have a wider range of reach than the legal regulation.  
 
Figure 4.2 - The Spectrum of Governance: From Formal to Informal 
 
 
Since the guidelines and best practices (set by/with the industry) have wider ranges of reach, 
they are a more appropriate form of regulation for the private market. The desired flexibility 
(in lieu of the law that cannot easily be changed) is retained through them, yet the essentiality 
of transparency and disclosure for the growth of this market, especially private equity, is 
promoted. However, since they are not obligatory, they are not necessarily followed/complied 
with by all participants. “The challenge is to locate the right mix of soft law and government 
measures that encourage [a company] to effectively disclose” (McCahery & Vermeulen, 
2012:223). Therefore, it would appear that some form of co-regulation between the industry 
and the regulator (National) cooperation is inline, to be able to reach an acceptable level of 
compliance. Whereby, a “periodic review of the company compliance is conducted by 
government sponsored monitoring committees which publish the industry-wide compliance 
level yearly” ( McCahery & Vermeulen, 2012:224).  
 
4.2.3.2 Compliance and Regulation  
 
It is not sufficient to have standards, rules and regulations that are widely accepted without the 
effective enforcement. Compliance with them is essential, even if it is the implementation of 
rule-based regulations. Being rule-based and “formalistic” (Pistor, 2002:113) does not 
necessarily mean that all those related will oblige. There needs to be supervision and monitoring 
to ensure its implementation. Compliance without some form of enforcement or monitoring can 
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lead to “formal” compliance, rather than “real compliance” (i.e. in form rather than in spirit) 
(Pistor, 2002:125).  
 
Effective enforcement systems are also required with soft laws, even if created by the industry; 
it does not mean that compliance would be of a high level or of high value. Many of the soft 
regulations are ‘voluntary’, and on the basis of ‘comply or explain’. Although they are flexible 
and act as a self-regulating mechanism, there are drawbacks to soft regulation. “[T]here is often 
no clear duty to comply and no clear beneficiary of the duty” (Smith, 2012:380), since they are 
not legally obligatory and so will not necessarily be practiced by all nor will they all be 
implemented. In such circumstances, who checks the soundness of the basis of whether to 
comply or not? And how effective is the monitoring? So as to be able to deal with “creative 
compliance” (Pistor, 2002:113) created as a result of different explanations and interpretations 
by the implementers. 
 
In the private contract/agreement, the investor is not involved in the day-to-day management, 
and does not have many governance powers. As such, they “must rely on regulatory 
enforcement to ensure compliance” (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:181). Hence, operative legal 
systems that are receptive to improper behaviour, and where accordingly rules are enforced, 
will increase investor confidence and market growth. 
 
4.2.3.3. Smart Regulation 
 
Smart regulation, a contemporary form of regulation, follows on from the above concept of 
regulators collaborating with other parties to realise compliance and enhance the regulatory 
enforcement strategy. In such regulation the regulator empowers second (quasi-regulators) and 
third parties (public interest groups) to act as “surrogate regulations” (Gunningham & Sinclair, 
1998:2) and (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:86). The “three-sided” (Baldwin et al., 2013:266) form of 
regulation works on the basis of mixing strategies and instruments implemented by the parties 
participating in the enforcement. Enforcement starts at the parties’ level, with the least 
interfering policy measures and is escalated upwards within the parties and to the regulator, 
when response to the lower level fails. Such a form of flexibility in the enforcement serves to 
fill the sanctioning gaps. At times when it might not be possible to escalate the matter upwards, 
due to certain legal issues, alternative options are available, by traversing sideways.  
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Figure 4.3 - The Three Aspects of Smart Regulation 
 
 
However, for such a form of regulation to be effective in its compliance and enforcement 
requires that the regulators take up certain measures to act as warning signals, if 
compliance/enforcement effectiveness is weakening. Regulators must take into consideration 
certain matters for the “regulatory pluralism” (Parker, Kuuttiniem, Klaasen, Hill, & Jacobs, 
2000:67) to work. In order for the non-government regulating parties to perform their task 
effectively, regulators must bear in mind that these parties could seek their self-interest above 
that of the industry/society (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:86,467), and regulators would need to keep 
regulatory capture, caused by those seeking their self-interest above those of the industry, at a 
minimum. As such, a form of monitoring (firm reporting, inspecting, independent auditing, etc.) 
is required. To assist in the “trigger[ing]” (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998:8) and to act as a 
warning sign, once a certain level is reached, taking into consideration allowing for a “buffer 
zone” (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998:8), upon which the regulator can react, before any 
negative effect spills over. There are also times when regulators would need to introduce 
temporary measures that act as “circuit breakers”, especially when new regulations that are 
unfavoured by the industry are being introduced and implemented. They are required in order 
“to achieve real progress in areas where regulatory resistance is high and external monitoring 
is difficult” (Gunningham & Sinclair, 1998:9).   
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For such a form of compliance/enforcement to be acceptable and adaptable by those enforcing 
(the regulatory pluralism) and by those that it is enforced upon (the regulatees), trust in the 
effective implementation of such a system is imperative. Trust that the regulator will act as a 
“fair umpire who administers and enforces laws or regulations that have important substantive 
objectives” (Parker et al., 2000:72); and trust that the law would be implemented effectively 
and that non-compliance is not an acceptable culture. Furthermore, those assisting parties 
require adequate information in order to be able to perform the duties effectively and to make 
fair decisions. Therefore, industry information is mandatory at the lower levels of the pyramid. 
However, upon enforcement for the provision of information, those that are compliant should 
not be put at a comparative disadvantage by those that are non-compliant, especially under 
voluntary compliance regimes, and disciplinary sanctions to overcome and prevent such 
exploitation are required. 
 
4.3 REGULATIONS ON PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Although private equity investment has been around for a long time, interests with regards to 
governance and transparency have only surfaced in the last couple of years, after the financial 
crisis. Upon reviewing the international (in this study: USA, UK and Europe) market 
regulations on the matter, it appears that the form of direct investment in private equity is 
considered private placement when dealing with “accredited investors”20 and is considered 
“Exempt” 21 , and only in some jurisdictions registration with the securities 
regulator/commission is required. Moreover, the major forms of private equity that have been 
of concern and gained some attention from the international market and regulators is the 
“private equity tainted by the perception of asset stripping, excessive leverage and disregard 
for the interest of employees” (buyouts) (Goddard, 2009:3). Accordingly, guidelines directed 
to the portfolio companies of private equity firms (such as the David Walker Guidelines, by the 
BVCA 22, that became mandatory in 2007), and Directives on hedged funds (such as European 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers - AIFM23, enforced in November 2010) have been put 
																																								 																				
20  Most definitions are similar and accredited investors under US regulations include “banks, investment and 
insurance companies and certain tax-exempt organizations and individuals whose net worth exceeds $1million (or 
meet certain income thresholds)” (Ref. US. Private equity Funds: selected regulatory and Tax issues-Filippo M. 
Cinotti, Esq.)	
21 The offering and sale of securities are considered exempt from registration with the securities regulator, provided 
that they are not offered to the public (only to accredited investors, and are sold to a relatively small number of 
investors (e.g. in the US only 35 accredited investors).	
22 British Venture Capital Association, the industry body and public policy advocate for private equity and venture 
capital in the UK.	
23 AIFM “is defined as any entity managing alternative investment funds … as a regular business. An alternative 
investment fund is considered any “collective undertaking” which raises capital from a number of investors in order 
to invest it according to a defined investment policy and does not require authorisation pursuant to Article 5 of 
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forward. In the US, following the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC adopted rules that placed reporting 
requirements on advisors of private hedged and private liquidity funds. They only apply to large 
funds, and in the case of private equity, funds with US$ 2billion assets, need to report annually 
on “their fund leverage, bridge financing and certain financial investments”. The reported 
information will be for internal use (“to monitor systemic risk in the U.S. financial system”) 
and will not be published (Paraskeva 2011). 
 
Furthermore, international non-government organisations that place best practices and 
standards on the governance of corporations and issuers of securities, such as the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 24  and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD),25 have attempted to look at private equity from the 
aspect of conflict of interest and the managing of the portfolio companies. However, their 
attempts have concluded that most of the matters are addressed in their existing issued general 
principles and code.  
 
There are also industry associations that try to monitor the activity of the industry and try to 
maintain an acceptable professional level in the industry. Such as, with regards to private equity 
there are: the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA), the European Venture Capital 
Association (EVCA26), the Dutch Private Equity Venture Capital Association (NVP27), and the 
Institutional Limited Partners Associations (ILPA) (based in Canada). They mainly offer 
guidance on the private equity business in general and on the relationship between the GP and 
																																								 																				
Directive 2009/65/EC (commonly known as UCITS Directives).” AIFM Directives applies to managers of hedged 
funds, private equity funds, real-estate funds and commodity funds (Seretakis, 2012).	
24 IOSCO set principles and standards that reflect good conduct, with the aim of protecting investor rights, to increase 
market efficiency and to reduce risk and market failure. IOSCO initiated a consultation paper in 2006 on “Private 
Equity Conflict of Interest”, whereby the aim was to outline principles for the industry and the regulators to assess 
private equity firms for managing conflicts. In May 2008 it issued its final report and the report concluded that most 
of the issues related to market abuse and conflict of interest are not exclusive to private equity and are covered by 
their general principles on the securities market. In addition, some issues “could fall under the remit of other 
international organizations”(IOSCO 2008).  	
25 OECD initiated a paper in May 2007 on “The role of private equity of capital in corporate governance” for hedge 
funds and private equity firms (though it was for those actively engaged in publically held companies).  Later on 
that year, it rejected the proposed code as the related principles are addressed within the existing OECD principles 
of corporate governance (OECD 2007).	
26 In the EVCA Handbook, it recommends that the fund document should provide for the GPs obligations to the LP 
on the following matters: “the frequency of reports to be made; the information to be contained in these reports; the 
form and frequency of responsible investment reporting; the basis of valuation that will be used for such reports; 
and the manner in which the reports are able to be made (e.g. in writing, by email, via a secure website).” It also 
recommends that the LP Advisory Committee (LPAC) should advise when it comes to conflict of interest matters 
and be involved in investment decisions. It also recommends that the GP make suitable arrangements to facilitate in 
meeting the LP’s inquires and concerns and to have an annual meeting whereby the GP can meet and update the LPs 
in person (EVCA, 2013:29-30).	
27 Nederlands Vererriging Van Participatiemaatchappijen.	
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LP, and the GP and the portfolio. Among these associations, the ILPA28 is the only one that 
looks at serving the requirements of the limited partner rather than those of the general partner. 
It places reporting requirements on the general partner, which meet the institutional investor’s 
disclosure requirements. They have produced minimum reporting content to be provided by the 
GP to the LP on a quarterly basis29. Furthermore, it provides templates of the form of reports, 
with the aim of “increase standardization in the private equity industry…to create greater 
efficiencies, improve the level of disclosure, and reduce the expense of administrating and 
monitoring private equity investments” (Ilpa 2016b:4). In addition, as a best practice, under the 
“Private Equity Principles”, they suggest that a committee with members from the LPs should 
be established (Limited Partner Advisory Committee - LPAC). Whereby its role “is not to 
directly govern, nor to audit, but to provide a sounding board for guidance to the GP and a voice 
for the LPs when appropriate” (Ilpa, 2011b:13). They also have a Due Diligence Questionnaire 
“that is a comprehensive document that covers …questions investors should ask GPs…” so as 
to help the investor with his due diligence process and in making his investment decision. 
 
There are also principles for responsible investment (PRI) in private equity addressed to LPs.  
These principles/guides are an investor30 initiative in participation with the United Nation 
Environment Programme (UNEP) Finance Initiative and United Nations Global Compact.  
They provide an outline for the investor31 to consider environmental, social and corporate 
governance (ESG) issues, while making their investment decision, in order to maintain market 
sustainability and improve long-term returns. They encourage LPs to act as “stewards” in 
private equity, similar to investors/shareholders in a public company role, and to perform 
governance over the fund by introducing/requesting disclosure practices. They refer the LP to 
the use of the ILPA’s private equity fund governance best practice.   
 
Closer to the region, there is the MENA32 Private Equity Association. They are a non-profit 
entity that serves to encourage the growth of PE and VC in the region, to enhance transparency 
and to promote the sharing of information and network communication among the PE and VC 
and related stakeholders. It was established in 2010, and the partners of the association are: 
																																								 																				
28 The ILPA have three guiding principles on private equity partnership: Alignment of interest, Governance and 
Transparency.	
29 The ILPA’s Quarterly Reporting Standards were originally released in October 2011 and were revised in 
September 2016. 
30 “The principles were developed by, and for pension funds and investment managers” (PRI, UNEP, & UN, n.d.:2). 	
31  Their “target audience is any LP seeking to ensure that their GPs work with the underlying portfolio companies 
to consistently and effectively identify and manage material ESG risks and opportunities, with the aim of improving 
long-term, risk–adjusted returns” (PRI et al., n.d.:3). 	
32 Middle East and North Africa – MENA.	
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Egyptian Private Equity Association (EPEA), KPMG, Hawkama, and Zawya. In addition to 
providing reports on the private equity growth in the region, they have documents on the content 
of the legal document33 and the term sheet that will bind the relationship in the VC parties in 
the deal. The aim of such documents is to help reduce the high cost of producing such essential 
documents, which is vital to sustaining the relationship between the VC/PE parties. The 
documents are addressed to entrepreneurs seeking to raise venture capital. Unlike the other 
associations outside the region, membership is not mandatory, or “comply or explain” 
compliance, however, as per their code of conduct34, it encourages their members to comply 
with eleven principles. These principles include: “Members shall be accountable to their 
investors and keep their investors fully and regularly informed, including the provision of 
regular financial reports” and “Members who sponsor investment syndications with other 
parties, whether members of the Association or not, must operate on the basis of full disclosure 
to such other parties”, and “All full members must supply investment and performance 
information to the Association or its nominated agent. This information will be treated 
confidentially and used in the compilation of private equity industry reports where only 
aggregate information will be published” are three principles related to disclosure and 
transparency. They have an objective to liaise with regulators to communicate the industry’s 
participants’ concerns and to work on improving the regulatory regime in private equity 
industry, so as to encourage investment opportunities in the region.  
 
The guidelines/measures that are recommended by these associations are proposed in 
consultation with the industry experts. The guidelines are implemented differently among 
associations. Some such as BVCA are implemented on the basis of “comply or explain”, and 
others such as the EVCA, Dutch and ILPA, their guidelines/code have become mandatory for 
all members of the association. The associations’ aim is for the guidelines to work on the basis 
of the venture capitalist making an effort to uphold reputation through being in line with the 
norms. 
 
The intention is for the best practices/guidelines to work as supplements to provide greater 
transparency in the industry. This supplementation has its deficiencies, in that the variety of 
guidelines across the industry can cause disorientation. Therefore, to have greater effect they 
need to work towards standardisation of their standards (J. a. McCahery & Vermeulen, 
																																								 																				
33 “Venture Capital Legal Documentation in the Middle East and North Africa: a guide to help entrepreneurs 
understand the legal documentation process involved in venture capital deals in MENA” - March 2012 (MENA 
2012).	
34 As of January 2012.	
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2012:220). It is not that it should be a one-size-fits all concept, as much as it is for the 
guidelines/best practices to have common language, to be standardised, and consistent in the 
information reported/disclosed, and to act as a benchmark.  
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of such standards is contingent on the level of support they receive 
from the regulators and industry participants. These industry setters, although they reach a 
wider range of participants, they need the support of the regulator. While maintaining flexibility 
in the private market, legislation is to be avoided, yet this does not mean that the regulator has 
no role in enforceability. For these best practices to be taken up in the national codes by 
regulators, this would help enhance transparency and “the voluntary guidelines would … have 
a mandatory effect” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:216). The regulators can monitor the 
compliance through sponsoring third parties to monitor and publish the compliance level on an 
annual basis. Hence, effective implementation of transparency and disclosure is arrived at 
through “the coordination of public and private resources to manage regulatory risk” 
(McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:223). Furthermore, for an effective outcome of transparency 
and for it to serve its purpose, two other conditions are required: publicity by making 
information available/accessible and accountability by having to “pay[ ] the price for one’s 
action” (Naurin, 2007:3). Hence, making information transparent and available increases 
awareness, yet it does not necessarily produce the desired outcome. Holding back information 
will not be reduced if the party holding it back is not held accountable for such 
action/misconduct, nor will it incentivise the counterparty from speaking out (Naurin, 2007; 
World Development Report (Spotlight 11), 2017:247-251). 
 
4.4 GOVERNANCE IN PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
The private equity market is different to the family owned or the public/listed companies market. 
As such, the regulations of a company law, of a “one-size-fits all” type of regulation is not 
suitable (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:2). Although private equity is a form of partnership, 
most company laws do not cover directly for such form/structure. The partnership set-
up/company is only regulated as a corporate body, subject to the requirements of any other 
regular business (Cumming & Johan, 2007:3219), while private equity is “a hybrid business 
form between the limited partnership and a corporation, which play[s] the role of the general 
partner” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:27). With such an arrangement the governance 
framework, moral hazard, and asymmetry of information problems that could arise from the 
relationship are vulnerably covered by company law, and are supplemented by getting into a 
	 92	
contractual agreement. Even though the contractual arrangement complements the company 
law, the contractual agreement in private equity is considered somewhat incomplete (as seen in 
Chapter 2 earlier) as not all circumstances or outcomes can be foreseen.  Furthermore, not only 
is it incomplete, it also involves significant costs (both monetary and time worth), and the level 
of enforceability can vary significantly, all depending on the “experience[] of the courts and 
legal systems” (McCahery & Vemeulen, 2008:48).   
 
Since private equity does not involve the issuing of debt or securities to the public, it is beyond 
the regulators’ and policymakers’ radar for most jurisdictions. LPs are considered as “large 
investors” and should be able to handle themselves, and regulators usually limit their 
regulations to “retailer investors” and preventing systemic risk.  However, according to the de 
Larosière Report 35 , “appropriate regulation must be extended … to all firms or entities 
conducting financial activities which may have a systemic impact… even if they have no direct 
links with the public at large” (de Larosière et al., 2009:26). Private equity (including venture 
capital) is another form of institutional setup providing finance/liquidity to the market; parallel 
to the banking system and capital market exchanges. Subsequently, ignoring such relationship 
can lead to market failure (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:142).  Large investors, more commonly 
known as sophisticated/accredited/qualified investors are assumed to be able to write optimal 
contracts with their GPs, and sustain conflict of interest to a minimum (Andenas & Chiu, 
2014:24-25). This is not always the case, since we are dealing with an industry where 
information is opaque and contracts are very complex and not easily comprehensible. Therefore, 
in order for this industry to grow and for more investment/money to be put into private equity 
(especially venture capital), some form of regulation is required.  A form that is expected to 
sustain market flexibility, by keeping regulatory interference low, yet enhance market 
efficiency, and assist in “macro-prudential oversight…essential for financial stability” 
(McCahery & Vermeulen, 2012:199) (de Larosière et al., 2009:24). The “intention is not for 
anyone, least of all regulators, to dictate specific terms and rules. Instead, the idea is to make 
important items easier to understand and compare” (Morris & Phalippou, 2012:61,77). The 
intention is to make information available in the market, and it is suggested that, in order for it 
																																								 																				
35 In October 2008, after the crisis, Jacques de Larosière was commissioned by the European Union Commission to 
chair a high-level expert group on EU financial supervision, which was mandated to give advice to the future of the 
European financial regulation and supervision and to take the European Union “Towards a new regulatory agenda 
– to reduce risk and improve risk management; to improve systemic shock absorbers; to weaken pro-cyclical 
amplifiers; to strengthen transparency; and to get the incentives in financial markets right” (de Larosière et al., 
2009:4), as one of its objectives. 
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to function efficiently, “market-wide information has to be monitored and submitted to national 
regulators, primarily by market providers” (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:423). 
 
Information is required to be in a “convenient and consistent format; comprehensive (but with 
the emphasis on quality rather than quantity)” (Morris & Phalippou, 2012:61,78). Currently, 
most of the directives and guidelines look at the relationship between the manager (GP) and the 
portfolio company, and not much attention is given to looking into the relationship between the 
LP and the GP. Moreover, not much public information is available (even with the regulators 
there is not much information) on the private equity market. There is some flow of information 
between the GP and the LP.36 However, such information is not of great quality as it is neither 
consistent nor easily comprehensible. Therefore, in order to address this concern in the private 
equity industry, agreeing on standardising and harmonising 
information/reporting/documentation is essential (Andenas & Chiu, 2014:178 and Morris & 
Phalippou, 2012:61,78). The enhancement of information flow and its availability will not only 
assist decision-making, but will also increase confidence in the large investors to invest in 
private equity (especially financial/insurance institutions, and pension funds, who have some 
form of obligation to their stakeholders) (McCahery & Vermeulen, 2012:224).  However, in 
order that some of the investors do not lose out, care needs to be taken, so that standardisation 
is not made prior to identifying all the parties involved and allocating and understanding their 
risk. This is because “the weakest party always suffers from premature standardisation because 
the big institutional players want to reduce their costs, and have all the leverage”37 (Alim, 
2014:234). 
 
Furthermore, the growth of private equity/private investments positively affects the economy 
and in turn has positive social benefits. As such, the post-crisis thinking is to treat it as social 
responsibility with a social good concept, so as to obtain the supervision and monitoring 
attention it deserves. Being part of the financial stability equation, social accountability is 
essential, and is expected to form part of the policy of development of financial regulations 
(Andenas & Chiu, 2014:468-469). Care is needed not to rely completely on the global 
organisations to develop and enforce the relevant related policies. This is because the reach of 
such organisations is limited and does not easily penetrate the domestic market, thus falling 
																																								 																				
36 The ILPA, with one of its principles being transparency, has produced standards for quarterly reporting, so as to: 
enable the LP to interpret and account for a transaction accurately; reduce LP and GP processing times and ultimately 
reduce monitoring costs; improve LP-GP communications with regards to an investment’s status and thereby 
minimising required follow-up questions; and enabling GP compliance with legal terms in documentations” (Ilpa, 
2011a:2) as a few of its purposes.	
37 Quoted in an interview by Micheal J.T. McMillen, Lawyer.	
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short in meeting the domestic market needs. Moreover, the “international organisations are in 
any case unlikely to be able to do more than produce enabling pieces of soft law” (Andenas & 
Chiu, 2014:461). As the international surveillance by global organisations is not easily (or 
always) integrated into the domestic market, then, to resolve such matters, some best 
practices/soft regulations, with the backing of domestic regulators (for effective compliance 
and enforcement) relating specifically to meet the deficiencies of such markets are required.   
 
4.5 SHARI’AH REGULATIONS AND GOVERNANCE ON PRIVATE 
EQUITY 
 
The main international standard setting bodies for the Islamic finance industry are the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the Islamic 
Financial Service Board (IFSB) and the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM). 
AAOIFI is an organisation body that sets the accounting, auditing and Shari’ah standards for 
Islamic financial institutions and performs a similar function to the International Accounting 
Board (IAB) that sets the accounting standards for the conventional industry.38 The IFSB is an 
organisation that issues guiding principles for the banking, insurance and capital markets for 
the Islamic financial industry; similar to the Basel Committee on Banking supervision (BCBS), 
the International Association of Insurance Supervision (IAIS), and the International 
Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) in the conventional financial industry. While, 
the IIFM is an organisation with the aim of setting standards for the Islamic capital markets and 
money market, with its primary aim of standardising the Islamic financial products, 
documentation and related process.   
 
The aim of these organisations, while remaining in line with the international standards, rules 
and guidelines, is to address the specifics of the Islamic features and Shari’ah principles related 
to the Islamic industry. The above organisations are relatively new compared to their 
conventional counterparts, and as such, they have not yet covered all matters pertaining to the 
Islamic financial industry. It is an on-going process.    
 
																																								 																				
38AAOIFI “identifies the gaps and differences between the IAS/IFRS and the specific needs of Islamic financial 
institutions and transactions. AAOIFI formulates industry specific standards when the equivalent IAS (or IFRS) are 
not suitable in whole for Islamic financial institutions or where specific Islamic banking and finance practices (such 
as mudaraba and musharaka, two profit and loss sharing modes) are not discussed	within	IAS/IFRS”	stated	under 
the chapter on Dr. Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim (the inaugural Secretary-General for AAOIFI and IFSB) in (Alim, 
2014:165). 	
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4.5.1. Shari’ah Regulations 
 
With regards to standards and guidelines on Islamic private equity, like the conventional not 
much is available. Islamic private equity is based on the concept of Sharika39 and Mudaraba40 
and AAOIFI has Shari’ah accounting standards related to these forms of partnership and to the 
principal agent format known as Investment Wakala.41 The standards cover issues such as 
transparency, in particular to documentation, conflict of interest with regards to incentives 
(profit sharing ratios, servicing fees) and on restricted/unrestricted contracts/accounts. These 
standards are related to the mechanisms of treatment and of accounting and presenting when 
reporting in the financial statements. They are not related to the governance relationship 
between the investor (LP) and the financial institute/manager/entrepreneur (GP). AAOIFI has 
also issued governance standards (GS) on “Statement on governance principles for IFI”, where 
it stipulates matters pertaining to the governance practices the IFI is to follow. Principle 3 of 
the standards (GS-6/5/3)42 requires the IFI to treat its fund providers equitably and to provide 
them with adequate and timely financial and non-financial information43, so that the fund 
providers are able to make suitable investment decisions. As part of principle 3, the IFI is to 
have the necessary governance mechanism “to safeguard against any inequitable treatment of 
fund providers” and it proposes to provide “certain rights to those parties to help in their 
decisions and related measures.”44  
 
Moreover, the IFSB’s main concern is the stability of the financial institutions, and as such, 
their principles and guidelines are more concerned with serving the financial institution itself 
and its operations. In line with the international organisations’ setting standards (BCSB, OECD, 
IOSCO) disclosure, transparency, conflict of interest, the discipline in market conduct and 
ethical behaviour, along with the requirements of a Shari’ah board and a compliance officer 
for monitoring purposes, are addressed, but in relation to the financial institution. The IFSB 
																																								 																				
39 Sharika (Musharaka) Shari’ah Standard No. (12)-AAOIFI (1429H-2008).	
40 Mudaraba Shari’ah Standards No. (13)-AAOIFI (1429H-2008).	
41 Investment Wakala Shari’ah Standard No. (46)-AAOIFI (1433H-2012).	
42 AAOIFI Governance Standards (6.5.3): “An IFI should ensure equitable and unbiased treatment of fund providers 
and other significant stakeholders and associated investments as well as in relation to the provision of adequate 
financial and non-financial information to allow them to take appropriate decisions regarding their dealings with the 
institution”.	43 AAOIFI Governance Standards (6.5.3.2): “Fund providers and other significant stakeholders of an IFI should be 
provided with adequate and timely information about major changes to its business that can have material 
consequences to their interest in the IFI”.	
44 AAOIFI Governance Standards (6.5.3.1): “Necessary governance mechanisms should be in place to safeguard 
against the risks of inequitable treatment of fund providers and other stakeholders. Such measures could be the 
provision of certain rights to those parties to help in their decisions and related measures”.	
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follows a “principles-based” 45  voluntary approach, whereby the implementation of the 
principles would enhance the institution’s reputation. They have general governance related 
principles46; however, they are not specific to the private equity industry and are similar to the 
conventional principles, so the LP/GP relationship is not within the equation. Principle 447 of 
IFSB-3 deals with transparency towards investment account holders (IAH) (restricted and 
unrestricted) which requires the IFI to make a timely disclosure of information relevant to their 
accounts. Additionally, even though some references to reporting requirements are made, such 
as those under IFSB-3, standardisation of the form of reporting (which helps in the investment 
analysis and comparison purposes) is lacking. Furthermore, Islamic private equity LP/GP 
investment is considered, as per the AAOIFI standards, as a restricted investment that is off-
balance sheet 48 , and IIFM have not yet issued any standards related to such restricted 
investments.49  
 
IFSB have recently issued IFSB-1950  with regards to Sukuk and Islamic CIS in relation to such 
products being offered within the regulated capital market. Other than it dealing with products 
related to the regulated capital market, it addresses market intermediaries and issuers of 
securities, unlike the earlier issued CIS principles (mentioned below) that mainly address 
financial institutions. Additionally, the guidelines also mention that they should also be taken 
up as good market practice by the private offering market, and within the guidelines it states: 
“the IFSB notes that, even where disclosures are not required by regulation, they are often made 
as a matter of good practice. It hopes, …this standard will be taken into account by those 
responsible for making disclosures in respect of such offerings” (IFSB-19: 13). The guidelines 
provide general principles concerning clear and accurate information, sufficient information 
and timely information. There is also a section on recommended disclosure for “Private 
																																								 																				
45 As per the IFSB-9 Guiding principles on Conduct of Business for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services, 
item (7): “A principle-based approach encourages voluntary efforts by IIFS to develop their own systems and internal 
controls for governance, risk management and regulatory compliance, and leaves room for IIFS to choose the 
structures and processes that best suit their business models…” (December 2009).	
46 IFSB-3 “Guiding principles on corporate governance for institutions offering only Islamic financial services 
(Excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds)” - December 2006; IFSB-4 
“Disclosure to promote transparency and market discipline for institutors offering Islamic financial services 
(Excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds)” - December 2007; IFSB-5 
“Guidelines on key elements in the supervisory review process of institutions offering Islamic financial services 
(Excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds)” - December 2007; IFSB-6 
“Principles on governance for Islamic collective Investment Schemes” - January 2009.	
47 IFISB-3, Principle (4): “Principle 4: IIFS shall make adequate and timely disclosure to IAH and the public of 
material and relevant information on the investment accounts that they manage”.	
48  As per AAOIFI financial accounting standard no. 6 on the equity of investment account holders and their 
equivalent, and under item 2/2/1: “…assets and liabilities relating to equity of restricted investment account holders 
and their equivalent shall be treated separately from the Islamic bank’s assets and liabilities”.	
49 IIFM currently have standards on the interbank unrestricted Wakalah Agreement. 	
50 IFSB-19 “Guiding Principles of Disclosure Requirements for Islamic Capital Market Products (Sukuk and Islamic 
Collective Investment Schemes”. They were published in April 2017 and are expected to be implemented by July 
2018. 	
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Equity/Venture Capital Funds” that is offered to sophisticated investors in the private market. 
However, the recommendation does not see any additional specific disclosure for Islamic 
private equity that is different to that of conventional private equity. Yet, it does advise that 
“Supervisors should pay particular attention to the Shari’ah governance disclosure, bearing in 
mind the need for scrutiny of individual transactions and operational arrangements” (IFSB-
19:173). 
 
Moving on from the international organisational setting standard bodies to the regulatory bodies 
at national level, the Malaysian Securities Commission (MSC) issued “Guidelines and best 
practices on Islamic venture capital” in May 2008. Under these guidelines, the venture capital 
corporation (VCC) and venture capital management (VCM) are only required to register with 
the MSC as a supervisory requirement. These guidelines and best practices are specific to 
Islamic venture capital (Islamic private equity), and set operating best practices requirements 
on the VCC and VCM. Requirements include the need for an independent Shari’ah advisor; 
requirements on the activities and investments of the portfolio management to be Shari’ah 
compliant; disclosure requirements by the Shari’ah advisor, and compliance officer and on 
maintaining the clients’ monies. Although, it specifically addresses Islamic venture capital, the 
requirements concerning the operations of the investment and LP/GP governance and standard 
form of reporting are not addressed. 
 
Since the relationship between the IAH51 and the IFI is similar to the collective investment 
scheme, there appears to be a move towards Islamic collective investment schemes (CIS), and 
treating private equity investments as private equity funds. “CIS participants stand in a better 
position than IAH, since securities regulations usually ensure that CIS operators meet stringent 
requirements before they can operate a CIS” (IFSB-352, item 29). One of which is that they are 
to provide the CIS participants with a prospectus disclosing all the information that is relevant 
to the investment. Furthermore, in IFSB-4, it considers there being “broad similarities” (item 
35:10) between profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) and CIS, and recommends that the 
disclosure of the IOSCO’s principles on CIS can be used to design the “relevant disclosure for 
IAH, restricted IAH, and investment funds that operate in accordance with Shari’ah, including 
																																								 																				
51 IAH - Investment Account Holders.	
52 IFSB-3 “Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services 
(excluding Islamic insurance (takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds)”.	
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Islamic mutual funds managed by IIFS in the form of restricted investment accounts and stand-
alone Islamic funds”53 (item 37:10).  
 
4.5.2. Shari’ah Governance/Compliance 
 
A unique feature of Islamic finance is compliance of its products and operations with Shari’ah 
principles. The IFSB defines the Shari’ah non-compliance risk as “The risk that arises from the 
bank’s failure to comply with the Shari’ah rules and principles determined by the relevant 
Shari’ah regulatory councils”. In investing in Islamic Private Equity (IPE), Shari’ah 
compliance is an important matter for maintaining its Shari’ah features as well as its 
creditability. As per AAOIFI governance standards (GS-6.4/3), “The business model of an IFI 
is characterised by contracts that are designed to be compliant with Shari’ah, making it unique. 
The risks associated with such contracts are also unique…”. Hence, in investing in IPE, two 
essential risks (relevant to the study on the relationship between the IFI and the Investor) arise, 
Shari’ah risk and equity investment risk, which could also be referred to as legal risk. The 
Shari’ah risk is whereby the IFI fails to comply with the Shari’ah rules and principles approved 
by their Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB). While the equity investment risk arises due to the 
IFI entering/undertaking a partnership/investment contract (Musharakah/Mudarabah), and 
failing to validate and meet the terms of the undertaking/contract (Laldin, 2015:85). These two 
risks are somewhat related; the terms of the contractual relationship are set in line with the 
Shari’ah rules and principles and by maintaining and abiding by the Shari’ah rules and 
principles, non-compliance of both risks can be reduced. The IFI non-compliance of the above 
two risks could result in both financial and non-financial consequences. The non-compliance 
could invalidate the investment contract, and/or generate non-halal income. Subsequently, it 
could lead to legal disputes, reputation tarnish and thus affect its future business/investments 
(Ginena & Hamid 2015: 83-84; Hamza, 2013: 227). Hence, it is important for the IFI to have a 
proper Shari’ah governance system/framework for maintaining Shari’ah compliance of 
products and operations.   
 
International standard setting bodies such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Service Board (IFSB) have 
come up with guidelines that define the parameters of a sound Shari’ah governance regime. A 
																																								 																				
53 IFSB-4 on Disclosure to promote transparency and market discipline for institutions offering Islamic financial 
services (excluding Islamic insurance (takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds), was issued in December 2007, 
and in January 2009 the IFSB issued IFSB-6 on the Guiding principles on governance for Islamic collective 
investment schemes.	
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key element of this framework is a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) constituting a number 
of Shari’ah scholars who review and approve all the products offered by the IFI. The IFSB puts 
forth the requirements for a Shari’ah governance system that the supervisory authorities are 
recommended to consider implementing. As per Principle 1.2 of IFISB-10, upon appointment 
of an independent SSB, the IFI should have in place “…Clear terms of reference regarding its 
mandates and responsibilities… well defined operating procedures and line of reporting…”. 
The supervisory authority is to ensure that the IFI has a proper pre- and post-Shari’ah 
compliance monitoring mechanism in place (IFSB-10-3).54 
 
As per AAOIFI’s governance standards, the three main key components of Shari’ah 
supervision and compliance are for the IFI to have the following: Shari’ah Supervisory Board, 
Sharia’h Review and Internal Shari’ah Review. In AAOIFI Governance Standards (GS-1), the 
IFI is to have an independent Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), to be appointed/dismissed by 
the shareholders upon nomination of the board of directors (GS-1/3 and GS-1/8).55 The IFI is 
to have a minimum of three SSB members and the agreed terms of engagement are to be 
recorded in the appointment letter signed between the IFI and the SSB member (GS-1/4). 
Furthermore, the SSB “shall appoint from among its members or any person a supervisor(s) to 
help it in performing its duties (GS-1/6). In addition, to reduce the risk of independence of the 
SSB, the SSB is to be rotated every 5 years.56 
 
A Shari’ah compliance system is an on-going process that starts pre-investment and continues 
post-investment. As can be seen from Figure 4.4 below, it starts from the inception, the pre-
entry to an investment stage, to agreeing on the structure/legal set-up, to documenting and 
obtaining SSB approval and continues through to post-investment/transaction with a proper 
implementation and follow-up review and audit by examination and evaluation of the extent of 
compliance, of which the outcome of the proper execution is reported and any non-compliance 
matters are rectified. Failure to do so (rectifying non-compliance) could result in enforcement 
measures either by the regulator (withdrawal of license) or by the court (due to the legal case 
against the IFI by the investor) (Adawiah, 2012).   
																																								 																				
54  IFSB-10 “Guiding Principles on Shar’ah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services”.	
55 AAOIFI Governance Standards (1): “Shari’a Supervisory Board: Appointment, Composition and Report”.	
56  AAOIFI Governance standard (5): “The continuation of the same Shari’ah board member on a Shari’ah 
supervision engagement over a prolonged period of time may impose a threat to independence. The SSB member 
should take steps to ensure independence and objectively are maintained on the engagement. There is a concern that 
a long involvement by an SSB member with a client could lead to a closed relationship which could be perceived to 
be a threat to independence and objectivity. An IFI should take steps to provide for an orderly rotation of SSB serving 
on an engagement, so as to ensure that at least one SSB should be rotated every five years”.	
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Figure 4.4 - Mechanism of Shari'ah Compliance Process 
 
 
The proper selection of the product being in line with Shari’ah, and the proper use by the IFI 
of the funds collected and invested in accordance with the IFI-Investor agreement 57  are 
paramount to the investment/IFI maintaining its creditability. Shari’ah compliance/assurance 
is maintained by the Shari’ah compliance review/audit that is carried out by the Shari’ah 
Review. The IFSB principles refer to both internal and external Shari’ah compliance reviews. 
As per Principle 3.1 (107)58 of IFSB-3, the IFI is to undertake an internal Shari’ah compliance 
review to follow-up on the implementation and to monitor Shari’ah compliance. In addition, 
Principle 3.1 (106)59 of IFSB-3, the Shari’ah review is to take place following the issuing of 
the SSB decision/ruling, to ensure its compliance with the ruling, through an external Shari’ah 
																																								 																				
57 AAOIFI Governance Standard (4.9): “... off-balance sheet accounts, and this places greater responsibility on the 
Islamic bank’s management to ensure that the funds are invested in accordance with the terms of the agreement and 
that profits are allocated according to the agreed terms between the Islamic bank and holders of investment accounts 
which should be in compliance with Shari’ah rules and principles…” 	
58 IFSB-3.1 (107): “…  This function may be carried out by an Audit Committee or Executive Committee, or by an 
internal set-up such as the Risk Management Department, Compliance Department, Investment Department, or 
Fatāwā and Research Department. In order to ensure that Sharī`ah compliance reviews are conducted by competent 
and adequately trained professionals, the internal auditors/Sharī`ah reviewers will be expected to carry out this task 
with the necessary competence”.	
59 IFSB-3.1 (106): “… The Audit Committee of IIFS should use their best efforts in ensuring that the external 
auditors are capable of accommodating ex-post Sharī`ah compliance reviews (relying – where appropriate – on work 
carried out by internal auditors/Sharī`ah reviewers) within their terms of reference. Where possible, the Audit 
Committee and the internal auditor/Sharī`ah reviewer shall work closely with the external auditors to enhance the 
external auditors’ capabilities for conducting such Sharī`ah compliance reviews as part of their audits”.	
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review. While the AAOIFI Shari’ah governance standards60 place obligations on the IFI for a 
quarterly internal Shari’ah review to be performed on the Shari’ah compliance of the IFI, in 
line with the Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s (SSB) approvals/decisions. Furthermore, the IFI’s 
SSB are to review and determine that the investments entered into by IFI are and remain 
Shari’ah compliant throughout the investment term, and to produce an annual Shari’ah 
compliance report on the matter. The Shari’ah compliance review/audit report that is prepared 
by SSB (with the assistance of the IFI’s internal Shari’ah department report)61 is to be reviewed 
by the external auditor of the IFI, after which it forms part of the annual financial report.62 The 
AAOIFI standards do not specify for an external Shari’ah audit to be performed by an external 
Shari’ah party/auditor,63 but rather the requirement of an external audit is embedded within the 
requirement of issuing the external audit of the financial statement. The SSB are to report any 
violations in their opinion statement in the SSB report that they produce.64 Moreover, although 
the standards do not specifically address the details of the format of the Shari’ah decision/fatwa, 
when the SSB produces the Shari’ah decision/fatwa it is expected that it is produced in detail 
and is clear and transparent, so as to increase awareness.65  
 
Independence is an important element in the Shari’ah governance framework. It adds 
creditability and enhances confidence (public confidence) in the IFI. The IFSB in its definition 
of the Shari’ah governance system emphasises the importance of independence: “A set of 
institutional and organisational arrangements through which IFIs ensure that there is an 
effective independent oversight of Shari’ah compliance over the issuance of relevant Shari’ah 
pronouncements…dissemination of information and ….an internal Shari’ah compliance 
review” (IFSB-10). However, the matter of effective implementation of independence has 
																																								 																				
60 AAOIFI Governance Standards (3.20): “The internal Shari’ah review shall be carried out by an independent 
division/department or be part of the internal audit department, depending on the size of an Islamic financial 
institution (FI). It shall be established with an IFI to examine and evaluate the extent of compliance with Shari’ah 
rules and principles, fatwas, guidelines, and instructions issued by the IFI’s Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SBB)…”.	
61 AAOIFI Governance Standard (3.20): “The head of the internal Shari’ah review shall discuss conclusions and 
recommendations with appropriate levels of management before issuing the final written report. On completion of 
the internal Shari’ah review, at least a quarterly written report shall be prepared which must be signed by the head 
of internal shari’ah review, addressed to the board of directors and copied to the SSB and management.”	
62 AAOIFI Auditing Standards (4).	
63 AAOIFI, in December 2016, following the conclusion of its 3rd Governance and Ethics Board meeting announced 
it was working on standards on the External Shari’ah Audit.	
64 AAOIFI Governance Standard (1.21): “If the SSB has ascertained that the management of the IFI has violated 
Islamic Shari’ah Rules and Principles or fatwas, rulings and guidelines issued by its SSB; then the SSB has to report 
the violations in their opinion paragraph of its report”.	
65 IFSB-3.54: “…the IIFS shall be transparent in the adoption and application of Sharī`ah rules and principles issued 
by the IIFS’s Sharī`ah scholars”; IFSB-3.56: “An IIFS shall make available to the public, upon request, an 
explanation of any decision to adopt a fatwā issued by its Sharī`ah scholars, whereby such explanation should be 
prepared in consultation with the Sharī`ah scholars. Similarly, an IIFS should be prepared to provide a transparent 
clarification to the public should they decide to abandon a fatwā issued by its Sharī`ah scholars.” And AAOIFI (GS-
6.4/4): “An IFI therefore understand and respond to the transparency needs of its stakeholders. For this the BOD and 
management of the IFI should ensure that its stakeholders are recognised and that their information needs are 
addressed.”	
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resulted in differences in opinion. In AAOIFI, the independence is reflected in the requirement 
for the internal Shari’ah review to be carried out by “an independent division/department or 
part of the internal audit department, depending on the size of an IFI. It shall be established 
within the IFI to examine and evaluate the extent of compliance with the IFI’s SSB…” 
(AAOIFI GS-3). In addition, the SSB is to produce a report at year end of the IFI’s extent of 
Shari’ah compliance (AAOIFI-GS-2).  
 
Such steps in establishing independence have generated some concerns. These concerns arise 
from the SSB having to produce an independent opinion where conflict of interest may exist. 
The concern being independence is affected when the SSB has some form of “economic stake” 
(remuneration and renewal) with the IFI, in addition to basing its review on the internal 
Shari’ah department that also has some economic stake with the IFI (Grais & Pellegrini, 2006). 
Let alone also expressing an opinion on the level of compliance they have approved and 
provided details on (Hamza, 2013: 228). Suggestions in the industry have been to rotate the 
SSB, as has been the case in the past with auditors. However, the issue of rotating the whole 
board could compromise the quality of the audit because the new board would not be familiar 
with the IFI’s business and its management (FEE, 2004). Grais and Pellegrini (2006:16), in 
defence of the arguments of the proposals to rotate the SSB in order to achieve greater 
independence, and the inefficiencies that may result (from the experience faced with internal 
auditors in the past), suggest that: “An alternative may be found in the practice of periodically 
rotating SSB members rather the entire boards. This would infuse fresh approaches in the SSB 
and may increase independence through peer reviews; it would not necessarily compromise 
audit quality, as the continuing members would assure continuity”.   
 
Moreover, independence could be increased by delinking the economic benefits of the SSB and 
the IFI to an independent party. Hamza (2013:235), in relation to this, recommends “the 
appointment and the remuneration of the SB [Shari’ah Board] members should be done by 
another body like the central bank or government to ensure the independence of the SB which 
is crucial for credibility”. If this is done at the central level, then this reinforcement of the 
independence of the SSB role would reduce the conflict of interest concerns, enhance 
creditability of the Shari’ah compliance process and increase investors’ confidence in the IFI. 
 
The discussion on the relevant literature on Shari’ah governance matters shows that a vital 
component of the Shari’ah governance system is the SSB (Grass, 2013:334). The investors rely 
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on the effective role and monitoring of the SSB, since they are expected to have access to 
internal information similar to that of the IFI’s management (AlJifri & Khanselwal, 2013). 
Hence, SSB’s decisions are only as good as the information that they are provided with. 
Therefore, for effective implementation of the above process (shown in Figure 4.4 above) and 
for efficient functioning of the SSB, establishment of an effective Shari’ah supervision set-up 
is required within the IFI. The proper selection of products that are compliant with Shari’ah, 
and the proper use by the IFI of the funds collected and invested in accordance with the IFI-
investor agreements66 and maintaining Shari’ah compliance throughout the term of agreement 
is paramount to the IFI maintaining its creditability. In carrying out its obligations the SSB 
needs a “clear framework and structure to ensure its independence and effectiveness” (Malkawi, 
2013:544). This framework and structure (appointment, composition, procedures, 
qualifications, audit and Shari’ah report) form essential elements in the Shari’ah governance 
process (Malkawi, 2013:552).  
 
Most studies in the past in relation to the Shari’ah governance system have been either 
theoretical or based on secondary data (Grais & Pellegrinni, 2006; Rammal, 2006; Suleiman, 
2000; Alman, 2012; Grass, 2013; Malkawi, 2013; Injas et al., 2016). Some studies compare the 
Shari’ah governance system with the conventional system (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Saif Alnasser 
& Muhammed, 2012), while others cover SSB and its role in governance of IFI (Garas & Pierce, 
2010); Shari’ah audit (Lahsasna, Ibrahim & Othman, n.d.) and audit and Shari’ah control (Shaii 
& Salleh, 2010).  
 
There are a few studies that report information on Shari’ah Scholars/SSB based on the primary 
data collected from interviews with Shari’ah scholars that were not only SSB members but also 
Shari’ah scholars involved in the IFI. Ullah, Harwood & Jamali (2016) report issues of fatwa 
rather than the Shari’ah governance system. Other primary data studies examine the SSB 
performance via seeking feedback/input from the Board of Directors and SSB members using 
survey questionnaires (scaling and multi-choice questions) on SSB performance (Nathan, 2010). 
A more recent study based on primary data collected from the SSB members mostly from 
Malaysia deals with some of the contemporary Shari’ah governance issues (Hasan, 2014).   
 
While there is vast literature discussing various issues related to Shari’ah governance structures 
and regimes, studies examining the operations of the SSB are rare. As such, very little is known 
																																								 																				
66 AAOIFI Governance Standard (4.9). 	
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about the way the SSB operates and how decisions are made. While conducting this study and 
in meetings its aims, the study contributes in this specific area by exploring the black-box 
presenting the views of Shari’ah scholars on different aspects of Shari’ah governance in IFI. 
Specifically, the study presents the opinions of 13 Shari’ah scholars from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) region on various issues related to Shari’ah governance such as the SSB 
structure, framework and Shari’ah process and views on the strengths and weaknesses of 
current practices. The findings of which are presented in Chapters 8 and 9.  
 
Having discussed the relevant67 Shari’ah regulations and governance matters, the following 
section will look at the GCC regulations with regards to investing in IPE and the related 
Shari’ah governance, before moving on to the empirical parts of the study. 
 
4.6 GCC REGULATIONS ON PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) countries consist (in alphabetical order) of: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Currently, all six states 
offer Islamic financing, with Oman being the most recent starting in 2011. All six jurisdictions 
aim to follow international standards and are ordinary members (with the exception of Kuwait68) 
of IOSCO, and thus work towards being in line with the IOSCO principles of the securities 
capital market. The regulations in the GCC are being developed in line with international 
standards developments, and the global and regional economic changes, keeping in mind the 
maturity of their particular industry/market. As is the case in the West, there is a move by some 
of the GCC countries towards CIS, and treating the pooling of funds of restricted accounts as a 
form of CIS. Whereby the CIS issues units of shares, representing ownership. As such, some 
of these countries have recently issued CIS regulations, as can be seen below. 
 
Furthermore, with regards to following the AAOIFI Shari’ah and Accounting Standards, not 
all six countries do so. The AAOIFI Shari’ah Standards are mandatory in Bahrain and Oman, 
and they are voluntarily used in Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.69 
 
																																								 																				
67 Only those Shari’ah governance matters that were related to the study were discussed.	
68 As of the date of this review, Kuwait has yet to sign with IOSCO.	
69 As per AAOIFI’s website: “Adaptation of Standards”, dated 30/4/2017.	
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Bahrain  
Bahrain has a single financial regulatory model70, whereby the financial sector (banking, 
insurance, and capital market) is regulated by one independent organisation/authoritative body, 
the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB). The CBB Law and the CBB rulebooks are the regulatory 
framework that govern these industries. Currently, rule book volume 2 regulates Islamic 
financial institutions (IFI). It sets rules for the supervision of the prudential/functional aspect 
of the financial institution, and maintaining the financial soundness of the financial institution. 
While rulebook volume 6 deals with the capital market (excluding mutual funds, which is 
regulated under volume 7 of the CBB rulebook) and the regulation and supervision of the non-
prudential/market conduct of businesses dealing in the securities market.   
 
Private placement offerings 71  are exempt from the public offering regulations, however, 
registration and filing of the offering memorandum is required. They can only be offered to 
high net worth individuals and institutional investors defined as accredited investors.72 The 
document is to be registered and a no objection to use the document is to be obtained. The 
offering document is required to contain certain responsibility statements and disclaimers, in 
addition to disclosure requirements. A list of the anticipated accredited investors (if known) is 
to be submitted with the document along with a copy of the subscription form, which should 
include a section on the accredited inventors confirming his status as an accredited investor. 
Fees are expected to be reasonably justifiable, and at a level that would “not materially 
compromise the interest of both the issuer and the investor.”73 A cap of 3%74 has been given as 
guidance on the level of fees. No dissemination of information regarding the private offer is to 
be made in the public domain prior to the close of the offer. Furthermore, any dissemination of 
information after the offer is closed, must not give the impression to be viewed as an invitation 
to transact in the securities of the private offer.  
 
																																								 																				
70 This was adopted in August 2002, under Decree 21/2002 (in respect of the establishment of the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange as amended - Decree 7/1987, in respect of the establishment and organisation of the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange).	
71 As defined in Offering of securities module of Rulebook Volume (6): “Private offer must only be made to 
accredited investors and must be for a minimum investment of USD 100,000.00. A private offer, excluding those 
offers made by way of private equity, is limited to a take up by less than 100 accredited investors”.	
72 Accredited investors are defined as: “(a) Individuals who have a minimum net worth (or joint net worth with their 
spouse) of USD 1,000,000, excluding that person's principal place of residence; (b) Companies, partnerships, trusts 
or other commercial undertakings, which have financial assets available for investment of not less than USD 
1,000,000; or (c) Governments, supranational organisations, central banks or other national monetary authorities, 
and state organisations whose main activity is to invest in financial instruments (such as state pension funds)”.	
73 As per Article (OFS-2.4.7) of the Offering of Securities Module of Volume 6 of the CBB Rulebook.	
74 The fee guidance range is: Up to BD100,000,000: 3%; BD100,000,001-500,000,000: 2%; BD500,000,001 and 
above: 1%.	
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In addition to the requirements specific to a private offer, there are general requirements that 
all issuers of securities need to abide by. There are two that may interest private equity 
participants. The first being that any SPV created to act as an issuer of assets in Bahrain would 
need to incorporate the SPV as a company under the laws of Bahrain. The other is that the rights 
of securities holders should not be restricted other than what is permitted by the law 
“particularly regarding voting and granting of proxy to any eligible person(s) (no irrevocable 
proxies or any terms of issue subject to a grant of proxy will be permitted)”.75 Furthermore, the 
appointed capital market advisory service provider (lead manager) needs to be either 
incorporated in Bahrain and a CBB licensee or authorised by the CBB to provide such a service.  
 
These are general requirements for all private placements and private Islamic equity 
offerings76 (such as Mudaraba contracts) in addition to the general requirements; they 
are subject to enclosing a Shari’ah certification on the compliance of the structure on 
offer and to the documentation being in line with Shari’ah. In March 2014, rules with 
regards to reporting the requirement for a semi-annual report on private placements 
issued or promoted by banks were issued.77 The IFI are required to provide a progress 
report/letter on a semi-annual basis (as a minimum) to investors and the CCB on private 
placements/real estate projects; to provide a summary of the accounts in a letter to the 
investors, and to have reviewed (quarterly) and audited accounts (annually) made 
available for investors. 
 
In March 2014, rules with regards to clarifying pertaining to SPVs were added. Among 
the clarified rules is a requirement placed on the SSB of the IFI to monitor on “…an 
ongoing basis the Shari’a compliance of the SPVs and must oversee the conduct of the 
annual Shari'a compliance review of transactions, assets, liabilities and other 
commitments and relationships entered into by all SPVs with which the Bahraini 
																																								 																				
75 OFS-1.5.2 (f) of the Offering of Securities Module of Rulebook Volume 6 of the CBB’s Rulebook.	
76 The following additional information and documents must be provided with the application for the offering of 
Shari’ah compliant securities: (a) A copy of the Shari’ah pronouncement report that the transaction is in compliance 
with the principles of Shari’ah; (b) A copy of the trust deed or other document securing the Shari’ah compliant 
securities together with any trustees agreement; (c) A copy of any collateralising instruments and details of 
underlying assets; (d) A copy of the underlying asset valuation report produced by at least two independent valuers; 
and (e) Any other documents made available for inspection. 	
77 BR-2.2 of Rulebook Volume (2). 	
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Islamic bank licensee is involved …The Shari'a compliance function of the Bahraini 
Islamic bank licensee must perform such reviews.”78 
 
Furthermore, in April 2015 a resolution79 emphasising the Sharia’h governance was 
issued with respect to the establishment of a centralised Shari’ah supervisory board and 
in February 2016, the members of the centralised Shari’ah board were elected.80 
Currently, there is no requirement for the IFI to perform an external Shari’ah audit, 
only an internal one. The SSB is to supervise the internal Shari’ah review/audit that is 
performed by the IFI’s internal Shari’ah department. However, following its 
consultation with the industry in 2016, the CBB in August 2017 issued rules with 
regards to Shari’ah governance, whereby it requires the IFI to perform independent 
external Shari’ah compliance audit (ESCA). 81  The independent audit is to be 
performed before the issuance of the SSB report. The ESCA report (as per AAOIFI and 
guided by the International Standard on Assurance Engagement - ISAE 3000)82 is to be 
submitted to the audit committee initially then to the SSB and IFI’s management.83 The 
proposed rules also require the SSB, in the event that the report contained non-
compliance issues, in addition to submitting a report to the shareholders, to provide a 
copy to the CBB.84 
 
As mentioned above, in line with the move towards CIS, in January 2013, IFI restricted sharing 
investment accounts are only to be opened in the form CIS.85  Rulebook 7 has rules that regulate 
collective investment undertakings86 (CIU) (which also includes Shari’ah compliance CIU); 
however, they are only relevant to fund structures. There are rules on private investment 
undertakings (PIU) that are only initiated by or offered to high net worth individuals87 or 
																																								 																				
78 BR-5.2.15 of Rulebook Volume (2).	
79 Resolution 20 of 2015, in respect of establishing of centralised Shari’a supervisory board.	
80 Resolution 3 of 2016, in respect of forming members of the centralised Shari’a supervisory board.	
81 Proposed Shari’ah Governance Module: SG-5.1.2.	
82 Proposed Shari’ah Governance Module: SG-5.1.3.	
83 Proposed Shari’ah Governance Module SG-5.2.1.	
84 Proposed Shari’ah Governance Module: SG-2.3.24.	
85  LR-1.3.17C of Rulebook Volume (2) “Any new restricted Shari’a compliant profit sharing investment 
relationships in the bank’s own structured products may only be opened in the form of units or shares in a collective 
investment undertaking and will be subject to the Rules and Guidance contained in Volume 7 and relevant sections 
of Module BC Chapter 9 (Volume 2)”.  	
86 As defined in the CIU module of volume (7) of the CBB Rulebook: “Collective investment undertakings ('CIUs') 
are undertakings: (i) The sole object of which is the collective investment of capital raised from the public or through 
private placement, including investment seeded by the operator, in financial instruments and other assets and which 
operates on the basis of risk-spreading as appropriate; and (ii) The holdings of which may be re-purchased or 
redeemed out of those undertakings' assets, as appropriate”.	
87 As defined in the CIU module of volume (7) of the CBB Rulebook: High net worth investors are: ”(a) Individuals 
holding financial assets (either singly or jointly with their spouse) of USD 25 million or more; (b) Companies, 
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financial institutions and a minimum initial investment of the equivalent of USD3m. The PIU 
are subject to registration and reporting (such as annual reports and net worth) for statistical 
purposes. 
 
In August 2016, a law88 was issued, in respect of “Limited Partnership Companies”, which 
enables banks and financial institutions to establish investment vehicles in the form of limited 
partnerships. According to this, the investment in the form of a limited partner may be carried 
out in CIS and PIU.89  Moreover, in October 2016 a law90  was also issued, in respect of 
“Protective Cell Companies” (PCC). Whereby PIU, CIS are able to be taken up by PCC. This 
enables such investments to take place, having segregated and protected the assets of each cell 
(investment) from the other cells of the core company. It offers something similar to the concept 
of SPV, and ring-fencing of the assets of the investment (Willis, 2008). 
 
Kuwait 
In 2010, the Capital Market Authority91 (CMAK) was established in Kuwait to regulate the 
capital market and the securities activities in the country. And in September 2011, the regulation 
of investment funds and investment companies’ activities were moved from the Central Bank 
of Kuwait (CBK) to the CMAK.92 The CBK only regulates the financial activities of these 
companies and foreign funds.   
 
At present, as per the CMAK Law and executive by-laws, a private placement offer is an offer 
made to a certain group of people93 to subscribe into closed companies (i.e. not public listed 
companies) or a subscription made for the increase of capital of an existing company.  The 
private placement offering document is required to be submitted to the CMAK for approval. 
Certain disclaimer and responsibility statements, along with certain disclosures are required to 
be made in the document. The CMAK law states that the executive by-law shall provide for the 
procedures, rules and regulation of offering, trading and transferring of securities that are not 
																																								 																				
partnerships, trusts or other commercial undertakings, which have financial assets available for investment of not 
less than USD 25 million; or (c) Governments, supranational organisations, central banks or other national monetary 
authorities, and state organisations whose main activity is to invest in financial instruments (such as state pension 
funds)”.	
88 Law Degree No. 18 of 2016.	
89 As per Article (2) of the consultation paper on the law with respect to Investment Limited Partnerships.	
90 Law Degree No. 22 of 2016.	
91 Capital Markets Authority of Kuwait was established under Law 7/2010 - February 2010.	
92 In line with Article (162) of Law 7/2010, which stated that these companies were to be regulated by CMAK within 
one year of issuing the CMA’s executive by-laws (issued in March 2011). 	
93 The definition does not specify the size or the type of group of people. 	
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listed on the stock exchange. In 2015, the executive by-laws94 were issued according to which 
offering securities by way of private placement requires the CMAK’s approval, and the offering 
prospectus needs to be submitted for approval. Once the offer is complete the list with the 
details of subscribers is to be forwarded to the authority. 
 
The CMAK law and executive by-law have regulations on collective investment schemes and 
investment funds. Investment funds are a private offer when the minimum investment is 
equivalent to KD100,000 and is offered to a certain group.95 Some amendments were made to 
these regulations in February 2012, one of which was the form of an investment fund. It can 
take one of the following forms: securities investment fund; real estate investment fund; cash 
fund; debt instrument fund; private ownership fund; holding fund; or any other type approved 
by CMAK. The fund is subject to CMAK’s approval and an offering document is required 
along with periodic reporting to be made to the CMAK. The fund manager is also required to 
publically disclose, through the exchange, monthly information on the fund, even if it is not 
listed. In 2015, further changes were made, but more to clarify matters related to the definition, 
widening the scope from the narrow concept of investment funds to collective investment 
schemes. 
 
In June 2013, the CMAK issued rules on corporate governance (Resolution 25/2013), where 
listed companies and licensed (but not listed) companies that engage in securities activities are 
to abide by them no later than 31st December 2014. According to the Resolution, companies 
are to report the extent of their compliance with these rules in their annual reports.  Furthermore, 
there are rules on the company’s social responsibility, with the aim of encouraging the 
companies to widen their activities to cover activities in the areas of economic development, 
social development and environmental protection. They are also required to have procedures in 
place that will balance between the company’s goals and the society’s goals.  
 
																																								 																				
94 Resolution 72 of 2015 regarding issuance of Executive By-Laws of Law No. 7/2010 and its amendments 
regarding the establishment of Capital Market Authority and regulating securities activities.	
95 As per Article (302) of the CMAK’s executive by-law, an investment fund is a private offer when the minimum 
investment is the equivalent to KD100,000 and is addressed to: (a) government of Kuwait; (b) Kuwait Central Bank; 
(c) the exchange or any financial market approved by CMAK; (d) persons licensed to deal with their private account; 
(e) Investment companies licensed to deal with their own account; (f) any other person the CMAK approves to be 
offered to. 	
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In December 2016, the Central Bank of Kuwait issued instructions regarding Shari’ah 
governance of Islamic banks in Kuwait.96 The IFI’s SSB is to consist of a minimum of three 
members, to be appointed by the General Assembly, upon nomination of the BOD. The BOD 
are to ensure that the IFI are aware of their appointed role and responsibilities. The term of 
appointment is not stated, however, no SSB member can be on more than three Islamic banks 
in Kuwait. As per the instructions, the SSB is to prepare a Shari’ah compliance report, by 
supervising the internal Shari’ah department/unit that would be undertaking the review and 
submitting their report to the SSB, upon which the SSB will issue their report. Furthermore, 
due to the SSB’s continuous engagements and to them giving priority to the role of issuing 
fatwa more than Shari’ah supervision, the Shari’ah audit is required to be performed by an 
independent external Shari’ah firm (ESF). The ESF is to be appointed by the general assembly 
upon nomination by the board of directors. They are to provide their report along with a copy 
of the SSB report to the shareholders. The effective date of enforcement is set for 20/1/2020, 
due to the need of qualified persons (with both Shari’ah and audit knowledge), for the effective 
implementation of performing an external Shari’ah audit.  
 
Oman 
The Capital Market Authority of Oman (CMAO) was established in November 1998 under 
Law Decree 9/80. The CMAO regulates the securities and insurance business in Oman. A 
private placement is an offer made by a publically listed company to a certain number of 
individuals. It is not related to non-listed companies. Venture investment companies fall under 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), and the memorandum is reviewed by the 
MOCI. The venture investment companies are listed as part of the exit strategy of the 
investment, and at the time of listing an offering document is required to be approved by the 
CMAO. The CMAO have regulations on investment funds, and the offering document of the 
fund is required to be approved by the authority. The fund manager is required to provide the 
authority with an annual report. The open-ended fund does not need to be listed. 
 
Under the Islamic banking regulatory framework of the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), project 
financing “involves attempting to raise capital on the basis of the forecasts through limited 
circulation of the prospectus to unconnected third parties.”97 The regulation states that in cases 
																																								 																				
96 Instructions on Shari’ah Supervision Governance for IFI, issued 20/12/2016. These instructions replace the ones 
issued earlier in 2003 and are to complement the corporate governance instructions on banks issued in June 2012. 
The effective date of the regulations is set for 1/1/2020.	
97 Article 5.2.2 of Licensing Requirements of the Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, issued by the Central 
Bank of Oman.	
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of raising funds for specific purposes under the restricted investment accounts, the investment 
account holder (IAH) should meet certain eligible qualifications and that a minimum level of 
investment might be required as part of the eligibility requirements.98  However, no set levels 
have been mentioned. Separate accounts are to be maintained for restricted IAH, and the 
AAOIFI standards are to be followed by the licensee. On matters where no AAOIFI standard 
exists, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are to be followed.99 Furthermore, 
certain investment activities of the licensed bank may require the approval of CMAO, 
especially those for dealing with capital market instruments such as mudarabah or wakala 
structured under CIS where they are to abide by the CMAO’s rules and regulations.100  
 
The CBO law in line with AAOIFI Shari’ah governance standards, places a requirement for a 
SSB to be appointed by the shareholders, and a SSB member can only be appointed/selected 
for two consecutive terms. The SSB is required to produce a Shari’ah review report based on 
the assessment of the IFI’s internal Shari’ah review (Article 2.2). The CBO Islamic banking 
regulatory framework also requires IFI to have both a Shari’ah compliance unit101  and a 
Shari’ah internal audit unit.102 The Shari’ah compliance unit is to monitor and control the 
Shari’ah risk103 and Shari’ah compliance of the IFI’s departments and to report to the Internal 
Shari’ah Reviewer. While the internal Shari’ah audit is to assist the SSB, to perform an audit 
and to submit quarterly reports to the SSB with a copy to the management and Audit 
Committee.104 Moreover, the IFI is to conduct an annual external independent Shari’ah audit, 
to endorse the credibility of the internal Shari’ah audit.105 The independent external report is to 
be submitted to the IFI’s Board of Directors and the Central Bank with copies sent to the IFI’s 
																																								 																				
98 Article 1.6.3 of the Operational Risk of the Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, issued by the Central Bank 
of Oman.	
99 Article 1.2.1 of the Accounting Standards and Auditor Reports of the Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, 
issued by the Central Bank of Oman.	
100 Article 5.10.3 of Licensing Requirements of the Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, issued by the Central 
Bank of Oman.	
101 CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.4) - Shari’ah Compliance Unit. (2.4.1.1): “Licenses are required 
to introduce a Shari’ah compliance unit as part of the Shari’ah Governance Framework, reporting to the Internal 
Shari’ah Reviewer”.	
102 CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.5). (2.5.1.1): “Licenses shall establish a Shari’ah audit unit as 
part of the Shari’ah Governance Framework, reporting to the Internal Shari’ah Reviewer”.	
103	CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.4.1.5): Shari’ah compliance shall also induce Shari’ah risk 
control whereby an appropriate senior shall identify, measure, monitor, control and manage… any real or perceived 
risk of Shari’ah non-compliance by licensees across the entire organization…”.	
104 CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.5.1.12): “…On completion of the internal Shari’ah report, at 
least quarterly written reports shall be prepared which must be signed by the Internal Shari’ah  Reviewer, addressed 
to the SSB and copied to the management”. (2.5.1.15): “… A copy of the report shall also be presented to the Audit 
Committee of the Board”. 		
105	CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.5.1.22): “The Licensees shall engage an independent third party 
to conduct an annual external independent Shari’ah audit. The purpose of this audit is to add credibility to the internal 
Shari’ah audit of the Licensees through an independent endorsement. This will also enhance public confidence in 
the Shari’ah legitimacy of the Licensees”.	
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SSB and management.106 The SSB is to report any non-rectifying reoccurring Shari’ah non-
compliance to the Central Bank and it is to be documented in the annual Sharia’h compliance 
report. The rules provide a sample of reporting of non-compliance to be reported under the 
opinion section of the report. 
Qatar 
The securities market in Qatar is regulated by the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA), 
which was established under Law No. 33/2005 and later replaced by Law 8/2012. However, 
the operation of QFMA commenced in 2010. As per the QFMA rulebook, private offerings to 
“Qualified investors” 107  are exempt from submitting an offering document for QFMA’s 
approval as they are considered as “having sufficient experience to invest in the security 
market”108 (Qatar, 2010:7). 
 
The Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) 109  issued Private Placement 
Scheme Rules in 2010 (effective January 2011); however, these rules are applicable to 
collective investment schemes.110 The permitted legal forms for the schemes are: a collective 
investment company; a collective investment partnership; a collective investment trust; and 
other permitted forms of schemes. The scheme111 can only be offered to qualified investors112 
and there is no limit on the amount to be invested. Limited liability companies or limited 
																																								 																				
106 CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (2.5.1.24): “Independent Shari’ah auditor shall submit its report 
to the Board of Directors of the Licensee and the Central Bank, with a copy to the SSB and management of the 
Licensee”.	107 	Qualified	 investors	 are	 defined	 as	 per	 QFMA’s	 Offering	 and	 Listing	 Rulebook	 of	 Securities	 (issued	November	2010): “…including but not limited to: a) financial services companies licensed by QFMA or Qatar 
Central Bank or any other supervisory authority in Qatar; b) Insurance companies; c) Investment funds; d) 
Government and governmental institutions; e) Individual investors with high solvency; f) Strategic investors.” No 
definition for what constitutes an individual investor with high solvency or what defines a strategic investor. 	
108 As per Article 5.3 of the Offering and Listing Rulebook of Securities-Main Market issued by Qatar Financial 
Markets Authority.	
109 The Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority (QFCRA) authorises and regulates firms and individuals 
conducting financial services in or from the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC). They oversee entities established under 
the QFC which directly offers their own or indirectly (on behalf of clients) managing private placements.   Through 
the QFC local and overseas companies can apply to establish banking, asset management and insurance businesses. 	
110 As per the rules, a private placement scheme is defined as: “(a) it is established in the QFC; (b) it is registered 
under these rules as a private placement scheme; and (c) the number of unit holders does not at any time exceed 
100”. 	
111 “They may only be marketed to individuals who meet the definition of a qualified investor, that is, someone with 
the experience, knowledge and financial resources to manage the higher risk profile of these financial products” (A 
Guide to the QFC Collective Investment Scheme Regime, issued by QFCRA:8).	
112 The rules define qualified investor as: “(1) a person can be a qualified investor for ascheme or an authorised 
firm (or both). (2) A qualified investor for a scheme is:(a) a person who would be a business customer or market 
counterparty of the scheme in relation to dealings in investments that consist of (or include) units in the scheme if 
the scheme were an authorised firm and the person were a client of the scheme; or (b) a person who is a business 
customer or market counterparty of any authorised firm in relation to dealings in investments that consist of (or 
include) units in the scheme. (3) A qualified investor for an authorised firm in relation to units in a scheme is a 
person who is a business customer or market counterparty of the firm in relation to dealings in investments that 
consist of (or include) units in the scheme”. 	
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partnership companies can be incorporated for the schemes, and the process of the 
incorporation and registration is at the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) Companies Registration 
Office. The rules also cover Islamic funds, where a requisite of abiding by AAOIFI accounting 
standards and a Shari’ah board is required.   
 
QFCRA have also issued rules on Islamic Finance for those interested in carrying out their 
business in “1 or more regulated activities in accordance with Shari’ah 113 ” 
(restricted/unrestricted profit sharing investment accounts/portfolios/funds). 114  An SSB, 
comprising a minimum of 3 members is to be appointed/dismissed by the General Assembly 
upon nomination by the BOD. Their appointment is for 3 years and is renewable, and it is up 
to the BOD to decide on the terms of appointment. Both the internal Shari’ah review and the 
SSB Shari’ah review are to be performed in accordance with AAOIFI standards. The IFI is to 
have a proper mechanism of controls and a system for effective Shari’ah compliance.  
Furthermore, the IFI is required to disclose how it conducts its Shari’ah review and the 
frequency of the review, in response to the investor’s request. As per the Investment 
Management and Advisory Rules (INMA)115, the Islamic firm is to provide the investor with 
periodic statements, as per the agreed period with the investor, but for no longer than a 6 month 
interval. The rules also provide minimum information that the IFI is to enclose in the terms of 
business it signs with the investor.116 
 
In addition, the QFC have issued regulations (regulation 15/2012) on a special purpose 
company (SPC)117 for the establishment of a transaction. The SPC has to provide the QFC on 
																																								 																				
113 Article (1.2.1) of Islamic Finance Rules 2005 (ISFI), version 4, (includes amendments made by Islamic Finance 
Amendments Rules 2012 (QFCRA Rules 2012-3).	
114 A profit sharing investment account (or PSIA) “is an account, portfolio or fund that satisfies the following 
conditions: (a) it is managed by an authorised firm in accordance with Shari’ah and is held out as such;  
(b) under the management agreement with the firm — (i) the investor concerned and the firm agree to share any 
profit in a specified ratio; and(ii) the investor agrees to bear any loss not caused by the firm’s negligence or breach 
of contract; (c) the management of the account, portfolio or fund is a regulated activity.” While, a restricted PSIA 
“is a PSIA that is subject to a restriction as to where, how or for what purpose the investment funds may be invested”. 
Article-1.2.3 of Islamic Finance Rules 2005 (IDFI), version 4, effective 1 February 2013, includes amendments 
made by Islamic Finance Amendments Rules 2012 (QFCRA Rules 2012-3).	
115 Article (9.1.7) of Islamic Management and Advisory Rules 2014 (INMA), effective January 2016. It includes 
amendments made by Islamic Banking Business Prudential (Consequential) and Miscellaneous Amendments Rules 
2015 (QFCRA Rules 2015–3). 	
116 Article (9.1.5) of Islamic Management and Advisory Rules 2014 (INMA).	
117 Of which some of its activities are: “a) the acquisition (by way of leasing, title transfer, risk transfer or otherwise), 
the holding and the disposal of any asset (tangible or intangible, including but not limited to receivables and shares) 
in connection with and for the purpose of a Transaction; (b) the obtaining of any type of financing (banking or capital 
markets), the granting of any type of security interest over its assets, the providing of any indemnity or similar 
support for the benefit of its Shareholders or the entering into any type of hedging arrangements, in connection with 
and for the purpose of a Transaction; (c) financing of the Initiator or another Special Purpose Company” (Article 
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an annual basis a “business plan outlining the activities that it intends to carry out in the 
upcoming calendar year.”118  
 
Saudi Arabia 
The Capital Market Authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (CMAS) is the regulator of the 
securities market in Saudi Arabia. An offer is considered a private placement119 if it is offered 
to sophisticated investors 120 , or to no more than 60 investors 121  (excluding sophisticated 
investors), where the minimum amount of investment is greater than the equivalent of SAR 1 
million or the total value of the offer does not exceed the equivalent of SAR 5 million. In such 
offers the private placement prospectus (PPM) is required to be approved by the CMAS. The 
offer can only be made through persons authorised by CMAS to carry out the activity of 
arranging. No public advertising or public solicitation of the offer can be made, and certain 
disclaimer and responsibility statements are required to be disclosed in the PPM. The CMAS 
are to be notified within 10 days after completing the offer of the total proceeds and details of 
who have acquired the securities.122 No other on-going disclosure obligation is required once 
the offer has been made. The CMAS is also to be notified in the event that the offer is not 
completed within the timetable of the offer. As it is expected that all Islamic offers are Shari’ah 
compliant123, there is no specific requirements to be made for being Islamic or for Islamic 
private equity offers. 
																																								 																				
(9.1. (a)-(c)).	
118 Article (17A1.(a)) of  QFC Special Company Regulations-version-2, Regulation 15/2012 (amended), issued 
22/12/ 2013.	
119 The issue of securities by the government or a supranational authority approved by the CMAS is also considered 
a private placement.	
120 Sophisticated investors are defined as per the CMAS’ Offering of Securities Regulations (issued by Royal Degree 
No. (3) dated 2/6/1424H (2004) and amended by Resolution of the Board of CMA No. (3-151-2016) dated 
22/3/1435H (21/12/2016)) Article (11): “An offer of securities is restricted to sophisticated investors where the offer 
is directed at any of the following persons: 1) Authorised persons acting for their own account; 2) Clients of a person 
authorised by the Authority to conduct managing activities provided that: (a) The offer is made through the 
authorised person and all relevant communications are made through the authorised person; and (b) The authorised 
person has been engaged as an investment manager on terms which enable it to make decisions concerning the 
acceptance of private offers of securities on the client’s behalf without reference to the client; 3) The government of 
the Kingdom, any supranational authority recognised by the Authority, the Exchange and any other stock exchange 
recognised by the Authority or the Depositary Centre. 4) Institutions acting for their own account; 5) Professional 
investors; or 6) Any other person prescribed by the Authority. 
121 The restriction on the number of investors is considered a limited offer, where the offer to the employees of the 
issuer/its affiliate also falls under the definition of a limited offer.	
122  Article (13) of the CMAS’s Offering of Securities Regulations (issued by Royal Degree No. (M/3) dated 
2/6/1424H (2004) and amended by Resolution of the Board of CMA No. (3-151-2016) dated 22/3/1435H 
(21/12/2016)).	
123 As per Article 6of the Saudi Monetary Agency Law, issued by Royal Decree No. 23 dated 15/12/1957: “The 
Agency shall not undertake any of the following functions: a. Acting in any manner which conflicts with the 
teachings of the Islamic Law. The Agency shall not charge any interest on its receipts and payments”.	
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The CMAS has regulations on investment funds that were first issued in December 2006 and 
amended in 2016.124 Private placement of investment funds can be offered to investors of a 
minimum investment of the equivalent of 1 million Saudi Riyals. Approval of the prospectus 
for a private placement offer needs to be submitted 15 days prior to the expected date of the 
offer. The contractual agreement is established by both parties signing on the terms and 
conditions of the fund.125 The fund manager is required to make annual (quarterly for real estate 
funds) reporting to the investor126 along with annual audited financial statements and to submit 
a copy to the CMAS.127 Furthermore, the Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA) has issued rules for 
regulations for investment funds and collective investment schemes128 established by local 
banks, on the establishment, operating and marketing of open- and closed-end funds.129 Under 
the banking regulation under SAMA, there are no specific regulations for Islamic banks, it is 
expected that they abide by the Shari’ah principles. However, under the regulations for a 
finance company it states that in addition to activities being in line with Shari’ah, the finance 
company should have a Shari’ah committee.130   
 
In July 2012, SAMA issued principles of corporate governance for bank operations in Saudi 
Arabia to be applied on a mandatory basis. 
 
 
																																								 																				
124 Investment Funds Regulations: Royal Degree No. (M/30) dated 2/6/1424H (24/12/2006) and Amended by 
Resolution of Board CMA1-61-2016 dated 16/2/1437H (23/5/2016).	
125 Article 76: Contractual form of Organisation of Private Fund: “b. The contractual relationship between a potential 
unit holder and the fund manager is established by them signing the fund's terms and conditions”. 	
126 Article 89: Reporting to Unit holders: “a. Annual reports (including audited financial statements) and short form 
annual reports of the private fund must be prepared in accordance with the requirements set out Annex 5 of these 
regulations and must be provided by the fund manager to unit holders on request and without charge. Annual reports 
should be made available to unit holders no later than (70) calendar days from the end of the period to which it 
relates by such means as specified in the fund's terms and conditions. b. Interim reports for a private real estate funds 
shall be prepared every (6) months in accordance with the requirements of Annex 5 of these Regulations, and make 
available to unit holders within (35) days from the end of the reporting period, in the places and the means specified 
in the terms and conditions of the fund, and the fund manager must provide Unit holders initial reports of the Fund 
upon request at no charge”.	
127 Article 90: Reporting to the Authority: “a. After making the annual reports available to unit holder pursuant to 
Article (89) (including the annual audited financial statements), the fund manager must submit such reports to the 
Authority no later than (5) days following the day of which the reports request was made. b. The fund manager must 
submit to the Authority any information regarding the subscription or redemption of units in a private fund and no 
later than (10) days following the day of which the information request was made”.	
128 Ministerial Decision No. 3/2052 dated 24 Rajab 1413H (1993) via SAMA Circular dated June 1993.	
129 As per Article 4.10 of Ministerial Decision 3/2052, the legal framework of the: “Fund established in Saudi Arabia 
shall not be considered an independent legal entity but only as a contractual agreement between the investment 
department of the bank and the customers for the management of funds collectively subscribed to”.	
130 SAMA-Finance Companies Control Law published 27/8/2012.	
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United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) is the securities regulator in the UAE. It was 
established under Federal Law 4/2000 in January 2000. The SCA regulates the securities 
business with regards to publically listed companies. All the official regulations are in relation 
to dealings in the market (the exchange), it does not appear to have regulations with regards to 
private offerings made outside the market place, and as such no registration or approval of the 
private placement memorandum with SCA appears to be necessary. The Ministry of Economy 
deals with company matters prior to listing on the exchange. 
 
Joint ventures as per Federal Law 8/1984 and its amendments of the Commercial Companies 
Law (issued by the Ministry of Economy) are not required to register in the register of 
Commerce. Instead, it is the agreements between the parties that “shall regulate the entitlements 
and obligations of the partners and also the manner of distributions of the partners and also the 
manner of distribution of profit and loss.”131 
 
In 2016, SCA issued regulations with regards to private funds. They are to be offered to 
qualified investors132 and the minimum subscription is AED 180,000 per unit. To offer a private 
fund, a license (renewed annually) is required and the offering document needs to be approved 
by SCA.133 Additionally, in January 2017, SCA issued Administrative Decisions on Funds: one 
on Private Equity Fund134, and the other on Venture Capital Controls.135 The Private Fund 
controls introduces the concept of GP/LP as the investment relationship agreement, and is 
																																								 																				
131 Article (57) of Chapter 4 of the Commercial Companies Law under Federal Law 8/1984 as amended by Federal 
Law 13/1988.	
132	Definition of Qualified Investor: 1. An investor that is capable of managing its investments by itself and on its 
own accord such as: a. The Federal Government and local governments, governmental institutions and authorities, 
or the companies fully owned by any of the aforementioned. b. International bodies and organisations. c. The person 
licensed to engage in a commercial business in the State, provided that one of the purposes of its business is 
investment. d. A natural person with financial solvency who declares that his annual income is not less than one 
million Dirhams annually (AED 1,000,000), or his net equity, with the exception of his main house, is valued at five 
million Dirhams (AED 5,000,000) and declares that he has the adequate knowledge and experience – whether solely 
or through a financial consultant – to assess the Prospectus, the advantages and risks associated with or arising from 
the investment. 2. The investor represented by an Investment Manager licensed by the Authority”.	
133 SCA Decision No. (9/R.M) of 2016 Concerning the Regulations as to Mutual Funds (issued 7/3/2016) - Private 
Mutual Fund Article (34): “1. Requirements for approving the licensing of a Private Mutual Fund: 
a. The founder of the Fund shall be a Management Company or founders that meet the conditions of competence 
and integrity issued by the Authority. b. The minimum subscription limit per investor shall be 180 thousand Dirhams. 
2. The application submitted to the Authority to license the Private Mutual Fund shall be submitted on the prescribed 
form together with the supporting information and statements and enclosed with the Prospectus, the KIID [Key 
Investor Information Document] and the investment policy of the Fund. 3. The Authority shall issue a decision 
approving or denying the license application within a period no later than 30 business days from the date of 
submitting a complete application…”. 	
134 Administrative Decision No. (2/R.T) of 2017.	
135 Administrative Decision No. (3/R.T) of 2017.	
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subject to the mutual funds regulations. While the Capital Venture controls introduces funds 
investing into venture capital companies and sets controls to maintain the risk involved. The 
institution is required to appoint a risk management officer and to produce an annual report as 
per IFRS (Article 2). 
The principles on corporate governance issued in 2009136 (concerning the criteria of corporate 
governance and standards for institutional discipline) are applicable for companies listed on the 
local licensed exchanges. The Central Bank has mandatory principles to be adhered to by 
licensed banks and financial institutions. 
 
With regards to Shari’ah requirements, as per the UAE Central Bank Law137, IFIs are to conduct 
their business as per the Shari’ah law and each IFI is to have a supervisory body at the 
institutional level, with no less than three members. The IFI’s Article of Association “shall 
determine the way in which this authority should be formed, the manner in which it will 
discharge its tasks and its other terms of reference” (Article 6). Moreover, as per the Law, a 
Higher Authority is to be formed under the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs, who is to 
approve the SSB members and set-up before being appointed by the IFI. In 2016, the UAE 
cabinet approved the establishment of a Centralized Higher Shari’ah Authority to be 
established under the Central Bank. The role of the proposed authority is to lay down the 
principles and requirements for product approvals, as well supervise the IFI’s internal Shari’ah 
controls compliance with Shari’ah. 
 
With regards to the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC)138, in 2004 the DIFC Law No. 
13 regulating Islamic Financial Business was issued. As per the Dubai Financial Service 
Authority’s (DFSA)139 Islamic Finance Rulebook (IFR), the IFI is to appoint an SSB to whom 
the BOD can select and agree on their terms of appointment. The IFI is to have proper Shari’ah 
compliance systems in place. In addition to having proper documented policies and processes 
for controls and for handling governance matters. The appointment and termination SSB is by 
the BOD. A Shari’ah review and internal Shari’ah review are required as per AAOIFI 
governance standards. The rules define profit sharing investment accounts (mudarabah) as 
financial products, and an IFI entering transacting in such products is required to sign an 
agreement, and to provide investors with periodic statements post-investment, in addition to 
																																								 																				
136 Ministerial Decree No. 518 of 2009 (issued by The Ministry of Economy and Board Chairman of SCA) 
replaces SCA Board Decree No. 32/R of 2007.	
137 Federal Law No-6 of 1985 Regarding Islamic Banks, Financial Institutions and Investment Companies.	
138 Since a few of the IFI interviewed in the study were regulated by DIFC, their regulations were also reviewed. 	
139 The Authority that set the rules and regulations implemented on DFIC.	
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enclosing the Shari’ah pronouncement in the marketing document. Details of the minimum 
requirements are covered in the rules (IFR). 
 
4.7   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In looking at the “mechanisms of standard-setting, information gathering and behaviour 
modification” (Black, 2002:26) for the private equity industry in general and Islamic private 
equity in particular for the region, the regulatory framework was reviewed followed by the 
types of regulation. 
 
The level of regulations and the effective implementation and enforcement of the regulations 
depends on the information structure of that economy. Economies with a high level of 
transparency and disclosure are considered economies that function on rule-based regulations, 
whereas economies with low transparency and low levels of disclosure function on relationship 
(trust)-based regulations. Moreover, there are regulations that are principle-based, where the 
general rule is provided, leaving the specifics/details to the domestic regulator.  Also, there are 
regulations that are rule/market-based regulations, which are more specific and provide details 
of the rule. Whilst the market rule might be considered too specific, the principle rule might 
not be as efficient as anticipated because its elaboration depends on the experience and expertise 
available in a particular domestic market. Furthermore, when it comes to compliance with the 
regulation, consideration needs to be given to whether it is more effective if left to the regulative 
authorities alone or to include third parties such as industry associations.  
 
The private equity sector’s regulations neither appear to have much nor to have a coherent 
regulation regime. The reason being is that since it does not affect the general public then it 
would not affect systematic risk. However, of late (after the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis) 
this view is starting to change. Investments in this area, although involving high net worth 
investors and financial institutions, is a form of financing in the market and a provision of 
liquidity to the economy, and thus has an indirect effect on the financial market system. The 
preservation of this market sector is starting to be considered as a social good. In that 
investments in the private equity sector are important to continue for the growth of the economy 
and its developments. In order to encourage such investments, confidence needs to be 
maintained, by providing some disciplines and monitoring within such a sector. Recent 
developments of the views in the different forms of regulation have led to the development of 
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“Smart Regulation”; a contemporary form of regulation. Under this approach, the government 
in liaison with businesses (acting as self-regulators) and public interest groups (industry 
associations) work together to regulate and monitor compliance in the private equity market.  
However, compliance imposed by industry associations only applies to its members and not all 
are mandatory, some are voluntary or take the form of “comply or explain”.  
 
While reviewing the GCC region’s regulation on private equity in general and Islamic private 
equity in particular, they did not differ much from the international market standards. Private 
equity/placement is considered as dealings among sophisticated investors that did not require 
much regulation. Furthermore, the regulation’s availability was not made clear or explicit by 
some of the six countries. Some of the countries, while reviewing the regulations/information 
on their website, did not provide a negative statement about not regulating such a form of 
investment, nor did they state the relevant supervisory authority. Moreover, different terms 
were used for what makes/constitutes a private offer, making it difficult to identify and compare 
the rules/regulations across the jurisdictions. In addition, on the websites, the rules/regulations 
were in both Arabic and English language, while on others they were only in one language 
(either Arabic or English). And at times, in order to understand the term/definition used, reading 
the English was required, due to the difference in the translation of the terminologies.140 This 
leads to the importance of overcoming this deficiency in the quality of disclosure, so as the 
rules and regulations are more easily accessible and comprehensive, and hence reduce the 
reliance on informal networks, when wanting to deal in this market. In addition, the 
unification/standardisation of the form of regulating this market will work towards reducing 
legal arbitration behaviour. 
 
Following the financial crisis, the trend in the international market as well as the GCC is to 
move towards private equity investments to take the form of collective investment schemes 
(similar to mutual funds and the issuing of units of shares). This is because such schemes (even 
the private placement schemes) have more requirements imposed on them by regulators.  The 
requirements are more the availability of certain parties (investment 
administrator/custodian/transfer agents/investment advisor) to form part of the set-up of the 
scheme and their obligations. On-going obligations and the responsibility of monitoring, with 
regards to the compliance to protect/uphold investors’ rights, are not clearly provided in these 
regulations.  
																																								 																				
140 Since the term being used is of English origin.	
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The IFI/GP’s ability to operate in accordance with Shari’ah is an important factor in IPE. Hence, 
having an efficient and effective Shari’ah governance system is essential. The SSB along with 
the external Shari’ah audit perform the checks and balances towards maintaining Shari’ah 
compliance. Although not all of the GCC countries have adopted the IFSB principles or 
mandatorily enforce AAOIFI Governance Standards, all have requirements to have SSB and 
Shari’ah Review.  
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Chapter Five: 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In exploring the literature on Islamic private equity in the previous chapters and in reviewing 
the related theories, some challenges/gaps were identified and some questions were raised.  
Using the knowledge acquired from the literature review as a springboard, this research study 
attempts to address some of the issues/questions related to Islamic private equity. 
 
The research strategy/framework for the study is undertaken in two stages: the planning and 
the effectuation stages (Rmenyi, et al., 1998:104). Whereby the research methodology and 
research design fall under the planning stage and the actual conduct of the research (on the field) 
fall under the effectuation stage. The outcomes from the latter are the findings and the analysis 
covered in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Process Model of Research Process 
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In order to conduct a research study, a research design needs to be established to ascertain the 
most suitable way to answer the research questions and to meet the research aim and objectives. 
To have a better context of the research aim and objectives in the planning stage, this chapter 
starts by summarising the key issues identified in the literature review of the previous chapters. 
This will not only provide a background for the study, but will also assist in shaping the research 
aim, objectives and questions that this dissertation attempts to answer. The section also presents 
the appropriate methods used to collect and analyse the data. 
 
5.2 PLANING STAGE  
 
5.2.1 Research Background 
 
The relationship in Islamic private equity (IPE) is based on the principal-agent notion, where 
the GP is the agent and the LP is the principal. Even though the LP is the owner of the 
capital/funds he only has formal authority; real authority in terms of decisions related to 
investments is in the hands of the GP. The LP permits such control based on reputation and 
trust. The IPE form of financing is affected by explicit and implicit variables. While some of 
the explicit variables are risk attitude, goal conflict, availability of information, outcome 
measurability, payoffs and type of governance structure, the implicit variables include social 
expectations, social embeddedness, culture, reputation and trust. In addition, IPE is also 
administered by Shari’ah parameters such as transparency, equality, risk-sharing, and actions 
(including intentions).   
 
Furthermore, IPE is influenced more by the implicit variables, along with the demand and 
supply in the market for private financing capital. For the LP to continue the supply of 
capital/finance to such an industry the allocation of control rights and obligations would need 
to be clearly stated in the contract/agreement and investors’ rights would need to be protected.  
Furthermore, for the investment relationship to be Shari’ah compliant141, the structural set-up 
has to be in an acceptable format (such as Mudaraba, Musharaka, Wakala) and arrangements 
need to be in place for an on-going process of checking and monitoring, making sure 
transparency, disclosure and investor rights are preserved. 
																																								 																				
141 Due to the lack of familiarisation with the term “based”, “compliant” will be used.	
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The IPE relationship is also influenced by the interactionism theory, whereby actions and 
reactions are as a result of interactions with one another or within a group. Moral hazard and 
ethical concerns are to be considered in working at gaining the LP’s trust. Reflections are to be 
made on the rational in making ethical judgments, in relation to being acceptable with self 
(moral-equity), within society/culture (relativism), and within contractual 
obligations/agreements (contractual). Culture acts as a social source, whereby trust is built 
through culture. There are times when trust and control are complementary (when large agency 
problems exist) and other times when trust acts as a substitute (when small agency problems 
exist) for control. Thus, to avoid opportunities for an abuse of such trust, contractual agreements 
need to be impersonal and outside the social tie trust. Hence, there may be a need to have 
contracts/agreements that are based on procedural regulations, whereby these are put in place 
by the industry/the regulators. Contracts under the contract theory are considered incomplete, 
in that it is not possible (or even costly) to determine all possible scenarios/factors that need to 
be considered. In addition, contracts are at times vague or silent on key features. As such, the 
legal and enforcement system is important for the protection of the rights of the parties involved. 
 
In private equity financing supervisory rules and regulations are few. The governance 
supervisory arrangements are mostly on the governance of the GP (Islamic private equity firm) 
with regards to the investments/investment portfolio (the relationship between the GP, acting 
as the managing firm and the portfolio company it is managing). The relationship between the 
LP/investor and the GP (the first level of the private equity investment) is mainly left to the 
parties themselves. The investors/LPs in private equity financing are considered sophisticated 
enough and are able to conduct their own due diligence and protect themselves from risks.  
However, considering this market is greatly influenced by culture and social capital, the 
question arises about what is actually disclosed and transmitted to the LPs. Is the GP clear, 
transparent and efficient in the timing of the disclosure when they interact with their LPs? Are 
the GPs fully transparent and are they timely disclosing all the risks along with the benefits 
prior to investment (at the time of marketing/road show) to post-investment (on-going/during 
investment) in order for the LPs/investors to make satisfactory investment decisions? What 
ensures that the GP discloses all good and bad information/news to the LP on time? These are 
important factors that affect the IPE in being Shari’ah based compliant. 
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5.2.2 Research Aim, Objectives and Questions 
 
 Research Aim and Objectives 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the relationship between the investors and Islamic private 
equity firms in the GCC and to suggest ways in which these can be strengthened. In this regard 
issues related to information disclosure and transparency, Shari’ah and the regulatory 
environment will be examined. The goal is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of IPE to 
promote the growth of this industry. Moreover, for a better insight, especially since the IPE 
model is based on the conventional, and to have a comparative perspective about whether IPE 
investors’ experience differed from that of CPE investors and whether experience and time 
(being in practice longer) had an effect, conventional investors’ experience of investing in 
private equity is also explored. The specific research objectives of the study are given below.  
 
6. To review the literature on private equity (PE) and identify the issues arising in the 
relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity (IPE) firms. 
7. To identify certain specific issues related to agency problems and investors’ rights 
from a transparency, Shari’ah and regulatory perspective in the relationship 
between investors and IPE. 
8. To ascertain the views of investors regarding the specific issues (transparency, 
Shari’ah, and regulation) in IPE and assess their awareness of such issues. 
9. To examine the operations of IFI (acting as an IPE firm) with regards to the specific 
issues of transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation. 
10. To suggest some recommendations with regards to transparency, Shari’ah and 
regulations on improving the investor and IFI (acting as a PE firm) relationship in 
IPE. 
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5.2.2.3 Research Questions 
 
In line with the interest in the specific issues in IPE, the research questions can be identified 
under three headings: Transparency and Information, Shari’ah and Regulation of private equity 
market. 
 
B. Transparency and Information 
A1. How do the FI and investors handle activities in the pre-investment stage? 
A. 1.a. What is the FI's/investor's approach to the investment? 
A.1.b. What is the information shared and discussed prior to investing, undertaken 
by the FI/investor? 
A.1.c. What is the due diligence performed and the documents prepared/received 
by the FI/investor, prior to investing? 	
A.2 What are the pre-investment requirements regulating the PE market? 
A.2.a.	What pre-investment regulatory requirements apply to the FI/investor? 
 
A.3. How does the FI/investor handle the post investment stage? 
A.3.a. What is the frequency and format of the update provided/received by the 
FI/investor? 
A.3.b. How is the decision making on conflict of interest matters maintained by 
the FI/investor? 	
A.4 What are the post-investment requirements regulating the PE market? 
A.4.a.	What post-investment regulatory requirements apply to the FI/investor? 
 
A.5. What is the investor’s view on the investment relationship? 
A.5.a. What is the investor's view on the contractual relationship with FI? 
A.5.b.	What is the investor's view on the FI’s communication of information? 
A.5.c. What is the investor's future investment plan? 
 
A.6. What are the issues of concern in the framework of PE with regards to transparency 
and information? 
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A.6.a. What are the issues with regards to the investment set-up? 
A.6.b. What are the issues with regards to the information disclosure? 
 
B. Shari’ah  
B.1. What is the FI/investor’s/Shari’ah scholar’s level of Shari'ah understanding? 
B.1.a.	What are the important Shari’ah principles to the FI/IPE Investor/ Shari’ah 
scholar? 
B.1.b. What are the Shari’ah risks to FI/IPE investors/Shari’ah scholar? 
 
B.2. How is Shari’ah compliance maintained? 
B.2.a. How is Shari'ah compliance maintained by the FI/IPE investor/Shari’ah 
scholar? 
B.3. What are the Shari’ah regulatory requirements? 
B.3.a.	What are the Shari’ah regulatory requirements that apply to the FI/IPE 
investor/Shari’ah scholar? 
 
B.4. What are the issues of concern in the framework of PE with regards to Shari'ah? 
B.4.a. What are the issues with regards to the investment framework set-up? 
B.4.b. What are the issues with regards to the information disclosure? 
 
C. Regulating Private Equity Market 
C.1 What are the views on regulating the PE market? 
C.1.a. What are the FI’s/investor’s views on regulating the PE market? 
 
5.3 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND FRAMEWORK  
 
Research philosophy deals with issues related to the development of knowledge, whether it is 
acceptable or not and how it can be obtained (epistemology) and the nature of knowledge and 
how it can be understood (ontology). The ontological and epistemological assumptions will 
have different ways of influencing the research process. The two broad research philosophies 
used in management research are positivism and interpretivism (Sauders, 2009: 107-108). 
Which of these research philosophies is adopted depends on the researcher’s views on certain 
assumptions such as the nature of reality (ontological), what constitutes acceptable knowledge 
(epistemological) and the role of value in research (axiological). Responding to these 
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assumptions would drive the researcher to arrive at the appropriate research methodology to 
pursue. 
 
For those following the positivist philosophy, the assumptions are that an objective view is 
taken (ontological), where only observable and measurable facts are considered valid 
(epistemological) and the researcher excludes the social context, which is detached from that 
being researched and hence, the researcher’s opinion is unbiased (axiological). While the 
assumptions under an interpretivist is that the researcher takes a subjective view (ontological), 
whereby a human element is involved and the researcher interacts with that being researched 
(epistemological), and hence interpretations are involved in making an opinion (axiological) 
(Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Accordingly, depending on the research questions and the approach 
the researcher is interested in undertaking, in line with the assumptions, and thus deciding on 
the paradigm approach, the research methodology process is decided.  
 
Based on the above, whereby a human element is involved and the researcher’s intention was 
to seek the investors’ experience, the interpretivist philosophy was pursued. The following 
sections discuss the research methodology and methods used to address the above research 
questions. 
 
5.3.1 Research Methodology 
 
According to Hennink et al. (2013:12), “methodology refers to how we gain knowledge about 
the world, and how we collect research data. In social research or “academic research” (Bryman, 
2012:4), there are mainly two approaches to research: deductive and inductive.  Deductive 
research mainly assumes the positivist philosophy, whereby the understanding/belief is that “it 
embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality” (Bryman, 2012:36) and the 
objective of the research is to examine the validity of such reality. In such a form of research, 
the researcher takes an “etic approach” (Kuttner, et al., 2008) which is also known as an 
“outsider” approach (Kuttner, Threlkeld, and Haste 2008) and starts with a general principle 
(underlying the literature)/theory, a hypothesis, and through a process of deductions and testing 
of the quantitative data collected, attempts to validate the theory/hypotheses.  
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The inductive research is conducted based on the interpretivisim philosophy. Where the goal is 
to better understand the human behaviour, their experiences and their interpretations, to 
understand “the social meaning people attribute to their experiences, circumstances, and 
situations” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:4). In other words, “hearing the voices of people 
themselves” (Hennink et al., 2013:42), and their insights into a central experience. In such a 
method the researcher takes an “emic approach” (Kuttner, Threlkeld, and Haste 2008), which 
is also known as an “insiders” approach (Kuttner, Threlkeld, and Haste 2008) and starts with 
an observation and through a process of qualitative data collection and induction, attempts to 
understand the matter from their perspective to arrive at a general principle of the observation 
(generating a hypothesis). 
 
Furthermore, to better understand and assist in forming the research framework, it is also 
important to decide on the purpose of the study. There are mainly three purposes for conducting 
a research study: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. If the area of study is untouched, 
then exploratory research is undertaken, where the data gathered will help “shape the direction 
of future research” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:10). While if the area of research is more 
familiar, a further social aspect is sought and then the purpose of study would be more of a 
descriptive one. However, if further information was sought with regards to the “relationship 
between different components of a topic” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:10), then the purpose 
of the study would be explanatory. 
 
Based on the above, where the study was to pursue an interpretive philosophy and the intention 
is to hear the voices of the investors, and to enter into a fairly untouched area (investors’ 
experience in investing in private equity), the research followed an inductive methodology with 
an exploratory purpose. Drawing from the background analysis above, the following section 
reports on the appropriate research design and method of research conduct, based on the 
research aim, objectives and questions stated above. 
 
 5.3.1.2 Research Design 
 
Under the qualitative methodology there are mainly five traditional research approaches: 
narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case study (Creswell, 2007). The 
narrative approach looks into the life of an individual, while the ethnography looks into the 
lives of a social group and their culture. The case study approach seeks to study and analyse a 
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specific case or multiple cases, while the phenomenology approach seeks to understand the 
experiences about an incident/a phenomenon. Through the grounded theory approach, a theory 
is developed from the data collected in the field/ground.  
 
Phenomenology is not a method for capturing the experience of one individual, nor is it one-
dimensional. It is an approach that attempts to capture people’s experience of an incident across 
various dimensions. It is “how the experience is lived in time, space, and vis-à-vis our 
relationship with others…” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:19). According to Creswell (2007: 
58), the phenomenology approach assumes “that these experiences are conscious ones, and the 
development of descriptions of the essences of these experiences, not explanations or analyses”. 
There are mainly two types of phenomenology: hermeneutical and transcendental. Under the 
hermeneutical phenomenology, the researcher, along with providing a description of the lived 
experience, undergoes an “interpretive process in which the researcher makes an 
interpretation … of the meaning of the lived experience” (Creswell, 2007:59). While under the 
transcendental, the researcher focuses less on his interpretations and “more on the description 
of the experiences of participants” (Creswell, 2007:59), and attempts to suspend (brackets) 
his/her experiences/understandings (Creswell and Clark, 2006).   
 
From the research aim of this study, whereby the relationship between the investor and the FI 
and their experiences are sought, in particular that of the investor, the appropriate research 
methodology used to carry out the research can be described as following a social 
constructivism and interpretative method, with an exploratory and inductive approach, through 
the collection of qualitative data (sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.1). The methodology facilitated 
addressing the objective of describing and explaining the relationship between the financial 
institutions and investors in order to ascertain the gaps and weaknesses and how to improve 
them. 
                 
5.4. RESEARCH METHOD FOR COLLECTION OF DATA 
 
5.4.1. Research Method Instruments 
 
Research method choices can be classified as mono or multiple. With the mono method, the 
researcher chooses either the quantitative or qualitative approach when pursuing the data 
collection and data analysis process (Saunders, et al., 2009). If the qualitative approach is 
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selected then data collection and data analysis will be performed using the qualitative 
procedures only. While, the multiple method offers four different possibilities, whereby 
combinations of different data collection and data analysis techniques of the two approaches 
are either taken up together (mixed-method) or combined (mixed-model) (Error!	Reference	
source	not	found.).  Saunders et al. (2009), in agreeing with Tashankkori and Teddlie (2003), 
suggest that the use of multiple methods helps to better evaluate the research findings and in 
explaining and interoperating the answers of the research questions. By combining the 
approaches, the strategies can facilitate and or complement one another.  
 
Figure 5.2 - Research Method Choice 
 
 
Since the qualitative methodology was to be undertaken, then in this cross-sectional study142, 
the mixed-model approach was taken up and priority was given to the qualitative method (since 
the approach taken up was the inductive approach - section 5.3.1), where the dominant model 
was the qualitative, and the quantitative was secondary (Azorín & Cameron, 2010:98).  This is 
known as the “nested methods design” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:283), in that the 
quantitative method is “embedded” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:283) in the qualitative.    
																																								 																				
142 The study taking place at a particular time, as opposed to a longitudinal study, which is a study that is 
undertaken to study change and development over time (Saunders et al., 2009:155).	
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5.4.1.1. Data Collection Tools 
 
There are various techniques used for data collection and depending on the type of research the 
methods vary. In the quantitative method, surveys through questionnaires/structured interviews 
and experiments are conducted and numbers or attributes that can be converted into some form 
of amounts/scale are collected, analysed and statistics and correlations are generated, and 
findings are then generalised to represent the population. In such methods, a large sample of 
respondents is required. While with the qualitative method, participants are observed and 
interviewed (semi-structured/open-ended interviews/in-depth interviews/focus groups), to 
capture their experiences in words that are either spoken or written, which are then 
interoperated through codes into themes. The sample of participants in such a method is much 
smaller (Hennink, Hutter, and Baily, 2013).  
 
When the aim in undertaking a study is to “investigate insights that go beyond the publically 
available data” (Nix & Chen, 2013:7), then it can only be done by directly communicating with 
the participants. Thus, personal interviews with the participants was the best method of 
approach for the collection of data, with the aim of accessing the “black box” (Nix & Chen, 
2013:57) of their experience/perception. However, in order to have some form of 
standardisation in interoperating the responses from investors/LP, questionnaires (of closed-
ended and open-ended questions) were used, through semi-structured interviews. Once these 
interviews had been conducted, in-depth interviews were performed with Islamic financial 
institutions (IFI) offering Islamic private equity, and with Shari’ah scholars (members of 
Shari’ah Supervisory Boards - SSB) to obtain input on the issues raised in the semi-structured 
interviews, and to perceive how the other party in the relationship handled matters. 
  
5.4.1.2. Level of Measurement 
 
The level of measurement “refers to the relationship among the values that are assigned to the 
attributes for a variable” (Trochim 2006). There are basically four levels of measurements: 
nominal scale, ordinal scale, interval scale and ratio. The mathematical/statistical property of 
each depends on which measurement scale is being used. The level of measurement helps in 
determining the level of interoperating in the relationship between variables and assists in the 
selection of the most suitable statistical analysis to be used.   
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Figure 5.3 - Hierarchy of Level of Measurement 
 
 
As we move up the hierarchy, the type of measurement includes the qualities of the lower level 
in addition to a new quality, and therefore, the higher the level of measurement the greater the 
statistical analysis that can be performed on the results obtained. Furthermore, since the study 
to be undertaken was seeking the understanding of a social phenomenon through interviewing 
participants, then the level of measurement “seldom aspires beyond the interval level” 
(Crawford, 1997).  
 
Moreover, there are basically two categories of measurement scales: comparative and non-
comparative scales (Crawford, 1997). Scaling is used in measuring responses, and there are 
mainly three types of one dimensional scaling.143 They are: Thurstone, Guttman and Likert 
scaling. Whereby the response items on the Thurstone scale, in its simplest form, offer 
participants to select responses from a set of comparing statements (agree/disagree), in the 
Guttman scale the response items are cumulative, in that by agreeing on a statement, among a 
set of listed statements/response items, the participants will also be agreeing with the statements 
of the previous questions. In the Likert scale (a non-comparative scale) the response items are 
summed to produce a total score. It is created by way of generating responses that can be rated 
on a scale, either by using an odd-numbered scale or an even-numbered scale. An odd-
																																								 																				
143 Versus using multi-dimensional scaling; this is more complex in constructing and understanding, and is usually 
used when more than one characteristic is being measured in one variable.	
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numbered scale (0-4, 1-5, 1-7, etc.) provides the participant with a neutral/undecided option144 
(2, 3, 4 respectively), while an even-numbered scale forces the participant to make a decision.145 
The ratings of all the items/statements are summed to arrive at the final score (Trochim, 2006). 
All three forms were used in the questionnaire. The choice of which form to use was based on 
which the researcher considered to be the most appropriate to suit the question being asked. 
 
5.4.2. Sampling Process 
 
5.4.2.1. Determining the Sampling Methods 
 
There are mainly two types of sampling methods: probability and purposeful (non-
probability). Probability sampling is where all cases of the population have a 
“specifiable chance of being selected” (Dawson, 2013:53), and is used when the 
researcher seeks to generalise the results. With the non-probability, “it is not possible 
to specify the possibility of one being included in the sample” (Dawson, 2013:53), and 
is used by researchers who are interested in description rather than generalising. With 
the probability sampling, the participants are selected randomly. While, under 
purposeful, the participants are selected based on meeting certain specifications.  Some 
of the subcategories of purposeful sampling are: quota sampling, expert/judgment 
sampling, and snowball sampling. With the quota sampling, a certain target size is set 
for the sample. Whereas with the expert sampling, the specification is on the type of 
experience of the participant. Snowball sampling is used when participants are not 
easily identified; a second/next participant is reached based on the network connection 
of the first participant (Trochim, 2006). It works by “one subject gives the researcher 
the name of another subject” (Vogt, 2005).  
 
The selection of the appropriate sample method depends on the purpose of the study. Since the 
purpose of this research was descriptive and exploratory rather than generalisation, then the 
purposive samples are more appropriate (Dawson, 2013:53). Whereby the sample cases are 
selected depending on the purpose of the study. With such a form of sampling, the appropriate 
form of data collection used is the snowballing form of sampling. It basically relies on 
																																								 																				
144 For example, for an odd-numbered scale of 1-5: 1=strongly agree, 2=disagree, 3=undecided, 4=agree, 
5=strongly disagree.	
145 For example, for an even-numbered scale of 1-4: 1=strongly agree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, 4=strongly disagree.	
	 134	
relationships and networks. In the private equity field (the area of this study) the participants 
are mainly financial institutions and high net worth individuals, who are not easily accessible 
to the normal individual. Entrance to this market is usually through gate-keepers. Hence, the 
snowballing research strategy was the most appropriate. In order to obtain responses from such 
a sample, some form of trust is required and “trust may be developed as referrals are made by 
acquaintances or peers rather than other more formal methods of identification” (Atkinson & 
Flint, 2001:2). The disadvantage to such a form of data collection is that it could be biased in 
representation in that it might not provide a fair and unified sample and could be more inclined 
to over-represent depending on the inter-relationship of the referred subject. Such biasness was 
reduced by increasing the sample size (as much as possible) and commencing with a wider 
selection of subject representation, from which referrals were made.  
 
Furthermore, the judgment sampling was also used as a form of data collection. In this sampling 
method the person to be interviewed is directly approached for their “knowledge and 
information to provide useful … insights” (Rmenyi et al., 1998:194). In this study, the judgment 
sample were the IFI and the Shari’ah scholars (members of SSB). 
 
5.4.2.2. Research Population and Sample Size 
 
According to Raddon (2012), the sample size with a large response rate is important, for a 
qualitative study, where the reliance is heavily on the interpretivism of participants.  This can 
only be achieved by conducting face-to-face, in-depth interviews. Thus, he sets the minimum 
number of participants as five. Furthermore, as the research moves from theory building (being 
more description and more explanation) towards theory testing (validating a hypothesis/theory), 
the number of participants increases. The maximum recommended is 500 (Figure 5.4). 
Figure 5.4 - Methodological Continuum 
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The research population of this study was the six GCC countries, which is where the sample 
frame was drawn from. It was difficult to determine the exact size of the sample from the start 
of the research, since the area of study is not easily accessible (Dawson, 2013:54). However, 
initially, the attempt was to establish contact with equal numbers of LPs/investors from each of 
the GCC countries, with an intention to have a sample size of a minimum of 30 participants for 
both the Islamic and conventional investors.  
 
With regards to the second part of the study, the expert sample, since GPs/IFIs operate across 
jurisdictions when trying to raise investment funds, they would be common to the GCC region, 
and it would not be necessary to attempt to have one from each GCC in the sample.  Depending 
on accessibility and responses, ten GPs/IFIs were initially intended to be sought.  For members 
of the Shari’ah Supervisory Board, ten scholars (since they are common to most investments) 
were also initially considered to be sought. Thus, the second part of the study intended to start 
with an initial sample size of 20 participants. Section 5.4.5 below covers the details of the actual 
size of the study. 
 
5.4.3.  Questionnaire Content and Interview Format 
 
5.4.3.1. Questionnaire Content 
 
The intention of the data collection through questionnaires was to provide an explanation and 
to assist in interpreting the behaviour/decisions made, to address the research questions stated 
above. As such, the questions were designed in a way so that the responses/answers received 
could be measurable and assist in answering the research questions (section 5.2.2.3) and thereby 
achieve the objectives of the study. 
 
To assist in designing the questions and response format of the questionnaire, the research 
questions were reviewed to decide on the type of ‘data variable’ (Saunders et al., 2009:368) 
that each of the questions being asked was seeking. According to Saunders et al. (2009), there 
are three types of data variables: opinion variables, behaviour variables, and attribute variables. 
The responses to the data containing opinion variables would reflect how the respondent 
thinks/feels/believes. While responses to a behaviour variable would help to reveal what the 
respondent did/does/will do, the response data of attribute variables would provide information 
on the characteristics of the respondent. Thus, once this step was established, then details of the 
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measurement responses were developed in line with the type of data variable required, for each 
of the questions.  
 
In addition to having some open-ended questions, the questionnaire contained closed-ended 
questions (semi-structured questionnaire), which were designed so as to be able to give 
quantitative data. Responses to closed-ended questions were designed using either the Likert 
scale or a categorical list, in that the participant was provided with a list of answers to choose 
from. This helped in quantifying the responses and in finding patterns, whereby some statistical 
techniques could then be used in the analysis.  
 
The questionnaire that was used with investors and the questions of the IFI interviews were in 
English. However, the questions addressed to the Shari’ah scholars were originally prepared in 
English and were then translated (by the researcher) into Arabic, since not all the Shari’ah 
scholars are fluent in English. Both (IPE and CPE) investors were asked the same questions, 
except for the Shari’ah questions. The Shari’ah questions were addressed only to IPE investors. 
 
5.4.3.2. Interview Format 
 
There are mainly two types of interviews: exploratory/in-depth interviews and standardised 
interviews. Usually, the research study would start with exploratory/in-depth interviews which 
are conducted to “collect precepts, and ideas, and to improve the conceptualisation of the 
research problem” (Oppenheim, 2001:70), and then if required, standardised interviews are 
conducted to seek in-put/opinion on the findings of the in-depth interviews. The in-depth 
interviews are conducted with experts in the field. 
 
In this research study, however, the order was reversed. This was due to the fact that the study 
was seeking the LP’s/investor’s opinion and feedback on their experiences that they had 
undergone with GPs/IFIs, so as to raise awareness of any weaknesses in the hope of putting 
forward recommendations for developments. As such, LPs/investors were interviewed first.  
The interviews conducted with the LPs was standardised as much as possible, through the use 
of one-to-one “interview-administered questionnaires” (Saunders et al., 2009:320), to be 
filled/answered by the participants. The intention was to forward the questionnaire prior to the 
interview, if possible, to be discussed/answered during the interview (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
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2011:102). Other than assisting in comparability during the data analysis, standardising also 
minimises concerns such as “interview bias[ness], the attempt to impose one’s own benefit on 
the situation and interpretation of the responses” (Patton, 2001:74). The closed-end questions 
were to “reflect our own categorisations - what we think some of the key issues may be” (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy, 2011:102) and may not cover all issues or if covered, they may be different 
“from how the respondents themselves would have discussed them” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2011:102). Thus, the questionnaire also had some open-ended questions (semi-structured 
questionnaires) to overcome this drawback. 
 
Once the LP’s/investor’s responses were collected, the input received was used as background 
information to explore the topics that would be discussed in the in-depth interviews conducted 
with GP/IFI and Shari’ah scholars (members of Shari’ah Supervisory Board - SSB). The 
interview took the form of “semi-structured interviews” (Saunders et al., 2009:320), using the 
information obtained in the earlier interviews to explore the opportunities and perceptions of 
the experts “to reveal and understand the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ ….the ‘why’” (Saunders et al., 
2009:320) of the research question and objectives.  With the anticipation of raising awareness 
of the current relationship and situation in the private market of IPE, among the supervisory 
and the experts, so as to seek improvement; with the intention to enhance confidence in the 
investment form of Islamic equity financing.  
 
5.4.4. Pilot Testing 
 
Pilot testing was undertaken prior to the actual commencement of the data collection/interviews. 
It was performed in order to test the questionnaire’s clarity and understandability (question 
wise, instruction wise and presentation wise), in addition to assessing the validity and 
representativeness of the questions. Pilot testing was performed by providing experts in the 
field of PE with the: information sheet, consent form, and the questionnaire. They were then 
asked to provide their feedback on the documents provided. In addition, feedback from normal 
(non-expert) professionals was also sought, so as to evaluate the understanding of the format 
of the questions and their presentation, as not all investors are experts (HNW individuals are 
usually businessmen). Based on the feedback received, amendments were made to the questions 
accordingly.   
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5.4.5. The Fieldwork 
 
Investors 
Following obtaining the approval of the Durham University Business School’s Sub-Committee 
for Ethics (DUBS SCE), the search for potential participants commenced. Initially, a few 
contacts were approached to assist in identifying/providing eligible participants (investors). 
However, due to the sensitivity of the matter (private/personal investments) and to 
confidentiality issues (client confidentiality), progress was fairly slow through direct contacts.  
Then an attempt was made to make use of the online business social network service LinkedIn. 
Through searching for possible eligible investors (individuals of private businesses, 
representatives of institutions, and representatives of family offices) requesting to connect and 
then once connected sending a request to assist and share their experience/expertise and 
participate in the study. Once a positive response was received, an introductory e-mail, 
including the information sheet, questionnaire, and consent form was sent to the new contact.  
Thereafter, follow-up e-mails or phone calls were made, until the questionnaire was returned. 
Furthermore, once a connection was made with a new participant, his connections/network 
would provide new possibilities for searching for other eligible participants. Moreover, 
searching online for individuals who talked (at conferences) or wrote or worked in a similar 
area to the study assisted in identifying potential participants, who were then approached 
through LinkedIn. Although time consuming (as the researcher had to wait until a 
response/acceptance to connect was received, and at times there were no responses), this 
method of snowball sampling, using the online business social network had a positive outcome 
in reaching the sample size. The sample size for the IPE questionnaire was 35 investors (with 
a rate of response of 58%) collected during a period of 4 months (January to April 2015). 
Additionally, information from 16 respondents of the CPE questionnaire (with a rate of 
response of 57%) was collected during a period of 4 months (September to December 2015), 
brings the total number of investor respondents to 51. 
 
Although the aim was to conduct a face-to-face interview-administered questionnaire with the 
participants, it was not always possible. Even though the researcher was willing to travel to 
meet with the participant, this was not always the preference of the interviewee. The purpose 
of the face-to-face interview was mainly to ensure a response to the questionnaire. However, 
some of the participants preferred to respond to the questionnaire by themselves in their own 
time and then to e-mail it back. When correspondence was made by e-mail, the researcher 
followed up on any clarifications/explanations after reading through the responses. Some 
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participants preferred the researcher to call at a certain time and to take note of the participant’s 
response and comments.  In such instances, once the interview was conducted an e-mail would 
be sent to the participant to confirm the responses received during the telephone call. For those 
who were willing to meet, arrangements were made for a convenient date, time and place to 
meet, where the participants would respond to the questionnaires and provide their input.  
 
Moreover, once contact was established and e-mails were sent, there were some who responded 
within a few days and there were those who took some time, after several reminders and follow-
ups (due to work and travel). Furthermore, with regards to responding to clarifications, not all 
participants did so. Some investor participants, once they had responded to the questionnaire 
the first time round, did not respond the next time round when some clarifications or further 
explanations or examples were requested.  
 
While the aim was to have an equal number of participants from across the GCC, this was not 
possible. Table 5.1 shows the number of respondents in the sample from different countries 
across IPE and CPE. Due to the recent happenings in the financial market146 , and more 
specifically to private investment projects in the region, investors were not willing to share their 
experience either due to the negative experience and as such did not want to expose such an 
experience, or due to undergoing or planning to take-up legal action and did not want to 
participate, so as to not jeopardise their situation/case. Furthermore, some governmental 
authorities, such as endowment and investment authorities, declined to participate, with the 
reasoning that replying to the questionnaire would give away their investment strategy.  
 
Table 5.1 - Sample Size and Regional Coverage 
 
 
																																								 																				
146 Following the financial crisis, exiting of some investments/projects was not possible and completion of some 
investments/projects was put on hold.	
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Oman
Saudi 
Arabia UAE
IPE 11 6 6 1 6 5 35
CPE 1 4 1 3 4 3 16
12 10 7 4 10 8 51
23.53% 19.61% 13.73% 7.84% 19.61% 15.69% 100.00%
Total
Domicile of Investor
Investor Type Total
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Thus, to conduct a more meaningful analysis, the investors were grouped. Those who invested 
in IPE, due to their greater sample size, were grouped according to the similarities in their 
organisational set-up. The investors of the IPE group were clustered into two broad groups as 
follows: ‘Institutional’ investors that included Financial Institutions, along with Takaful 
Companies, Investment Companies, Asset Managers, Advisor/Consultants and Pension Funds; 
‘Individual’ investors constituting High Net Worth (HNW) and Family Offices. Although, CPE 
investors included both institutions (6) and individuals (10), they were kept as one group, due 
to the sample size of the group. Moreover, by doing so, the proportions among the groups were 
more balanced (18 individuals (IPE), 17 institutions (IPE) and 16 conventional (CPE)), which 
would assist in producing a more meaningful study. 
 
Furthermore, not all interviews that were conducted were recorded, although this was the 
intention of the researcher. Prior to commencing the interview, the interviewee was asked if 
he/she would consent to the interview being recorded, and in a few cases, it was not preferred.  
As such, at those interviews and where the researcher sensed that it made the interviewee 
uneasy and could affect his/her response, recording was not done. Of those who agreed to the 
administered questionnaire-interview four did not agree to be recorded, however, all accepted 
to the use of anyonymised quotes in publications. 
 
IFI/GP/PE Firms  
In searching the market either online or via LinkedIn, or at conferences or through the 
researcher’s contacts, IFIs offering private equity private placements in the region were 
identified and accordingly approached. The approach was either direct contact or through e-
mail or establishing contact via LinkedIn or via phone call and trying to arrange for a meeting 
for an interview. Once the meetings were set, the researcher then travelled to meet the IFI’s 
representative at their offices. Other than in Bahrain where the researcher resides, journeys 
were made to Qatar, Riyadh, Kuwait, and Dubai.147 The sample size of the IFIs surveyed 
reached 15 over a period of 4 months (December 2015 - March 2016). 
 
Interviews were conducted at the IFI’s offices, at their convenience. A set of questions was 
prepared beforehand, whereby it was used as guidance towards asking the same questions to 
																																								 																				147	There were no IFIs from Oman since Islamic Banking has recently been introduced in Oman as 
such IFI experience in offering private equity/placement investment does not exist.	
	 141	
everyone. However, at times the interviewee was left to freely talk about the experiences 
encountered without being restricted to specifically answer a specific question, giving them 
chance to share and contribute to actual events that took place in such investments in recent 
prior years. Furthermore, some people were a little reserved at first about talking in the event 
of bringing any liability to their IFI. Only after assurance was given, and after the interviewee 
was left to his own time to express himself and talk at the outcome of the interview, were the 
interview questions put forward to the interviewee. 
Some were also apprehensive due to being wary that it would reflect on them, as licensees, on 
how they responded, since the researcher was at the time an employee of a regulated authority. 
Some were a little uncomfortable with being recorded at the beginning, but eventually settled, 
as the interview went on. All agreed to the interview being recorded, except for one. In addition, 
all IFI participants (except for one, other than the one who preferred not to be recorded) agreed 
to using	anyonymised quotes in publications. 
 
As with the investors, some IFI participants, who during the interview/meeting mentioned that 
they would forward or provide further information post-interview, did not do so, nor did they 
respond to follow-up e-mails on the matter. 
 
Shari’ah Scholars (SSB Members) 
Some members of SSB were identified via IFI’s website and going over the information on 
their SSB, while others were through an online search. Initially their names were identified, 
and then their contact numbers were sought. The technique used was more of a 
snowballing/networking process. First by contacting those in the industry to provide a contact 
number for a scholar and then once the first few were contacted, the contact details of the other 
scholars were taken. Of the scholars who participated, at first some did not respond to the calls, 
and then based on advice given by one of the scholars, a message was sent (due to the scholars 
being very busy to respond to all calls), briefly explaining the reason for contact (to conduct an 
interview for a PhD study), a response would take place and a date and meeting was set. Some 
meetings took place in the scholar’s country of residence, at their offices or at a convenient 
place or at conferences that they were attending or participating in. 
 
Contacting and conducting interviews with SSB members was done at the same time/period as 
arranging for meetings with IFI. While travelling to meet with IFI, some Shari’ah scholars were 
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also met during the same trip but separately and independently from the IFI meetings. The 
researcher was able to interview 13 Shari’ah scholars over a period of 4 months (December 
2015 - March 2106). All scholars were comfortable with conducting the interview and the 
recording. The interview was conducted in Arabic, as the scholars were from the GCC and 
preferred to discuss the issues in Arabic (even though some were known to speak in English), 
since the researcher spoke the language. 
 
Furthermore, while conducting the interviews with the scholars, the Shari’ah review process 
was not very clear as to the extent of the SSB member’s involvement in the review. As such, 
two Shari’ah Compliance Officers/Heads of the Shari’ah department of IFI were contacted for 
further explanation and clarifications. 
 
5.4.5. Data Quality and Reliability 
 
Since this study is undertaking the qualitative research approach, the aim is not to generalise 
the findings but rather to seek input on the experience from the participants. Thus, it is important 
to take measures that will increase the accuracy of the data/information being collected. 
 
5.4.5.1. Strategies for Validating the Findings 
 
Using mixed data collection methods and mixed paradigms can assist in validating the findings 
of a research study, in addition to providing a better understanding of the research study. 
Combining the qualitative and quantitative techniques of data collection, such as interviews  
(qualitative) and questionnaires (quantitative) while conducting a research study helps to 
“reduce the impact of personal biases on the part of the analysis” (Yauch & Steudel, 2003:478). 
The mixed method of research can also have a complementarity effect and can help to enrich 
and add depth to the analyses of the results. It helps to analyse the study on several levels: “the 
individual level as well as the societal level” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011:283). 
 
Furthermore, conducting a pilot test also enhances the quality of the data to be collected because 
it assists in increasing understanding and clarity, enhancing validity. Additionally, most 
interviews were tape recorded, so as not to allow for any misleading or forgetting of 
data/information. Thus, providing more accuracy in the textual analysis and preventing the 
possibility of having influenced the “content of the participants’ descriptions in such a way that 
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the descriptions do not truly reflect the participants’ actual experience” (Creswell, 2007:215). 
Furthermore, attempting to conduct a one-to-one interview, and where not possible to 
correspond with the participant to respond, reduced the chances of not receiving a response 
(Nix & Chen, 2013:89).    
 
Testing For Reliability 
The measure of internal consistency of the variables within a set of questions (that are drawn 
up to measure matter/construct) based on ordinal scale questions can be achieved by measuring 
the Cronbach Alpha Coefficient (CAC) (Green et al., 1977: 829). Hence, the CAC test was 
performed on questions with similar ordinal scales, measuring a particular set of constructs. In 
the investors’ questionnaire, there were 6 sets of questions (6 different constructs measuring 
different issues) with similar ordinal scales, and as such they could be tested for reliability using 
the CAC test. Table 5.2 below summarises the results of the test.  
 
Table 5.2 - Reliability Testing: Cronbach Alpha 
 
 
The general acceptance of a good level of internal consistency is 0.7 and above. The set of 
questions being measured (with the exception of two sets of questions) have scored above the 
acceptable level of 0.7. An explanation for the low score on one set of questions could be due 
to there not being many communalities between items under the set of questions, since CAC 
“is a function of the extent to which items in a test have high communalities and thus low 
uniqueness” (Cortina, 1993:100). Moreover, the CAC is affected by the number of items, item 
intercorrelations, and dimensionality” (Cortina, 1993:103). This means that it is best applied 
and most reliable when used on variables with a similar scaling with multi items, rather than a 
single item: “single item reliabilities are generally very low, and without reliable items the 
validity of the item is poor at best and at worst unknown” (Glim & Glim, 2003:84).  This could 
be the reason for the negative result obtained for the other set of questions because the number 
of items with the set of questions was two. Furthermore, since the remaining ordinal scale 
Set of 
Questions
Questions Measuring
Number of 
Varibales/Items
Cronbach's 
Alpha
1 Principles Discussed During Meeting 9 0.740
2 Information Decision Based on 15 0.785
3
Vote-Negotiate-Document Conflict of Interst 
Process (Investors' Rights)
7 0.814
4 Meeting Expectations 4 0.828
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questions in the questionnaire were of single items, calculating the CACs was considered 
inappropriate, and was not performed. 
 
5.5. RESEARCH METHODS FOR DATA ANALYSIS  
 
Since the questions of the questionnaire (to investors) and the questions of the in-depth 
interview (to IFI and shari’ah scholars) are closed-ended and open-ended questions; the sample 
size is not comparatively large; the data that was collected was of the nominal (categorical) and 
ordinal (ranked) scale; and since the concern of the research is the sample (a deeper 
understanding of the participants) and not the population, then the use of descriptive, textual 
and content analysis, along with non-parametric statistics was used. The results and findings of 
the interviews with investors, IFIs and Shari’ah scholars are reported in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 
respectively. 
  
5.5.1. Descriptive and Inferential Analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis was used on the closed-end questions, of the investors’ questionnaires. 
The analysis conducted of the descriptive statistics was performed to give an overview of the 
results of the data collected, with regards to the key variables identified in the research model.  
The analysis was carried out by using mathematical formulas (such as weighted score and 
medians), non-parametric tests (section 5.5.3), descriptive charts and graphs. SPSS-20 (a 
computer programme used to aid in statistical analysis) was used to do the statistical analysis 
of the investors’ responses to the questionnaire. The responses were coded and entered into the 
SPSS. The generated statistical output was then exported to Excel. In Excel appropriate 
presentable formats of the statistical outputs were created and the weighted score (where 
applicable) was calculated.  
 
5.5.2. Textual and Content Analysis 
 
Textual analysis was used to analyse the open-ended questions (of the IFI’s and Shari’ah 
scholars’ interview responses). The data/information (transcript) collected through 
interviewing was imported from Word into Nvivo-11 (a computer programme used to aid in 
the qualitative data analysis) and was analysed. With the aid of the software, the script was 
divided into segments of text, which through combining expressions and meanings were coded, 
after which the codes were grouped into categories of themes. The categories were derived 
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from the research questions and the topic/area the questions were seeking to cover. Initially, 
many code groups were formed and then a process of combining the related groups was 
undertaken, to clear out the overlapping in the codes among the groups (Error!	 Reference	
source	not	 found.). The results were then put in a presentable format using Excel. Textual 
analysis was performed on the IFI’s and Shari’ah scholars’ interview responses. However, 
Nvivo software was used for the IFI interview transcripts only. With regards to the Shari’ah 
scholars’ interview transcripts, similar analysis/procedures were used but with the use of Excel, 
due to Nvivo not being compatible with the Arabic language.  
 
Figure 5.5 - Textual Analysis 
 
 
Moreover, content analysis was performed on the qualitative data (collected under the open-
ended questions of the questionnaire). The responses obtained from the open-ended questions 
in the questionnaire were converted to quantitative data by creating a form of frequency of the 
responses (repeated themes through the words used) and observations (repeated behaviour) 
(Trochim, 2006) and by calculating the number of counts of responses for each theme/set of 
information. Excel software was used to assist in the process of analysis. 
 
5.5.3. Non-Parametric Inferential Statistics Methods 
 
Of the non-parametric statistics available, the ones that were used in the study are identified by 
Turner (2014) and Pallant (2013). The specific tests used in inferential analyses are given below.  
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• Wilcox Rank Sum (Mann-Whitney U) statistics, an alternative to the t-test for 
independence between groups: used on data of ordinal/ranked scale to analyse 
data from two independent groups.  
• Kruskal-Wallis statistics, an alternative to one-way ANOVA between groups: 
used on data of ordinal/ranked scale to analyse data from two or more 
independent groups. 
• One-way Chi-squared goodness of fit statistics: used on data of nominal scale 
(using frequency counts) to analyse data for a single variable. 
• Two-way Chi-squared of independence statistics: used on data of nominal scale 
to analyse data between two variables. 
• Chi-squared homogeneity: used on three or more independent groups on a 
dichotomous dependent variable. 
 
The Chi-square tests could only be used when the expected frequency count was at least 5 for 
all participants. Furthermore, the effective size and post-hoc test (adjusted standardised 
residuals and pairwise) were conducted on results with statistically significant differences 
between the groups/variables. Statistical significant levels of 5% and 10% were considered and 
were adjusted for multiple tests when post-hoc pairwise tests were conducted. The significant 
alpha (0.05/0.1) criteria was revised using the Bonferroni adjustment, whereby the alpha level 
was divided by the number of tests. Moreover, the SPSS statistics generate pairwise results, 
according to Dunn (1964), whereby for each pairwise comparison performed, the whole dataset 
is used; similar to the post-hoc test following a one-way ANOVA. The generated results were 
then compared to the adjusted significant alpha.  
	
5.6. CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES/LIMITATIONS/CONTRAINTS 
 
5.6.1. Ethical Issues 
 
From the participants’ side, the study aimed to look into the experiences of investors, and hence, 
confidentiality of the information provided at interviews and the anonymity of the participants 
are important matters to be covered. All participants were provided with an information sheet, 
which was given at the beginning, briefing them on: the purpose of the study, maintenance of 
information (confidentiality), anonymity of their identity, and their rights (Hesse-Biber & 
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Leavy, 2011:64). Participants also signed a consent sheet confirming their understanding and 
agreement to participate. 
 
To maintain confidentiality, all participants, following the receipt of the questionnaire or 
interviews, were allocated with a code148 and anonymised, upon which, from that point forward 
reference to the participants by the researcher was through the code allocated. Furthermore, all 
interview transcripts were typed personally by the researcher, to maintain confidentiality. 
Typing of the transcripts was for data analysis use only. All recordings and consent forms have 
been kept in the strict confidence. 
 
From the researcher’s side, the researcher, at the time of conducting the interviews, worked 
with the Central Bank of Bahrain at the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate and at some 
stage (2006-2010) part of the researcher’s responsibilities was the review of private placement 
documents. Although to some this might seem to give rise to a conflict of interests, the intention 
of the research is not to fault the participants, but to try to improve the playing field, so as to 
encourage growth in the equity form of Islamic financing. For transparency and ethical 
purposes, being an employee of the Central Bank was clearly stated in the Information Sheet 
that was presented to the participant at the beginning of the meeting. 
 
Moreover, in addition to obtaining Durham University Business School’s Sub-Committee for 
Ethics’ approval, all data/information obtained for the study was obtained from the participants 
themselves or was from the public domain. As such, the code of confidentiality of the 
workplace was maintained. 
 
5.6.2. Limitations of Qualitative Research 
 
Under the qualitative method, which is based on the interpretive approach, subjectivity and 
reflexivity are two main issues that can affect the research, especially at the collection of data 
stage. Subjectivity, in that both the participant under study and the researcher each have their 
own views and come from different backgrounds, which might affect their interpretations.   
																																								 																				
148 For example, Investor: INV-01, IFI: IFI-01, Shari’ah Scholars: ShSc-01, and Shari’ah Compliance 
Officer/Head: SCO-01.	
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Furthermore, the participant under study could be affected by the position of the researcher (as 
in this study (the researcher) working with the regulator), which could affect (unconsciously or 
consciously) the responses the participant provides (providing answers that the researcher 
would like to hear). This is known as “personal reflexivity” (Hennink et al., 2013:20). Also 
“interpersonal reflexivity” (Hennink et al., 2013:42) is to be considered. This is where the 
quality of the information generated through interviewing and data collection is determined 
based on the level of rapport that is developed between the researcher and the participant.  
 
Another constraint is the time factor. Qualitative research is based on identifying reaching out, 
and interviews/liaising with the participant, and hence is time consuming. This in turn imposes 
some constraints on the time available to spend on the process versus keeping in line with the 
scheduled outline of the research study. 
 
5.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
 
The study followed the interpretivism methodology, with an inductive approach, and a 
phenomenological strategy. Whereas the choice of research method was the mixed method, 
along a cross-sectional horizon, interviews and questionnaires were used as forms of data 
collection with the aim of obtaining a deeper understanding of the relationship between the 
investor and the IFI, rather than the generalisation of the population. The next three chapters 
report the empirical results from the survey. 
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Chapter Six: 
 INVESTORS’ APPROACH TO ISLAMIC PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT: 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the investors’ responses gathered through a questionnaire-based survey. The data 
in this chapter is analysed using descriptive and inferential analysis examining the investors’ profile, 
their investment approach, and their pre- and post-investment relationship with the FI. It looks into the 
perceptions of three groups of investors of their investment experience from transparency, disclosure 
and investors’ rights perspectives; their views on how to govern the PE investment environment and 
their thoughts on continuing to invest in such investments. For comparative purposes, data on both 
investors investing in Islamic private equity (IPE) and investors investing in conventional private equity 
(CPE) was obtained. Hence, in addition to the above, for those who invested in IPE, their perception of 
Shari’ah compliance was also sought. The data was initially inputted into SSPS software and the tables 
used were generated using SSPS and modified in Excel. Since the study sample is small, non-parametric 
techniques were used. Moreover, the Mann-Whitney U test and the Kruskal-Wallis H test for the 
differences between independent groups (U test - between 2 groups and H test - between 2+ groups) 
were conducted, since they are a more suitable non-parametric alternative to the t-test, for independence 
between groups. Furthermore, where appropriate, the Chi-square (Chi-sq) test was carried out to 
ascertain the statistical significance for independence/differences. 
 
While an initial attempt was made to discuss each set (investors, FI, and Shari’ah scholars) of findings 
in the related chapter as the results unfold, it was decided otherwise. The reason being, due to the inter-
relationship between the three groups, especially the investors and FI, deliberating separately turned 
out to be more confusing and at times incomplete. Having part of the picture in one chapter and then 
the other in another chapter. Hence, it was decided to discuss all three in one chapter. Moreover, to 
bracket the researcher’s work experience from the participants’ experience, and thus not 
affect/influence the interpretations and discussions, the researcher considered it, as a precautionary 
measure, more appropriate to disclose the facts and finding separately. Thus, this chapter (6) and the 
next two chapters (7 & 8) will present the findings and results of the studies conducted. Then, the 
discussions on the results and findings, along with the contextualisation with the literature review, will 
be covered in Chapter 9. 
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6.2 INVESTOR PROFILE 
 
A total of 51 investors participated in the study. Of the 51 participants, 35 were IPE investors and 16 
were CPE investors. The participating investors were from across the GCC149, who had invested in 
private equity/private placement investments including real estate projects (PE).150 The investors ranged 
from different segments of sophisticated/accredited151 investors. As discussed in Chapter 5, section 
5.4.5, the investors were grouped into 3 groups: individuals, institutions and conventional. 
 
6.2.1 Investor Type and Domicile 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.1 below, the participants were from across the GCC. Most of the 
respondents were from Bahrain with 23.53%, followed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia with 19.61%, and 
the UAE made up 15.69%, followed by Qatar with 13.73% and Oman with 7.84%. The greater number 
of participants from within the individual group are from Bahrain (55.56%), and from Saudi Arabia 
(16.67%), and the greater number of participants from the institutional group are from Kuwait (29.41%) 
and Qatar (23.53%). While the greater number of participants from the conventional group are from 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (25.00% each). 
	
Table 6.1 - Investor Type and Domicile of Investor 
	
 
																																								 																				
149 GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council Countries.	
150 For those who invested in IPE, the investments are in accordance with the Shari’ah principles.	
151The sophisticated/accredited investors definition varies across jurisdictions, but generally, the assumption underlying 
sophistication/accreditation is that individuals or organisations who qualify will have sufficient financial sophistication and a 
certain level of income to understand and take on the risks associated with certain investment offerings.	
Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Oman Saudi 
Arabia
UAE
Count 10 1 2 0 3 2 18
% of within 
Investor Type
55.56% 5.56% 11.11% 0.00% 16.67% 11.11% 100.00%
Count 1 5 4 1 3 3 17
% of within 
Investor Type
5.88% 29.41% 23.53% 5.88% 17.65% 17.65% 100.00%
Count 1 4 1 3 4 3 16
% of within 
Investor Type
6.25% 25.00% 6.25% 18.75% 25.00% 18.75% 100.00%
Count 12 10 7 4 10 8 51
% of Total 
Investors
23.53% 19.61% 13.73% 7.84% 19.61% 15.69% 100.00%
Institutions
Conventional
Total
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Domicile of Investor
Total
Individuals
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6.2.2 Investors’ Investment 
 
To assist in identifying the form of investment relationship that the investor had with their FI and as 
such identify the legal set-up of the type of investment152, the respondents could choose from four ways 
of investing in IPE/CPE. They were either through direct investment (DI), some form of 
partnership/Musharakh or indirect investment (IN) where the funds are pooled into a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV), fund of funds (FF) or limited partnership (LP), which represented a form of 
Mudarabah/Wakalah. Participants had the option to select more than one type of investment. 
	
Table 6.2 - Investor Type and Investment Carried Through 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.2, the most popular form of investment among the participants was direct 
investment, whereby 37 of the participants, representing 72.55% of the total number of investors, had 
invested in DI. While the least form was through funds of funds, with 13 of the participants (25.49%) 
who had invested through them. Investing through an SPV (56.86%) was a more popular form through 
which 29 investors invested, than through LP, where only 19 had invested (37.25%). Furthermore, from 
within the groups, the order of preference between the three groups of investors appeared to be similar, 
with the individual and conventional investors having greater preference for carrying out investment 
through LP (6 individual participants (33.33); 9 conventional participants (56.25%)) than the 
institutional investors (4 participants (23.53%)).  
																																								 																				
152 Part of research questions A.	
Direct 
Equity 
Investment
Indierct Equity 
Investment
Private Equity 
Fund of Fund
Limited 
Partnership
Count 12 8 4 6 18
% within Total 
Investors
66.67% 44.44% 22.22% 33.33% 35.29%
Count 13 9 4 4 17
% within Total 
Investors
76.47% 52.94% 23.53% 23.53% 33.33%
Count 12 12 5 9 16
% within Total 
Investors
75.00% 75.00% 31.25% 56.25% 31.37%
Count 37 29 13 19 51
% of Total 
Investors
72.55% 56.86% 25.49% 37.25% 100.00%
Conventional
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
 Investment Carried Through (ICT)
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Investor Type
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The study questioned the participants on the last period of investment within the last 10 years.153 Of the 
conventional investors, one investor’s most recent investment was post-2014, and two participants did 
not select a response, all three were not included in the count. It appears from Figure 6.1 below that the 
period 2012-2014 was for all groups to be the period of their most recent years of investment. About 
12.50% of the individual investors and about 4.17% of the institutional and conventional investors did 
not invest beyond the year 2008 (the start of the financial crises). Between the years 2009 and 2012, 
12.50% of the investors invested in IPE (individual and institutions group) and then the sentiments of 
all three groups appears to have picked up with around 64.58% (43.75% -  IPE, 20.83 - CPE) investing 
between the years 2012 and 2014.  
	
Figure 6.1 - Recent Year of Investment 
 
 
In order to find out how familiar the investors were with investing in private equity they were asked 
about their familiarity with equity financing. Those investing in IPE were more specifically asked with 
																																								 																				
153 The response is to the last investment made, which means that they could have also invested in the years prior to the 
period they selected.	
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Descriptive 
Statistics
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011 2012-2014 Total
Count 0 6 2 10 18
% of Total 0.00% 12.50% 4.17% 20.83% 37.50%
Count 2 0 4 11 17
% of Total 4.17% 0.00% 8.33% 22.92% 35.42%
Count 0 2 1 10 13
% of Total 0.00% 4.17% 2.08% 20.83% 27.08%
Count 2 8 7 31 48
% of Total 4.17% 16.67% 14.58% 64.58% 100.00%
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
Total
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regards to the investment being a Shari’ah compliant investment154 and about their familiarity with 
Islamic equity financing. The responses can be seen in Table 6.3 below. A weighted score155 was 
calculated, by calculating the weighted average for each group of investors. With a weighted score of 
3.00, both the institutional and conventional investors appear to be more familiar than the individual 
investors who have a weighted score of 2.00 on average. From the weighted score, it appears that the 
majority of both groups of investors fall between the ranges of being “Familiar” to “Very Familiar”, 
with institutional and conventional being closer to “Very Familiar” compared to the individual investors. 
Furthermore, it appears from the Percentage of the Count to Total Investors that the conventional 
investors are more specialised (13.73%) than the institutional investors (7.84%) and the individual 
investors (1.96%). Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis H test conducted revealed a statistically significant 
difference in familiarity level between the three groups, H (2) = 8.988,  p = 0.011.  
 
Table 6.3 - Investor Type and Familiar in Equity Financing 
 
 
In order to find out which of the groups were statistically different from one another, a post hoc test 
was performed, using Dunn’s (1964)156 procedure with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Statistical significance was accepted at the p <0.0167157. As can be seen in Figure 6.2 below, in 
conducting the pairwise comparison test, there appears to be a statistically significant difference 
																																								 																				
154 The investors’ understanding of Shari’ah principles and compliances will be covered later in the chapter under section 6.5.6 
Shari’ah definition and compliance.	
155 The weighted score was calculated by multiplying the count from each category of responses within each group by the 
scores allocated to the specific category. Then within each group, the sum of the outcome of the responses is divided by the 
number of participants of that particular group.	
156 This procedure uses the whole data set when making each pairwise comparison in a manner similar/analogous to post hoc 
tests following a one-way ANOVA (Laerd Statistics, 2015).	
157 p is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence, in this case there are 3 groups, so p =0.05/3=0.0167.	
Table 6.3- Investor Type and Familiar in Equity Financing
Somewhat 
 Familiar
Familiar
Very 
Familiar
Specialized
Count 2 9 6 1
% of Total 
Investors 3.92% 17.65% 11.76% 1.96%
Count 1 6 6 4
% of Total 
Investors 1.96% 11.76% 11.76% 7.84%
Count 0 3 6 7
% of Total 
Investors 0.00% 5.88% 11.76% 13.73%
H (2) p
8.988 0.011
Median
3.25
2.76
2.33
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 4, with 1 "Somewhat Familiar" to 4 "Specialized".
Institutions 3.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Individuals 2.00
Conventional 3.00
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Familiar in Equity Finance
Weighted 
 Score-a
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between the medians of the individual (2.00) and conventional (3.00) groups of participants, with a 
large size effect158 ( p = 0.008, r = -0.512). 
	
Figure 6.2 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Familiar with Equity Finance Across the Type of Investor Group 
 
 
6.3 INVESTORS’ APPROACH 
 
In order to identify the investors’ determining factors on the appropriate level of disclosure/type of 
information required in investing in IPE159/CPE, this section reports the sources of information that the 
participants looked into or considered as important in their decision making on an investment. They 
were questioned about how much of the information was based on personal sources versus impersonal 
sources, in addition to providing examples of both types of sources that they use. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
158 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
159 Part of research questions A.	
Pairwise Comparison of Familiar with Equity Finance
-Each node shows the average rank of being Familiar with Equity Finance for Each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant  difference between their medians
Familiar with Equity Finance
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -6.833 0.152 0.455
Individuals-Conventional -14.521 0.003 0.008 -0.512
Institutions-Conventional -7.688 0.117 0.352
Adj. p  (0.05/3) 0.0167
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6.3.1 Personal Source of Information 
 
With regards to the investors’ approach to investment, participants were asked to indicate how much of 
the information used prior to making an investment decision is based on personal sources (i.e. calls, 
meetings with FI/GP, personal network and so forth). The range of responses was from “None at All” 
to “Great Extent”.  
  
Table 6.4 - Investor Type and Personal Source 
  
The outcomes of the responses are presented in Table 6.4 above. Overall, all three groups of investors 
appear to place a considerable portion on Personal Sources, with the conventional group placing the 
greatest weight (5.13). Unexpectedly, it seems that the institutional investors based more weight (5.06) 
of their decision making on personal sources than the individual investors, whose responses weighed 
4.39. From the Percentage of the Count to Total Investors, all the institutional investors and 
conventional investors took Personal Sources into consideration, with no count (0%) for “None at All” 
and most of them consider it as forming a “Substantial Extent” (13.73% - institutional, 7.84% -
conventional) to “Great Extent” (11.76% - institutional, 13.73% - conventional) of their decision 
making. While the individual investors were more towards “Considerable Extent” (11.76%) to 
“Substantial Extent” (9.80%). However, the Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed the 
distribution of Personal Sources for all three groups was similar, and the median for individuals (4.50), 
institutions (5.00), and conventional (5.00) was not statistically significantly different, H(2) = 3.321,    
p = 0.190. 
 
Participants were also asked to list three types of Personal Sources of information upon which they base 
their investment decision. This was an open question, and only 49 of the 51 participants provided a 
response to the question. Furthermore, some respondents provided less than three types of Personal 
Sources of information. The responses are presented in Table 6.5 below. As can be seen from the table, 
None at 
All
Slight 
Extent
Certain 
Extent
Considerable 
Extent
Substantial 
Extent
Great 
Extent
Count 1 1 1 6 5 4
% of Total 
Investors
1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 11.76% 9.80% 7.84%
Count 0 0 1 3 7 6
% of Total 
Investors
0.00% 0.00% 1.96% 5.88% 13.73% 11.76%
Count 0 0 0 5 4 7
% of Total 
Investors
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.80% 7.84% 13.73%
H (2) p
3.321 0.190
Individuals 4.50
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
5.13
5.06
4.39
Conventional 5.00
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 6, with 1 "None at All" to 6  "Great Extent".
Institutions 5.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Personal Source
156		
“Calls and Meeting Manager/Placement Officer, Investee Company and Related Parties” (Calls with 
FI) scored the highest source of personal information overall, representing 65.31%, followed by 
“Professional/Authorities’ Advice” (Professional Advice) and “Friends and Personal Network Advice” 
(Personal Network), representing 42.86% each. While inquiring internally within the institution itself 
or with partners scored the least with 20.41% (other than no personal sources and relied on own 
experience).  
	
Table 6.5 - Investor Type and Personal Source Investing Based On 
 
 
Based on the percentage of count of the responses within each group, the top three personal sources for 
all three groups of investors were the same, yet the order of preference was slightly different. For 
individuals and conventional investors the order of preference of Personal Sources upon which they 
based their decisions were the same: Calls with FI (52.94% - individuals, 100% - conventional) and 
Professional Advice (52.94% - individuals, 37.50% - conventional), Personal Network (47.06%-
individuals, 31.25% - conventional). While for the institutional investors they were: Personal Network 
(50.00%), Calls with FI (43.75%), and Professional Advice (37.50%). With regards to basing it on 
“Own Experience”, conventional (6.25%) was the group that relied on it the least. 
 
6.3.2 Impersonal Source of Information 
 
Along with how much of the personal information formed part of the decision making, impersonal 
information was also looked at to see how much of their investment decision was based on it. 
Calls & Meetisng 
Manager/ 
Placement Officer 
Investee Company 
& Related Parties
Professional/ 
Authorities Advice
Friends & 
Personel 
Network Advice
Internal-    
Investment 
Team -Partners 
Call/Meet
Own 
Experience-
None
Count 9 9 8 3 3 17
% within 
Investor Type
52.94% 52.94% 47.06% 17.65% 17.65% 34.69%
Count 7 6 8 3 4 16
% within 
Investor Type
43.75% 37.50% 50.00% 18.75% 25.00% 32.65%
Count 16 6 5 4 1 16
% within 
Investor Type
100.00% 37.50% 31.25% 25.00% 6.25% 32.65%
Count 32 21 21 10 8 49
% of Total 
Responses
65.31% 42.86% 42.86% 20.41% 16.33% 100.00%
Total
Institutions
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Personal Source Investment Based on
Total 
Responses
Individuals
Conventional
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Impersonal sources include documents, reports, press releases and so forth. The range of responses 
given by the respondents is shown in Table 6.6. 
	
Table 6.6 - Investor Type and Impersonal Source 
 
 
 As can be seen from the table above, overall, participants placed considerable weight on Impersonal 
Sources. Individuals were mainly between “Considerable Extent” and “Substantial Extent” with 9.80% 
of the respondents for each. While institutions (15.69%) were more inclined towards “Considerable 
Extent” and the conventional investors (13.73%) were more towards “Substantial Extent” in how much 
they relied on Impersonal Sources. The conventional investors placed more weight on impersonal 
information with a weighted score of (5.00), than both the individuals (4.50) and institutional investors 
(4.00). The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed the distribution of Impersonal Sources 
across the group of investors was the same, and that the medians for individual (4.50) and institutions 
(4.00) and conventional (5.00) were statistically significantly different at the 10% significance level, H 
(2) = 4.982, p = 0.083. However, when the pairwise comparison was performed (Figure 6.3) using 
Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, it revealed that 
although there was a pairing between the institutions and conventional, with a medium size effect160 (p 
= 0.083, r = -0.388), it was not statistically significant at the statistical significant acceptance                          
p < 0.0333161. 
	
																																								 																				
160 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
161 p is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence, P at 10% significance adjusted for 3 groups, p =0.1/3=0.0333.	
None at 
All
Slight 
Extent
Certain 
Extent
Considerable 
Extent
Substantial 
Extent
Great Extent
Count 1 2 1 5 5 4
% of Total 
Investors
1.96% 3.92% 1.96% 9.80% 9.80% 7.84%
Count 2 1 2 8 3 1
% of Total 
Investors
3.92% 1.96% 3.92% 15.69% 5.88% 1.96%
Count 0 1 2 2 7 4
% of Total 
Investors
0.00% 1.96% 3.92% 3.92% 13.73% 7.84%
H (2) p*
4.982 0.083
Table 6.6- Investor Type and Impersonal Source 
4.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Impersonal Source
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
4.69
3.71
4.28
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 6, with 1 "None at All" to 6 "Great Extent".
* at 10% significant level
Individuals 4.50
Conventional 5.00
Institutions
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Figure 6.3 - Post hoc Test on the Distribution of Impersonal Source 
 
 
Participants were then asked to list three types of impersonal sources of information upon which they 
based their investment decisions. This was an open question and the responses were grouped as seen in 
Table 6.7 below. Some investors provided more than three impersonal sources. All sources provided 
were taken into consideration when the responses were grouped. “Market Research, Industry Report 
and Intelligence Platform” (Market Research) collectively represented the highest source, with a 
representation of 72.55% of responses from all responses, with more conventional investors (87.50%) 
relying on them more than institutions (76.47%) and individual (55.56%) investors. This was followed 
by “Financials, Ratios and Valuation” (Financials) with 43.14%, followed by “Offering Document and 
Subscription Agreement” (Offering Document) with 31.37%, followed by “Press Releases, Magazines 
and Conferences” (Presses) with 29.41%, followed by “Business Plan, Investment Strategy, Legal 
Structure and Exit” (Business Plan) with 25.49% and “Due Diligence” (Diligence) with 19.61%, 
followed by “Management Performance and Reputation” (Reputation) with 15.69%. Last of all was 
“Professional Advice, Meeting and Recommendation” and “Own Experience-None” with 9.80% each. 
Based on the percentage of count of responses, the top three impersonal sources for the individuals 
group were: Market Research (55.56%), Financials (44.44%) and Offering Document (44.44%). While 
Pairwise Comparison of Impersonal Source
-Each node shows the average rank of Impersonal Source for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant  difference between their
medians
Impersonal Source
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Institutions-Individuals 6.912 0.157 0.47
Institutions-Conventional -11.068 0.028 0.083 -0.388
Individuals-Conventional -4.156 0.402 1.000
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
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the three impersonal sources for the institutional investors were: Market Research (76.47%), Presses 
(47.06) and Financials (35.29%). For conventional investors, the top three Impersonal Sources were: 
Market Research (87.50%), Financials (50.00%) and Diligence (43.75%). 
 
Table 6.7 - Investor Type and Impersonal Source Investing Based On 
	
 
6.3.3 Obtaining Market Information 
	
As discussed under section 6.3.2, Market Research scored the highest as an impersonal source of 
information upon which investment decisions were based. Hence, the participants were also asked how 
easy it was to obtain market information on the IPE/CPE market. Table 6.8 summarises their responses. 
As can be seen from the weighted score of those who tried to seek market information, conventional 
(3.88) and institutional investors (3.76) had more difficulty than individual investors (2.94). However, 
27.78% of the investors within the individual group did not try to obtain any market information. 
Moreover, the Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed the distribution of obtaining market 
information for all three groups was similar, and the median for individuals (3.50), institutions (4.00) 
and conventional (4.00) was not statistically significantly different, H(2) = 4.064, p = 0.131. 
Offering 
Document & 
Subscription 
Agreement- 
Investor Pack
Financials, 
Ratios & 
Valuation
Business 
plan, 
Investment 
Strategy, 
Legal 
Structure & 
Exit
Management 
Performance 
& Reputation
Due 
Diligence
Market 
Research, 
Industry 
Report & 
Intelligence 
Plateform
Press 
Releases, 
Magazines 
& 
Confrences
Professional 
Advice, 
Meeting & 
Recommenda
tion
Own 
Experience-
None
Count 8 8 5 2 1 10 2 2 3 18
% within 
Investor Type
44.44% 44.44% 27.78% 11.11% 5.56% 55.56% 11.11% 11.11% 16.67% 35.29%
Count 4 6 5 3 2 13 8 2 2 17
% within 
Investor Type
23.53% 35.29% 29.41% 17.65% 11.76% 76.47% 47.06% 11.76% 11.76% 33.33%
Count 4 8 3 3 7 14 5 1 0 16
% within 
Investor Type
25.00% 50.00% 18.75% 18.75% 43.75% 87.50% 31.25% 6.25% 0.00% 31.37%
Count 16 22 13 8 10 37 15 5 5 51
% of Total 
Responses
31.37% 43.14% 25.49% 15.69% 19.61% 72.55% 29.41% 9.80% 9.80% 100.00%
Descriptive 
Statistics
Impersonal Source Investment Based on
Total
Individuals
Conventional
Total
Institutions
Investor Type
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Table 6.8 - Investor Type and Obtaining Market Information 
 
 
6.3.4 Environmental, Social and Governance Matters 
 
Before moving on to the next section on the investor and FI relationship, investors were asked whether 
the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) matters formed part of the information that they 
considered while investing. The option of responses provided ranged from “None at All” to “Great 
Extent”. As can be seen from Table 6.9 below, conventional investors (3.75) gave more weight to ESG 
when making investment decisions than individual investors (2.94) and institutions (3.12). The 
conventional investors gave EGC consideration to a “Substantial Extent” and the institutional investors 
were more inclined towards “Considerable Extent”, while individual investors were more towards 
“Certain Extent”. It also appears that 23.53% of the institutional investors, 22.22% of the individual 
investors, and 6.25% of conventional investors did not take ESG matters into consideration at all. The 
Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed the distribution of EGC matters for the three groups 
was similar, and the median for individuals (3.00), institutions (3.00) and conventional (4.00) was not 
statistically significantly different, H(2) = 2.876, p = 0.237. 
	
With 
Difficulty
Somewhat 
Difficult
Somewhat 
Easy
Easy Didn't Try
Count 2 7 2 2 5
% within Total 
Investors
11.11% 38.89% 11.11% 11.11% 27.78%
Count 4 7 4 2 0
% within Total 
Investors
23.53% 41.18% 23.53% 11.76% 0.00%
Count 3 9 3 1 0
% within Total 
Investors
18.75% 56.25% 18.75% 6.25% 0.00%
H (2) p
4.064 0.131
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in descending order from 5 to 1, with 5 to "With Difficulty" to 1  "Didn't  Try".
Conventional 4.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Institutions 4.00
3.88
3.76
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Obtain Market Informaion
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
Individuals 3.502.94
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Table 6.9 - Investor Type and Environmental Social Governance Issues Affect Investment Decisions 
 
 
6.4 PRE-INVESTMENT INVESTORS’ RELATIONSHIP WITH FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS  
 
In order to determine the level of information disclosure and transparency between the investor and FI 
in an IPE/CPE investment162, investors were questioned on their pre-investment relationship with the 
FI. The following section reports on the findings with regards to the investors’ relationship prior to 
investing. It looks into the documents the investors received, read and on the language and 
comprehensiveness of the documents; the area of discussion prior to investing; whether their decision 
was based on information or trust; the agreements they signed and their ability to negotiate prior to 
signing. 
 
6.4.1 Type and Language of Documents Received 
 
Investors were asked about the type of documents they received from the FI when approached with an 
investment opportunity. Table 6.10 below shows that the majority (86.30%) of participants had received 
a full set of documents (offering document, term sheet and subscription form/agreement). It was only 
the institutional investors that received a subscription form/agreement (2.00%), and for the individuals, 
the smallest set of documents they received was the term sheet along with the subscription 
form/agreement (3.90%). While the least set of documents received by the conventional was “Others” 
(3.90%). The others that were reported by the conventional were: one reported that in past investments 
they did not receive any documents and the other participant relied more on site visits and the 
management’s reputation (since the related PPM documents were old and represented the first stage of 
																																								 																				
162 For the IPE investment - part of research questions A.	
None at 
All
Slight 
Extent
Certain 
Extent
Considerable 
Extent
Substantial 
Extent
Great 
Extent
Count 4 1 7 4 2 0
% within Total 
Investors
22.22% 5.56% 38.89% 22.22% 11.11% 0.00%
Count 4 3 3 4 0 3
% within Total 
Investors
23.53% 17.65% 17.65% 23.53% 0.00% 17.65%
Count 1 2 4 2 7 0
% within Total 
Investors
6.25% 12.50% 25.00% 12.50% 43.75% 0.00%
H (2) p
2.876 0.237
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 6, with 1 "None at All" to 6 "Great Extent".
Conventional 4.00
Institutions 3.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Investor Type 
Descriptive 
Statistics
Environmental Social Governance Issues
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
Individuals 3.00
3.75
3.12
2.94
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the investment). Moreover, the institutional investor that only accepted a subscription agreement was 
an investor alongside (partnership) the FI, in a form of Musharaka, and was well aware of the details 
of the investment. 
	
Table 6.10 - Investor Type and Documents Provided to Investors 
 
 
Investors were also asked how they found the language of the documents, agreements/contracts that 
they had signed. Was the language easy to understand or complex? Was it comprehensive enough to 
protect their rights and were adequate covenants in place to address the conflict of interest? Table 6.11 
summarises their responses. It appears from the weighted score that the individual investors (1.25) 
found the language of the agreement/document simpler than the other groups of investors (1.50). Within 
the groups of institutions and conventional there were equal numbers of participants who found the 
language “Simple” (12.50% - institutions, 25.00% - conventional), easy to understand and “Complex 
Not Easy to Understand” (12.50% - institutions, 25.00% - conventional). However, 10 from individuals 
and 9 from institutions did not select a response. While with regards to the comprehensiveness, it 
appears that conventional investors (25.00%) considered the agreement more comprehensive than that 
of individual investors (20.45%) and institutions (18.18%). Although 5 institutional investors and 2 
individuals did not select a response. 
	
Provided Full 
Set
Provided Term Sheet 
and Subscription 
Form/Agreement 
Only
Provided 
Subscription 
Form/Agreement 
Only
Other
Count 16 2 0 0 18
% of Total 31.40% 3.90% 0.00% 0.00% 35.30%
Count 15 1 1 0 17
% of Total 29.40% 2.00% 2.00% 0.00% 33.30%
Count 13 1 0 2 16
% of Total 25.50% 2.00% 0.00% 3.90% 31.40%
Count 44 4 1 2 51
% of Total 86.30% 7.80% 2.00% 3.90% 100.00%
Total
Institutions
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Total
Individuals
Conventional
Documents Provided
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Table 6.11 - Investor Type and Language of Agreement and Document Comprehensiveness 
 
 
It is interesting to see within the investors who invested in IPE that the individuals found the 
agreements/documents more simple and easy to understand (18.75% - individuals, 12.50% - institutions) 
as opposed to the institutional investors, who found it complex and not easy to understand (12.50% - 
institutions, 6.25% - individuals). This could be due to some individual investors, although having 
received the full set of documents, relied on the presentation made by the FI and questions put forward 
to them, as commented on by an individual investor. On the other hand, looking at the break-up within 
the conventional group (Table 6.12), it was the conventional institutions that found the language simpler 
(66.6% - conventional institutions, 40.00% - conventional individuals) and more comprehensive (83.33% 
- conventional institutions, 60.00% - conventional individuals) than the conventional individuals.  
	
Table 6.12 - Break-up of Conventional Investor Group and Language of Agreement and Document 
Comprehensiveness 
 
 
Simple Complex Comprehensive
Not 
Comprehensive
Count 6 2 9 7
% of Total 18.75% 6.25% 20.45% 15.91%
Count 4 4 8 4
% of Total 12.50% 12.50% 18.18% 9.09%
Count 8 8 11 5
% of Total 25.00% 25.00% 25.00% 11.36%
Count 18 14 28 16
% of Total 56.25% 43.75% 63.64% 36.36%
H (2) p H (2) p
1.476 0.478 0.592 0.744
1.00
1.00
1.5
1.5
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "Simple" and 2 to "Complex".
b-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "Comprehensive" and 2 to "Not Comprehensive".
Kruskal Wallis Kruskal Wallis 
Total
Conventional
Institutions
1.50
1.50
1.31
1.33
Document Comprehensive Protect 
Rights and Address Conflict of Interest Weighted 
Score-b
Language of 
Document/Agreement Weighted 
Score-a
1.25 1.44
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Median Median
Individuals 1.00 1.00
Simple Complex Comprehensive
Not 
Comprehensive
Count 4 6 6 4
%Within 
Investor 
Type
40.00% 60.00% 60.00% 40.00%
Count 4 2 5 1
%Within 
Investor 
Type
66.67% 33.33% 83.33% 16.67%
Count 8 8 11 5
% of Total 50.00% 50.00% 68.75% 31.25%
1.17
1.40
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "Simple" and 2 to "Complex".
b-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "Comprehensive" and 2 to "Not Comprehensive".
Conventional 
Individual
Conventional 
Institutional
Total
1.00
2.00
1.33
1.60
1.00
1.00
Language of 
Document/Agreement Weighted 
Score-a
Median
Weighted 
Score-b
Median
Document Comprehensive Protect 
Rights and Address Conflict of Interest
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The participants were also asked whether they had read the documents provided to them, or they had 
someone else read them on their behalf, or they did not read them in detail and relied on the meeting 
and FI’s promoting of the investment.  
	
Table 6.13 - Investor Type and Reading of Documents 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.13 above, the greater portion of all groups of participants read the 
documents with individuals 25.49%, institutions 17.65% and conventional 27.45%. While it was only 
the institutional and conventional investors that relied solely on the reading of experts and their feedback 
(5.88% - institutions, 9.80% - conventional). However, 5.88% of the individuals did seek the experts’ 
feedback but had also read the documents personally, in addition to 9.80% of the institutional 
participants also doing so. It appears that none of the individual or institutional participants relied solely 
on either just the FI’s promotion or on their network and relations. These were the options provided as 
part of the set of responses, and only one conventional participant selected having relied solely on 
Network. Only individuals appeared to rely on the promotion of the FI of the investment, but not solely, 
as they had also read the document. 
 
Participants were questioned about whether certain matters were discussed in their meetings with the 
FI (promoter of investment), and in what detail. The choices of responses were: “In Detail”, “Some 
Detail”, “Briefly” and “Not Discussed” and the weighted score was calculated for each issue discussed 
and tabulated in Table 6.14 below. Some participants could not recall (4 participants) whether certain 
issues were discussed, while some other participants did not select a response on certain issues (6 
Read 
Personally
Expert/ Advisors 
Read Provide 
Feedback
Read 
Personally-
Expert
Read 
Personally-
Promoting FI
Relied on 
Network
Count 13 0 3 2 0 18
% of Total 25.49% 0.00% 5.88% 3.92% 0.00% 35.29%
Count 9 3 5 0 0 17
% of Total 17.65% 5.88% 9.80% 0.00% 0.00% 33.33%
Count 14 5 0 0 1 16
% of Total 27.45% 9.80% 0.00% 0.00% 1.96% 31.37%
Count 36 8 8 2 1 51
% of Total 70.59% 15.69% 15.69% 3.92% 1.96% 100.00%
Total
Reading of Documents
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Individuals
Conventional
Total
Institutions
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participants). The weighted score was calculated on the total number of participants that provided a 
response for each issue. 
 
It appears that on all issues discussed, more details were discussed with institutional and conventional 
investors than individual investors. This was especially pronounced with regards to Alignment of 
Interest matters, where institutions and conventional weighted scores were 3.41 and 3.60 respectively 
versus individuals with 2.60. In addition, Risk Factors (3), Shari’ah Non-Compliance (3), Rights and 
Obligations (3), Transparency-Disclosure (3), Governance (2), Investment Plan (1), and Reporting 
Update (1) also appear to be issues, where individual participants experienced a shortfall, in that these 
matters were not discussed. While with institutions and conventional there was only one matter each 
that was not discussed; with institutions, it was Governance (1) and with conventional it was Alignment 
of Interest (1). In all groups Exit Strategy was discussed and mainly in “Some Detail” to “In Detail”. 
 
Although it appears that there might be some difference in the level of discussion on a few of the issues 
that were discussed between the FI and the three groups of investors, the Kruskal-Wallis H test that was 
conducted on all matters discussed presented otherwise. The test showed the distribution of all matters 
for all three groups was similar (with the exception of Alignment of Interest, Governance and Shari’ah 
Non-Compliance), and there was statistically no significant difference between individuals, institutions, 
and conventional, as can be seen in Table 6.14 below. However, the test showed that there is a 
statistically significant difference in Alignment of Interest between individuals (3.00), institutions 
(3.00), and conventional (4.00) with a large size effect163, H (2) =10.867, p = 0.003. The test also showed 
that there is a statistically significant difference in Governance between individuals (2.00), institutions 
(3.00), and conventional (4.00), H (2) = 9.352, p = 0.009. Furthermore, the test that was conducted on 
Shari’ah compliance also showed that there is a statistically significant difference between individuals 
(3.00) and institutions (4.00), with a medium size effect, H (1) = 4.066, p = 0.044, r = -0.341. 
 
 
	
																																								 																				
163 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
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Table 6.14 - Investor Type and Issues Discussed with FI* 
 
Issue 
Discussed
Investor Type
Descriptiv
e Statistics
In Details
Some 
Detail
Briefly
Not 
Discussed
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
Individuals Count 3 6 3 3 2.60 2.50
Institutions Count 8 8 1 0 3.41 2.00
Conventional Count 11 3 0 1 3.60 1.00
H (2) p
11.732 0.003
Individuals Count 3 5 8 2 2.50 3.00
Institutions Count 7 4 5 1 3.00 2.00
Conventional Count 9 6 1 0 3.50 1.00
H (2) p
9.352 0.009
Individuals Count 4 8 1 3 2.81 2.00
Institutions Count 7 6 4 0 3.18 2.00
Conventional Count 8 5 2 0 3.40 1.50
H (2) p
3.381 0.184
Individuals Count 9 6 1 1 3.35 1.50
Institutions Count 13 2 2 0 3.65 1.00
Conventional Count 13 3 0 0 3.81 1.00
H (2) p
4.822 0.090
Individuals Count 7 6 4 3.18 2.00
Institutions Count 7 7 3 3.24 2.00
Conventional Count 8 8 0 3.50 1.50
H (2) p
1.962 0.375
Individuals Count 6 5 5 1 2.94 2.00
Institutions Count 8 9 0 0 3.47 2.00
Conventional Count 7 7 2 0 3.31 2.00
H (2) p
3.846 0.146
Individuals Count 5 4 4 3 2.69 2.00
Institutions Count 8 6 3 0 3.29 2.00
Conventional Count 8 6 2 0 3.38 1.50
H (2) p**
4.931 0.085
Individuals Count 6 4 4 3 2.76 2.00
Institutions Count 8 5 4 0 3.24 2.00
Conventional Count 8 7 1 0 3.44 1.50
H (2) p
4.115 0.128
Individuals Count 8 6 1 3 3.06 2.00
Institutions Count 13 3 1 0 3.71 1.00
H (1) p r
4.066 0.044 -0.341
** At 10% significant level.
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Reporting 
Update
Rights and 
Obligations
Risk Factors
Shari'ah  Non-
Compliance
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Exit Strategy
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in descending order from 4 to 1, with a score of 4 to In Detail” to 1 “Not Discussed”.
*All the p -values reported are the 5% significant level.
Table 6.13- Investor Type and Issues Discussed with IFI *
Alignement of 
Interest
Governance
Transparency-
Disclosure
Investment 
Plan
167		
Accordingly, post hoc tests were performed to see which groups differed from one another. The pairwise 
comparison test was performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons. Statistically significant was accepted at the p <0.0167164 level. The post hoc 
analysis of Alignment of Interest (Figure 6.4) revealed that there was a statistically significant difference 
in the median scores between the individuals (3.00) and conventional (4.00), with a large size effect (p 
= 0.003, r = -0.532), but not between institutions and conventional or between institutions and 
individuals. 
	
Figure 6.4 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Discussed Alignment of Interest Across the Type of Investor Groups 
 
 
Furthermore, the post hoc analysis on Governance (Figure 6.5) revealed that there was a statistically 
significant difference in the median scores between the individuals (2.00) and conventional (4.00), with 
a large size effect (p = 0.007, r = -0.532) but not between institutions and conventional or individuals 
and institutions.  
 	
																																								 																				
164 P is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence in this case there are 3 groups, so p= 0.05/3=0.0167.	
Pairwise Comparison of Alignment of Interest Discussed
-Each node shows the average rank of Alignment of Interest for each group of investor
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference 
between their medians
Alignment of Interest Discussed
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Institutions-Individuals -9.67 0.41 0.122
Individuals-Conventional -15.58 0.001 0.003 -0.532
Institutions-Conventional -5.91 0.224 0.673
Adj. p  (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Figure 6.5 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Discussed Governance Across the Type of Investor Groups 
 
 
With regards to Shari’ah compliance, no pairwise post hoc test was conducted to find out which group 
differed from the other because it only involves two groups of investors.  
 
6.4.2 Information vs. Trust 
 
Taking into consideration the documents the investors received and the meetings they had with the FI, 
participants were questioned on whether they assessed how sufficient the information they had prior to 
making an investment decision, was on the information provided, or was it on trust in the FI, or was it 
both (information and trust). 
 
	
Pairwise Comparison of GovernanceDiscussed
-Each node shows the average rank of Governance for each group of investor
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference 
between their medians
Governance Discussed
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -7.549 0.114 0.114
Individuals-Conventional -14.823 0.002 0.007 -0.532
Institutions-Conventional -7.274 0.139 0.418
Adj. p  (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Table 6.15 - Investor Type and Benchmarking of Sufficient Information/Trust 
 
 
From Table 6.15 above, it appears that the majority of the participants (60.78%) had benchmarked on 
both the information provided and trust, with conventional (23.53%) being the greater group to do so 
and institutions (19.61.6%) were slightly more than individuals (17.61%). When it came to depending 
just on the information provided, individuals (11.76%) depend more on information alone than 
institutions (9.80%) or conventional (5.88%). Although benchmarking to make an investment decision 
solely on trust in FI was low, it was more for the individual (5.7%) than the institutional (2.9%) or the 
conventional (1.96%) participants. Those depending on “other” were mainly conducting their own 
investigation/research and discussing this with colleagues and experts, as commented by two of the 
participants.  
 
Participants who relied on information were asked to select the type of information and to rank this in 
order of priority. A list of 15 types of information was provided (as can be seen in Table 6.16 below). 
In order to allocate the ranking of responses, the ranking scale was grouped into five groups: ranging 
from “Not Important” to “Very Highly Important” and the weighted score was calculated. The results 
are reported in Table 6.16. To further facilitate the analysis the responses were grouped into either 
“Important” or “Not Important”. From the grouping, it appears that the top five sources of information 
to the participants were: Financial Performance (individuals - 17, institutions - 14, conventional - 14), 
then Investment Opportunity (individuals - 14, institutions - 15, conventional - 13), followed by 
Management Team (individuals - 11, institutions - 9, conventional - 12), followed by Risk and 
Mitigation (individuals - 17, institutions - 14, conventional - 14), and then Terms and Conditions  
Information 
Provided
Trust FI-GP
Information 
and Trust-
Both
Other
Count 6 2 9 1 18
% of Total 11.76% 3.92% 17.65% 1.96% 35.29%
Count 5 1 10 1 17
% of Total 9.80% 1.96% 19.61% 1.96% 33.33%
Count 3 1 12 0 16
% of Total 5.88% 1.96% 23.53% 0.00% 31.37%
Count 14 4 31 2 51
% of Total 27.45% 7.84% 60.78% 3.92% 100.00%
Conventional
Total
Institutions
Individuals
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Benchmarking Sufficient Information
Total
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Table 6.16 - Investor Type and Source of Information* 
  
Information Type Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Not 
Important (a)
Very Low 
Importance 
(b)
Low 
Importance 
(C)
Important (d)
Highly 
Important (e)
Very Highly 
Important (f)
Not so 
Important 
(a+b+c)
Important 
(d+e+f)
Weighted 
Score-g
Median
Individuals Count 5 0 2 2 2 7 7 11 3.94 4.50
Institutions Count 5 1 2 5 3 0 8 8 3.00 3.50
Conventional Count 3 0 1 4 4 3 4 11 4.00 4.00
H (2) p
3.610 0.164
Individuals Count 3 0 1 3 3 8 4 14 4.50 5.00
Institutions Count 1 0 0 2 1 12 1 15 5.38 6.00
Conventional Count 2 0 0 1 2 10 2 13 5.07 6.00
H (2) p
3.416 0.181
Individuals Count 1 0 0 0 3 14 1 17 5.56 6.00
Institutions Count 2 0 0 2 5 7 2 14 4.81 5.00
Conventional Count 0 1 0 2 2 10 1 14 5.33 6.00
H (2) p
4.258 0.119
Individuals Count 4 0 0 0 6 8 4 14 4.56 5.00
Institutions Count 3 1 0 3 1 8 4 12 4.38 5.50
Conventional Count 0 0 0 1 1 13 0 15 5.80 6.00
H (2) p
6.864 0.032
Individuals Count 9 0 0 2 4 3 9 9 3.06 2.50
Institutions Count 7 0 2 3 4 0 9 7 2.81 3.00
Conventional Count 2 1 2 3 5 2 5 10 3.93 4.00
H (2) p
2.970 0.227
Individuals Count 7 0 0 3 6 2 7 11 3.39 4.00
Institutions Count 7 0 0 3 1 5 7 9 3.38 4.00
Conventional Count 2 0 1 4 5 3 3 12 4.27 5.00
H (2) p
1.286 0.526
Individuals Count 11 0 1 5 1 0 12 6 2.17 1.00
Institutions Count 5 0 2 5 2 2 7 9 3.31 4.00
Conventional Count 3 1 4 2 4 1 8 7 3.40 3.00
H (2) p
5.229 0.073
Individuals Count 8 1 0 1 7 1 9 9 3.06 3.00
Institutions Count 5 1 1 2 4 3 7 9 3.50 4.00
Conventional Count 1 0 1 4 7 2 2 13 4.47 5.00
H (2) p
3.109 0.211
Individuals Count 6 1 3 2 2 4 10 8 3.28 3.00
Institutions Count 4 0 3 3 3 3 7 9 3.63 4.00
Conventional Count 0 0 2 6 2 5 2 13 4.67 4.00
H (2) p
4.329 0.115
Individuals Count 11 0 3 3 1 0 14 4 2.06 1.00
Institutions Count 5 1 1 4 4 1 7 9 3.25 4.00
Conventional Count 3 2 6 1 3 0 11 4 2.93 3.00
H (2) p
5.207 0.074
Individuals Count 12 0 3 1 1 1 15 3 2.00 1.00
Institutions Count 8 3 0 3 0 2 11 5 2.38 1.50
Conventional Count 3 2 5 3 1 1 10 5 3.00 3.00
H (2) p
4.650 0.098
Individuals Count 7 2 3 2 3 1 12 6 2.72 2.50
Institutions Count 7 0 1 6 2 0 8 8 2.75 3.50
Conventional Count 3 0 3 5 3 1 6 9 3.53 4.00
H (2) p
2.134 0.344
Individuals Count 10 3 0 1 1 3 13 5 2.39 1.00
Institutions Count 11 3 0 1 0 1 14 2 1.69 1.00
Conventional Count 6 6 2 1 0 0 14 1 1.87 2.00
H (2) p
1.741 0.419
Individuals Count 11 3 2 1 0 1 16 2 1.83 1.00
Institutions Count 9 1 2 3 1 0 12 4 2.13 1.00
Conventional Count 3 5 2 3 2 0 10 5 2.73 2.00
H (2) p
4.851 0.088
Individuals Count 7 0 2 3 1 5 9 9 3.33 3.50
Institutions Count 7 1 2 3 1 2 10 6 2.75 2.50
H (1) p
0.601 0.438
g-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 5 with a score of 1 to "Not Important” to 5 “Very Highly Important”.
*All the p-values reported are the 10% significance level.
Table 6.15 -Investor Type and Source of Information* 
Current Events
Kruskal-Wallis 
Investment 
Opportunity
Kruskal-Wallis 
Financial 
Performance
Kruskal-Wallis 
Management Team
Kruskal-Wallis 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Risk & Mitigation
Kruskal-Wallis 
Regulatory 
Requirements
Kruskal-Wallis 
Consultant 
Recommendation
Kruskal-Wallis 
Policies & Procedures
Kruskal-Wallis 
Family & Friends
Kruskal-Wallis 
Personal Experience
Kruskal-Wallis 
Shari'ah 
Pronouncement
Kruskal-Wallis 
Terms & Conditions
Kruskal-Wallis 
Alignment of Interest 
& Transparency
Kruskal-Wallis 
Applicable Law
Kruskal-Wallis 
 Investor Protection 
& Rights
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(individuals - 9, institutions - 9, conventional - 13). While the five least important sources of information 
were: Family and Friends (individuals - 13, institutions - 14, conventional - 14), then Personal 
Experience (individuals - 16, institutions - 12, conventional - 10), then Consultant Recommendation 
(individuals - 15, institutions - 11, conventional - 10), followed by Applicable Law (individuals - 14, 
institutions - 7, conventional - 11), and then Regulatory Requirements (individuals -12, institutions - 7, 
conventional - 8). 
 
It was interesting to see that the group of investors that invested in IPE (individuals and institutions), 
unlike those that invested in CPE (conventional), found Alignment of Interest and Transparency (IPE : 
individuals - 6, institutions - 4, CPE: conventional - 0), Terms and Conditions (IPE: individuals - 9, 
institutions - 7, CPE: conventional - 2), Team Management (IPE: individuals - 4, institutions - 4, CPE: 
conventional - 0), Risk and Mitigation (IPE: individuals - 7, institutions - 7, CPE: conventional - 3), 
and Current Events (IPE: individuals - 7, institutions - 8, conventional - 4) were not an important 
source/factor of information. Moreover, with the group of investors that invested in IPE, 19 as opposed 
to 15 participants did not think Shari’ah compliance was important information. The overall comment 
received by participants with regards to Shari’ah compliance was that they relied on the SSB of the FI 
or on the investment and took it for granted that the investment opportunity was Sharia’h compliant. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed that the distribution of all source information for 
all three groups was similar (with the exception of Management Team, Regulatory Requirements, 
Applicable Law, Consultant Recommendation, and Personal Experience), and that there was no 
statistically significant difference for all three groups of investors, as can be seen in Table 6.16 above. 
The test showed, at the 10% significance level, that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
median scores of the three groups of investors on Management Team, H (2) = 6.864, p = 0.032. However, 
when the post hoc pairwise was performed (Figure 6.6) using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, although there appeared to be a difference between 
institutions (5.50) and conventional (6.00), (p = 0.032, r = -0.420) and individuals (5.00) and 
conventional, with a medium size effect165 (p = 0.064, r = -0.427), it was not statistically significantly 
accepted at the p <0.0333166 , as can be seen in Figure 6.7 below. 	
																																								 																				
165 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
166 P is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence in this case there are 3 groups at 10% significance, so p = 0.1/3=0.0333.	
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Figure 6.6 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Management Team (Source of Information) 
 
 
Similar outcomes were reached when the Regulatory Requirements167, Applicable Law, Consultant 
Recommendation, and Personal Experience were tested. 
 
Figure 6.7 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Applicable Law (Source of Information) 
 
																																								 																				
167 A post hoc pairwise test on regulatory requirements revealed there was no significant difference between the three 
investor groups.	
Pairwise Comparison of Source of Information on Management Team
-Each node shows the average rank of Source of Information on Management for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their medians
Management Team (Source of 
Information)
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Institutions-Individuals 0.194 0.964 1.000
Institutions-Conventional -10.383 0.023 0.068 -0.420
Individuals-Conventional -10.189 0.021 0.064 -0.427
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
Pairwise Comparison of Source of Information on Applicable Law
-Each node shows the average rank of Source of Information on Applicable Law for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their  medians
Applicable Law 
 (Source of Information)
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Conventional -7.883 0.101 0.302
Individuals-Institutions -10.219 0.03 0.091 -0.359
Conventional-Institutions 2.335 0.636 1.000
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
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With Applicable Law, initially, there was a difference between the three groups of investors at the 10% 
significance level (H(2) = 5.207, p = 0.074) and more specifically a comparison between the median 
scores of individuals (1.00) and institutions (4.00), with a medium size effect168 (p = 0.091, r = -0.359), 
using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, yet, it was not 
statistically significantly accepted at the p <0.0333, as can be seen in Figure 6.7 above.  
 	
Figure 6.8 1- Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Consultant Recommendation (Source of Information) 
 
 
Furthermore, when the H test on Consultant Recommendation was performed, it also initially revealed 
there was a difference at the 10% significance level (H(2) = 4.650, p = 0.098). In addition, when the 
post hoc pairwise comparison was conducted, there was a difference between the median scores of the 
individual (1.00) and conventional (3.00) groups, with a medium size effect (p = 0.097, r = -0.367), 
using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, yet it was not 
statistically significantly accepted at the p <0.033, as can be seen in Figure 6.8 above. 
 
																																								 																				
168 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Pairwise Comparison of Source of Information on Consultant Recommendation
-Each node shows the average rank of Source of Information on Consultant Recommendation for each   
group of  investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their medians
Consultant Recommendation 
 (Source of Information)
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -3.562 0.441 1.000
Individuals-Conventional -10.083 0.032 0.097 -0.367
Institutions-Conventional -6.521 0.178 0.533
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
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Figure 6.9 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Personal Experience (Source of Information) 
 
 
A similar outcome was experienced with Personal Experience. Whereby the H test conducted revealed 
there to be a difference at the 10% significance level, (H(2) = 4.851, p = 0.088), yet the post hoc 
comparison revealed that although there appears to be a difference between the median scores of 
individuals (1.00) and conventional (2.00), with a medium size effect (p = 0.093, r = -0.380) using 
Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, it was not statistically 
significantly accepted at the p <0.033, as can be seen in Figure 6.9 above. 
 
Next the individuals who had based their decisions on trust, whether fully or partially, were asked about 
how much they rated trust. The range of rating options was: “High”, “High-Medium”, “Medium”, 
“Medium-Low” to “Low”. With regards to the responses to this question, of the participants who were 
not applicable169 to provide a response, four participants provided a response. They were 3 individuals 
(Low - 1, Medium - 1, High - 1) and one institution (High - 1). Their responses were included in Table 
6.17 below. Moreover, one participant that was applicable to respond did not do so.  
 	
																																								 																				
169 Those who had not selected trust as part of basing their decision making on (in the previous question), were not 
applicable to respond to rate trust. 	
Pairwise Comparison of Source of Information on Personal Experience
-Each node shows the average rank of Source of Information on Personal Experience for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their medians
Personal Experience
 (Source of Information)
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -2.750 0.552 1.000
Individuals-Conventional -10.133 0.031 0.093 -0.380
Institutions-Conventional -7.383 0.127 0.380
Adj. p  (0.05/3) 0.0333
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Table 6.17 - Investor Type and Based on Trust in FI 
 
 
It appears that the individual participants (3.69) had more weight on trust in the FI promoting the 
investment, than the institutional (3.36) and conventional (3.27) participants. Although institutions were 
not as high on trust as individuals, there appears to be no “Low” in trust among the institutional 
participants as opposed to two individual and three conventional participants who had low trust in the 
FI. This reflects the comments made by individuals that the element of trust had played a big part in 
them subscribing to the investment. Especially for those who had known the FI, and had prior 
investments with them, as noted by two of the participants. While comments made by the “Low” 
conventional were that they did not believe in promoters nor did they have much trust in the industry 
and they are guided by the outcome of the due diligence in their decision making. The Kruskal-Wallis 
H test that was conducted showed the distribution of basing decisions on trust for individuals, 
institutions and conventional was similar, and the median for individuals (4.00), institutions (3.50) and 
conventional (3.00) was not statistically significantly different, H(2) = 0.704, p = 0.703. 
 
6.4.3 Agreement Signed 
 
The investors’ views on the contract/agreement the investor had signed with the FI were assessed by 
the participants’ ratings of how satisfied they were with the agreements they had signed. The options 
of responses ranged from “Fully Satisfied” to Not Satisfied” (Table 6.18).  
	
High High-Medium Medium Medium-Low Low
Count 5 3 3 0 2
% of Total 12.50% 7.50% 7.50% 0.00% 5.00%
Count 0 5 5 1 0
% of Total 0.0% 12.50% 12.50% 2.50% 0.00%
Count 5 2 3 2 3
% of Total 12.50% 5.00% 7.50% 5.00% 7.50%
H (2) p
0.704 0.703
Conventional 3.003.27
3.36
3.69
Investor Type
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 5 with a score of 1 to "Low” to 5 “High”.
Median
Individuals 4.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Descriptive 
Statistics
Based on Trust
Weighted 
Score-a
Institutions 3.50
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Table 6.18 - Investor Type and Satisfied with Agreement 
 
 
It appears that the institutional investors were more satisfied with the agreements they had signed than 
the individuals and conventional, with a weighted score of approximately 3.94 as opposed to 3.17 for 
individuals and 3.88 for conventional. The majority of institutional and conventional investors were 
“Fairly Satisfied” with 21.57% and 17.65% respectively, while 19.61% of individual investors were 
“Satisfied”. Those institutional investors that were satisfied commented that the agreement is negotiated 
until it is acceptable for all parties. The Islamic commercial laws and regulations need a lot of work to 
improve, and as such the agreement is negotiated so as to cover all aspects of the investment and the 
obligations. Of those institutional investors who were fairly satisfied, they reasoned that there were 
some subscription agreements that covered everything, and there were some that were very light where 
they had to request more protection. This is similar to one of the individual’s comments that he was not 
satisfied, in that the agreement was poorly drafted and vague. Some individuals remarked that 
agreements are written up in a way that they are more fully protecting the financial institution than the 
investor. Furthermore, another individual, who was fairly satisfied, noted that if he could go back in 
time, he would give more attention to every detail, rather than to the basis of trust and a booming market. 
On the other hand, the comments of fairly satisfied conventional investors were not that much different. 
One commented that contracts are more biased towards the PE firm. While another remarked that the 
agreement faced legal issues when being implemented in some jurisdictions, resulting in costs and time 
trying to find legal solutions. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed that the distribution of satisfied with the 
agreement signed is the same across the group of investors, and that there is a statistically significant 
difference, in the satisfaction between the group of investors, H(2) = 8.658, p = 0.013. Accordingly, a 
post hoc analysis, using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons 
Fully 
Satisfied
Fairly 
Satisfied
Satisfied
Somewha
t Satisfied
Not 
Satisfied
Count 2 3 10 2 1
% of Total 3.92% 5.88% 19.61% 3.92% 1.96%
Count 3 11 2 1 0
% of Total 5.88% 21.57% 3.92% 1.96% 0.00%
Count 4 9 1 1 1
% of Total 7.84% 17.65% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
Count 9 23 13 4 2 51
% of Total 17.65% 45.10% 25.49% 7.84% 3.92% 100.00%
H (2) p
8.658 0.013
Investor 
Type
Descriptive 
 Statistics
Kruskal-Wallis 
Table 6.18- Investor Type and Satisfied with Agreement 
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in descending order from 5 to 1 with a score of 5 to "Fully Satisfied” to 1 “Not Satisfied”.
Satisfied with Agreement
Weighted 
 Score-a
Median
Institutions 3.94 4.00
Conventional 3.88 4.00
Total
Individuals 3.17 3.00
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was performed (Figure 6.10 below). Statistical significance was accepted at the p <0.0167170 level. The 
analysis revealed there to be differences in the median scores between individuals (3.00) and 
conventional (4.00), with a medium size effect171 (p =0.034, r = -0.402), and between individuals and 
institutions (4.00), with a medium size effect, (p = 0.035, r = -0.446), but not between institutions and 
conventional. However, the differences were not statistically significant, p > 0.0167. 
 	
Figure 6.10 2- Post Hoc Test of the Distribution of Satisfied with the Agreement Across the Type of Investor Groups 
 
 
The participants were also asked whether they had the ability to negotiate any of the contractual clauses. It appears 
from Table 6.19 
Table	6. below that 52.17% of individuals of the total proportion of the Opportunity to Negotiate do not 
appear to have negotiated any of the contractual clauses, while only 17.39% of the conventional and 
30.43% of institutional investors appear not to have been able to do so. Moreover, in performing the 
Chi-square analysis of the goodness-of-fit and the representation of the actual portions (of “No” or 
“Yes”) between the group of investors and the expected, there appears to be some discrepancies between 
the expected and observed actual counts. It was expected that 8 individuals would say “No”, but actually 
12 individuals said “No” (adjusted residual = 2). It was also expected that 7 conventional investors 
would say “No”, but actually 4 said “No” (adjusted residual = -2). While the expected and actual for 
institutions was much closer (adjusted residual = 1). 
																																								 																				
170 P is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence in this case there are 3 groups, so p= 0.05/3=0.0167.	
171 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Pairwise Comparison of Satisfied with the Agreement 
-Each node shows the average rank of being Satisfied with the Agreement for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their medians
Satisfied with the 
Agreement
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals--Institutions -11.953 0.12 0.035 -0.446
Individuals-Conventional -12.181 0.011 0.034 -0.402
Institutions-Conventional -0.228 0.963 1.000
Adj. p  (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Table 6.19 - Investor Type and Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses 
 
 
Accordingly, a Chi-square test of homogeneity was performed and the test revealed that a statistically 
significant difference exists between the Yes/No proportions of the investor type (see Table 6.20 below).	
Of the 51 participants' responses, where the investor group sizes were unequal, 12 conventional (75%) 
were able to negotiate compared to 6 (33.3%) individuals and 10 institutions (58.8%) when signing the 
agreement, with a statistically significant difference in proportions,             p = 0.047. The post hoc 
analysis that was performed involved pairwise comparisons using the z-test of two proportions with a 
Bonferroni correction, and p adjusted for multiple comparisons. The proportion of “Yes” of 
conventional investors was statistically higher then the individual investors,       p < 0.05, but there is 
no statistically significant difference between the proportions between individuals and institutions and 
between conventional and institutional investors, p > 0.05. 
 	
No Yes
Count 12 6
Expected Count 8.10 9.90
% Within 
Opportunity to 
Negotiate
52.17% 21.43%
Adjusted Residual 2.29 -2.29
Count 7 10
Expected Count 7.67 9.33
% Within 
Opportunity to 
Negotiate
30.43% 35.71%
Adjusted Residual -0.40 0.40
Count 4 12
Expected Count 7 9
% Within 
Opportunity to 
Negotiate
17.39% 42.86%
Adjusted Residual -1.95 1.95
Count 23 28
Expected Count 23.00 28.00
% Within 
Opportunity to 
Negotiate
100.00% 100.00%
Value df p V
6.098 2 0.047 0.346
Median
Descriptive 
Statistics
Opportunity to 
Negotiate Contractual 
Clauses
Weighted 
Score-a
Investor Types
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
1.33 1.00
1.59 2.00
2.001.75
Total
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "No" and 2 to "Yes".
Pearson Chi-Square*
* 5% significance level
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Table 6.20 - Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses and Investor Type  
 
 
Subsequently, a Chi-square test of independence was conducted between investor types and 
Opportunity to Negotiate. All expected cell frequencies were greater than five. There was a statistically 
significant association between investor type and Opportunity to Negotiate, X"(2) = 6.098, p = 0.047. 
The association was moderately strong (Cohen, 1988), V172= 0.346. The post hoc pairwise analysis that 
was performed at a statistically significant acceptance level p < 0.0167 (p < 0.05 adjusted for multiple 
comparisons) did not reveal there to be a difference between the groups of investors. However, when it 
was accepted at p < 0.0333 (p < 0.1 adjusted for multiple comparisons) it revealed statistically 
significant differences in the median scores between individuals (1.00) and conventional (2.00) with a 
medium size effect173 (p = 0.047, r = -0.402), but neither between individuals and institutions nor 
between institutions and conventional (see Figure 6.11). 
 	
																																								 																				
172 V is the Cramer's V measure used to determine the effective size for tables larger than 2 by 2, which takes into account 
the degrees of freedom. And the standard for interpreting Cramer’s V as proposed by Cohen (1988) for df (2): 0.07=small 
effect, 0.21=medium effect, and 0.35=large effect.	
173 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Individuals Institutions Conventional
Count 12a 7a, b 4b 23
Expected Count 8.12 7.67 7.22 23
% within 
Investor Type
66.67% 41.18% 25.00% 45.10%
Count 6a 10a, b 12b 28
Expected Count 9.88 9.33 8.78 28
% within 
Investor Type
33.33% 58.82% 75.00% 54.90%
Value df p V
6.098 2 .047 0.346
a, b :Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Investor Type  categories and the proportions  
significant from each other at the 0.05 level: Those with same letters, there are no statistically 
significant differences in the portions between those groups. Those with different letters there 
are statistically significant difference between those groups.
Descriptive 
Statistics
Opportunity 
to Negotiate 
Contractual 
Clauses
Pearson Chi-Square Test
Number of Valid Cases 51
Investor Type
Total
No
Yes
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Figure 6.11-Post Hoc Test on the Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses Across the Type of Investor Groups 
 
 
From Table 6.21 below, where the opportunity to negotiate was compared to the amount invested, it 
appears that most of those who had the opportunity to negotiate any clauses were mainly those investors 
who had invested $10m+. As per comments made in the questionnaire and correspondence with 
participants, individual participants that were able to negotiate was mainly with the wavering or 
reducing of fees and at times the yield. While big ticket size investors (from all groups of investors), 
who had the muscle to do so, due to the large commitment, were able to negotiate certain terms, such 
as: board representation, valuation at exit, warrants and reserve matters. Some of those who had invested 
in a partnership were also able to negotiate everything, as per comments made. In such events if the 
agreement could not be touched, a side letter would be signed with the negotiated terms. Although the 
Kruskal-Wallis H test that was carried out revealed there to be a statistically significant difference, at 
statistical acceptance p <0.05, between the opportunity to negotiate and the amount invested H (3) = 
8.469, p = 0.037, post hoc pairwise analysis for comparison between the groups revealed there to be no 
difference between the groups of investors. 
 	
Pairwise Comparison of Opportunity to Negotiate
-Each node shows the average rank of Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses  for each 
group of investor
-The lighter line displays  those that revealed to be statistical  significant diffeerence 
between their medians
Opportuntiy to Negotiate
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -6.5 0.134 0.401
Individuals-Conventional -10.625 0.016 0.047 -0.402
Institutions-Conventional -4.125 0.355 1.000
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
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Table 6.21 - Amount Invested and Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses by Investor Type 
 
 
Participants were also questioned as to whether signing the agreement was conditional to giving proxy 
to the FI for decision making. From Table 6.22 below it appears that the number of counts for both the 
individual and institutional groups of investors were similar, and of approximately equal counts, for 
both signing the agreement, being conditional (8 - individuals, 8 - institutions) and non-conditional (7-
individuals, 8 - institutions). While with regards to the conventional investors, it appears to be more 
optional (10 participants) than conditional (4 participants). Looking into the break-up of conventional 
investors’ weighted scores (Table 6.23 below), it appears that more conventional individuals (2.60) than 
conventional institutions (2.33) experienced the signing a proxy to FI upon subscribing to the 
investment as optional, in comparison to the individuals (2.22) investor group (who invested in IPE). 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test was performed and no statistically significant differences were found 
between investor type and subscribing being conditional to giving proxy, H (2) = 1.615, p = 0.446. 
 
 	
No Yes Individuals Institutions Conventional
$100,000-$1m Count 4 2 6 5 0 1 6
$1m-$5m Count 5 2 7 3 2 2 7
$5.1m-$10m Count 5 2 7 1 4 2 7
$10m+ Count 8 21 29 9 10 10 19
Total Count 22 27 49 18 16 15 49
H (3) p
8.469 0.037
*This table is provided to give an indication of the number of investors investing in each group of Amount Invested.  To 
give an indication of the size of investment and ability to negotiate (e.g. 5 Individuals invested in the range of $100,000-
$1m and no Institution and 1 conventional had invested in that range. Of the 5 in that investment range ($100.000-
$1m) only 2 were able to negotiate)
Table 6. 20-Amount Invested and Opportunity to Negotiate Contractual Clauses by Investor Type
Kruskal Wallis 
Total Total
Number of Valid Cases 49
No. of Investors in Investment 
Amount*Investment 
Amount
Descriptive 
Statistics
Opportunity to 
Negotiate 
Contractual Clauses
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Table 6.22 - Investor Type and the Independence of Subscribing and Proxy 
 
 	
Table 6.23 - Break-up of Conventional Investor and the Independence of Subscribing and Proxy 
 
 
Those participants who selected “Other” was either because they had invested directly into the first 
stage of the investment, and so no proxy was involved; or because they did not do so initially, in advance, 
and proxy was given later. Some selected “Other” for whether proxy was offered or not, depending on 
the type of investment/product that they were investing in. In addition, an individual participant noted 
that his selection of “Other” was due to him signing a share purchase agreement rather than a 
subscription agreement. This means that he had invested in the second level of the investment structure, 
at the investee company level174, and so was a direct shareholder with a board seat. Furthermore, it was 
interesting to see that some participants who had selected “Conditional” were permitted to vote.175 The 
																																								 																				
174 As per understanding from an interview conducted with an FI, as covered in Chapter 7 on the results and analysis of FI.	
175 Covered in section 6.5.2 on analysis on permitted to vote question.	
Signing Proxy 
Optional to 
Subscribing
Signing Proxy 
Conditional to 
Subscribing
Other
Count 7 8 3
% of Total 13.73% 15.69% 5.88%
Count 8 8 1
% of Total 15.69% 15.69% 1.96%
Count 10 4 2
% of Total 19.6% 7.8% 3.9%
Count 25 20 6 51
% of Total 49.02% 39.22% 11.76% 100.00%
H (2) p
1.615 0.446
Median
3.00
2.00
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Subscribing & Proxy Independence
Weighted 
Score
Individuals 2.00
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order with 3 to Signing proxy being 
Optional, 2 Conditional and 1 to Other. The allocated weights do not reflect any qualitative ranking.
Conventional
Total
2.41
2.50
2.22
Institutions
Kruskal-Wallis 
Signing Proxy 
Optional to 
Subscribing
Signing Proxy 
Conditional to 
Subscribing
Other
Count 7 2 1
% of Total 43.75% 12.50% 6.25%
Count 3 2 1
% of Total 18.75% 12.50% 6.25%
3.00
2.33 2.50
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order with 3 to Signing proxy being 
Optional, 2 Conditional and 1 to Other. The allocated weights do not reflect any qualitative ranking.
Median
Conventional 
Investor
Descriptive 
Statistics
Subscribing & Proxy Independence
Weighted 
Score
Conventional 
Individuals 2.60
Conventional 
Institutions
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explanations given were: proxy was given for management and voting was permitted on investment 
issues (as explained by conventional (institutional) participant) and this was permissible due to a side 
letter alongside the main agreement, giving them a board seat on the investee company (as elaborated 
by conventional (individual) participant). At the same time, some participants (institutions and 
conventional) remarked that signing a proxy was conditional, which is specifically relevant to PE 
investments done through the SPV partnership route, in that the managers are given proxy, assigning 
them the right to vote on any matter on the investor’s behalf or to pass any resolution requiring the 
approval of all partners/shareholders. There are even times when managers are also given power of 
attorney for restructuring purposes. 
  
Table 6.24 below shows that 36 of the 49176 participants confirmed the FI participation alongside the 
investor in the investment being offered, in 7 cases the FI did not participate, while the other 5 
participants did not have any idea about whether the FI had participated or not. The weighted score that 
was calculated showed a very small difference in the weighted averages of the three groups. This was 
also reflected in the Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted, which showed the distributions were 
similar and that statistically there was no significant relationship between the FI participation and the 
type of investor, H (2) = 0.771, p = 0.680. 
 	
Table 6.24 - Investor Type and FI Participation in the Investment 
 
 
																																								 																				
176 Two participants did not provide a response.	
Participated
Didn't 
Participate Don't Know
Count 14 1 3
% of Total 28.57% 2.04% 6.12%
Count 11 4 2
% of Total 22.45% 8.16% 4.08%
Count 11 2 1
% of Total 22.45% 4.08% 2.04%
Count 36 7 6 49
% of Total 73.47% 14.29% 12.24% 100.00%
H (2) p
0.771 0.680
Institutions
Investor Type
Individuals
3.00
Kruskal-Wallis 
Descriptive 
Statistics
IFI participation in the Investment
Weighted 
Score-a
Median
3.00
2.53
2.61
Conventional 3.00
Total
a-To calculate weighted score, scores were allocted in descending order with 3 to "Participated" 2 to 
"Didn't  Participate" and 1 to "Don't  Know".
2.71
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6.5 INVESTORS’ RELATIONSHIP WITH FI POST INVESTMENT 
 
In order to determine the post investment relationship, questions on whether the FI had maintained a 
relationship with participants were asked. The respondents were also questioned on the extent of their 
involvement in the decision making of any key issues post investment, and if there was an agreed upon 
process for deciding on any conflict of interest matters that may arise during the investment period. 
This was in addition to the form and frequency of the updates they received post investment.177 
 
6.5.1 Maintaining Relationship with FI 
 
Table 6.25 below looks into whether the FI maintained a relationship with the investor in the post 
investment period. One conventional participant did not provide a response. The majority of participants 
from all three groups seem to have a relationship with 13 of the 18 individual participants, 14 of the 17 
institutional participants and 13 of the 16 conventional participants indicating some form of relationship 
with the FI, post investment. The results are similar and are also reflected in the weighted score 
calculated on the participants’ responses with the weighted average for individuals being 1.76, 
institutions 1.81 and conventional 1.93. There were three who selected “Other”, two (1 -individual, 1 - 
conventional) of which commented that in some investments there was a relationship and in some there 
was not. While the third (institution) participant who selected “Other” remarked that they had a 
relationship manager within their institution that managed the relationship with the FI. Moreover, due 
to the closeness in responses, the Kruskal-Wallis H test showed that the distributions were similar and 
that there was no statistically significant difference between the medians of individuals, institutions and 
conventional with regards to having a relationship with the FI, H (2) = 1.479, p = 0.477. 
 	
																																								 																				
177 Part of research questions A.	
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Table 6.25 - Investor Type and Relationship with FI 
 
 
Participants were also asked whether, as part of the post-relationship, the FI had established and agreed 
with the investor beforehand on a defined documented methodology upon which it will deal with 
matters of conflict of interest that may arise after the investment has been made. It appears from Table 
6.26 below that such a mechanism was not available to the majority (13) of the individual investors and 
in only (5) cases did the FI have such a documented process with individuals. While with regards to the 
other two groups: institutions, those that did have a mechanism, were close to half of the participants 
(8) while with the conventional, they were more than half (10) of the participants. Some of the individual 
participants commented that such matters would be raised, unofficially during investment review 
meetings, or that they would be the ones raising them directly with FI/GP. Furthermore, the institutional 
participants noted that it depended on the quality of the GP. Some GPs developed “related party 
transactions policy procedures” that covered such matters. While others noted that although it is not 
documented, as partners, such issues are discussed and settled amicably. With regards to conventional 
participants, one (conventional individual participant) remarked that it is provided for at the inception 
of the agreement. While another commented that it should be stipulated that the GP develop and 
implement a solid and transparent process and it is applicable to direct, indirect and LP forms of 
investment (excluding funds of funds). Moreover, one of the conventional (individual) participants who 
had selected “No” noted that it is difficult to evaluate the absence of conflict of interest without being 
involved in the business and that the lack of conflict of interest process does not mean that there are no 
conflicts.  
	
No Yes
Count 4 13
% of Total 8.51% 27.66%
Count 3 13
% of Total 6.38% 27.66%
Count 1 13
% of Total 2.13% 27.66%
Count 8 39 47
% of Total 17.02% 82.98%
H (2) p
1.479 0.477
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "No", 2 to "Yes".
1.81 2.00
2.001.76
Kruskal Wallis 
1.93 2.00Conventional
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Investor Type 
Descriptive 
Statistics
Median
Weighted 
Score-a
Relationship with IFI 
(Manged)
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Table 6.26 - Investor Type and Document Process with FI 
 
 
Moreover, in performing the Chi-square analysis of the representation of the actual portions (of “No” 
or “Yes”) between the group of investors and the expected, there appears to be some discrepancies 
between the expected and observed actual counts. It was expected that 8 individuals would say “Yes”, 
but actually 5 individuals said “Yes” (adjusted residual = -2). It was also expected that 7 conventional 
investors would say “Yes”, but actually 10 said “Yes” (adjusted residual = 2). While the expected and 
actual for institutions were the same (adjusted residual = 0). The test revealed there was statistical 
significance at the 10% significance level, with a large size effect178 , X" (2) = 4.993, p = 0.082,                      
V = 0.316. However, although in the post hoc pairwise analysis that was performed presented there was 
a difference between individuals and conventional with regards to the Documented Process of Conflict 
of Interest, with a large size effect179  (p = 0.081, r = -0.383), it was not statistically significant,                    
p > 0.0333180 (see Figure 6.12 below). This was confirmed by the outcome of the Chi-square test of 
homogeneity that was performed and the test revealed there was no statistical difference between the 
two portions across the types of investors (as can be seen from the subscript letters in Table 6.26 above). 
 	
																																								 																				
178 The standard for interpreting Cramer’s V as proposed by Cohen (1988) for df (2): 0.07=small effect, 0.21=medium effect, 
and 0.35=large effect.	
179 The standard for interpreting Cramer’s V as proposed by Cohen (1988) for df (2): 0.07=small effect, 0.21=medium effect, 
and 0.35=large effect.	
180 P adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence, in this case there are 3 groups, so P = 0.1/3 = 0.0333.	
Individuals Institutions Conventional
Count 13a 9a 5a 27
Expected Count 9.72 9.18 8.10 27
Adjusted Residual 1.94 -0.11 -1.92
% Within Clearly Documented 48.15% 33.33% 18.52% 100.00%
Count 5a 8a 10a 23
Expected Count 8.28 7.82 6.90 23
Adjusted Residual -1.94 0.11 1.92
% Within Clearly Documented 21.74% 34.78% 43.48% 100.00%
Count 18 17 15 50
Expected Count 18.00 17.00 15.00 50
% Within Clearly Documented 36.00% 34.00% 30.00% 100.00%
Value df p V
4.993 2 .082 0.316
Clearly 
Documented 
Process Regarding 
Consultation on 
Conflict Matters
Descriptive Statistics
Investor Type
Total
a, b :Each subscript letter denotes a subset of Investor Type  categories and the proportions  significant from each 
other at the .05 level: Those with same letters, there are no statistically significant differences in the portions 
between those groups. Those with different letters there are statistically significant difference between those 
groups.
No
Yes
Total
Pearson Chi-Square Test
50Number of Valid Cases
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Figure 6.12-Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Clearly Documented Process Regarding Consultation on Conflict of 
Interest Across Type of Investor Groups 
 
 
6.5.2 Permitted to Vote 
 
To determine the level of the investors’ participation in the level of decision making post-investment, 
participants were asked if they were permitted to vote on key issues, such as amendment of the 
agreement, dissolution before the end of the investment period, extension of the investment period, 
conflict of interest, and removal of manager. The responses reported in Table 6.27 below show that 
more than half of the institutional participants were able to vote on the key issues (ranging between 10 
to 12 participants) as opposed to individuals (ranging between 10 to 13 participants) and conventional 
(ranging between 8 to 11 participants) where nearly more than half were not permitted to vote. The gap 
between the institution participants and the individual and conventional groups of participants, with 
regards to those permitted to vote and not permitted to vote, appears to be similar. From the comments 
noted from individuals, it is those with significantly large investments that were able to vote, mainly 
either through having a board representation (as a result of the size of the investment) or due to having 
been able to obtain such ability through an agreement prior to committing the investment. Individual 
participants that were not as fortunate and it was noted that they knew of the FI making decisions on 
mandates, including exit, but that they had no say in the matter. While another participant mentioned 
that on matters such as exit, the FI had informally asked in which direction they wanted to go.  
 
Pairwise Comparison of Documented Process Regarding Consultation on 
Conflict of Interest                     
-Each node shows the average rank of Documenting Process on Consultation on Conflict of  
Interest
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between their 
medians
Clear Documented 
Process
Test Statistics Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -4.82 0.257 0.772
Individuals-Conventional -9.722 0.27 0.081 -0.383
Institutions-Conventional -4.902 0.272 0.815
Adj. p  (0.1/3) 0.0333
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Of the conventional (individual) participants, 3 did not select a response. Of which two commented that 
it depends on the investment and that when co-investing, yes, and when investing through LP or vehicle 
co-investment structures, voting rights were limited to none. The third conventional individual 
remarked that in investments where they had board seat representation, they had full voting, and in 
those where they did not, they were not permitted to vote on anything. While one conventional 
individual that was permitted to vote noted that he was permitted to vote on the matters listed, except 
on the removal of the manager, and was able to do so through signing side letters that are subject to 
some preconditions and special votes for those letters to be executed/triggered. The side letters covered 
matters such as: special management fees, carry provisions, co-investment options, and additional board 
seats. The conventional (institution) that selected voted on “Other” matters was on matters related to 
investment decisions such as loans and capital increase. Moreover, a conventional (institution) investing 
in the LP form noted that although in such investments a blanket power of authority is given to the GP, 
when it came to changes to the LP agreement terms, they were able to vote. 
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Table 6.27 - Investor Type and Voting on Key Issues 
	
To Vote Not Vote
Indiviuals Count 7 11 1.39 1.00
Institutions Count 11 6 1.65 2.00
Conventional Count 6 9 1.40 1.00
Value df p V
2.884 2 0.236 0.240
Indiviuals Count 8 10 1.44 1.00
Institutions Count 12 5 1.71 2.00
Conventional Count 6 9 1.40 1.00
Value df p V
3.630 2 0.163 0.269
Indiviuals Count 8 10 1.44 1.00
Institutions Count 11 6 1.65 2.00
Conventional Count 7 8 1.47 1.00
Value df p V
1.682 2 0.431 0.183
Indiviuals Count 5 13 1.28 1.00
Institutions Count 10 7 1.59 2.00
Conventional Count 6 9 1.40 1.00
Value df p V
3.494 2 0.174 0.264
Indiviuals Count 5 13 1.28 1.00
Institutions Count 10 7 1.59 2.00
Conventional Count 4 11 1.27 1.00
Value df p # V
4.745 2 0.093 0.308
Indiviuals Count 2 11 1.15 1.00
Institutions Count 1 8 1.11 2.00
Conventional Count 6 3 1.67 2.00
H (2) p
2.155 0.341
Pearson Chi-Square Test
Number of Valid Cases 50
# At 10% significant level
** These 31 cases represent participants who had either stated that they were permitted to vote on 
other matters (other than the list of options provided) or stated that they were not permitted to vote on 
any other matter not listed. The rest of the 20 investors had stated there responses (permitted not 
permitted) to the list of options of matters, and so Others were not applicable to them. 
Table 6.25- Investor Type and Voting on Key Issues
Median
Pearson Chi-Square Test
Pearson Chi-Square Test
Number of Valid Cases 50
Number of Valid Cases 50
Removal of Investment 
Manager
Extension of Investment 
Period
Issues of Conflict of 
Interest
Pearson Chi-Square Test
Number of Valid Cases
Number of Valid Cases
Number of Valid Cases
Kruskal Wallis *
Other Matters
Weighted 
Score-a
Amendment of 
Agreement
50
* The Kruskal Wallis was conducted and not the Chi-Square test, due to the the count in some groups 
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 2 to "To Vote” and 1 to “Not Vote”.
Dissolution before end of 
Investment Period
50
Pearson Chi-Square Test
31**
Key Issues Investor Time
Descriptive 
Statistics
Permitted 
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The Chi-square test for independence was performed on all key issues, and the results indicated that 
(with the exception of Removal of Manager) there is no significant association between investor type 
and permission to vote on any of the key issues, as can be seen in Table 6.27. The test on Removal of 
Manager, at the 10% significance level (p < 0.1) indicated that voting on Removal of Manger was 
statistically significant, with a moderately large size effect181, X"(2) = 4.745, p = 0.093, V = 0.308. 
However, the post hoc comparison analysis that was performed revealed there to be no pairwise 
relationship between the groups. 
	
6.5.3 FI Frequency of Updates  
 
This section looks into the frequency with which the FI updates the investors and the investors’ thoughts 
on the matter. Table 6.28 below displays the FI frequency in getting in touch with the investors. The 
participants had to select the frequency in terms of “Frequent”, “Occasional” or “None” and accordingly 
the weighted scores were calculated. Two conventional participants did not select a response. With 
regards to the individual participants, most of them were between having received frequently (16.33%) 
and occasionally (16.33%). Only 2 participants (4.08%) had not received any updates. While with the 
institutional investors all of them had received updates. The majority of the institutional (24.49%) had 
received frequent updates and the remaining 10.20% received occasional ones. The conventional 
participants were similar to institutions in that all participants received updates: 20.41% received them 
frequently and 8.16% received them occasionally. The range of frequency of updating was from 
quarterly, semi-annually to annually. The Kruskal-Wallis H test on the distribution of how often the FI 
got in touch for all groups of investors indicated that there was no statistically significant difference in 
frequency of the FI getting in touch with the three groups of investors at the 5% level of significance, 
H (2) = 4.067, p = 0.131. 
 	
																																								 																				
181 The standard for interpreting Cramer’s V as proposed by Cohen (1988) for df (2): 0.07=small effect, 0.21=medium effect, 
and 0.35=large effect.	
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Table 6.28 - Investor Type and How Often FI Gets in Touch 
 
 
The participants who answered “Occasional” and “None” to how often the FI got in touch were then 
asked about their opinion on the reason for the FI’s behaviour. Those applicable to respond were 10 
individuals, 5 institutions, and 4 conventional, of which one applicable individual did not provide a 
response, and so was not included in the total count. In addition, two of the applicable conventional did 
not provide a respond and so were not included in the total count. However, the total count includes all 
participants who responded to the question (those applicable and not applicable). The participants’ 
opinions are displayed in Table 6.29 below. The participants had to rank the reasons for FI’s behaviour, 
choosing from: jeopardises the FI’s/GP’s information advantage (Information Advantage), endangers 
their (FI) position (Endanger Position); undermines their (FI) authority (Undermine Authority); too 
costly (Cost), and other. To facilitate in the scoring, the responses were scaled into 5 groups of 
importance, as can be seen in Table 6.29 below. The majority of the eligible participants of all three 
groups appear to consider these reasons as “Not Important” reasons for the FI not updating them 
frequently. Of those that did consider those to be a reason, Information Advantage was the main one   
(3 - individuals, 3 - institutions, 4 - conventional), followed by Endanger Position (3 - individuals,            
0 - institutions, 2 - conventional). Only 2 individuals considered Undermine Authority to be a reason, 
and 3 participants (2 - institutions, 1 - conventional) considered it to be due to Cost. The Kruskal-Wallis 
H test that was conducted at the 10% significance level confirmed that there was a statistically 
significant difference between the three groups of investors in Information Advantage, H (2) = 4.678, 
p = 0.096. However, a post hoc test on the pairwise analysis revealed there to be no pairwise relationship 
between the groups. 
 
Of the individual participants, who considered that it was very highly important to jeopardise the FI’s 
information advantage, one participant noted that the FI failed to report on fair value, either because 
Frequent Occasional None
Count 8 8 2
% of Total 16.33% 16.33% 4.08%
Count 12 5 0
% of Total 24.49% 10.20% 0.00%
Count 10 4 0
% of Total 20.41% 8.16% 0.00%
H (2) p
4.067 0.131
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 3 to "Frequent", 2 to "Occasional" and 1 to "None".
Investor Type 
Descriptive 
Statisitics
How Often IFI Gets in Touch Weighted 
Score-a
Median
Individuals 2.002.33
Conventional
3.00
2.71
2.71
Kruskal-Wallis 
Institutions
3.00
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they did not have an appropriate set up to do so or because the FI did not want to show that it was not 
doing well. While some of the individual investors selected “Others”, to them the reason for the FI’s 
lack of getting in touch was: the FI lacks responsibility in addition to that the FI does not want to report 
negative news as it affects its reputation, which was also a comment made by a conventional (individual) 
participant. Furthermore, one individual participant commented that with regards to reporting, it 
depends on the investment and he did not consider that most PE required quarterly updates. Moreover, 
according to the institutional participant who selected “Other”, it was that the FI’s main concern was 
just getting their fees and nothing else. 
 	
Table 6.29 - Investor Type and Reason For Not Getting in Touch 
 
 
In addition to questioning the participants on the reason for the FI’s behaviour in keeping in touch, they 
were also asked the effect that receiving information would have on them as investors. The options of 
responses offered and their selection have been summarised in Table 6.30 below. Three conventional 
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participants did not select a response and were not included in the total count. In addition, one individual 
commented “None” to the selection of responses provided, as the information received might all be 
negative, and so was also not included in the total count. In most cases the effect was similar in all 
groups, with the most popular response being that it would enhance the trust in the GP/FI                        
(25.53% - individuals, 27.66% - institutions, 25.53% - conventional) and reduce the need to monitor 
(17.02% - individuals, 17.02% - institutions, 12.77% - conventional). In addition, the institutional 
participants were willing to inject more capital. 
 	
Table 6.30 - Investor Type and the Effect of Information/Report Received on Investors 
 
 
Furthermore, the participants were asked what form the provision to report and to provide feedback by 
the FI was in, and whether it was part of the formal agreement they had with the FI, or part of an 
informal agreement, or something else. As can be seen in Table 6.31 below, the responses from the 
three groups were similar. Whereas to the majority of the participants it formed part of the formal 
agreement (11 - individuals, 12 - institutions, 10 - conventional), and for 5 participants from each of the 
three groups, it formed part of the informal agreement. An institution participant who selected it was 
part of the informal agreement noted that although there was nothing mentioned in the agreement on 
reporting, it is a common practice that the FI has to report to the investor. While an individual who 
selected informal agreement noted that it was a way by which the IFI keeps its relationship with the 
investor, to attract the investor into another investment. Furthermore, a conventional (individual) 
participant, who selected it was part of an informal agreement, noted that it was imposed by the 
regulators/agencies that govern the institutions they deal with. Of the institutional participants who 
selected that reporting back was part of the formal agreement, they commented that reporting 
requirements are always specified to some extent in all private equity investments. Moreover, two 
Reduces the 
Need to 
Monitor
Enhances 
Trust in FI 
GP
Willing to 
Inject 
Capital
Count 8 12 4 17
% of Total 17.02% 25.53% 8.51% 36.17%
Count 8 13 7 17
% of Total 17.02% 27.66% 14.89% 36.17%
Count 6 12 3 13
% of Total 12.77% 25.53% 6.38% 27.66%
Count 22 37 14 47
% of Total 46.81% 78.72% 29.79% 100.00%
Effect of Information/Report Received
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
Descriptive 
Statistics
Total
Investor Type
194		
individual participants selected “Other”. One of the individuals had no idea with regards to this matter, 
and the other did not specify anything. 
 	
Table 6.31 - Investor Type and Reporting Provision Part of Formal/Informal Agreement 
 
 
A cross-tabulation was performed between reporting back being part of a formal/informal agreement 
and the form through which the investment was carried out when invested in private equity (Table 6.32 
below). It appears that close to 70% in each group stated that reporting back formed part of the formal 
agreement. With individuals, the most popular forms were direct equity investment, followed by LP 
where reporting back was part of the formal agreement (54.55% - Direct Equity, 45.45% - LP). While 
with institutions, it was also direct equity investment (75.00%), but this was followed by indirect equity 
(58.33%). And for to conventional participants, it was also direct equity investment (80.00%), but this 
was followed by both indirect equity investment (70.00%) and LP (70.00%). 
 	
Part of Formal 
Agreement
Part of Informal 
Agreement
Count 11 5
% of Total 22.92% 10.42%
Count 12 5
% of Total 25.00% 10.42%
Count 10 5
% of Total 20.83% 10.42%
Count 33 15 48
% of Total 68.75% 31.25% 100.00%
H (2) p
0.658 0.719
Kruskal-Wallis 
2.00
2.00
2.00
Median
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated with 1 to "Part of Formal Agreement", 2 to "Part of 
Informal Agreement", and 3 to "Other".
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
Weighted 
Score-a
Report back Formal/Informal 
Agreement
1.67
1.71
1.69
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
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Table 6.32 - Reporting Back Part of Formal/Informal Agreement and Investment Carried Out  
 
 
6.5.4 FI Method of Updates  
 
Participants were asked about whether it was easy to analyse the information received from FI with the 
industry performance. They were given a four-scale option to select from, as can be seen in Table 6.33 
below. It appears that the majority of investors were in the range of “Somewhat easy” to “Not So Easy”, 
as reflected in the weighted score. To individuals (18.00%) and conventional (18.00%) it was more 
“Somewhat Easy”, while to institutions (14.00%) it was more “Not So Easy”. Furthermore,                              
4 participants from each group of individual and institution investors and one conventional considered 
the information received to being easy to analyse. The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed 
that the distribution of the ease of analysis of the information received for the three groups of investors 
was similar. It also showed that there was no statistically significant difference in the ease of analysing 
the information received, H (2) = 0.471, p = 0.790. 
  
	
Direct Equity 
Investment
Indierct 
Equity 
Investment
Private 
Equity Fund 
of Fund
Limited 
Partnership
Count 6 4 4 5 11
% of Total within 54.55% 36.36% 36.36% 45.45% 68.75%
Count 4 2 0 1 5
% of Total within 80.00% 40.00% 0.00% 20.00% 31.25%
Total Count 10 6 4 6 16
Count 9 7 3 2 12
% of Total within 75.00% 58.33% 25.00% 16.67% 70.59%
Count 4 2 1 2 5
% of Total within 80.00% 40.00% 20.00% 40.00% 29.41%
Total Count 13 9 4 4 17
Count 8 7 4 7 10
% of Total 80.00% 70.00% 40.00% 70.00% 66.67%
Count 3 4 1 2 5
% of Total within 60.00% 80.00% 20.00% 40.00% 33.33%
Total Count 11 11 5 9 15
Investment Carried out Through
Total 
Formal/Informal 
Agreement
Individuals
Part of Formal 
Agreement
Part of Informal 
Agreement
Institutional
Part of Formal 
Agreement
Part of Informal 
Agreement
Reporting Back 
Formal/Informal 
Agreement
Percentages and totals are based on respondents: 16 total Individuasl responses, 17 total Institutions responses, 15 total Conventional 
responses.
Conventional
Part of Formal 
Agreement
Part of Informal 
Agreement
Investor Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
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Table 6.33 - Investor Type and Information Received Easily Analysed 
 
 
Participants were also questioned on the method of reporting, whether it was standardised, the same 
from one period to another, and if the information that was reported was not only the same, but was 
also consistent and that it allowed for comparison from one period to the next. Table 6.34 below 
summarises their responses. Most of the investors in the three groups found the method of reporting 
standardised and consistent for them to compare: individuals (11), institutions (15) and conventional 
(9). The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed that the distribution of the method of 
reporting for all three investor groups was similar. The test indicated that there was no statistically 
significant difference in frequency of how the three groups of investors found the method of reporting, 
H (2) = 3.568, p = 0.168. 
 	
Table 6.34 - Investor Type and Method of Reporting 
  
Easily 
Analyzed
Somewhat 
Easy
Not So 
Easy
Not at All 
Easy
Count 4 9 3 2
% of Total 8.00% 18.00% 6.00% 4.00%
Count 4 6 7 0
% of Total 8.00% 12.00% 14.00% 0.00%
Count 1 9 4 1
% of Total 2.00% 18.00% 8.00% 2.00%
Count 9 24 14 3
% of Total 18.00% 48.00% 28.00% 6.00%
H (2) p
0.471 0.790
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 4 with a score of 1 to "Not 
at All Easy” to 4 “Easily Analyzed”.
2.82
2.83
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type Median
Kruskal Wallis 
3.00
3.00
3.00
Information Received Easily Analyzed
Weighted 
Score-a
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional 2.67
Standardized 
Consistent for 
Comparison
Not 
Standardized
Count 11 7
% of Total 22.45% 14.29%
Count 15 2
% of Total 30.61% 4.08%
Count 9 5
% of Total 18.37% 10.20%
Count 35 14
% of Total 71.43% 28.57%
H (2) p
3.568 0.168
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 1 to "Standardized Consistent for 
Comparison” and 2 to “Not Standardized”.
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type Median
1.64
1.88
1.61
Kruskal Wallis 
Method of Reporting
Weighted 
Score-a
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional 2.00
2.00
2.00
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Participants were also asked whether they needed to go back to the GP/FI for any further information 
or questions. Figure 6.13 below provides a breakdown of those participants (investor type wise) who 
did not find the information received sufficient enough and needed to go back for more information, 
and categorised this in line with the method of reporting of the information. 25 of the 35182 participants 
who considered the informational update that they received as standard, had to go back for more 
information. Of which 7 participants were individuals, 12 were institutions and the remaining                         
6 participants were conventional. While nearly all of the participants (12 of the 14183 participants) who 
considered the information they received was not standardised had to go back for more information. 
Unlike expected, both institutions and conventional did not appear to go back for further information 
when the reports received were not standard. The comments given by the participants that invested in 
IPE mainly revolved around the information received being too general or standard and that it did not 
provide enough details, clarification, and sufficiency to evaluate performance. To some it was more on 
the progress of the investment or that it did not match the forecast. In addition, some of the comments 
were that they had to go back and follow-up with the FI/GP because there were delays in the reporting. 
While the comments made by those who invested in CPE, in addition to obtaining further clarification 
on performance/forecast, as in IPE, they had to go back for further clarifications on some clauses that 
were not enforceable in certain jurisdictions. 
	
																																								 																				
182 See Table 6.34. Total count of participants who found reporting method standardised and consistent for comparison.	
183 See Table 6.34. Total count of participants who found reporting method not standardised or consistent for comparison.	
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Figure 6.13 - The Method of Reporting and The Need to Go Back to FI/GP With Questions or Further Information 
 
 
An open-ended question was then put to the participants with regards to what information they would 
like to see being reported.184 Table 6.35 below summarises the responses. The responses have been 
grouped into the categories seen in Table 6.35. Ten of the 51 participants (5 - individuals, 1 - institution, 
4 - conventional) did not provide a response.  
	
Table 6.35 - Investor Type and Information Liked to be Reported 
 
 
Participants were interested in timely, regular performance updates on the investment. The top three 
groups of information that participating investors were interested in appear to be the same for all types 
																																								 																				
184 Part of research questions A.	
Based on 49 total responses: 18 Individuals, 17 Institutions, 14 Conventional
4
3 3
7
12
6
5
2
5
2
0 0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Individuals Institutions Conventional
Co
un
t
Method of Reporting and The Need to Go Back to FI/GP
Standardized-Not Gone Back to IFI/GP (SNGB) Standardized-Gone Back to IFI/GP (SGB)
Not Standardized-Gone Back to IFI/GP (NSGB) Not Standardized-Not Gone Back to IFI/GP (NSNGB)
Investor/Method SNG SGB NSG NSNG
Individuals 4 7 5 2
Institutions 3 12 2 0
Conventional 3 6 5 0
Total 10 25 12 2
% To Total Responses 20.41% 51.02% 24.49% 4.08%
Financials-
Ratios-
Valuation
Market-
Economy-
Industry-
Sector
Investment 
- Exit
Risk-
Return
Management Litigations
Shari'ah 
Compliant
Operational Social
Count 11 6 7 2 1 0 0 1 0 13
% of Total 26.83% 14.63% 17.07% 4.88% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 31.71%
Count 15 6 9 3 3 2 3 6 3 16
% of Total 36.59% 14.63% 21.95% 7.32% 7.32% 4.88% 7.32% 14.63% 7.32% 39.02%
Count 10 5 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 12
% of Total 24.39% 12.20% 24.39% 0.00% 0.00% 2.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 29.27%
Count 36 17 26 5 4 3 3 7 3 41
% of Total 87.80% 41.46% 63.41% 12.20% 9.76% 7.32% 7.32% 17.07% 7.32% 100.00%
Information liked to be Reported
Total
Total
Institutional
Conventional
Descriptive 
Statisitics
Investor Type
Individuals
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of investors. They were in the following order: Financials & Valuation, Investment & Exit, and Market-
Economy-Industry-Sector Performance. Institutions (36.59%) gave greater weight to financials than 
individuals (26.83%) and conventional (24.39%). The details of the top three groups of information 
updates that they are interested in are listed in Table 6.36 below. Moreover, institutional investors were 
also interested in receiving information updates on: Risk & Return, Management, Operational, Shari’ah 
Compliance, Litigation, and Social Updates. While individuals were only further interested in: Risk & 
Return, Management, and Litigation. On the other hand, with conventional investors, other than the top 
three mentioned above, they were only interested in Litigation; the remaining types of information do 
not appear to be of interest. With regards to those investing in IPE, it is interesting to note that overall 
interest among investors in information on Shari’ah compliance was low, and was only institutions (3). 
	
Table 6.36 - Details of The Top 3 Information Updates Liked to be Reported 
 
 
6.5.5 Risk in Private Equity  
 
Risks are expected in all investments; hence, participants were asked if they had any concerns with 
regards to investing in IPE/PE. Table 6.36 summarises their responses. It appears that nearly all (47) 
participants see that there are risks. The participants were asked if those risks were addressed in the 
documents that they were provided. They commented that the risks, when addressed, were in general 
terms. Of the 47 participating (who responded to the risk question - Table 6.37 below), 46 provided a 
response to whether it was addressed in the document (Table 6.38 below). Of those 46 responses,               
29 participants said yes, while the remaining 15 did not think the documents had covered the risk, as 
can be seen in Table 6.38 below. Of the 5 participants that did not provide a response, two did not 
respond to having any risk concerns in the previous question. The Mann-Whitney test that was 
conducted showed that the distribution of the documents addressing risk is similar across categories of 
Financials & Valuations
Market-Economy- Industry-Sector 
Performance
Investment & Exit
Performance progress & Comparative 
analysis
Macro industry overview Investment status/update
Quarterly financials Macroeconomic overview Progress report Vs Planned
Annual Audited financials Market analysis & status Any delays
Cost overruns Market trend & outlook Capital redemption
Explanation of non-performing assets Similar project comparison Exit plan/process
GP fee structure Future investments /activities
Fees and expenses charge to investors Corporate Governance
Calculation Methodology & Valuation Board meetings/minutes
Investment risks
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concern of PE risk and that there is no statistically significant difference between those that have 
concern and those that have none, U = 29.000, z = -0.995, p = 0.320. 
Table 6.37 - Investor Type and Concern PE Risk 
 
Table 6.38 - Concern PE Risk and Document Addressed 
Risk 
	
 
Overall, the comments made were that the type of risk depends on the type and nature of the investment. 
The common risks of concern between the conventional individuals and conventional institutions were: 
liquidity risk, business risk, market conditions and exit. Conventional individuals had concerns, 
especially with investing in PE in the MENA region. The concerns that were stated, in addition to the 
above, were: valuation at entry and exit, the carry forward paid to managers, sectorial/global allocation, 
transparency, disclosure of conflicts, minority position (and FI/GP being selective with investors), 
financial manipulation, lack of alignment of interest, lack of operating experience of GP, governance 
and corruption/fraud. While conventional institutions, in addition to the above, stated: financial 
structure, management, operation, legal, and regulation. 
 
With regards to the investors that invested in IPE, individual and institutions, they noted that most of 
the risks in IPE are similar to the conventional PE investment, such as market, liquidity, management, 
legal, financial, credit, profitability and geographical risks. They had some further observations with 
regards to it being Shari’ah compliant and that there were also such risks as risk shifting, ownership, 
lack of transparency, concealing and shifting funds between investments, inexperienced individuals in 
Shari’ah, governance (misconduct of management and negligence), alignment and conflict of interest. 
They also had some concerns with regards to regulatory and jurisdiction issues. The main concerns with 
regards to regulatory risk were the lack of regulations in this area of investment and the ineffective/lack 
of regulatory enforcement (especially when it came to overdue investment term). While with regards to 
jurisdictional issues, they were obtaining the required authorisation, operating in non-Islamic countries 
None Have Risk of Concern
Count 1 17 18
% of Total 1.96% 33.33% 35.29%
Count 2 15 17
% of Total 3.92% 29.41% 33.33%
Count 1 15 16
% of Total 1.96% 29.41% 31.37%
Count 4 47 51
% of Total 7.84% 92.16% 100.00%
Total
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
Concern PE Risk
No Yes
Count 0 2 2
% of Total 0.00% 4.35% 4.35%
Count 15 29 44
% of Total 32.61% 63.04% 95.65%
Count 15 31 46
% of Total 32.61% 67.39% 100.00%
U Z p
29.000 -0.995 0.320
None
Have Risk of 
Concern
Descriptive 
Statistics
Concern PE 
Risk
Total
Document Addressed 
Risk
Total Median
2.00
2.00
Mann-Whitney 
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and the implementation of Shari’ah rulings. This was in addition to the possible risk of breach of the 
agreement and the cost of having to take up the matter legally.185 
 
6.5.6 Investing in Islamic Private Equity 
 
Furthermore, those that had invested in IPE were asked some questions with regards to Shari’ah 
investing: the importance of Shari’ah risk, and Shari’ah definition and compliance. Note that Shari’ah 
related issues are not relevant to conventional investors.   
 
6.5.6.1 Shari’ah Risk 
 
The IPE participants (individual and institution groups) were also asked how important Shari’ah risk 
was to them. The response options on the level of importance scaled from “Very Important” to “Not 
Important”, as can be seen in Table 6.39 below. For about 68.57% of the participants (24 participants) 
Shari’ah risk appears to be of high importance (Important-Very Important), of which about                                
11 participants were institutions and 13 participants were individuals. It was interesting to see that to 
some Shari’ah risk was not of importance, and more so to individuals than institutions (5 - Individuals 
and 2 - Institutional). The Mann-Whitney test that was conducted showed that the distribution was 
similar and that there was no statistically significant difference in the ease of analysing the information 
received with the two groups of investors, U = 135.500, z = -0.608, p = 0.544. 
	
Table 6.39 - Investor Type and Importance of Shari'ah Risk 
 
																																								 																				
185 Reference was made to the GCC Arbitration Centre, and the initial administrative cost in taking up the case at the Centre 
was expensive.	
Very 
Important Important
Somewhat 
Important
Not 
Important
Individuals Count 6 7 0 5 2.78 3.00
Institutions Count 8 3 4 2 3.00 3.00
Count 14 10 4 7 35
% of Total 40.00% 28.57% 11.43% 20.00% 100.00%
U Z p
135.500 -0.608 0.544
Median
Descriptive 
Statistics
Importance of Shari'ah  Risk
Weighted 
Score-a
Total
Investor 
Type
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order with 1 to "Not Important” and 4 to 
“Very Important”.
Mann-Whitney 
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6.5.6.2 Shari’ah Definition and Compliance 
 
In order to obtain the investors’ view of Shari’ah compliance, their understanding of what they defined 
as being Shari’ah compliant was first sought. This was an open question and Table 6.40 below 
summarises their responses. The responses provided were grouped into different categories as can be 
seen in the table. A few had a holistic/spiritual view and were not into the technical aspects and to some 
the technical aspects were part of their definition. While others provided a very broad definition in that 
it had to be in line with the Shari’ah principles, laws and standards. It is interesting to see that the 
financial/ratio matter was more part of the individual participants’ definition than that of the institutions. 
However, the majority (8 - individuals, 7 - institutions) relied on the Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s 
(SSB) approval, and as commented by a participant, once the Fatwa is given, it was not disputed and 
they did not go into the details. Moreover, with regards to dependence on the SSB, an institutional 
participant observed that even though they relied on the SSB, at times, the English version of the Fatwa 
differed from the Arabic version. Moreover, the individual participants who had a holistic view thought 
that since the whole economy was based on riba, it would be unavoidable, especially when 
finance/leverage is required to maintain the technical/ratio aspect. Furthermore, two of the participants 
who provided a broad definition also commented on the side that anything Shari’ah is usually related 
to excessive fees and margins and is more related to the benefit of the structuring entity than the investor. 
	
Table 6.40 - Investor Type and Investor Shari'ah Definition 
	
 
Participants were given a set of Shari’ah principles and had to select the most important Shari’ah 
principle(s) from their point of view. The list of principles provided are those represented in the vertical 
axis in Figure 6.14 below. The views of both groups are mostly similar, with a slight variation on some 
of the principles. The major difference was in abiding to the principle of profit and loss (the sharing 
principle) and the prohibition of Riba, which appears to be a more important principle to the institutional 
participants. While to the individual participants, transparency and all partners being aware of their 
rights, along with disclosure, was slightly more important to them.  
Holistic Non-
Technical/Sharia'h 
Spirit/Ethical
Four Prohibits-
Riba, Haram, 
Gharar, Gambiling
Financial-Ratio & 
Profit/Loss Islamic Product
Social-Adds 
Value
Shari'ah 
Supervisory Board 
Approavl/Overseen
Shari'ah 
Principles/ Law/ 
Standards 
 (did not elaborate)
Count 3 2 5 1 2 8 5 18
% of Total 8.57% 5.71% 14.29% 2.86% 5.71% 22.86% 14.29% 51.43%
Count 1 3 1 0 1 7 7 17
% of Total 2.86% 8.57% 2.86% 0.00% 2.86% 20.00% 20.00% 48.57%
Count 4 5 6 1 3 15 12 35
% of Total 11.43% 14.29% 17.14% 2.86% 8.57% 42.86% 34.29% 100.00%
Total
Investor 
Type
Descriptive 
Statistics
Shari'ah  Definition as per Investor
Total
Individuals
Institutions
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Figure 6.14 - Important Shari'ah Principles as per Investor's Point of View 
 
	
Before looking into how the participants follow-up on whether the investments are Shari’ah compliant, 
they were asked what happens when the IPE investment is no longer Shari’ah compliant. It was an 
open-ended question and the responses were gathered and grouped into categories, as can be seen in 
Table 6.41 below. Four of the participants did not respond to this question: two from each group of 
investors. There appears to be a difference in thoughts between the two groups of participating investors. 
The institutional participants’ thoughts were mainly between giving the FI a chance to correct the non-
compliance and/or exiting the investment (8 participants) and referring to the SSB for advice                         
(5 participants). While the individual participants’ thoughts were between no action (6 participants), 
and exiting and purifying the income (4 participants). Some of the participants opting for exiting and 
purifying commented that they expected their investment principle to be returned. Furthermore, some 
of those who thought of no action were of the view that they are unable to do anything on their own, 
and would need the support of other LPs, while others felt they were locked in until the end of the 
investment period. While some considered that they had entered with the intention of it being Shari’ah 
compliant and so would continue. In addition, for some participants it did not matter since they were 
conventional investors and the profitability of the business was more important. 
	
45.71%
40.00%
42.86%
45.71%
31.43%
31.43%
31.43%
28.57%
31.43%
37.14%
40.00%
40.00%
34.29%
37.14%
25.71%
28.57%
Abiding by Principle Profit and Loss
Transaction real not based on uncertainty
Prohibition of Haram Halal only
Prohibition of Riba and Gharar
Fair-Transparent dealing-All partners aware
Disclsoing information no manipulation
No unjust enrichment-equity and fairness to all parties
Enhancement of living Std and Max Shareholders wealth
Percentage
Sh
ar
i'a
h
Pr
in
ci
pl
es
Investor Type and Important Shari'ah Principles
Individuals
Institutions
204		
Table 6.41 - Investor Type and What Happens When Shari'ah Non-Compliant 
 
 
Participants were then asked about how they ensure Shari’ah compliance throughout the investment. 
This was an open-ended question and the responses were grouped as can be seen in Table 6.42 below. 
One individual participant did not provide a response. It appears that the majority of participants 
(70.59%) relied on the SSB and/or the Shari’ah audit report. However, quite a few individual 
participants (14.71%) claimed that they did not receive the Shari’ah report and for some it was not 
possible to follow up on the Shari’ah compliance matter and they relied on the SSB of the investee or 
the FI’s management. Some also relied on both the SSB and the FI’s management (one institution and 
one individual). With regards to others, it was that the participant relied on the fact that since the FI was 
licensed as Islamic it would only invest in Shari’ah compliant investments, or that once the initial 
Shari’ah screening was done prior to investing it was not followed up thereafter. In another case, the 
participant relied on the instructions/policies in ensuring Shari’ah compliance, set by the FI at the time 
of investment. While to another participant, there was no set method as it depends on the investment 
instrument. Moreover, even when Shari’ah reports were not received, one individual participant 
indicated that being a direct investor, the investment manager was able to monitor compliance due to 
the form of partnership. 
	
Table 6.42 - Investor Type and Ensuring Maintaining Shari'ah Compliance 
 
 
Correct and 
Exit- Exit
Exit and 
Purify income SSB advice
No action-Just 
means non-
compliant
No idea
Count 2 4 2 6 1 15
% of Total 6.45% 12.90% 6.45% 19.35% 3.23% 48.39%
Count 8 3 5 1 0 16
% of Total 25.81% 9.68% 16.13% 3.23% 0.00% 51.61%
Count 10 7 7 7 1 31
% of Total 32.26% 22.58% 22.58% 22.58% 3.23% 100.00%
Individuals
Institutions
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor 
Type
What happens when shari'ah non-compliant
Total
SSB and or Shari'ah 
Audit Report
Relay on IFI 
Management
Follow-up From 
Time to Time on 
Operational 
Activities
Don't get Audit 
reports Other
Count 11 6 0 5 3 17
% of Total 32.35% 17.65% 0.00% 14.71% 8.82% 50.00%
Count 13 2 2 0 2 17
% of Total 38.24% 5.88% 5.88% 0.00% 5.88% 50.00%
Count 24 8 2 5 5 34
% of Total 70.59% 23.53% 5.88% 14.71% 14.71% 100.00%
Total
Ensure Maintaining Shari'ah  Compliance
Institutions
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor 
Type
Individuals
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The participants were then asked if they were aware that the investment is overseen by a SSB and also 
if they had perceived at any time during the investment that the investment project faced any ethical 
and/or legal issues. Their responses to both questions were cross tabulated and summarised in Table 
6.43 below. The majority of the participants (71.43% or 25 participants) were fully aware that the 
investment was overseen by a SSB. Of those only 14.29% (5 of the 25 fully aware participants) 
perceived that the investment had faced some unethical issues and 8.57% (3 of the 25 fully aware 
participants) are of the view that the investment might have undergone both unethical and legal issues. 
While some participants (22.86% or 8 participants) were somewhat aware that the investment was 
overseen by a SSB, of which a few had seen either unethical issues (2 of the 8 somewhat aware 
participants), or illegal issues (1 of the 8 somewhat aware participants), or both (2 of the 8 somewhat 
aware participants). There was one participant who was not aware of whether SSB was overseeing the 
investment and another had no idea. Furthermore, although the participant was unaware about the 
supervision of SSB, he perceived during the investment that it faced some unethical issues. With regards 
to the issues that the participants had perceived as being unethical/illegal, they noted that there were 
some cases when the FI was taking excessive risks in some IPE products; while some noted that due to 
lack of investments, some invested businesses were not following entirely Islamic principles (such as 
carrying conventional debt, non-halal products on the premises). There were those that considered it 
unethical that the FI had not disclosed the charges it had charged the investors (which they had 
discovered after investing), and that they were excessive in value and taken upfront, regardless of 
whether the investment was successful or not. Furthermore, a comment was also made by a participant 
that at times the SSB, after having initially signed off the investment, was not aware of what happened 
to the investment thereafter. 
	
Table 6.43 - Aware Investment Overseen by SSB and Perceptive to Ethical and/or Legal Issues 
 
Unethical 
Issues
Illigal 
Issues
Both None
Count 5 0 3 17 25
% of Total 14.29% 0.00% 8.57% 48.57% 71.43%
Count 2 1 2 3 8
% of Total 5.71% 2.86% 5.71% 8.57% 22.86%
Count 1 0 0 0 1
% of Total 2.86% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.86%
Count 0 0 0 1 1
% of Total 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.86% 2.86%
Count 8 1 5 21 35
% of Total 22.86% 2.86% 14.29% 60.00% 100.00%
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Fully Aware
Somewhat 
Aware
Not Aware
No Idea
Perceptive to Ethical and/or Legal Issues
Total
Aware 
Investment 
Overseen By SSB
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6.6 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
 
In order to get an idea of the participants’ awareness of the regulatory requirements186 and their opinion 
on the level of enforcement, the participants (of all three groups) were asked if they were aware if the 
FI/GP had any requirements to meet. The outcome of their responses has been summarised in Table 
6.44 below. A 3-point Likert scale was provided and the weighted score was calculated. It appears that 
50.00% are “Fully Aware” and 30.00% of the participants are “Somewhat Aware”, with the institutional 
participants being more aware than the individual and conventional participants (11 - institutional, 7 - 
individual, 7 - conventional). Close to half of the individuals (7 participants) were “Not Aware” of any 
regulatory requirements, while only one institution and two conventional were not aware. The Kruskal-
Wallis H test that was conducted showed that there was no statistically significant difference in the 
awareness of the regulatory requirements that the FI had to meet, between the three groups of investors, 
H (2) = 4.228, p = 0.121. 
	
Table 6.44 - Investor Type and Awareness of Whether FI have Regulatory Requirements 
 
 
None of those who invested in CPE made any comments. Of those that invested in IPE, one of the 
participants, although not aware, thought that since the FI is a financial institution it must fall under the 
supervision of the Central Bank. Another noted that there were no regulations as such, as some 
regulators look at matters from a commercial perspective rather than a regulatory perspective, and other 
regulators might pretend to have regulatory requirements, but actually they do not. While another 
participant, who stated full awareness, commented that there were no Islamic requirements (those 
related to Shair’ah compliance) for the GP to meet, but there were other regulatory requirements. 
 
																																								 																				
186 Part of research questions A.	
Fully 
Aware
Somewhat 
Aware
Not Aware
Individuals Count 7 4 7 2.00 2.00
Institutions Count 11 5 1 2.59 3.00
Conventional Count 7 6 2 2.33 2.00
Count 25 15 10
% Total 50.00% 30.00% 20.00%
H (2) p
4.228 0.121
MedianInvestor Type
FI have Regulatory Requirements
Weighted 
Score-a
Descriptive 
Statistics
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in decsending order from 3 to 1 with 3 to 
"Fully Aware” to 1 “Not Aware”.
Kruskal Wallis 
Total
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Participants were then asked about their views on how effectively the regulatory requirements were 
enforced. There responses were summarised in Table 6.45 below. Three participants did not provide a 
response. The responses were based on a 3-point Likert scale and the weighted score was calculated. It 
appears that the individuals and conventional have similar views “Somewhat Enforced” with a count of 
6 and 7 respectively. While institutions (9) are of the view that they are “Fully Enforced”.  Furthermore, 
almost half of the individual (8) participants did not have an idea, while only 2 institutions and one 
conventional did not have an idea if the regulations were effectively enforced. A comment made by one 
of the individual “Somewhat Enforced” group of participants was that they relied on the auditor’s report. 
In the sense that if the auditor’s report had been given clearance then it is the assumption that they have 
fully gone through the requirements indicating enforcement. The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was 
performed revealed that there is a statistically significant difference in the views on effective 
enforcement score between the three groups of investors H (2) = 6.13, p = 0.047. 
	
Table 6.45 - Investor Type and Regulatory Requirements Effectively Enforced 
 
 
Accordingly, a post hoc pairwise comparison analysis was performed (Figure 6.15), using Dunn’s (1964) 
procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Statistical significance was accepted 
at the p < 0.0167. This post hoc analysis revealed there to be a difference in the median of individuals 
(3.00) and institutions (4.00), with a medium size effect187, (p = 0.040, r = -0.396). However, it was not 
statistically accepted, p > 0.0167. 
	
																																								 																				
187 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Fully 
Enforced
Somewhat 
Enforced
Not 
Enforced
No Idea
Individuals Count 4 6 0 8 2.33 3.00
Institutions Count 9 5 0 2 3.31 4.00
Conventional Count 4 7 2 1 3.00 3.00
Count 17 18 2 11 48
% of Total 35.42% 37.50% 4.17% 22.92% 100.00%
H (2) p
6.129 0.047
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in decesnding order from 4 to 1 with 4 to "Fully Enforced” to 1“No Idea”.
Table 6.42- Investor Type and Regulatory Requirements Effectively Enforced 
Median
Regulatory Requirements Effectively Enforced
Weighted 
 Score-a
Descriptive 
 Statistics
Investor 
Type
Total
Kruskal Wallis 
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Figure 6.15 - Post Hoc Test on Regulatory Requirement Fully Enforced 
 
 
Participants were also asked if there were any regulatory requirements they had to meet/abide by. This 
was an open question, and the responses (three participants did not respond) were grouped as can be 
seen in Table 6.46 below. (31.25%) of the participants reported that there were no requirements. Of the 
individual participants (whether invested in IPE or CPE) that had, they were mainly “Know Your Client” 
(KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Tax (FATCA), and Citizenship requirements. While with 
regards to the institutions (whether invested in IPE or CPE), as an institution their requirement varied 
depending on the jurisdiction and the regulator of that jurisdiction and what industry they were in. 
Examples of Entity Verifications 188 were: entity registration, articles of associations, and board 
resolutions to invest. 
	
																																								 																				
188 This is background verification on the entity entering the investment (similar to KYC on individual).	
Pairwise Comparison of Regulatory Requirement Fully Enforced
-Each node shows the average rank of the opinion Regulatory Requirement Fully  
Enforced  for each group of investor
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference   
between   their medians
Regulatory Requirement 
Fully Enforced
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r 
Individuals-Conventional 5.837 0.215 0.645
Individuals-Institutions 11.226 0.013 0.040 -0.396
Conventional-Institutions 5.388 0.265 0.796
Adj. p (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Table 6.46 - Investor Type and Regulatory Requirement on Investor 
 
 
6.7 MEETING EXPECTATIONS AND FUTURE PLANS 
 
Participants were asked if their experience of investing in PE had met their expectations in the following 
areas: on the procedures and FI approach, on the risk and returns, on the trust in the FI/GP, and on the 
Shari’ah purposes and Shari’ah compliance (for those that invested in IPE). Table 6.47 below 
summarises their responses. The range of responses provided to participants for each category were: 
“All”, “Some”, “Few” and “None” had met their expectations. As per the weighted score calculated, 
the average for the Procedures-Approach category is the same for all groups of investors (approx. 3 or 
“Some”). The expectations of participants of individuals appear to be spread across “All” to “None” on 
risk/return, while institutions (7) were more to “Few” and conventional were more inclined to “Some” 
(9). However, they seem to differ slightly when it comes to FI/GP trust. The institutional participants’ 
expectations (6) appear to be greater than the individuals’ (4), while the conventional (6) were more on 
Few. Moreover, no institutional participant selected “None”, indicating that at least some of their 
expectations were met. While this was not the case with the individual and conventional participants. 
There were 2 to 4 individual participants, and one conventional that said their expectations were not 
met at all (in all categories for individuals and on FI/GP trust for conventional). With regards to 
expectations meeting Shari’ah purposes/compliance, it appears to mostly range between “All”                      
(9 - individual, 9 - institutions) to “Some” (5 - individuals, 7 - institutions). Although Shari’ah 
compliance appears to have met over half of the participants’ expectations, it is not something that they 
obsess about and rely on the assurance of the SSB and the SSB’s conscience as commented by an 
individual participant. The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed that there was no 
statistically significant difference in the expectations between the three (two for Shari’ah) groups of 
investors in all of the categories. The results are tabulated in Table 6.47.  
KYC-AML-
Tax-
Citizenship
Regulator-
Jurisdrication-
Industry
Entity 
Verifications
Nothing
Count 8 2 1 8 18
% of Total 16.67% 4.17% 2.08% 16.67% 37.50%
Count 2 6 3 6 17
% of Total 4.17% 12.50% 6.25% 12.50% 35.42%
Count 9 5 1 1 13
% of Total 18.75% 10.42% 2.08% 2.08% 27.08%
Total Count 19 13 5 15 48
% of Total 39.58% 27.08% 10.42% 31.25% 100.00%
Investor Type
Regulatory Requirement on Investor
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Descriptive 
Statists
Conventional
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Table 6.47 - Investor Type and Investment Meeting Expectations  
 
 
Participants were then asked if they would continue to invest in IPE and were given the following 
choices to select from: “Plan to Continue”, “Undecided” and “No Plans to Continue”. As can be seen 
All Some Few None
Count 4 9 3 2
% of Total 7.84% 17.65% 5.88% 3.92%
Count 4 8 5 0
% of Total 7.84% 15.69% 9.80% 0.00%
Count 4 7 5 0
% of Total 7.84% 13.73% 9.80% 0.00%
Count 12 24 13 2 51
% of Total 23.53% 47.06% 25.49% 3.92% 100.00%
H (2) p
0.033 0.984
Count 4 5 5 4
% of Total 7.84% 9.80% 9.80% 7.84%
Count 5 5 7 0
% of Total 9.80% 9.80% 13.73% 0.00%
Count 4 8 4 0
% of Total 7.84% 15.69% 7.84% 0.00%
Count 13 18 16 4 51
% of Total 25.49% 35.29% 31.37% 7.84% 100.00%
H (2) p
2.153 0.341
Count 4 8 3 3
% of Total 7.84% 15.69% 5.88% 5.88%
Count 6 5 6 0
% of Total 11.76% 9.80% 11.76% 0.00%
Count 4 5 6 1
% of Total 7.84% 9.80% 11.76% 1.96%
Count 14 18 15 4 51
% of Total 27.45% 35.29% 29.41% 7.84% 100.00%
H (2) p
0.688 0.709
Count 9 5 1 3
% of Total 25.71% 14.29% 2.86% 8.57%
Count 9 7 1 0
% of Total 25.71% 20.00% 2.86% 0.00%
Count 18 12 2 3 35
% of Total 51.43% 34.29% 5.71% 8.57% 100.00%
H (1) p
0.405 0.524
Median
Weighted 
Score-a
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
3.00
2.50
Investment Meet Expectations on Procedures-
Approach
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
3.00
Kruskal Wallis 
3.00
2.94
2.83
Kruskal Wallis 
Procedures-
Approach
2.94
Investment Meet 
Expectation on
Institutions
Conventional
Total
2.50
Total
3.00
Institutions 3.00 3.00
2.75
Risk-Return
Individuals
2.88 3.00
3.00 3.00
2.72
Conventional
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in decesnding order from 4 to 1 with 4 to "All” to 1 “None”.
Kruskal Wallis 
Total
Shari'ah Purpose-
Compliance
4.00
3.00
Total
Kruskal Wallis 
Individuals 3.11 3.50
Institutions 3.47
IFI-GP Trust
Individuals
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in Table 6.48 below, more than half (72.55% collectively: 19.61% - individuals and 25.50% institutions, 
27.45% - conventional) plan to continue investing in IPE/CPE. There are those that are undecided; more 
individual participants (5) than the institutional (3) and conventional (2) participants. While                            
3 individuals and one institution do not plan to continue.  
 
Many of the participants that invested in IPE (individual and institutions group) and that plan to continue 
had commented that IPE: offers an alternative form of investment, is an ethical way of investment and 
for some it is their core business. Those that were undecided observed that whether they would continue 
or not depends on the market, sector, and industry conditions. Some others would continue with smaller 
allocations and be more selective in the investment opportunities. Of those that do not plan to continue, 
they noted that they felt that the regulations and the legal system were not supportive enough from their 
experience. One of the participants considers that although the regulations might be in line with 
international standards, they do not provide the support needed to the investment environment, the 
economy or the investor. While those that invested in CPE (conventional group) and plan to continue 
commented that PE is a lucrative business, with a lot of potential, and the returns are superior compared 
to other asset classes, in addition to it offering greater flexibility in structuring the investment. One 
commented that although the results were mixed, the key to getting good rewards in PE is that the 
investments are made in a structured and systematic way. While another remarked that within the 
MENA region the only form of investment will be where he was a controlling shareholder, and he will 
not invest in any regional GP/LP investments. He will only consider GP/LP outside the region, with 
recognised GPs, with top performance and procedures. All comments made by the conventional group 
were by individuals, and by those who plan to continue. 
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Table 6.48 - Investor Type and Going Forward Expect to Continue 
 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was performed revealed there to be a statistically significant difference 
in “Going Forward Expect to Continue” between the three groups of investors, at the 10% significance 
level, H (2) = 4.936, p = 0.085. Accordingly, a post hoc pairwise comparison was conducted (Figure 
6.16), using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Statistical 
significance was accepted at p < 0.0333. Although, the post hoc analysis revealed there to be a 
difference between individuals (3.00) and conventional (3.00), with a medium size effect (p = 0.089,    
r = -0.363), it was not statistically significantly accepted as p > 0.1.   
	
Figure 6.16 - Post Hoc on Going Forward Expect to Continue 
 
Plan to 
Continue
Undecide
d
No Plans to 
Continue
Count 10 5 3
% of Total 19.61% 9.80% 5.88%
Count 13 3 1
% of Total 25.49% 5.88% 1.96%
Count 14 2 0
% of Total 27.45% 3.92% 0.00%
Count 37 10 4 51
% of Total 72.55% 19.61% 7.84% 100.00%
H (2) p*
4.936 0.085
* At 10% Significant level
Table 6.45- Investor Type and Going Forward Expect to Continue 
Going Forward Expect to Continue
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
Descriptiv
e 
Statistics
Investor Type
Kruskal Wallis 
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 3 to "Plan to Continue”, 
2 to "Undecided", and 1 to “No Plans to Continue”.
Total
Weighted 
 Score-a
Median
3.00
3.00
3.00
2.88
2.71
2.39
Pairwise Comparison of Going Forward Expect to Continue
-Each node shows the average rank of Going Forward Expect to Continue.
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant
difference between their medians.
Going Forward Expect to 
Continue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Institutions -5.670 0.149 0.447
Individuals-Conventional -8.674 0.030 0.089 -0.363
Institutions-Conventional -3.004 0.458 1.000
Adj. p (0.1/3) 0.0333
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6.7.1 Pairwise of Meeting Expectations and Future Plans 
 
With the above findings, it was decided to conduct a pairwise comparison of going forward plans with 
the investment meeting the participants’ expectations of the four categories. In order to conduct a 
pairwise analysis, a Kruskal-Wallis H test was initially performed to determine if there were differences 
between the three options of future plans in continuing to invest, and in the investments meeting 
expectations. Then, the pairwise analysis was performed on those that resulted in there appearing to be 
a statistically significant difference between the medians of “Meeting Expectation” and “Going Forward 
Expect to Continue”, to find out which option(s) was different from the other, by running a post hoc 
test. 
 
Investment meeting expectation on “Procedures-Approaches”, on “Risk-Return” and “Shari’ah 
Purpose-Compliance”, across the options of “Going Forward Expect to Continue”, showed there to be 
differences in the medians, across the 3 groups of investors. While there were no differences in the 
medians, in the investment meeting expectations on “FI-GP Trust”. Thus, a post hoc test was run on 
those that showed differences. 
 
a. Pairwise of Meeting Expectations on Procedures-Approach and Future Plans 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was run revealed that the distribution of investment meeting expectations 
on “Procedures-Approach” was similar for all groups, and the “Going Forward Expect to Continue” 
median scores were statistically significantly different between groups, H (2) = 7.844, p = 0.020. As 
such, pairwise comparisons were then performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (Figure 6.17). Statistical significance was accepted at the p < 
0.0167.189 Although the post hoc analysis revealed there to be a difference in the median of expecting 
to continue scores between the “No Plan to Continue” (1.50) and “Plan to Continue” (3.00), with a 
medium size effect190 (p = 0.028, 0.382) of the expecting to continue groups, yet it was not statistically 
significantly accepted, p > 0.0167.191 
 	
																																								 																				
189 P is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence in this case there are 3 groups, so p= 0.05/3=0.0167.	
190 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
191 The difference between Plan to Continue and No Plans to Continue (p = 0.028, r = 0.-382) could be accepted at 10% 
significance, p < 0.0333.	
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Figure 6.17 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Investment Meets Expectations on Procedures-Approach Across 
the Categories of Going Forward Expect to Continue 
 
 
b. Pairwise of Meeting Expectations on Risk-Return and Future Plans 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was run revealed that the distribution of investment meeting expectations 
on “Risk-Return” was similar for all groups, and the “Going Forward Expect to Continue” median 
scores were statistically significantly different between groups, H (2) = 15.410,  p < 0.0005. 
 
As such, pairwise comparisons were then performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (Figure 6.18). Statistical significance was accepted at the p < 
0.0167. This post hoc analysis revealed there to be a difference in the median of expecting to continue 
scores between the “No Plan to Continue” (1.00) and “Plan to Continue” (3.00), with a large size 
effect192 (p = 0.002, r = -0.502) and “Undecided” (2.00), with a medium size effect (p = 0.046, r = -
0.374) of the expecting to continue groups, but not between the “Undecided” group (2.00) or any other 
group combination. However, only the difference between “No Plan to Continue” and “Plans to 
Continue” was statistically significantly accepted, p < 0.0167. 
																																								 																				
192 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Pairwise Comparison of Going Forward Expect to Continue 
(Investment Meet Expectation on Procedures -Approach)
-Each node shows the average rank Going Forward Expected to Continue for each group  
of  investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference 
between  their medians 
Going Forward Expect to 
Continue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
No Plan to Continue-Undecided -12.075 0.14 0.421
No Plan to Continue-Plans to 
Continue
-18.963 0.009 0.028 -0.382
Undecided-Plans to Continue -6.888 0.163 0.488
Adj. p (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Figure 6.18 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Investment Meets Expectations on Risk-Return Across the 
Categories Going Forward Expect to Continue 
 
 
c. Pairwise of Meeting Expectations on Shari’ah Purpose-Compliance and Future Plans 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was run revealed that the distribution of investment meeting expectations 
on “Shari’ah Purpose-Compliance” was similar for all groups, and the “Going Forward Expect to 
Continue” median scores were statistically significantly different between groups, H (2) = 6.233, p = 
0.044. As such, pairwise comparisons were then performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Figure 6.19). Statistical significance was accepted at 
the p < 0.0167. This post hoc analysis revealed there was a difference in the median of expecting to 
continue scores between the “No Plan to Continue” (1.00) and “Plan to Continue” (4.00), with a medium 
size effect193 (p = 0.046, r = -0.357) of the expecting to continue groups, however, it was not statistically 
significant, p > 0.0167. 
 	
																																								 																				
193 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Pairwise Comparison of Going Forward Expect to Continue 
(Investment Meet Expectation on Risk-Return)
-Each node shows the average rank of Going Forward Expected to Continue for each 
group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference 
between their medians 
Going Forward Expect to 
Continue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. S ig. r
No Plan to Continue-Undecided -13.150 0.117 0.350
No Plan to Continue-Plans to 
Continue
-25.392 0.001 0.002 -0.502
Undecided-Plans to Continue 12.242 0.015 0.046 -0.374
Adj. p (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Figure 6.19 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Investment Meets Expectations on Shari'ah Purpose-Compliance 
Across the Categories Going Forward Expect to Continue 
 
 
6.7.2. Form of Investment Going Forward 
 
Participants were asked going forward, what their preferred form of investment would be. The options 
of responses provided were the same as those put forward at the beginning of the questionnaire, to 
identify the form of investment they had carried out when they invested in IPE/CPE. Some participants 
selected more than one form of investment. The responses are summarised in Table 6.49 below. It 
appears that all groups of investors have a similar order of preference: “Direct Equity” (11 -individuals, 
15 - institutions, 11 - conventional), followed by “Indirect Equity” (7 - individuals, 6 -institutions,                
9 - conventional), followed by “Limited Partnership (LP)” (6 - individuals, 1 - institutions,                               
5 - conventional). However, individual participating investors seem to be more inclined towards LP, 
and conventional more towards “Funds of Funds”, while institutions are more towards Direct Equity. 
Funds of Funds was the least preferred for both individual and institution groups. Moreover, one 
individual does not plan to invest going forward but all conventional and institutions plan to do so. As 
one institutional investor commented, it is part of their business.  
	
Pairwise Comparison of Going Forward Expect to Continue 
(Investment Meet Expectation on Shari'ah Purpose-Compliance)
-Each node shows the average rank of Going Forward Expected To Continue for each group 
of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between 
their medians 
Going Forward Expect to 
Continue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
No Plan to Continue-Undecided -8.125 0.154 0.461
No Plan to Continue-Plans to 
Continue
-12.201 0.015 0.046 -0.357
Undecided-Plans to Continue -4.076 0.286 0.857
Adj. p (0.05/3) 0.0167
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Table 6.49 - Investment Initially Carried Through and Investment Going Forward Cross-tabulation Across Type of 
Investor 
 
 
A comparison was done between the form of investment the participating investors carried out for their 
investment earlier and their going forward preference for investment. Table 6.49 (above) summarises 
the outcome of the cross-tabulation. It appears that of the 37 participants that invested initially in Direct 
Equity, 30 of them plan to continue investing in the same way, while others plan to invest in other forms 
and one individual has no intention of investing in Direct Equity going forward. With regards to Indirect 
Equity investment (investing through SPV), 18 of the initial 29 (62.07%) participants plan to continue 
in the same way, while only 10 of the 19 initial participants (52.63%) plan to continue investing in the 
LP form. And only 6 of the initial 13 participants (46.15%) of the Funds of Funds plan to continue in 
the same form of investment. 
 
As per the comments made by IPE investors (individuals and institutions groups), the majority of the 
preference is towards direct and indirect investments. Preference towards these investments provides 
them with some form of control over the investment and they get to see where their money is going. It 
was more of a say in the decision making rather than managing the business. Especially for those who 
did not have a Shari’ah investment team, or when their investment team was small, or the business of 
investment requires specific knowledge. Many of the Institutions were interested in partnering with 
Direct Equity 
Investment-
Fwd
Indirect 
Equity 
Investment-
Fwd
Private Equity 
Funds of Funds-
Fwd
Limited 
Partnership-
Fwd
Not 
investing-
Fwd
Individuals Count 8 5 0 5 1 12
Institutions Count 11 5 1 1 0 13
Conventional Count 11 8 3 3 0 12
Total Count 30 18 4 9 1 37 81.08%
Individuals Count 4 6 0 5 8
Institutions Count 8 3 1 1 9
Conventional Count 9 9 4 3 12
Total Count 21 18 5 9 29 62.07%
Individuals Count 1 1 2 2 4
Institutions Count 3 2 1 1 4
Conventional Count 4 4 3 3 5
Total Count 8 7 6 6 13 46.15%
Individuals Count 4 4 0 5 6
Institutions Count 3 2 1 0 4
Conventional Count 6 5 3 5 9
Total Count 13 11 4 10 19 52.63%
Total Investment 
Going Forward
Total 37 22 7 12 1
Total 
Investor
Individuals Count 11 7 2 6 1 18
Institutions Count 15 6 1 1 0 17
Conventional Count 11 9 4 5 0 16
% of Going 
Forward Form 
to Investment 
Carried 
Through 
Initially
Limited 
Partnership
Private Equity 
Fund of Fund
Indierct Equity 
Investment
Direct Equity 
Investment
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investment Going Forward
Total 
Investment 
Carried 
Through 
Intitially
Investor Type
Investment 
Carried 
Through 
Initially
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founders, to share the risk and help them grow, which will help build an effective Islamic investment 
industry and thus create more choices within the Islamic family of investments. While others, due to 
their size, wanted to share the risk but did not want to pay the large fees and thus prefer to invest directly. 
While for an institution, it was clear that as an investor they preferred to invest directly, but when it 
came to offering it to their clients they preferred to offer it indirectly. Moreover, the comments made 
by CPE investors (conventional) were, in addition to the control over direct and indirect forms of 
investment offered, that these forms of investment were also better in fee structure than in investing in 
the funds of funds. Furthermore, one investor noted (as mentioned earlier) that investing in the region 
would be direct through a controlling stake, and his interest in LP lies outside the MENA region. 
 
6.8 PRIVATE EQUITY INDUSTRY GOING FORWARD 
 
This section looks into the investors’ views on the private equity (PE) industry in general and how to 
take IPE/CPE forward. Their views on whether investing in PE had any public consequences and if it 
had any indirect systemic impact were sought. Their thoughts on what they saw as the key issues facing 
IPE/CPE were also questioned. In addition to what they thought, going forward, would be the best way 
to handle the IPE/CPE industry. 
 
6.8.1 Private Equity Impact on the Market 
 
Participants were provided with a selection of responses to select from. Table 6.50 summarises the 
participating investors’ views. Some selected more than one option, and one participant (conventional) 
did not respond. As can be seen from the table below, most of the participants thought that the PE form 
of investment had some kind of effect on the market and hence the economy. The main consequence 
was that it was another form of providing liquidity/finance to the market parallel to banks and market 
exchanges with 28.00% of the individual participants and 30.00% of each of the institution and 
conventional participants having that view. The next consequence was that the shortfall in the protection 
of investors and investor losses in PE could affect the liquidity in the market. More individual (28.00%) 
and conventional (22.00%) participants than institutions (18.00%) had such a view. The participants 
(20.00% of individuals, 18.00% of institutions, and 20.00% conventional) also thought that investors’ 
losses through PE investment could indirectly affect individual savers and the wider public. Only one 
institution did not think that investing in PE had any consequences for the market.  
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Of those participants that selected “Other”, the comments made by the IPE group of investors was that 
it was another way of creating money and that PE was an appropriate asset class for start-ups and 
developing companies as well as longer-term business models, such as real estate projects. This is true, 
especially since they did not have the constraint to report quarterly earnings, as listed companies have 
to. The only issue was the governance in PE companies is not as good as that in listed companies. It 
was suggested that this could be improved through imposing regulations, or be self-imposed by the 
company itself, or imposed by the PE investors. While the conventional (individual) participant that 
selected “Other” (in addition to having selected the other consequences) commented that with careful, 
prudent and ethical management, PE can improve the functioning of markets and economies and if not 
prudently and ethically done, it can have negative consequences and destroy economies.  
	
Table 6.50 - Investor Type and PE Impact 
 
 
6.8.2 Key Issues in IPE/CPE 
 
Participants were asked what they thought the key issues were that IPE/CPE faced. For the analysis, the 
responses were ranked using a 4-point Likert scale from “Low Importance” to “Very Highly Important”, 
as can be seen in Table 6.51 below. For ease of identifying the importance between the three groups, 
the levels of importance were totalled (i.e. those with low importance and not important were not 
included in the total of importance) and the percentage was calculated based on the total responses for 
each group of investors under each key issue category. All key issues were considered important to all 
groups, achieving at least over 50% of the total responses for each key issue. However, the conventional 
participants appear to have achieved a higher percentage of importance than the institutional and 
individual participants in the following key issues: Transparency and Investor Communication 
(93.75%), Fees-Alignment of Interest (81.25%), and Economic Environment (81.25%). While the 
Another Form 
of providing 
Liquidity-
Finance
Shortfall Investor 
Protection and 
Losses Imapcts 
Liquidity
Investor Losses 
Indirectly Effects 
Individual Saver 
and Public
None
Other indirect 
Systemic 
Impact
Count 14 14 10 0 1 18
% of Total 28.00% 28.00% 20.00% 0.00% 2.00% 36.00%
Count 15 9 9 1 1 17
% of Total 30.00% 18.00% 18.00% 2.00% 2.00% 34.00%
Count 15 11 10 0 1 15
% of Total 30.00% 22.00% 20.00% 0.00% 2.00% 30.00%
Count 44 34 29 1 3 50
% of Total 88.00% 68.00% 58.00% 2.00% 6.00% 100.00%
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
PE Indirectly Systemic Impact
Total
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional
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institutional participants appear to have achieved a higher percentage of importance than individuals on 
the following key issues: Fees-Alignment of Interest (76.47%), FI/GP Management (76.47%), Liquidity 
(70.47%), Transparency and Investor Communication (70.59%), Regulations (70.59%), and Economic 
Environment (64.71%). While individuals’ (83.33%) importance exceeded institutions’ (64.71%) on 
the issue of valuation.  
 
Of the eight participants that selected “Other”, six participants (2 - individuals, 2 - institutions,                        
2 -conventional) also selected from the list of key issues provided. While only two (2 - individuals) 
selected only “Other” and nothing from the list of key issues. The other issues that were noted by the 
IPE group (individuals and institutions) were: resistance to Shari’ah compliance; ability to source sound 
deals in the region; limited number of investment opportunities; investors’ knowledge of understanding; 
market research/knowledge, and exit. While the CPE group (conventional) noted: growth prospects of 
the target company and reputation of the institution they would be dealing with. Many conventional 
investors mentioned exit when they selected liquidity and valuations and commented that many 
investments have failed to exit due to liquidity issues and because either the information on price is 
only available to a few, or to initially having paid a high value for acquisition, due to the FI being under 
pressure to deploy funds. They also had concerns with regards to GPs, and being in the dark (as one 
described it as the Black Box). Elaborating that the investor is investing in an SPV, not getting involved 
in the investment, and after 5-7 years the investment has not yet matured and has been extended for 
another 2 years; while during that time the investor is getting quarterly NAVs without being told why 
and when the exit will happen. This ended with there are no clear regulations for GPs and PE funds. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was conducted showed that the distributions were similar and that there 
was no statistically significant difference in the views between the three groups of investors in all the 
key issues (with the exception of FI/GP Management and Regulations). The results are tabulated in 
Table 6.51. However, although the distribution of the views on the key issue scores for the three groups 
were similar, the Kruskal-Wallis H test showed there to be a statistically significant difference in the 
“FI/GP Management” between the median for individuals (0.50) and institutions (2.00), at the 5% 
significance level, H (2) = 6.794, p = 0.033; and in the “Regulations” between the median for individuals 
(1.50) and institutions (3.00), at the 10% significance level, H (2) = 5.585,  p = 0.061.  
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Table 6.51 - Investor Type and Key Issues in PE 
 
 
Accordingly, post hoc pairwise comparisons were then performed using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Figure 6.41 and Figure 6.42). Statistical significance 
was accepted at the p < 0.033.194 The post hoc analysis revealed there to be a difference in the medians 
of “FI/GP Management” between individual (1.50) and institutions (3.00), with a medium size effect195 
(p = 0.042, r = -0.398), but the difference was not statistically significant, p > 0.033 (Figure 6.20).  
																																								 																				
194  P is adjusted for multiple comparisons. Hence in this case there are 3 groups at the 10% significance level, so                   
p = 0.1/3 = 0.0167.	
195 Using Cohen’s (1988) criteria of 0.1=small effect, 0.3=medium effect, and 0.5=large effect.	
Individuals Count 8 1 2 2 5 18 9 50.00% 2.72 2.50
Institutions Count 3 3 4 3 4 17 11 64.71% 3.12 3.00
Conventional Count 2 1 3 4 6 16 13 81.25% 3.69 4.00
Total Count 13 5 9 9 15 51 33 64.71%
H (2) p
2.861 0.239
Individuals Count 3 0 3 5 7 18 15 83.33% 3.72 4.00
Institutions Count 4 2 2 7 2 17 11 64.71% 3.06 4.00
Conventional Count 1 1 5 1 8 16 14 87.50% 3.88 4.50
Total Count 8 3 10 12 17 51 39 76.47%
H (2) p
3.452 0.178
Individuals Count 8 0 3 3 4 18 10 55.56% 2.72 3.00
Institutions Count 3 1 7 1 5 17 13 76.47% 3.24 3.00
Conventional Count 1 2 5 4 4 16 13 81.25% 3.50 3.50
Total Count 12 3 15 8 13 51 36 70.59%
H (2) p
1.914 0.384
Individuals Count 9 2 3 4 0 18 7 38.89% 2.11 1.50
Institutions Count 3 1 5 4 4 17 13 76.47% 3.29 3.00
Conventional Count 2 3 5 4 2 16 11 68.75% 3.06 3.00
Total Count 14 6 13 12 6 51 31 60.78%
H (2) p
6.794 0.033
Individuals Count 6 1 2 1 8 18 11 61.11% 3.22 3.50
Institutions Count 3 1 3 3 7 17 13 76.47% 3.59 4.00
Conventional Count 2 2 4 2 6 16 12 75.00% 3.50 3.50
Total Count 11 4 9 6 21 51 36 70.59%
H (2) p
0.256 0.880
Individuals Count 6 1 2 5 4 18 11 61.11% 3.00 3.50
Institutions Count 5 0 1 5 6 17 12 70.59% 3.41 4.00
Conventional Count 0 1 1 10 4 16 15 93.75% 4.06 4.00
Total Count 11 2 4 20 14 51 38 74.51%
H (2) p
2.808 0.246
Individuals Count 6 3 3 4 2 18 9 50.00% 2.61 2.50
Institutions Count 2 3 0 5 7 17 12 70.59% 3.71 4.00
Conventional Count 3 4 4 3 2 16 9 56.25% 2.81 3.00
Total Count 11 10 7 12 11 51 30 58.82%
H (2) p*
5.585 0.061
Kruskal Wallis 
Total 
Responses
Total of 
Importance 
(Important 
to V.H. 
Important)
Weighted 
Score-a
% Total of 
Importance 
to Total 
Responses
Economic 
Environment
Investor TypeKey Issues
Descriptive 
Statistics
Transparency & 
Investor 
Communication 
Kruskal Wallis 
Regulations **
Liquidity
Kruskal Wallis 
Kruskal Wallis 
Table 6.48- Investor Type and Key Issues in PE
Median
Highly 
Important
Important
Low 
Importance
Not 
Important
Very Highly 
Important
Valuation
Kruskal Wallis 
Fees-Alignment of 
Interest
Kruskal Wallis 
IFI/GP 
Mangement**
* At 10% Significant Level
Kruskal Wallis 
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated in ascending order from 1 to 5 with 1 to "Not Important” to 5 “Very Highly Important”.
** Although Kruskal Wallis Test conducted showed to there being a staisitcal significant difference,  yet there appears to be no group of investors significantly different from the other.
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Figure 6.20 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of FI/GP Management Key Issues 
 
 
A similar outcome was revealed with pairwise analysis for “Regulations”. There was a difference in the 
medians between individuals (2.50) and institutions (4.00), with a medium size effect (p = 0.076,               
r = -0.369), but this was not statistically significant, p > 0.033 (Figure 6.21). 
 	
Figure 6.21 - Post Hoc Test on the Distribution of Regulations Key Issue 
 
 
Pairwise Comparison of FI/GP Management Key Issue
-Each node shows the average rank of IFI/GP Management Key Issue for each group of 
investors 
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference between    
their  medians 
FI/GP Management Key 
Issue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Conventional -9.622 0.053 0.159
Individuals-Institutions -12.028 0.014 0.042 -0.398
Conventional-Institutions 2.406 0.633 1.000
Adj. p (0.1/3) 0.0333
Pairwise Comparison of Regulations Key Issue
-Each node shows the average rank of Regulations Key Issue for each group of investors
-The lighter line displays those that revealed to be statistical significant difference  
between their medians 
Regulations  Key Issue
Test 
Statistics
Sig. Adj. Sig. r
Individuals-Conventional -2.024 0.685 1.000
Individuals-Institutions -11.011 0.025 0.076 -0.369
Conventional-Institutions 8.987 0.076 0.228
Adj. p (0.1/3) 0.0333
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6.8.3 Regulating IPE/CPE 
 
Participants’ views on how to handle the IPE/CPE market were sought by asking them whether it was 
beneficial to regulate the IPE/CPE market, who should regulate it and how to regulate it.196 
 
6.8.3.1 Beneficial to Regulate IPE/CPE Market 
 
Participants were asked if they thought it was beneficial or not to regulate the IPE/CPE market prior to 
the investment stage and/or in the post-investment stage. Investors investing in IPE (individuals and 
institutions) were asked with regards to investing in the Islamic private equity market and the 
conventional investors were asked with regards to investing in the conventional private equity market. 
All the responses were collated into one table because the questions were basically the same. One 
conventional investor did not provide a response. Table 6.52 below summarises the participants’ views. 
A cross-tabulation was performed to get an overall view of regulating pre- and post-investment. Overall, 
all groups appear to have a similar view, that it is beneficial to regulate pre- and post- investment.  
 	
Table 6. 52 - To Regulate Pre-Investment and To Regulate Post-Investment Cross-tabulation Across Investor Type 
 
 
																																								 																				
196 Part of research questions C.	
Beneficial to 
Industry
Not Beneficial 
to Industry Unsure No Idea
Individuals Count 12 0 1 13 3.77
Institutions Count 14 1 0 15 3.93
Conventional Count 10 0 0 10 4.00
36 1 1 38
Individuals Count 2 0 2 4.00
Institutions Count 1 1 2 3.50
Conventional Count 0 3 3 3.00
3 4 7
Individuals Count 0 3 3 2.00
Institutions Count
Conventional Count 1 1 2 2.50
1 4 5
Individuals Count 14 0 3 1 18
Institutions Count 15 2 0 0 17
Conventional Count 10 4 1 0 15
39 6 4 1 50
H (2) p
2.069 0.355
H (2) p
2.520 0.284
Descriptive 
Statistics
Individuals
To Regulate Post-
investment
Unsure
Total
Total
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 4 to "Beneficial to Industry”, 3 to "Not Beneficial to Industry", 2 to "Unsure" and 1 to “No Idea”.
Weighted 
Score-a
Kruskal Wallis 
(To Regulate Pre-Investment)
Kruskal Wallis
(To Regulate Post Investment) 
Total
Total
Not Beneficial to 
Industry
To Regulate Pre-investment
Total
Beneficial to 
Industry
Total
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Of the 39 participants (14 - individuals, 15 - institutions, 10 - conventional) who thought it was 
beneficial to regulate pre-investment, 38 (13 - individuals, 15 - institutions, 10 - conventional) of them 
also thought to was beneficial to regulate post-investment. It was interesting to see that all the pre-
investment institutional and conventional investors also agreed on post-investment, unlike the 
individual participants, where they were more in favour of regulating pre-investment but not post- 
investment. There were also 4 unsure respondents (3 - individuals, 1 - conventional). Some of the 
individuals’ hesitation was that it might be beneficial from the investors’ perspective, but might not be 
in favour of the PE firms’, which could lead them to re-locate to less regulated countries. Another issue 
was that having regulations could compromise the confidentiality of the firm’s strategy. While one 
conventional (institution) was Unsure because PE investments are free from regulatory complications 
and to regulate contracts would be difficult as they vary in mandates and strategy.   
 
Some of those investing in the IPE were of the opinion that if reporting was done clearly and quarterly, 
then there is no need to regulate post-investment. One participant, although they thought it was 
beneficial to regulate post-investment, had no idea with regards to pre-investment, in that the issue was 
not much about the agreement as it was the enforceability of post-agreement. In addition to being an 
effective monitoring system, it was not enough just to receive updates, and it is desirable that more is 
done by the regulator. On a similar concept, a participant thought that since each industry (of the 
investment opportunities) in itself is already regulated, pre-investment is not beneficial to regulate, 
while post is. There were those that thought regulations have to be balanced between regulating and the 
ease of doing business, and that too many regulations could negatively affect the growth of the industry. 
So it was beneficial to regulate pre-investment and leave post-investment to be regulated by having an 
effective enforcement, and a strong court and legal system. However, one of the participants commented 
that there appears to be a shortfall in the regulations, and the judicial system does not make up for it in 
both the courts and the arbitration system. Generally, those that were in favour of the regulations thought 
that it would have a positive effect on: investors’ protection, investors’ confidence, trust in the market, 
greater transparency, greater disclosure, more audit, reduce ambiguity, and bring in more 
controls/discipline to the market. They also thought that regulations were to be light, clear, address 
major issues and work towards standardisation. One of the participants who was in favour of regulating 
pre- and post-investment thought that although the investors of the IPE are supposed to be HNW and 
FI, the assumption is that they have the right knowledge to perform a proper risk assessment of the 
investment opportunities, which is not the case, especially in the GCC region. So having regulatory 
supervision and monitoring would assist in weeding out risky deals.  
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While those investing in CPE thought that it would comfort investors if they knew that best practices 
were being followed and issues related to investors’ rights are appropriately addressed. However, there 
were conventional investors that did not think it was beneficial and commented that private equity 
transactions already require a significant amount of time and effort to execute and to regulate pre-
investment would slow down the process, add cost and slow down the PE market. In addition to that, 
PE investments are offered to sophisticated investors and regulators do not have to worry with regards 
to protecting them as with retail consumers. Furthermore, the regulators cannot ensure the qualitative 
aspect of PE transactions, and if they could, it would mean that they are actually evaluating the 
transaction itself, which is beyond its scope and capabilities. They also had varying thoughts when it 
came to regulating post-investment. There were those that thought frontier markets need hand-holding 
as they develop and that regulations will add transparency, professionalism and maturity to the industry. 
While others thought the matter was more relevant to maintaining contractual obligations. Disclosure 
being the key factor, and to have requirements that regulate FI/GP on disclosing promptly and in the 
event that they do not do so, they could be subject to fraud. Such a system would require a clear and 
swift court process to deal with unjust cases. To those investors, it was not that to regulate what you 
can have or cannot have in the agreement, but to regulate to promote disclosure and to have an effective 
judicial system.  
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was performed showed that the distribution of to “Regulate Pre-
investment” is the same across all investor groups and that there was no statistically significant 
difference between them, H (2) = 2.069, p = 0.355. The same outcome was for to “Regulate Post- 
investment”, whereby H (2) = 2.520, p = 0.284. 
 
6.8.3.2 Who to Regulate IPE/CPE Market 
 
Participants were also asked who they thought should regulate: the Regulator, the Industry or Both. The 
responses were summarised in Table 6.53 below. One conventional investor did not provide a response. 
A cross-tabulation was performed to get an overall view of who is to regulate pre- and post- investment. 
It appears that they were in favour of regulating both stages; all had either the preference to have the 
Regulator regulate both stages or to have Both the Regulator and Industry regulate together, with the 
individual and conventional sentiments being more towards the Regulator and the institutions more 
towards the Industry. Seventeen participants (9 - individuals, 3 - institutions, 5 -conventional) thought 
that the Regulator should regulate both stages. While 15 participants (3 -individuals, 8 - institutions, 4 
- conventional) thought that Both (Regulator and Industry) should regulate both stages. There were 5 
participants (2 - individuals, 2 - institutions, 1 - conventional) who thought that the Regulator should 
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regulate pre-investment, and post-investment should be Both. There were 3 participants that were in 
favour of only regulating the pre-investment stage and not the post one, one individual was for the 
Regulator to regulate, and another individual was for Both, while one institution was for the Industry to 
regulate. There were 3 conventional that selected “None”, neither the Regulator nor the Industry. 
 	
Table 6.53 - Who to Regulate Pre-investment and Who to Regulate Post-investment Cross-tabulation Across Investor 
Type 
 
 
IPE investors who were for the Industry to be regulated thought that some form of supervision should 
be imposed on the Industry to ensure best practices and in addition, the Industry Associations might not 
have the power of enforcement. Those that were in favour of the Regulator had some reservations too. 
Although the preference is for the Regulator because it reduces the Industry’s capture197, the Regulator 
has to be efficient (which not all are, as commented on by the participants). The Regulators need to be 
qualified to monitor, guide and support, with effective enforcement, both the investment and the 
																																								 																				
197 Reference is to if the industry was given full reign it would prioritise their specific concerns over the overall benefit of the 
sector/industry. 	
Regulator Industry Both None
Individuals Count 9 0 1 10 3.80
Institutions Count 3 1 0 4 3.75
Conventional Count 5 0 0 5 4.00
17 1 1 19
34.00% 2.00% 2.00% 0.00%
Individuals Count 0 0 1 0 1 2.00
Institutions Count 0 2 0 0 2 3.00
Conventional Count 1 0 0 1 2 2.50
1 2 1 1 5
2.00% 4.00% 2.00% 2.00%
Individuals Count 2 3 5 2.80
Institutions Count 2 8 10 2.40
Conventional Count 1 4 5 2.40
5 15 20
10.00% 0.00% 30.00% 0.00%
Individuals Count 1 0 1 0 2 3.00
Institutions Count 0 1 0 0 1 3.00
Conventional Count 0 0 0 3 3 1.00
1 1 1 3 6
2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 6.00%
Individuals Count 12 0 6 0 18
Institutions Count 5 4 8 0 17
Conventional Count 7 0 4 4 15
24 4 18 4 50
H (2) p
3.488 0.175
H (2) p
2.270 0.321
Who to Regulate Pre-investment
Total Who Regulate 
Post Investment
Total
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated 4 to "Regulate", 3 to "Industry", 2 to "Both" and 1 to "None".
Total
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
Who to Regulate 
Post-investmnet
Total
Total
Total Who 
Regulate Post 
Investment
Weighted 
Score-a
% of Total Who Regulate to 
Total Investor
Regulator
Industry
% of Total Who Regulate to 
Total Investor
% of Total Who Regulate to 
Total Investor
Both
% of Total Who Regulate to 
Total Investor
None
Kruskal Wallis 
(Who to Regulate Pre-Investment)
Kruskal Wallis
(Who to Regulate Post Investment) 
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investors. They were also of the view that regulations are required, yet not to over regulate because it 
hinders creativity and development, or that the requirements prove to be costly for the managing entity. 
A note was also made that the relationship between the investor and the FI is based on a contractual 
agreement between both parties, based on clear terms, and what is required for the post-investment 
stage is effective enforcement of the regulation and proper court systems, in cases of a breach of contract. 
 
While CPE investors that were for the Regulator to regulate pre-investment thought it would add 
assurance that the risk related to the legal structure of the investment and investor rights would 
effectively be addressed. There were others who thought there is a place for both government and 
industry associations to regulate, while some commented that Industry associations regulating post- 
investment would add a level of supervision without disturbing the flow of the deal, in addition to 
ensuring effective monitoring of the business risk related to portfolio companies. 
 
With regards to the Industry regulating, a question was put forward to name the Industry associations 
that as participants they were aware of. The Industry associations that the IPE participants were aware 
of and mentioned were: ILPA (Institutional Limited Partners Association), MENA Private Equity, 
EVCA (European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association), PEGCC (Private Equity Growth 
Capital Council) and CIBAFI (General Council of Islamic Financial Institutions). Some also made 
reference to AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions) an 
international accounting, auditing and Shari’ah standards setting body. While the CPE investors, in 
addition to ILPA, mentioned: NVCA (National Venture Capital Association), EMPEA (Emerging 
Market Private Equity Association and CFA Institute (Chartered Financial Analyst Institute). 
 
6.8.3.3 How to Regulate IPE/CPE Market 
 
Participants were asked how the IPE/CPE market should be regulated. The choices of responses and 
the participants’ responses have been summarises in Table 6.54 below.  
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Table 6.54 - Investor Type and How Should They Regulate 
 
 
It appears that the majority were in favour of some form of compliance. Both the individuals and the 
institutions had similar numbers of participants under “Obligatory Compliance” (9 - individuals, 9 -
institutions), and “Comply or Explain” (7 - individuals, 7 - institutions). While 6 conventional were for 
“Obligatory Compliance” and 4 for “Comply or Explain”. The IPE participant responding “Other” was 
of the view that it should be both methods and not only one or the other. One participant was of the 
view that in order to regulate the Regulator would need to be on the board of the investee company to 
ensure that investors’ rights are protected, rather than regulating through the comply/explain or 
obligatory compliance. Those of the comply or explain view have commented that, although 
compliance is required to help discipline in the market, in order not to defeat the purpose of it being a 
private equity market, it needs to be on an explanation basis. Moreover, not every industry understands 
Islamic principles, so at times some explanations are needed, with regards to being able to comply. 
Furthermore, it was also noted that enforcement needs to be efficient and effective for the comply or 
explain basis to be an effective method. While for the CPE participants with the view of “Other”: two 
were of the view of having clear rules and regulations on the disclosure of all information and conflict 
of interest was sufficient and one thought that funds should be reported to the regulators of each country. 
 
With regards to how to regulate, the participants were also asked about having an Investors (LP) 
Advisory Committee (IAC) that represents the investors in the investment to voice the investors, focus 
on substantial issues, and meet with FI (GP) regularly to discuss time-sensitive important matte. The 
participants’ responses range from “Very Much Agree” to “Not Agree” or “Rather be Independent” and 
handled matters on their own, which are summarised in Table 6.55 below. It appears that participants 
are more in agreement than not. More than half of the participants (52.00%) “Very Much Agree” to 
having an IAC, more so individuals (11 participants) than institutions (8), and conventional (7). There 
were more institutional participants (4 - Somewhat Agree, 3 - Agree) that were of the view of 
“Somewhat Agree” and “Agree”, than individuals (2 - Somewhat Agree, 2 - Agree). While conventional 
were more for “Agree” (4) than “Somewhat Agree” (2). It was interesting to see that it was the 
individual participating investors (3) who preferred to be independent more so than the institutional and 
Obligatory 
Compliance
Comply or 
Explain Other None
Individuals Count 9 7 1 1 18 3.33
Institutions Count 9 7 0 1 17 3.41
Conventional Count 6 4 3 2 15 2.93
Total Count 24 18 4 4 50
Weighted 
Score-a
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated  1 to "None” , 2 "Other", 3 to "Comply or Explain", and 4 to 
“Obligatory Compliance”.
How should They Regulate
Total
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
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conventional participants, none of whom seem to want to be independent. Two participants from each 
of the institutions and conventional groups did not agree to having an IAC. 
 
The Kruskal-Wallis H test that was performed showed that the distribution of having an IAC is the same 
across all investor groups and that there was no statistically significant difference between the medians 
of the three groups, H (2) = 0.339, p = 0.844. 
 
Table 6.55 - Investor Type and Have an Investor Advisory Committee Representative 
 
 
6.9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
	
The current chapter attempted to address the research questions from the investors’ perspective in 
investing Islamic equity finance. And in doing so it attempted to compare their experience with the 
experience of investors who invested in the conventional private equity market. It looked into the 
investors’ experience in investing in IPE/CPE, their relationship with the FI, their investment decision 
factors and their level of awareness of IPE/CPE. In addition to the issues they faced and foresee in such 
an industry and their recommendations on improving the IPE/CPE market. The methodology that was 
conducted to seek the investors’ input was the quantitative method, based on a questionnaire that was 
presented to the participating investors. In conducting the analysis, the participating investors were 
grouped into three groups198: individuals, institutions (representing IPE) and conventional (representing 
CPE) and their responses were analysed using mainly descriptive analysis. Inferential non-parametric 
																																								 																				
198 Further explanation on such grouping is provided in the Research and Methodology Chapter 5, section 5.4.2.2.	
Very Much 
Agree
Somewhat 
Agree
Agree Not Agree
Rather be 
Independent
Count 11 2 2 0 3 18
% of Total 22.00% 4.00% 4.00% 0.00% 6.00% 36.00%
Count 8 4 3 2 0 17
% of Total 16.00% 8.00% 6.00% 4.00% 0.00% 34.00%
Count 7 2 4 2 0 15
% of Total 14.00% 4.00% 8.00% 4.00% 0.00% 30.00%
Count 26 8 9 4 3 50
% of Total 52.00% 16.00% 18.00% 8.00% 6.00% 100.00%
H (2) p
0.339 0.844
Have an Investor Advisory Committee Representative
Total
Individuals
Institutions
Conventional 4.00
4.00
5.00
Median
% of Total 
Agree (V.M 
Agree-SW 
Agree-Agree) to 
Total Investors
a-To calculate the weighted score, scores were allocated  in descending order with 5 to "Very Much Agree”  to 1 “Rather be Independent”.
Total
Kruskal Wallis 
Descriptive 
Statistics
Investor Type
Weighted 
Score-a
3.93
4.06
4.0030.00%
30.00%
26.00%
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analysis was performed with regards to seeing if there was any independence between the groups in 
their responses.  
 
Overall, for the investors, following their experience in investing in IPE/CPE, many of them plan to 
continue investing in IPE. However, the preference was more towards the form of investment where 
they would be more aware of what is happening; and they were less concerned with being involved in 
the management. Greater preference was towards direct and indirect forms of investment, rather than 
funds of funds or a limited partnership. Moreover, although the investors are all considered to be 
accredited sophisticated investors, there is a difference with regards to certain matters, where the size 
of investment has an effect on the relationship with the FI. Matters included discussing the alignment 
of interest matters, the pre-agreement on the handling of conflict of interest issues, the ability to 
negotiate prior to signing, and the ability to vote or provide input on the direction of decision making 
on material matters. When it comes to the Shari’ah compliance aspect, there appears to be a great 
amount of reliability on the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB). The investor expects to be investing in 
an Islamic investment and relies on the Shari’ah due diligence being performed and is not given priority 
when performing his own due diligence. This is in addition to forgoing not receiving the Shari’ah audit 
report, and placing full dependence on the SSB performing its role of supervision and audit.   
 
Investors were in favour in bringing in some form of regulation to the IPE/CPE market, yet not to over 
regulate it. The aim is to bring more discipline into the market and enhance the level of disclosure and 
transparency. Furthermore, as the relationship between the investor and FI when investing in IPE/CPE 
is a contractual one, enforcement of the contract/agreement in times of breach is of great importance, 
which currently appears to be weak, especially in the region. Any shortfall in the legal system affects 
the investors’ protection and reduces the investors’ confidence in the market.  
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Chapter Seven: 
IFI APPROACHES TO ISLAMIC PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT: RESULTS 
AND ANALYSIS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter looks into the results of the semi-structured interviews conducted with 15 Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFI199) from across the GCC200, with regards to their investment approaches during the pre- 
and post-investment stages, the transparency and due diligence process and Shari’ah compliance 
governance system. The results were analysed using content and thematic analysis. Initially the 
responses were transcribed by the researcher and then imported into Nvivo software. This software was 
used to assist in collating the responses and coding them. After which Excel software was used to 
analyse the content and derive the themes with regards to the IFI’s investment approach, post-
investment relationship and the IFI’s handling of due diligence, transparency and governance.  The 
Shari’ah compliance and Shari’ah Supervisory Board matters were performed manually after the initial 
Nvivo coding. 
 
The data analysis will first look at the general themes arrived at, which are then further explained by 
focus coding and looking into the subthemes. The results on each subtheme are supported by the related 
interviewee responses and quotations from different respondents.  
 
7.2 INVESTMENT APPROACH 
 
The set of questions under the investment approach were mainly to determine who and how the IFI 
approached potential investors. Table 7.71 summarises the various approaches undertaken, while         
Table 7.4 summarises how the IFI approached investors. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
199 In presenting the results, the IFI interviews will be represented in code form (IFI-01, IFI-02, etc.) to preserve the 
confidentiality and the identity of the IFI. While the IFI cannot be identified due to confidentiality, the basic characteristics 
of them are given in Appendix 4.	
200 GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council countries.	
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7.2.1 Investors being approached 
 
Table 7.1 to Table 7.3 summarises the responses of IFI with regards to who they approached and how 
they selected their potential investors. 
 
Table 7.1 - Investors Being Approached 
Interview Question How do you approach your potential investors? How do you decide which 
investor to approach? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Internal database 
2 Immediate circle of contacts 
Concluding Theme Investors’ selection was mainly based on friends, Board of Directors 
(BOD) members, shareholders and the internal data that was created of 
records of investors’ information created and maintained from regular 
visits. 
 
Over a period of time, IFIs have created an internal database of investors; created from regular visits 
and maintaining a record of investor information (appetite/sector of interest). Investors are usually 
acquaintances of the immediate circle of shareholders, BODs, and contacts and relationships that they 
have maintained through networking. 
 
Table 7.2 - Focused Coding 1 For Investors Being Approached 
Subtheme Internal Database 
Interviewees Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-04, IFI-08, IFI-09, IFI-12, IFI-13, 
IFI-14, IFI-15 
Created by regular visits and maintaining a 
record of investor information  
 
Investor relationships are maintained by the IFI, mainly by the investment relationship officer or the 
marketing/sales, or business development officers’ regular visits to investors, “We have a data base. 
We have investment relationship officers and they have maintained for the last 8 years, that they have 
developed, I mean they have a very good relationship with the investors” (IFI-10). The database 
maintains a record of investors, their appetite and sector of interest,“We build our database, we profile 
our investors, so that when I have the right opportunity, then I know which investors to approach and 
which investors not to approach” (IFI-08). Many of them have had prior investments and are regular 
investors, “We know our investors…we have been dealing with them for years” (IFI-04).     
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Table 7.3 - Focused Coding 2 For Investors Being Approached 
Subtheme Immediate Circle of Contacts 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-03, IFI-07 Friends, relationships, contacts 
IFI-01 Board of Directors (BOD) members 
IFI-08, IFI-10 Shareholders 
IFI-10 Strategic partners 
 
Usually, IFIs start with their immediate circle, this being shareholders and the BODs of the IFI, “We 
start with our immediate circle, which is our shareholders, then we go to the wider circle of other 
investors in the region…” (IFI-08) and their friends “…friends and people that sit on our board. People 
that are part of our bank” (IFI-01). When it comes to large investments, usually the preference is to 
approach friends, those who they have had a good investing experience with. “If there is a large ticket 
size, we just call up our friends” (IFI-07). 
 
The investors being targeted were sophisticated accredited investors: institutions and individuals, “We 
used to put categories for the clients: institutions and individuals. Individuals if they were High Net 
Worth (HNW) or individuals or salary person, for all investments” (IFI-03); “Our target is financial 
institutions, HNWs and family offices these who they are. A mix of both”	(IFI-05). In most cases the 
preference was for individuals, as individuals were quicker to respond than institutions, as Interviewee 
IFI-08 asserts; “It is a combination [individuals and institutional investors], but there is a slight bias 
towards individuals… an individual is much faster than institution...time deadlines to make the 
investment…so you get the feedback much faster and the process is quicker.” Individuals also would 
bring more individuals (family and friends), as IFI-06 notes; “he [individual] used to bring for you a 
lot of people [family members of the individual that signs a subscription]…”. 
 
7.2.2 IFI Approach 
 
The tables below summarise the responses of IFIs with regards to how they approached investors and 
how and what information they provided them with. 
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Table 7.4 - How IFI Approach Investors 
Interview 
Question How do you approach your potential investors? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/Remarks 
1 Approach was conducted in 2-3 stages 
2 Information was provided in 3 stages 
3 Private Placement Memorandum (PPM) and Executive Summary 
Concluding 
Theme 
Some approached investors to test their interest first, before providing them 
with detailed information. In some cases, a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
was signed, prior to providing information. Others provided the PPM and 
executive summary along with a presentation. 
 
Some IFIs’ initial approach was to visit and test the waters prior to going into details of the investment, 
while others would approach the investors with the investment, by providing the PPM and executive 
summary. 
 
Table 7.5 - Focused Coding 1 For How IFI Approach Investors 
Subtheme Approach was conducted in 2-3 stages 
Interviewees  Remarks 
 
IFI-08, IFI-15 Courtesy visit and testing interest (after which targeted investor is selected). Offer/sell the product, provide detailed information, 
cooling off period before signing. 
 
IFI-10, IFI-11, IFI-14 Presentation, after which the document is provided/forwarded, sits and discusses, cooling off period before signing. 
 
The above IFI’s approach was to first visit the investors and assess their interest “we start, we approach 
a wide range of investors first to gage the appetite and then once we have the initial feedback, we 
narrow down to our target investors” (IFI-08); and their understanding of the type of investment, 
“Courtesy visit, offer our profile, brief him on organisation structure, business, or history…Second visit, 
we offer him the product. The first visit is to understand the client; he is an investor or not? He knows 
private equity or not? So, we have to understand the client to see under which category he falls” (IFI-
15). After which they would provide further information on the investment, “and then we provide them 
with a second layer of information. Once that second step is over, then we go to meetings, in order to 
basically go into details and depth about this transaction and answer all questions they might have” 
(IFI-08). “Then based on that we work, because we have funds. …When you go on the second visit offer 
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them PPM, executive summary, teaser201 about the project we are offering him” (IFI-15). There are 
IFIs that present the investment through a presentation and provide the PPM thereafter, “We don’t go 
to investors with a PPM on a slide show, because the PPM is very narrative. The PPM would be in the 
document that we provide the client may be at the end of the presentation or we can send it to them 
afterwards by e-mail or hard copy as they might wish…he takes his time, he asks…he runs it by his 
internal approval process... He sits with you 3 times...convinced, signs with us” (IFI-13). 
 
In some jurisdictions, once the potential investors have been identified, the IFI would submit the 
potential list to the Regulator (if less than 60 investors) and seek the Regulator’s approval on the offering 
document (PPM) before providing the investor, “We meet with them [investors] initially, explain the 
idea. Let’s say, the strategy of the company, where the company might be in the next couple of years. … 
If they are interested, then we submit to the [Regulator] and get approval on the private placement offer. 
We will go back to them [investors] with the complete offering package and offering documents …” 
(IFI-12). 
 
Table 7.6 - Focused Coding 2 For How IFI Approached Investors 
Subtheme Information was provided in 2 stages 
Interviewee  Remarks 
 
IFI-01 Seek interest present with teaser 
Sign Non-Disclosure Agreement 
Provide more details 
 
In some instances, the IFI does not disclose details of the investment to the potential investor before he 
signs a Non-Disclosure Agreement. So in the event that he does not invest, once he sees the details, the 
investor maintains confidentiality and does not disclose the details of the investment/project as IFI-01 
notes; “First at the initial stage we give them a brief, a teaser, showing them the opportunity high level, 
if they would like to explore further, we sign a NDA (non-disclosure agreement) and send them the 
information that we have got.”. 
 
																																								 																				
201 A document/sheet circulated to potential investors for a specific offer of an investment that contains some information on 
the offer that might entice the potential investor.	
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Table 7.7 - Focused Coding 3 For How IFI Approached Investors 
Subtheme Information provided by PPM and Executive 
Summary 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-07, IFI-11 PPM and Executive Summary 
 
There are IFIs that in their first meeting provide the investor with a PPM and Executive Summary, “As 
a start the investment memorandum and the executive summary. Will start with giving a background of 
the institution itself…then we go and move to the investment itself… then at the end, sometimes there 
are some answering questions” (IFI-07). Once the investor is approached, they are given time to review 
and decide, “Providing the PPM…we open up the data room for our clients. We answer all the questions 
and then basically give them a window within the PPM that they could be anywhere from one to three 
months for a closing date where they have to basically say if they are interested or committed”               
(IFI-11). 
 
Moreover, there were instances where it was the investors that approached the IFI rather than the IFI 
approaching the investor. Some investors followed the herd as they say and were very eager to enter 
the investment, in that they were approaching IFIs to take them on board on the investments. They were 
kept on a waiting list, because there was a cap on the amount of capital being raised. This list would be 
approached if the capital to be raised was increased or if there was a no show by other investors. 
According to IFI-03; “People would come, I wouldn’t say begging, but please get me in this 
placement….They wanted to enter the investment and were asking favours to do so. There was a waiting 
list for the placement. I would tell him your number is five”. This interest from investors aroused the 
interest of the IFI’s management and the possibility of making greater gains through management fees, 
if they were to take those interested investors on board. As such, at times they took the risk and raised 
the cap on the amount to be raised as IFI explains; “Say I had put a target of 15m, those that had 
registered 18m. Now come management: I take fees say 10%, on the 3m [additional amount from 
investors’ interest], there is initial 300,000 per quarter in a year. So, … started to see how much the 
gain from the placement, and since people were coming, why lose it, I’ll [the management of IFI] take 
it [the gain to be made by taking the investors on board]. There was a liability from all levels; whether 
it was investors or placement officer”. 
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When IFIs approached the investors, they provided the information that they knew the investors were 
seeking and interested in hearing in order to get the investors’ attention. Table 7.8 summarises what 
IFIs discussed and on what investors based their investment decisions according to the IFIs. 
 
Table 7.8 - Basis of Investors’ Investment Decision 
Interview 
Question What is discussed in the meeting? I.e. Investors invested based on: 
Focused Coding Subtheme/Remarks 
1 Mainly interested in the exit and returns 
2 Mainly based on trust than information, reading and doing their DD 
Concluding 
Theme 
Investors were mainly concerned with the exit and the returns to be generated, 
and the IFI focused on this in their approach. Investors also based their 
decision making on the trust in IFI rather than reading the documents in detail 
and performing their DD on the investment. 
 
The IFI provides the investor with what it believes would help the investor’s decision making. The IFI 
simplified its presentation to the investor so they could easily understand the investment, especially 
when the investment structure is complicated such as when the setup was comprised of multi-level/multi 
SPVs. IFI-08 confirms; “Sometimes structures are so complicated that honestly there is no added value 
if you keep it in there, in the presentation. It is going to cause more confusion rather than help them 
understand. So, we try to simplify the structure and show it to the investors”. The IFI simplified its 
promoting of the investment as “take, list and exit” rather than there being any risk involved. “When 
you go to people, who are talking about looking at the investment, they are not seeing the establishing 
companies, as per investment understanding it’s riskier than listed companies. But it’s been marketed 
to the people as take, list and exit” (IFI-03). The IFIs provided the investors with what they wanted to 
hear, such as the returns to be generated. 
 
Table 7.9 - Focused Coding 1 For Investors Invested Based On 
Subtheme Decision Based on Returns 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-03, IFI-06 Mainly interested in the exit and the returns 
 
Many investors, although the IFI representatives would try to give them a briefing on all aspects of the 
investments, their main concerns were when they would exit and what the returns were. As IFI-03 noted; 
“we used to say to the client that this is the risk factor; that this is the return, that’s the investment. We 
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also give them that’s the advantage; that’s the disadvantages… The placement [officer] would do all 
the work, but the investor won’t look at it. The main question of the investor: what is the date of exit? 
What is the return? Not more than that.” When it came to the returns, the investors looked at the 
figure/the number of the percentage, as a return rate, disregarding what kind of rate it actually 
represented. Based on that, the investors would choose the investment with the higher percentage figure, 
disregarding whether the rate was the rate of return (ROI) or the internal rate of return (IRR). The ROI, 
although it shows a higher percentage figure/number, it only gives the investor an overall, simplified 
picture of the gains; while the IRR (with a smaller percentage figure/number) is a more complicated 
and comprehensive rate that takes into consideration not only the value to be gained, but also the 
dividends and time of payment. Hence, some IFI used this to their advantage and lured investors by 
stating the ROI on their documents/the PPMs. This caused some confusion among investors, and even 
though some of the IFI representatives tried to explain/clarify it to investors, the investors were not 
convinced and would go for the higher rate. As IFI-06 explains; “Some of the banks they write on the 
PPM, ROI 30%. Some of the banks used to write IRR 15%. The investor then says how are you 15%? 
See this person he’s giving me 30%, 35%. Come explain to him. Tell him IRR it depends on the exit 
period and so forth. He sees 35%, tells you, you don’t know [being the IFI representative does not 
understand what he is saying]. I [investor] will go with them [the IFI offering higher rate]” 
 
Table 7.10 - Focused Coding 2 For Investors Invested Based On Trust 
Subtheme Decision Based on Trust 
Interviewees Remarks 
IFI-06, IFI-07 Mainly based on trust than information, reading and doing their due 
diligence 
 
Regionally, many rely on trust rather than expecting to be well informed, “In the West it is like taken 
as given. There will be some sort of information, but …here in the region, trust” (IFI-07). As such, 
investors in addition to basing their investment decisions on returns to be generated, they also based it 
on trust in the IFI; a kind of hand shake deal rather than on their due diligence (DD) and reading the 
documents in detail. IFI-06 notes; “But that was the kind of deal, a kind of shake hand. I [the investor] 
am here to make money. How you do it, I [the investor] trust you guys [the IFI]”.          
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7.3 TRANSPARENCY AND GOVERNANCE 
 
This section looks into whether the investors’ interests/rights are considered in return for investing his 
funds. This is viewed through the IFI’s participation in the investment and sharing in the risk, and the 
voting rights that investors have in decision making. 
 
7.3.1. IFI Participation 
 
Table 7.11 summarises the factors that influence the IFI’s decision on its level of participation in the 
investment. How much will they be investing alongside their investors?  
	
Table 7.11 - Factors Affecting IFI's Participation in the Investment 
Interview 
Question 
What are the criteria used by the institution to make investment decisions? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Regulatory cap/exposure 
2 Factor of capital 
3 Asked by investors/gain investors’ confidence 
4 Investment department/allocation policy 
Concluding 
Theme 
Decision is mainly based on regulatory requirements and the investment 
policy of the IFI alongside gaining the investors’ confidence in the 
investment. 
 
It appears that the regulatory requirement is the main factor that indirectly affects the IFI’s participation 
percentage. It limits the IFI’s exposure, and depending on the capital base of the IFI and its investment 
policy allocation, the participating percentage is determined. While the investors’ preference was to 
have the IFI participate with them in the investment, to give them reassurance about the feasibility of 
the investment. 
	
Table 7.12 - Focused Coding 1 For Factors Affecting IFI's Participation in the Investment 
Subtheme Regulatory factor 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-02, IFI-07, IFI-08, IFI-15 Regulatory cap/exposure 
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The IFI is restricted with regards to its exposure limits that are set by the regulators of the financial 
institutions. Accordingly, this regulatory cap affects how much an IFI can invest; “We are capped by 
the [Regulator] regulations. We start from there…” (IFI-08). The regulatory cap sets a minimum, upon 
which the IFI can invest in any investments, “…that is a minimum. I expect it is set by the [Regulator]” 
(IFI-02).  
 
Table 7.13 - Focused Coding 2 For Factors Affecting IFI's Participation in the Investment 
Subtheme Capital Factor 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-08, IFI-13 Factor of capital 
 
Linked to the regulatory cap/percentage is the paid up capital of the financial institution. Hence, each 
institution capital is different and thus the amount available for investment differs, as IFI-08 notes; “It 
is always a function of our capital base. So that is a limit of, I believe, it is 15% of the capital base. It 
is the maximum at any point in time”; and IFI-13 goes on to elaborate “We see how much we can afford 
taking into consideration the number of investments we want to get in and how much we want to 
diversify out books. Because our book is limited, is more or less, the capital of the company. But most 
of it is coming from the investor along with ours”. 
 
Table 7.14 - Focused Coding 3 For Factors Affecting IFI's Participation in the Investment 
Subtheme Investment Policy 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-10, IFI-13, IFI-14, IFI-15 Investment department/allocation policy 
 
There are various investments to make and IFI’s investment policy and investment department set the 
amount of investment for each investment. It depends on the extent of exposure/risk they are willing to 
take, and how much they want to diversify; “We have risk matrix for evaluation, they would go through 
it. It has all the criteria. Based on that matrix, we will assess, then based on the assessment model we 
will decide…We have a policy that we don’t go more than 10%, so that to diversify” (IFI-15). The sector 
in which to invest in, “Depending on the sector, we have an investment policy here. You know already 
which sector to invest in…” (IFI-19). The capital allocated; “it depends on capital allocation. Let’s say 
I have 30% for real estate, 20% oil and gas, 50% for whatever…” (IFI-02). The IFI at times are 
restricted by the amount of funds available and budgeted; “Sometimes we have a budget. Because our 
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company would decline. We offer them the budget, this is a great investment, would you please join, 
they would run it by investment, if they have enough budget to invest, they would definitely invest”        
(IFI-13). 
 
Table 7.15 - Focused Coding 4 For Factors Affecting IFI's Participation in the Investment 
Subtheme Investor’s Confidence  
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-02, IFI-04, IFI-13 Asked by investors/gain investors’ confidence 
 
In order to gain the investor’s confidence, some IFI invest alongside the investors; “we typically re-
invest, co-invest, just to give investors the confidence, that we are committed” (IFI-02). While there are 
times when it is not the IFI who is putting forth the commitment willingly, but the investor that is asking 
for it; “We have at least 5% [stake in the investment]. Sometimes 10%. We are not required to, but we 
are asked by investors” (IFI-04). 
 
Table 7.16 - What is the IFI Participation Amount? 
Interview 
Question 
What is the process of deciding on the investment participation of your 
institution? I.e. what is your participation in the investment?  
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 5%-10% 
2 10%-20% 
Concluding 
Theme IFI investment ranges from 5% to 20% 
 
Most of the IFI participation ranges from 5% to 10%. There are those that go higher to 20%.  
 
Table 7.17 - Focused Coding 1 For What Decides the IFI Participation Amount in the 
Investment? 
Subtheme IFI Participation 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04, IFI-07, IFI-15 5%-10% 
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Several IFI participate between 5% to 10% in the projects they offer the investors; “We have at least 
5%, sometimes we invest 10%” (IFI-04); “We will not commit more than 10% in this fund...” (IFI-07). 
 
Table 7.18 - Focused Coding 2 For What Decides the IFI Participation Amount in the 
Investment? 
Subtheme IFI Participation 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-06 10%-20% 
 
While others participate between 10% and 20%, “But the rule of thumb was 20% or $20m as a max” 
(IFI-06). 
 
However, since there is no minimum requirement for the amount an IFI has to make alongside the 
investment it offers its investors, the IFI is not obliged to do so. Hence, depending on the criteria 
mentioned above (Table 7.11), the IFI will determine the amount, which at times could be zero, as          
IFI-15 notes; “There is no minimum, some projects we end up holding nothing”. 
 
Now while it is usually considered that the IFI participation is financial participation, in that the IFI is 
actually injecting cash, this is not usually the case. The IFI would take the amount that they plan to 
contribute with from the premium that they had placed on the value of the offer they made to the investor. 
Their portion of capital contribution would be taken from the arranging and promoting fee that is 
embedded in the price, as their portion of the capital, as explained by IFI-15; “Always they do it in kind. 
Across the board, all banks so far. In kind. What they do? We value the company at 90m, we our share 
[in the investment] is 10m, it [being the offer price] becomes 100m. So, we sell [the investment to 
investors at] 100m. We sell out of this, so our share [how much IFI contributed in cash] like nothing”. 
 
7.3.2 Investors’ Voting Rights 
 
This section looks into the investors’ interest and how it is handled by the IFI. Table 7.19 summarises 
how the IFI maintains the investors’ interest and voting rights. 
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Table 7. 19 – How Do You Maintain the Investors’ Interest and Voting Rights? 
Interview 
Questions 
How do you maintain investors’ rights and deal with/mitigate conflict of 
interest?  
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Proxy taken  
2 Different rights due to having different classes of shares 
3 Different rights due to different stake/percentage of ownership 
4 Different rights due to investment structure set-up  
Concluding 
Theme 
Overall proxy is taken for the IFI to act on behalf of the investor. Matters 
such as ownership, class of share and investment structure affected the 
investors’ power to vote/participate in the decision making.  
 
The IFI’s preference was to take proxy on voting for decisions to be made on the investment, post-
investment, especially when there are many small ticket size individual investors who are not so familiar 
with the investment. It gives the IFI the ability to make the decisions and maintain control over the 
investments. However, this was not so when the investment only involved two to three large ticket size 
investors. The large investors would at times make it to being board members in the investee company, 
as IFI-06 explains; “Because we were going to a lot of investors, not sophisticated202, it didn’t make 
sense to give them voting rights... There were a couple of transactions where there were only 2 investors 
or 3 and all were big funds and such thing, they can come on board, they can have certain decision, etc. 
But when I go to 50, 100 each has half a million, one million, 3m and I have 100 of them, what can I 
do? I had to do that solution [of diluting the investors’ voting power]”. 
 
Table 7. 20 - Focused Coding 1 For How Do You Maintain the Investors' Interest and Voting 
Rights? 
Subtheme Proxy Taken 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-06, IFI-08 Act on their behalf 
IFI-07, IFI-12 By protecting company rights investors’ rights are protected 
 
In the majority of cases the investor is a passive investor. The IFI does most of the decision-making. 
This is along the lines that since the IFI has done all the work and due diligence on the investment, the 
IFI is more aware of the industry and is in a better position to be on the board of the investment company 
and to make decisions on behalf of the investors. To this IFI-12 elaborates; “they already did a lot of 
																																								 																				
202 “Not sophisticated”, not from the aspect of having a certain level of wealth, but in the sense of not being familiar or 
knowledgeable about the investments/finance. 	
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work before actually coming to this point, where they got the license and stuff like that. So basically, 
they are saying, since we have done all this work, we are more into this industry, we understand it very 
well. Therefore, we are going to be members of the board for the first term…”. To some, it is considered 
a fiduciary duty of the IFI to protect the investor and act on his behalf, as expressed by IFI-01; “they 
have proxies given to the board members. The board members [that represent the investors] they are 
from the executive committee. The executive committee basically protects the interest of all other 
shareholders, it is a fiduciary duty at the end of the day”. Moreover, the IFI is given proxy to manage 
the investment on behalf of the investor. The IFI finds it easier and more practical to do so, especially 
when quick decisions need to be made, as IFI-08 notes; “We are merely managing this investment on 
their behalf…because of quickness of the decision making and the practicality, we get the proxy and 
manage throughout the life of the transaction”. 
 
Table 7. 21 - Focused Coding 2 For How Do You Maintain the Investors' Interest? 
Subtheme IFI Participation 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-06 Different rights due to having different classes of shares 
 
Based on the concept mentioned above, and that the IFI is more aware of the investment (due to the 
work and effort made) and as such is more entitled to the decision making, some IFI worked on 
maintaining such rights by having a different class of shares with different voting rights; “we don’t 
want investors those who we give shares to, tomorrow they interfere in the decisions here … we need 
to create 2 class of shares. Shares classes A and shares classes B. Class A is voting shares, class B non-
voting” (IFI-06). 
 
Table 7. 22 - Focused Coding 3 For How Do You Maintain the Investors' Interest? 
Subtheme IFI Participation 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-07, IFI-06, IFI-08, IFI-09, IFI-12 Stake/percentage of ownership 
 
Ownership affected the level of representation, whether it be the investor or the IFI, IFI-12 confirms; 
“Depending on how much percentage you are going to own, you have certain rights. You have voting 
rights, like 20% 25%... Basically, your ownership plays a role on the proxy. The larger you own the 
more influence you have”. Investors’ percentage of ownership also had an influence on whether they 
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would be able to be on the board of the investment/target company rather than the SPV and hence be 
able to participate directly in the decision-making. The SPV is an intermediary layer in the investment 
set-up/structure. A special purpose vehicle, a legal entity created to pool the investors’ funds into it, and 
that one legal entity (the SPV), rather than many investors, would invest in the investment/target 
company, which had a board of its own; “We have jointly teamed with other families… and acquired 
assets. We did not bring them at the SPV level; they are core investors with us [meaning that they were 
on the board of the investment company]” (IFI-01). While as IFI-07 explains, smaller investors were 
considered passive investors “unless you are a co-investor sitting with us on the board table, any 
smaller ticket sizes they be completely passive” (IFI-07). Ownership also affected attendance at the 
Annual General Meeting, “if you invest more than 10% you will be able to come to the AGM or EGM, 
which should be happening once a year” (IFI-09). 
 
Table 7. 23 - Focused Coding 4 For How Do You Maintain the Investors' Interest? 
Subtheme IFI Participation 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-06, IFI-13 Investment structure set-up  
 
Some IFI in an attempt to maintain control took up different investment structures. One of which was 
to pool the capital collected into a fund structure rather than directly into a company structure, “Usually 
when we talk fund versus private placement. The beauty of the fund, it gives the fund manager the say 
in controlling the fund money and the fund voting rights on whatever company, even without having a 
majority equity. And this is the difference between creating a fund or creating a company” (IFI-13). 
Another was to dilute the investor’s ownership across several companies within the investment structure. 
This is confirmed by IFI-06 who states; “They used to make 5 to 6 companies for the investor, and 
spread. For example, you put $10m in one company, you could be 10%, you are big for voting. But if 
we spread the $10m in 5 companies [companies that have been created as part of the investment 
structure], in every company you receive different percentage, so you become irrelevant”. 
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Table 7. 24 - Do You Ever Go Back to the Investor on Any Decisions to be Made? 
Interview 
Question 
When given proxy, do you ever go back to the investor on any decisions to be 
made?   
Focused Coding Subtheme/Remarks 
1 Goes back to investor 
2 Doesn’t go back to investor 
Concluding 
Theme 
In normal cases the IFI does not go back to the investors, but there are 
instances when it does. 
 
Since the IFI is given proxy, it does not consider that it needs to go back to the investors on any decision 
to be made, as long as it is within what has been stated in the PPM. 
 
Table 7. 25 - Focused Coding 1 For Do You Ever Go Back to the Investor on Any Decisions to 
be Made? 
Subtheme Goes Back to Investor 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-08, IFI-13, IFI-14 On strategic/material decisions 
IFI-05, IFI-10 If it affects the capital/legal structure  
IFI-02, IFI-13 If not stated in the terms and conditions of the PPM 
IFI-09 If in conflict with the interest of the board representative 
 
The IFI goes back to investors when strategic decisions such as exiting the investment are to be taken; 
“we cannot exit by ourselves, we have to get the approval from them [the investor] on exit” (IFI-01). 
Moreover, if anything that affects the legal structure of the company; “Usually we don’t go back to the 
investors for every single decision, unless it is related to liquidation or some change in structure legal 
framework…” (IFI-10); or the capital structure “If there is for example capital reduction, capital 
increase, distribution of dividend, acquisition, sale of asset, big assets of the company, you know 
liquidation, whatever, issuing of bond, something that will affect the capital structure of the company. 
But I think you cannot [go back to the investor], for example, if every time you want to make an 
acquisition” (IFI-05). Any decision to be made that is not within the terms and conditions of the PPM 
(which encloses the investment criteria and is the binding document between the IFI and the investor), 
is also a case when some IFI would go back to the investor; “if we are about to change the strategy of 
the fund to what we disclosed in the PPM. If we are considering something different, ok, we have to 
seek their approval. We have to stay on the same page. But only for material decisions, we seek their 
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approval. Like extending the fund term, changing something with the strategy. Doing something that 
will increase the risk” (IFI-13). As the board representative represents the interests of the investors, in 
the event the interests of both parties are not aligned, the IFI would consult with the investors; “When 
issues being discussed are in conflict with the board representative” (IFI-09).  
 
Table 7. 26 - Focused Coding 2 For Do You Ever Go Back to the Investor on Any Decisions to 
be Made? 
Subtheme Doesn’t go Back to Investor 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04 Due to having different goals 
IFI-02, IFI-14 Within the agreed terms/investment criteria 
IFI-06, IFI-15 Due to being given proxy and being updated  
 
On the other hand, some IFI do not consider going back to the investor with regards to any decisions to 
be made, as the goals of all the investors in the investments are different and it would not be practical 
to do so; “No, because the reason being clients may have different goals. Some clients wouldn’t mind 
holding the investment for 20 years, some clients want 5 years. If you do that [that being to go back to 
the investor] you can’t please everyone” (IFI-04). Moreover, there is no need to seek the investors’ 
decision on issues that the investors have agreed on beforehand. When the investor decided to enter the 
investment, he had done so based on certain terms and conditions, hence, anything within those 
conditions, the IFI is free to make his own decision; “As long as it is within the boundaries of the fund 
management role has been agreed, then it [it being the decision] is done by the fund manager”                
(IFI-14). While some IFI consider that since proxy was given, they do not see the need to seek the 
investors’ input on any decisions to be made about the investment, as IFI-15 notes; “Normally we don’t 
consult…because we had proxy”. 
 
7.4 POST-INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
This section looks into how the IFI maintained its relationship post-investment with the investor. It 
summarises the format of disclosure, the frequency of updates, and the level of disclosure. 
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7.4.1 Format of communication between the IFI and the investor   
 
This looks into how the IFI maintained communication with the investor once the funds were collected 
from the investor and invested into the investment/project. 
 
Table 7. 27 - How is the Communication Maintained Post-Investment? 
Interview 
Question 
How is communication maintained between the institution and the investor 
post-investment?  Do visits take place or just reporting? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Reports and visits 
2 Conferences/group sessions 
3 Presentation 
Concluding 
Theme 
Communication maintained through updates made by reports, visits and at 
times conferences and group sessions 
  
Some form of communication was maintained, whether it was through reports or visits, and in some 
cases conferences were conducted for big clients at the IFI’s expense. However, there was a period at 
the start of the financial crisis (2008-2010) where everyone was in the dark, including the IFI itself, and 
it did not know what to report to its clients, “in 2008, 2009 the market dropped, the update reduced, 
because what to tell them. We had to be careful what to say, what not to say… here from 2008 to 
2010/2011 the investor felt that as if he is sitting in a dark room. He can’t see anything. No clue what 
is my investment doing? … It was a shock for everyone; bankers as well as investors. Everybody was 
lost; didn’t know what to do… No one knowing what is happening, what is the plan. So, it was a little 
mess… Until afterwards the banks, took some time, adjusted themselves, started communicating with 
investors…” (IFI-06). 
 
Table 7.28 - Focused Coding 1 For How is the Communication Maintained Post-investment? 
 
Subtheme Reports and Visits 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-03, IFI-04, IFI-05, IFI-08, IFI-11, IFI-14 Reports and visits to all their investors 
IFI-15 Reports and visits only to major/big investors 
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In general, the IFI would produce reports of updates to the investor. There were some that would follow-
up the reports with a visit. However, there are some IFI that made visits to their big clients only, 
“especial clients, big clients we have frequent visits. At least either a call or at least every 3 months we 
have to update them” (IFI-15). At times visits depended on the relationship manager and the client, and 
whether there was a need for a visit, “...for the meeting there is no set formula for it. It depends on the 
relationship manager and on the client. Sometimes they [investors] don’t really have the need to meet. 
Sometimes they request meetings; sometimes they call [phone call rather than a visit/meeting] with the 
questions. It is really tailored to the client” (IFI-04). IFI also visited investors, not only to update them 
on their current investments but also to update them on future investments, “So we visit them. We make 
sure that they are aware of any developments or if they have any certain requests and plus we give them 
update of any potential investments in the future” (IFI-08).   
 
Table 7.29 - Focused Coding 2 For How is the Communication Maintained Post-investment? 
 
There were IFIs that made an event for the update. Some arranged conferences, whereby big clients 
were invited to the event, at the IFI’s expenses, for a few days in some city, where there would be some 
important speakers invited to talk, in addition to being updated on the performance of the investment, 
“invite the big investors… we would invite them on the bank’s expenses, 2 to 3 days …at a nice place, 
nice hotel and give them an update on the bank, on the market. We bring someone famous to talk about 
politics. The investor feels important, pampering him basically. So, it was good in that one on one with 
the investor. We would build relationship; we know what’s on their mind; what is his plan, etc.”         
(IFI-06); “We did 2 conferences in…, invited clients for around 4 days and showed them presentation 
of investments they had entered, what is the performance…” (IFI-03). Investors were selected due to 
the size of their investment and as such are to be treated differently, “if somebody investing above 
certain amount like 5m and above, different than somebody investing 100,000. So these big investors 
because they are holding certain percentage so we invite them.” (IFI-15). And there were those that 
invited their investors, but not to such a large set-up but more of a group gathering, where they would 
update them on the investment and the market, “we sometimes do sessions, where we invite our 
investors for summary or executive sessions and we bring our market expertise to present the market 
conditions in these areas” (IFI-13). 
 
Subtheme Conferences 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-03, IFI-06, IFI-13, IFI-15 Conferences/group sessions 
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Table 7.30 - Focused Coding 3 For How is the Communication Maintained Post-investment? 
 
There are investors, institutional investors, that request the IFI to come and present and update the 
institutional investor’s management on an annual basis, rather than just a visit made to the investment 
team, as noted by IFI-14. 
 
7.4.2 Frequency and Format of Disclosure 
 
The section below looks into the frequency and format of communication that the IFI maintained with 
its investors. 
 
7.4.2.1 Frequency of Disclosure 
 
Table 7.31 summarises the frequency of information/updates provided by the IFI to its investors. 
Overall, while reporting involved a lot of work in gathering the information, frequency depended on 
the nature of the investment; on whether there were any updates to report (some of these investee 
companies did not produce reports), if the IFI wanted to call/draw dawn capital, and maintaining 
relationships for future investments, “it would be to our benefit because we would want to maintain it 
is more of a relationship type that I would want this co-investor to again come with us in another deal. 
So, I think because of that try and maintain full dialogue, keep them happy, keep the information flow 
open” (IFI-07). 
 
 
 
 
Subtheme Presentations 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-14 Presentations to the board of directors, executive 
committee or management of the IFI’s institutional 
investors 
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Table 7.31 - What is the Frequency of the Information Provided to the Investor? 
Interview 
Question What is the frequency of the information provided to the investor?  
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 More than once a year 
2 Once a year 
Concluding 
Theme 
Reporting frequency varied, depending on the IFI and type of investment 
 
Updates were mainly quarterly or semi-annually. It depended on the type of asset class of the 
investments and if there was information to update. IFI tried to maintain regular updates, but it was not 
easy to do so. This is confirmed by IFI-06, “some of the banks had regularly every 3 months or regularly 
every 6 months, but it was a lot of work. But once a year had to be there at a minimum”. Although some 
IFI reported monthly, they were mainly reports to their clients on their portfolio of investments with the 
IFI, rather than updates on the performance of the investment/project, “Each month we send him a 
statement of account that he is holding, and we send him updates quarterly” (IFI-15). 
 
Table 7.32 - Focused Coding 1 For What is the Frequency of the Information Provided to the 
Investor? 
 
Some IFIs on a quarterly basis send an update to their investors on the latest developments since the 
last report, “Every quarter we are supposed to send a refreshment, progress report” (IFI-13); “there is 
a chart... Event chart saying …infrastructure in that period of time. So if there is a delay on one of them, 
we do quarterly reports we will update the investor, based on the PPM or based on the project”             
(IFI-15). 
 
Those IFIs that do not do quarterly updates would do so semi-annually, “so we do that on a regular 
semi-annual basis.” (IFI-11); “But when it comes to performance we do it semi-annual and annual” 
(IFI-14). 
Subtheme More than once a year 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04, IFI-11, IFI-13, IFI-13, IFI-15 Quarterly 
IFI-11, IFI-14 Semi-annually 
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Table 7.33 - Focused Coding 2 For What is the Frequency of the Information Provided to the 
Investor? 
 
Quite a few IFIs provide updates based on when the investee company produces its reports, “We do 
invest updates annually and they are post-management accounts or post-audited accounts. Depending 
on when the financial audited statements come out for the investee company, that the investors invested 
in” (IFI-11); “at the end of each year we issue for them like audited financial and final report for each 
year” (IFI-13). 
 
7.4.2.2 Format of Disclosure 
 
Table 7.34 to Table 7.37 below look into the format of disclosure. What information there was and how 
it was provided to the investor. Institutional investors and individual investors initially received the 
same information, “we prepare one standard report, which goes the same time, the same format to all 
investors” (IFI-15). But usually, institutional investors, along with individuals (family offices that have 
a professional team) would request further information, upon which they were provided with, “it [the 
information] is the same in theory, but financial institutions usually ask, because they have 
auditors…whereas an individual investor doesn’t really ask for that. They don’t have auditors” (IFI-
04). However, the issue arises with reporting on investments that the IFI have exited. The 
information/update provided could vary from one investor to another, due to the investors having 
entered the investment at different prices. The difference in entry price affects the turnover generated 
for each investor at exit, as IFI-08 explains: 
“Sometimes we feel from experience that the more information the investors are given in 
certain elements, such as fees and exit, especially exit. They tend to start comparing and … they 
get into too much detail and we lose the big picture …so we provide them the minimum possible 
information … Especially if you made any investment before 2008. There was a very high level 
of premium that had been charged at the time, across the banking industry…So if your 
investments were still outstanding from that era, you will probably have investors coming in at 
very different price levels. So obviously, at exit, for some it could be a loss and for others it 
could be a profit. So then you have to be careful how to display that information”. 
Subtheme Once a year 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-06, IFI-13, IFI-14 Annually 
253		
 
Table 7.34 - What Information is Provided to the Investor? 
Interview 
Question What information is provided to the investor? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Simple update 
2 Comparable updates 
3 Updates and projections 
Concluding 
Theme 
Updates were mainly on the performance of the investment to date and there 
were those that compared the investment performance to the market 
environment at the time. In addition to some disclosing major decisions made 
and to be made, along with future forecasts. 
 
Progress reports/updates were provided to the investors, based on a set template that the IFI has on each 
asset/investment class. 
 
Table 7.35 - Focused Coding 1 For What Information is Provided to the Investor? 
 
Some of the IFI’s updates mainly concentrated on the investment itself and its performance, “We always 
communicate with them, on a quarterly basis. At the end of each year we issue for them like audited 
financial and final report for each year, which explains to them fully what happened during the year. 
So they are aware of what is happening, what’s going on. This is how we capture the whole story”   
(IFI-13). 
 
Table 7.36 - Focused Coding 2 For What Information is Provided to the Investor? 
 
Subtheme Simple updates 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-05, IFI-07, IFI-09, IFI-10, IFI-
11, IFI-13 
Updates on performance, the financial and operations 
aspects of the investment itself 
Subtheme Comparable updates 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-06, IFI-08, IFI-15 Project update, market report, project in comparison to market and highlight any risk 
254		
While other IFIs compared the investment performance to the market environment, “It will show him 
the project itself, how it’s doing, how it is doing compared to the market. So then finally in terms of risk, 
we will highlight. There is a delay in structure. So normally we will update him with that”     (IFI-15). 
 
Table 7.37 - Focused Coding 3 For What Information is Provided to the Investor? 
 
In addition, some IFIs would also provide a forecast along with any major decisions taken by 
management during the reporting period, “The development from the past, last report, you know, what 
happened and the expected plan and the future, kind of forecast and the financials…if there are any 
major decisions to be taken then or has already been taken by management or the board of the respected 
company” (IFI-10). 
 
Usually the updates would be an executive summary in the form of a report, “between 5 pages to 10 
pages max. update executive summary, 2 nice pages, some photos…then 2 to 3 paragraphs on the 
business, 2 to 3 paragraphs on the market environment. A table, financial summary... sales, cost of 
goods sold, EBDA, net income, a little balance sheet, assets, liabilities…all summarised; we didn’t give 
audited accounts” (IFI-06). Elaboration would be on any good events, while any undesirable 
events/performance would be toned down, “when we go for a weak point, maybe we don’t zoom on it, 
2 to 3 points. But if there is a good comment, we will tell a story about it” (IFI-03); “Again, because 
formal communication is on a quarterly basis…if the information comes within the quarter, so we wait 
till the end of the quarter. If it is not resolved, then obviously it would be part of the quarterly. If it gets 
resolved, we may refer to it in the report, but then the tone you would be using is obviously different 
because the situation has already been resolved, rather than you now causing unnecessary panic to the 
investor” (IFI-08). 
 
In some instances, the IFI agrees upfront with the investor on the type of information that the IFI will 
be providing him with, as IFI-07 notes, “What we agreed on upfront. That I will provide him with 
financials…there will be a bit of commentary from the CEO on what is happening in the business, 
business update. If there is anything like negative, negative news to pass on”. 
Subtheme Updates and projections  
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-10 Update, along with major decisions taken during the period and financial forecast 
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While in some IFIs, although they provide the investor with updates, the content is kept to a minimum, 
“What was the minimum required. Always management will go with the minimum requirement of 
disclosure as per regulatory. They try to minimise it” (IFI-03). 
 
7.5 DUE DILIGENCE 
 
This section summarises how the due diligence was undertaken by the IFIs.  
 
Table 7.38 - Due Diligence Process Undertaken 
Interview 
Question 
What does your due diligence process cover? I.e. how is the DD process 
undertaken? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Due diligence in stages 
2 Due diligence performed by different parties 
3 Due diligence rarely performed 
Concluding 
Theme 
Most of the common due diligence was undertaken  
 
Due diligence (DD) is performed by all the IFI. The main ones were Shari’ah, financial and 
legal/regulatory, in addition to investment risk, management, commercial and market due diligence. 
Table 7.39 to Table 7.41 below look at how the due diligence process is undertaken. 
 
Table 7.39 - Focused Coding 1 For How is the Due Diligence Process Undertaken? 
 
Most of the IFIs start with an initial due diligence on the potential investment, mainly Shari’ah 
screen/concept and simple financial/operational due diligence. With the initial due diligence performed 
they would test the waters, seek the investors’ interest, after which, if the investors’ interest was high 
and attractive they would then take the due diligence a step further and perform a more comprehensive 
Subtheme Due diligence in stages 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04, IFI-05, IFI-12 Initial due diligence followed by in depth due diligence 
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assessment on the investment, “you don’t want to incur time and effort. So usually, it would be come at 
a later stage after submission of a letter of intent” (IFI-05). 
 
Table 7.40 - Focused Coding 2 For How is the Due Diligence Process Undertaken? 
 
Some IFI performed part of the due diligence internally and part of it externally. Generally, when it 
came to a specific specialised industry/market they would seek an external professional assessment, “In 
real estate, we have the legal due diligence, financial... This we do in house. And the structural take 
place, we hire engineering firms, we hire environmental engineers as well. It gets carried out by 
professionals, because we don’t have the experience…” (IFI-02). While others outsourced the due 
diligence process fully, “When we originate a transaction, we go through full third party due 
diligence…So all those parties and those reports, we combine them, put them in a PPM form…”           
(IFI-12). 
 
Table 7.41 - Focused Coding 3 For How is the Due Diligence Process Undertaken? 
 
While most of the common due diligence, such as Shari’ah, financial, legal, management, commercial 
investment risk is undertaken, social and environmental were not as common, “But as a day-to-day due 
diligence check list, we don’t specifically do social or environmental” (IFI-07). Some IFI consider it as 
a personal issue and it is left to the investor to take into consideration, “On the social issue, it is the 
client’s call. It isn’t our call” (IFI-05). While to others it is a derivative of Shari’ah due diligence, “To 
be fair we strictly more concern with the Shari’ah than let’s say social impact and most of the time 
Shari’ah impact is always interlinked with the social effect…it comes within the umbrella of Shari’ah” 
(IFI-08). Although it is not performed initially at the outset, there are times when it is required at a later 
stage, or in cases such as meeting overseas/international requirements in order to take on board foreign 
Subtheme Due diligence performed by different parties 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-02, IFI-04, IFI-07, IFI-12, IFI-
14 
Internal and external due diligence  
Subtheme Due diligence exceptional 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-05, IFI-07, IFI-08,   
IFI-13 
Social and/or environmental due diligence rarely performed  
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investors that macro environment and social impact due diligence are performed, “Those issues 
[environmental and social] we face basically post the investment. I’m not going to lie to you and tell 
you we covered those social diligences ahead of time. But sometimes when you face them you have to 
deal with them” (IFI-01); “We don’t do it. Yet, but I have seen it being done in the country… especially 
when there is an international investor coming in. Because they have some guidelines, they have to go 
through in the funds they are coming from…” (IFI-13). 
 
7.6 SHARIA’H COMPLIANCE AND SHARI’AH SUPERVISORY BOARD 
 
This section looks into the Shari’ah governance system within the IFIs. It looks into the Shair’ah set 
up, with regards to having a specific department and to having a Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB), 
the process of approval and the Shari’ah review that is undertaken post-approval. 
 
7.6.1 Shari’ah Compliance 
 
Table 7.42 summarises the IFI’s responses with regards to having a Shari’ah department and a Shari’ah 
compliance officer. 
 
Table 7.42 - Shari'ah Department and Shari'ah Compliance Officer 
Interview 
Question 
Is there a Shari’ah department/unit within the institution? 
Is there a Shari’ah compliance officer? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Shari’ah department and Shari’ah compliance officer 
2 No Shari’ah department but Shari’ah compliance co-ordinator 
Concluding 
Theme 
Even though IFI had someone handling the Shari’ah compliance, not all IFIs 
had a Shari’ah department  
 
Overall, there was some form of association with undertaking Shari’ah compliance by the IFIs, whether 
it be directly, by having an internal Shari’ah mechanism, or indirectly, by outsourcing the service. For 
those that had an internal mechanism, it did not necessarily mean that they had independent compliance 
for Shari’ah specifically, but it was taken care of through the general compliance of the institute or by 
someone from the investment team. 
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Table 7.43 - Focused Coding 1 For Is There a Shari'ah Department/Unit Within the Institution? 
Is There a Shari'ah Compliance Officer? 
 
Some of the IFIs had a Shari’ah department at the institutional level, “Yes [to Shari’ah department unit], 
it is independent of the business team…there is a Shari’ah compliance officer...” (IFI-01).  There were 
some IFIs that had a Shari’ah department at the headquarters level, of which they made use of their 
services at the branch level, “We have Shari’ah supervisors…At the bank level there is a whole 
department. But us at the company level we don’t have. We have Shari’ah supervisors”      (IFI-02); 
“we have an SLA [Service Level Agreement] with [parent institution] and that SLA includes the 
Shari’ah services… whenever we need Shari’ah we used to go the Shari’ah…of bank” (IFI-12).   
 
Table 7.44 - Focused Coding 2 For Is There a Shari'ah Department/Unit Within the Institution? 
Is There a Shari'ah Compliance Officer? 
 
In some IFIs they did not have a Shari’ah department and employees of other departments would be 
handling the Shari’ah compliance matters. In some it is the investment team that follows up on 
maintaining Shari’ah compliance and a member of their team co-ordinates with the SSB. In such 
instances, the members of the investment team have some Shari’ah knowledge, either through 
experience and through having worked previously in a Shari’ah department or they have Shari’ah 
guidelines provided by the SSB that they follow, as IFI-07 comments, “We do have someone from the 
investment team. It is only because …he worked in Shari’ah department in [another bank] 
beforehand...The coordinator”. While in some IFIs it is a member of the legal team (that also performs 
Subtheme Shari’ah department  
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-06, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-14,  
IFI-15 
Shari’ah department at institutional level and a 
Shari’ah team/Shari’ah compliance officer 
IFI-02, IFI-04, IFI-12, IFI-13 Shari’ah department at headquarters and Shari’ah supervisor/officer at institutional level 
Subtheme No Shari’ah department  
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-03, IFI-05, IFI-07 IFI employee acts as coordinator with the Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SBB) 
IFI-09 Outsourced 
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the compliance for the IFI) that keeps track during the year of Shari’ah compliance, “Usually it depends 
on the size of the fund. Usually the compliance people, the legal people” (IFI-05). While some carried 
out their Shari’ah compliance through the IFI compliance department and not specifically having a 
Shari’ah department as such, “Our head of compliance also our head of MLRO [Money Laundering 
Regulatory Officer]” (IFI-11). Moreover, some IFIs outsource the whole Shari’ah matter, “No [to 
Shari’ah department or unit], we don’t…but we do when we come up with an investment opportunity. 
We have Shari’ah company or Sharia’h board that we use” (IFI-09). 
 
Now for those IFIs that said they had a Shari’ah department; it is usually the head of the Shari’ah 
department that acts as the Shari’ah compliance/supervisor officer/head and liaises with the SSB and 
those below the head perform the Shari’ah audit, upon which the Shari’ah compliance report is based. 
The role of the head is more supervisory/advisory on matters related to the pre-execution of the 
transaction: provide input on new proposals to IFI’s departments, reviews and prepares documentation 
on new investments to the SSB. While those below undertake the role of auditing executed 
investments/transactions. This matter was clarified by getting in touch with the Shari’ah officers (SCO) 
of two IFIs. The Shari’ah department has two roles. The first is supervisory and is undertaken by the 
head of the Shari’ah department; he is considered the link between the IFI and SSB. His role, as 
explained by SCO-01 203  is: “Shari’ah supervision is the phase prior to the execution of the 
agreements ...transactions and main agreements; all these fall under the supervision prior to execution. 
We make sure the structure is correct and is in line with the standards. Make sure that it is acceptable 
by the Shari’ah Supervision Board. Make sure that its clauses do not have any terms that go against 
the Shari’ah standards or against the Shari’ah fatwas. Also provide advice to the executive 
management.” The second is Shari’ah audit which is undertaken by the Shari’ah team within the 
Shari’ah department. Whereby their role is post-execution of the transaction, as confirmed by                
SCO-02204: “The Shari’ah auditor goes out into the field to look at the bank’s executed transactions, 
and prepares all the audit paperwork and forms and so forth…. the Shari’ah’s supervisor reports are 
submitted to the Shari’ah Supervision Board”. 
On another note, when enquiring about the Shari’ah compliance officer’s independence, (since the 
Shari’ah compliance officer administratively falls under the IFI, yet technical performance is monitored 
by the SSB), as SCO-02 noted “…administratively: performance appraisal, promotion, bonuses of the 
Shari’ah supervisor is considered part of the bank’s employees’ appraisal. The Shari’ah Supervision 
Board view is taken on his technical performance, but the final say is on the bank”, and in some cases 
the IFI did not consider that there was any influence from the IFI management on the Shari’ah 
compliance officer’s decision making. To this IFI-06 comments, “No, it was always war…The CEO 
																																								 																				
203 The interview was conducted in Arabic and the quote has been transcribed and translated by the researcher.	
204 The interview was conducted in Arabic and the quote has been transcribed and translated by the researcher.	
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used to be convinced with the deal, board of directors convinced, the guy [being the Shari’ah 
compliance officer] doesn’t…He [the Shari’ah compliance officer would say] I don’t care. You have a 
problem go to the Shari’ah board”). While other IFIs did consider that it affected the Shari’ah 
compliance officer’s independence in the decision making, as IFI-15 explains, “In theory he is 
independent. In reality, whatever the CEO wants, he will do…in most of the banks, normally they say 
he is reporting [to the SSB], he is not reporting to [to referring to the CEO]. This is where you get 
concern [being administered by the IFI has some affect on the Shari’ah compliance officer’s 
independence]. I haven’t seen so far, any internal Shari’ah will not do what the CEO wants” (IFI-15). 
 
7.6.2 Process of Shari’ah Approval and Shari’ah Review 
 
The following section looks into the process of obtaining Shari’ah approval and performing the post-
investment Shari’ah review/audit.  
 
7.6.2.1 Process of Shari’ah Approval 
 
Table 7.45 below summarises the process of obtaining Shari’ah approval.  
 
Table 7.45 - Approval Process 
Interview 
Question 
What is the process in which the Shari’ah consultation/approval is obtained 
at your institution? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Investment team interacts indirectly with SSB 
2 Investment team interacts directly with SSB 
Concluding 
Theme 
To be able to invest, IFIs need to get the SSB’s approval on the investment 
 
In order to obtain approval, every related document is usually approved by SSB, “because we have to 
be Shari’ah compliant, so everything has to be approved by Shari’ah [Board]. Financing has to be 
approved by Shari’ah. The investment structure has to be approved by Shrai’ah. The investment itself 
has to be approved by Shari’ah. The tenants have to be approved, etc.” (IFI-02); “any documentation, 
any legal documentation, whether as basic as a non-disclosure agreement to a signing of a SPA [Share 
Purchase Agreement], or to basically signing of any due diligence document; every single document 
has to be approved by our Shari’ah” (IFI-11). And in most cases, the Shari’ah team prepares the 
necessary for the SSB to review, they provide their input at times to the investment team, however, they 
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do not make the Shari’ah judgement, as IFI explains, “The bank Shari’ah employees are not decision 
makers. They put together a file and they present it to the Shari’ah Board that meets periodically and 
takes a decision. Sometimes they have authority to take decisions on simpler points that are basic 
Islamic rules, which they can say yes or no to. But if there is something that allows subjectivity it goes 
up in the right sort of way…”. 
 
The SSB members were the decision makers, and would provide feedback when required for 
amendments to be made, “We provide them with the information then they provide the feedback, they 
have an opinion, they have a provision that needs to be removed from the agreement or amended. And 
we accordingly do the amendments based on the Shari’ah instructions. To ensure the compatibility” 
(IFI-02). However, this was not always the case during earlier years, as the SSB members were not very 
familiar with the investment structures, and so their questions were limited. But over time, as their 
knowledge/understanding broadened, they started to question more. As IFI-06 explains, “At the early 
days they [the SSB members] were not seeing much. Little by little, they learned. They wanted to see 
every single thing to the actual business. Not only Cayman [being the SPV, the intermediary level in 
the investment structure] also under the Cayman. There are also other companies on top of the 
Cayman ... A couple of times they used to examine/audit into the company”.  
 
Table 7.46 - Focused Coding 1 For What is the Process in Which the Shari'ah 
Consultation/Approval is Obtained at Your Institution? 
 
The process of consultation for approval in some IFIs starts right at the beginning. As the investment 
team has a new investment/project, they immediately get in touch with the Shari’ah team to work on 
the requirements. Usually, the Shari’ah team will review the documents/project files in detail and will 
provide a summary and present it to the SSB for approval. To that IFI-12 notes, “we basically contact 
the Shari’ah compliance officer and he will set up the requirements, come back to us if he needs more 
information and then he will present it [the investment/project] to the board…They review, first of all 
the issuer, ok, is Shari’ah compliant, then they will review the PPM”. Furthermore, IFI-10 elaborates 
Subtheme Investment team interact indirectly with SSB 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-02, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-
12, IFI-14, IFI-15 
Coordinates with Shari’ah Compliance/Head who has an 
active role 
IFI-07 Coordinates with Shari’ah Compliance/Head who has a 
passive role 
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on the matter, “we do approach the Shari’ah whenever we have a new project with a memo… meeting 
is arranged with..Sometimes with the lawyers, sometimes with the investment officer, with the SSB, or 
the Shari’ah auditor. They discuss and they highlight the issues. Sometimes Shari’ah comes up with 
some queries to be answered by the initiator of the investment, or treasury and a decision is made based 
on that”. And with the approval of the initial concept, the investment team will work on preparing all 
the related documents for SSB approval; first on the structure, then on the underlying asset, “We start 
by getting Shari’ah approval on the concept. Once it is granted as concept, then later SSB approval on 
the structure of the investment. Then we get approval on the underlying assets and we are free to go” 
(IFI-02). Moreover, at times the investment team is able to go ahead having only obtained approval on 
the structure, as IFI-15 explains, “…after we structure the deal we present it to them [being the SSB]. 
If they approve then don’t have to go back to them”. 
 
In other IFIs, the Shari’ah teams are not as active, and have a more passive role, merely co-ordinating 
meetings between the investment team and the SSB, “because this coordinator [the employee 
performing the Shari’ah compliance role] doesn’t really get involved in the deal. He is just meant to be 
the point of contact…communication channel, possibly makes it easier. But the Shari’ah Board talks 
directly to the team [being the investment team]. So, any clarification and issues they have …I 
remember there was instance where we were in co-investor deal, Shari’ah scholars were asking us 
questions. They interact with the deal…” (IFI-07).  
 
One of the issues IFI faced when complying with the documentation for approval was for it to be an all-
round document that would satisfy all parties, “Shari’ah compliant was very easy by the way. [It is a 
matter of] Internal activities and such thing. The problem was in the documentation. How to document 
all this in to paper, that it will pass Shari’ah and lawyers were happy, etc., and the other party who was 
not Shari’ah compliant for him, when he reads it he feels it is like normal” (IFI-06). 
 
Table 7.47 - Focused Coding 2 For What is the Process in Which the Shari'ah 
Consultation/Approval is Obtained at Your Institution? 
 
Some IFIs liaise directly with the SSB, “And when we send them the documents and the plans, etc. they 
review it. They invite us, they ask some questions and then they would approve it with framework. These 
Subtheme Investment team interact directly with SSB 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-05, IFI-13 Gets in touch directly with SSB 
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are the criteria 1, 2, 3 any deviation come back to us; let’s talk and discuss” (IFI-13). In other IFIs 
where the investment team liaised directly with SSB, they would not go immediately as an opportunity 
came up. They will first perform the initial screening themselves, as per the guidelines given to them 
by SSB, after which they will go to obtain approval from the SSB, as IFI-05 notes: “The SSB would 
give us guidelines ...You have to take the guidelines and say would these guidelines fit in this 
transaction …. so if I take a transaction I will not go to them [being the SSB] from the beginning, but 
if once it gets serious ... we are in the process of sending them a letter of intent ... At this stage…”.  In 
such cases, the investment team members will need to be trained to have some Shari’ah background, 
“You need to train your staff, whereby they are educated with the minimum requirement, so they 
understand that they cannot do this transaction if these companies you cannot touch” (IFI-05). 
However, for Shari’ah team members, with regards to having an adequate Shari’ah background, it was 
not enough to only be Shari’ah knowledgeable. Unlike the SSB members, the Shari’ah department 
team members, although they held high qualifications (PhD in Shari’ah), they lacked experience and 
financial/investment knowledge, which affected their understanding of the investment opportunities 
being presented. Hence, some investment teams faced some difficulties when dealing with Shari’ah 
team members to understand the opportunities being put forward for approval. IFI-06 explains, “…what 
I noticed, the level of education, sophistication, and experience for the in-house is usually [limited] 
yes… sees only one bank…some of them had PhD in Shari’ah, underlying something was totally 
different. So a lot of them are totally new. Just started 2 to 3 years ago. No experience. But when you 
sit with Shari’ah Board member, his experience is different”. 
 
The approval process would end with a certification letter produced by the SSB, “The report will go to 
them [SSB] on the project and normally you will find most of them in one letter with one paragraph 
saying we have reviewed and...  they have comment, they don’t have comment” (IFI-15). 
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7.6.2.2 Shari’ah Review  
 
Table 7.48 summarises the process of a Shari’ah review performed post-investment. 
 
Table 7.48 - Shari'ah Review 
Interview 
Question 
What is the institution’s process of monitoring the consistency of its Shari’ah 
compliance and how does it manage any Shari’ah compliance risk that may 
arise over time? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Performed internally 
2 Performed externally 
Concluding 
Theme 
Shari’ah review was undertaken either internally or externally by a Shari’ah 
Advisory Firm 
 
In most cases, a regular Shari’ah review205 is performed throughout the year, usually quarterly, “as a 
minimum quarterly” (IFI-01). This then acts as the basis for the annual Shari’ah report that is produced 
by the SSB for the shareholders and presented at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
 
Table 7.49 - Focused Coding 1 For What is the Institution’s Process of Monitoring the 
Consistency of its Shari'ah Compliance? How Does it Manage any Shari'ah Compliance Risk 
that May Arise Over Time? 
 
In some IFIs it is the investment team that provides the Shari’ah department with regular reports on the 
investment and based on the reports the Shari’ah team performs the Shari’ah audit, “we [being the 
investment team], give them [the Shari’ah team] monthly reporting and quarterly reporting and from 
time to time they go and physically check. …. they review the transaction from start, and they do the 
audit on the target companies. They produce a report … they would highlight all the Shari’ah aspects …. 
																																								 																				
205 The terms review and audit were used interchangeably with regards to Shari’ah compliance reporting.	
Subtheme Performed internally 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-06 Investment report to Shari’ah audit  
IFI-07 Investment team report to SSB 
IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-11, IFI-14, IFI-15 Shari’ah audit review 
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If they have raised any comments and how it is being dealt with...” (IFI-01). While in other IFIs, it is 
the Shari’ah compliance members that meet on an annual basis with the investment team (rather than 
the investment team providing a report to the SCO), and along with all the documents and information 
he obtains he produces the Shari’ah audit report, which is submitted to the SSB. IFI-06 explains, “… 
he takes documents, financials, meets with me [the investment team member], maybe a few of them used 
to visit… to see the business...Then he does a report and sends it to the Shari’ah Board. The Shari’ah 
Board looks at the report, all is well, signs and here is a Shari’ah certification for 2011, all is good…”.  
 
In some jurisdictions where AAOIFI standards were not compulsory, and as such the IFIs in those 
jurisdictions were not obliged to have a Shari’ah audit, “You have to remember that we are Islamic, 
but there is no stipulation that we have to be audited as Islamic” (IFI-07). In such IFIs and in the IFIs 
that did not have a Shari’ah department nor did they outsource it, they would directly report to the SSB. 
They would report to the SSB with regards to having maintained the conditions/parameters set by the 
SSB at the time of approval. IFI-07 goes on to explain, “So they [the investment team] also see on a 
monthly basis what is happening with the company [the investment company].…on an annual basis we 
give an update, so any of the issues that were highlighted…where our Shari’ah Board said here is the 
timeline to make these changes. You are going to invest in this company, fine, but better kind of convert 
all the accounts within one year. Change this within 2 years. So it was with conditions. So then we 
would have to report back”. 
 
While in some IFIs it was the Shari’ah department that handled the whole Shari’ah audit review, 
“Shari’ah audit/officer he will go and do on annual basis, project by project and they will check whether 
Shari’ah compliant not Shari’ah. complaint…” (IFI-15).  
 
Table 7.50 - Focused Coding 2 For What is the Institution's Process of Monitoring the 
Consistency of its Shari'ah Compliance? How Does it Manage any Shari'ah Compliance Risk 
that May Arise Over Time? 
 
Subtheme Performed internally 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-02, IFI-04, IFI-12, IFI-13 Outsourced to headquarters 
IFI-03, IFI-05,  IFI-09 Outsourced to Shari’ah Advisory Firm 
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There are some IFIs that outsourced the post-investment Shari’ah audit review, either through a service 
agreement with their headquarters or contracted it to a Shari’ah Advisory Firm. The coordinator, 
whether it be from the general compliance team or a Shari’ah supervisor at the IFI level, reports to the 
headquarters, “the general compliance officer in the company he is the person, point of contact to liaise 
between us in business and the Shari’ah who are residence at the bank...we have Shari’ah review every 
6 months. They come and ask for the file, the deal and they just review the whole thing” (IFI-13). When 
they come and check, they check that the implementation has taken place as per the decisions of the 
SSB, and that no deviation to the decision has occurred. Any deviation is then reported to the SSB. On 
this IFI-02 elaborates: 
“…Contracts, financing, procedures. To make sure that the procedures are correct and have 
been executed/implemented as per Shari’ah. Because if he discovers any violation, immediately 
he reports…to Shari’ah supervisors and supervisors report to SSB [at headquarters] … They 
come and do random checks from time to time, on files, on investments. They go and visit the 
investments sometimes … Like an audit”.  
In cases where the whole SSB is outsourced to a Shari’ah advisory firm, the firm would appoint a 
committee from its employees, who will perform the Shari’ah audit. IFI-05 confirms, “The Shari’ah 
company they appoint a Shari’ah committee or an independent committee. Whereby on an annual basis 
you need to go through everything and make sure that you… followed these parameters. When the 
annual audit comes, you have to show them, you followed this”. 
 
In instances where the Shari’ah review is performed internally, the issues raised in the report generated 
are taken up with the IFI/the investment team to be resolved. In the event the issue is still outstanding 
by year end, it then gets reported in the Shari’ah annual report prepared by the SSB. As IFI-01 explains: 
“They come back to us, resolve the issues. By year end...Whatever is outstanding ... they [SSB] would 
mention that this has been highlighted… and is still under the process… And they would say that they 
are comfortable, they have enough comfort that this would be resolved”.  However, there are times, as 
IFI-15 remarks, when the feedback on the Shari’ah audit report is not as efficient as would be preferred, 
whereby the IFI could have exited the investment, before the SSB gets back to them “…most of the 
Shari’ah Board they don’t have time... So, by the time the reports go to him and he reads it, sometimes 
we exited and still he didn’t come back. The efficiency is not there”. 
 
At other times the investment team did not see eye to eye with the Shari’ah audit comments. To them, 
those that performed the Shari’ah audit, at times, wanted to review documents that they did not think 
needed it, as they did not think they were Shari’ah related. IFI-06 remarks, “The confidentiality 
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agreement, that I want to sign, the Shari’ah has to see it. It is legal document… There are things when 
he then used to do audit, he will tell us, why didn’t show this document. It is a commercial agreement 
[in the opinion of the investment team member]. I [Shari’ah audit member] have to see it…”. 
 
7.6.3 Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
 
The following section looks into the IFI’s key on the independence of the SSB members of their 
institution. Its independence is in relation to the IFI it supervises. The independence is viewed from two 
aspects. First, whether there is any relationship or link of any of the SSB members with the IFI, and 
second, who appoints the SSB. 
 
7.6.3.1 SSB Independence 
 
Table 7.51 below summarises whether any of the SSB members have any relationship or link with the 
IFI they are supervising. 
 
Table 7.51 - Whether Any of the SSB Members Have Any Relationship or Link With the IFI 
They are Supervising 
Interview 
Question 
Are any of the SSB members on the Board of Directors (BOD) or on the Board 
Committee, a client or a shareholder? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 SSB completely independent 
2 SSB not fully independent (exception) 
Concluding 
Theme 
In most cases the SSB members are independent of the IFI they supervise 
 
In the majority of cases, the SSB are independent with regards to not being a member of BOD, or the 
IFI’s Board Committees or a client206 of the IFI or a shareholder. This is also reflected in the line of 
reporting, where they report directly to the BOD, “These members report to the BOD” (IFI-01). 
 
																																								 																				
206 With regards to not being a client of the IFI, although when interviewing the IFI, none had reported that any SSB members 
were a client (possibly due to the interviewee being from the investment team and so they were not aware), some Shari’ah 
scholars had admitted to being a client of the IFI. Moreover, in the cases when they were, they had disclosed this information.	
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Table 7.52 - Focused Coding 1 For Are Any of the SSB Members on BOD, on Board 
Committees, a Client, or a Shareholder? 
  
There are two categories of Shari’ah supervision: old school which is where the IFI will have its own 
independent SSB, where it will appoint Shari’ah scholars; and new school, which is where the IFI 
outsources the function of Shari’ah supervision to a specialised firm, “You are talking of the SSB, there 
are 2 schools. The old school, every company has a SSB. They chose scholars and they give 
remunerations at the end of the year” (IFI-05). The new school of appointing a specialised firm is a 
new trend, and in some jurisdictions it is a new addition to their list of authorised auditors, as                      
IFI-03 comments, “When the [Regulator] came they made new regulations on the Islamic companies 
that there must be Shari’ah Auditor registered at the [Regulator]. There weren’t any companies earlier, 
now they have started to register. So, I can sign with them, ... as Shari’ah Supervisory or Shari’ah 
Body…”. 
 
In either case the SSB is totally independent (with the exception below) from the IFI, as IFI-02 confirms, 
“He [the SSB member] is from outside, not related to us. So there is no conflict and he stays independent 
and they report directly to the Board…They are highly independent”.  
 
Table 7.53 - Focused Coding 2 For Are Any of the SSB Members on BOD, on Board 
Committees, a Client, or a Shareholder? 
 
One of the IFIs was given an exception to the norm of SSB members being independent from the IFI. 
This was due to one of the three SSB members resigning due to health issues and so the IFI sought the 
regulator’s approval for the Shari’ah compliance officer to replace the resigned member. On this            
Subtheme SSB completely independent 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-02, IFI-06, IFI-07, IFI-08, 
IFI-11, IFI-14, IFI-15 IFI’s own independent SSB 
IFI-03, IFI-04, IFI-05, IFI-09, IFI-12, 
IFI-13 IFIs outsource independent SSB 
Subtheme SSB not fully independent (exception) 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-10 SSB not fully independent (exception) 
269		
IFI-10 explains: “Shaikh A207 is now a member of the SSB and he is the internal Shari’ah compliance 
officer as well. He is a member on the board [SSB]… You can’t consider Shaikh A, as independent, but 
he does provide his opinion very independently. This is an exception”. 
 
7.6.3.2 Appointment of the SSB 
 
The appointment of the SSB was looked at as part of the SSB function being independent. Table 7.54 
below summarises who appoints the SSB. 
 
Table 7.54 - Appointment of SSB 
Interview 
Question Who appoints the SSB?  
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 AGM appoint by name on recommendation BOD 
2 AGM provide general approval open to BOD to select/appoint 
3 Depends on the investment (in the case of outsourcing) 
Concluding 
Theme 
In general, it is the AGM, but it varies whether by name or general approval 
to appoint a SSB 
 
Although in general the Annual General Meeting (AGM) made the decision either directly (deciding 
on the names) or indirectly (no specific names) with regards to the appointment of the SSB, the number 
of times that a SSB member could be re-elected/re-nominated was open. IFI-08 notes, “So every year, 
we state the re-appointment of the Shari’ah board. We recommend as management, or the board 
recommends, to the shareholders and then they endorse the appointment…The simple answer to the 
question, they can be renewed indefinitely”. This open-ended time of re-electing/re-appointing is a 
cause for concern with regards to the effect it can have on the scholar’s independence. Over time, the 
scholar becomes more familiar and closer to the IFI affecting his independence, and hence, is an area 
that needs improving, as IFI-15 comments, “Open…if you go to some of the Islamic banks some of them 
have been since the inception of the bank. This is one area that the [Regulator] can learn and play a 
good role in”.  
 
																																								 																				
207 A - The identity of the Shari’ah scholar has not been revealed to maintain the confidentiality and identity of both the 
scholar and the IFI.	
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However, in some cases, the flexibility the IFI has in determining the term period of the SSB’s service 
has assisted them in controlling the performance of the SSB members. In some cases, they have used it 
as a mechanism to control the SSB members’ attendance, as IFI-10 explains: 
“There is no limit. Some banks they appoint them for 3 years. And they renew it. Here we renew 
on annual basis… We had changed to annually, to allow us to evaluate the SSB performance. 
Because somehow the 2 members initially they were not attending the meetings, and that is why 
[changed to annually], they [management] want to keep an eye on the performance of the 
SSB…that was the recommendations [being that of the Management], not regulations. The 
regulators are fine if you are appointing them for 3 years”. 
 
Table 7.55 - Focused Coding 1 For Who Appoints the SSB? 
 
In some IFIs the BOD nominates the Shari’ah scholars to the shareholders at the AGM for approval, 
“The general meeting. A recommendation comes from the management, from the board and goes to the 
general shareholding meeting” (IFI-10). 
 
Table 7.56 - Focused Coding 2 For Who Appoints the SSB? 
 
In other instances, the SSB members are appointed based on the shareholders keeping it open to the 
BOD to select the Shari’ah scholar, as IFI-02 notes, “The AGM approves them…No specific names”. 
This open authorisation has allowed the IFI management to choose the Shari’ah scholars that they think 
will most likely accept their proposals, as IFI-15 explains, “most of the Shari’ah members you will find 
that he is appointed by the board. Which suit them, which they can work with. So, you will find lots of 
bank will say, from which school is he [the Shari’ah scholar] and the one that easily accepts, they will 
choose”. That being said, some IFI faced some difficult times in harmonising with some SSB members. 
Subtheme AGM appoint by name on recommendation of BOD 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-10, IFI-12, IFI-13, IFI-14 AGM by name on recommendation of 
BOD/management 
Subtheme AGM provide general approval open to BOD to 
select 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-02, IFI-07, IFI-08, IFI-11, IFI-15 AGM general approval open to BOD to select 
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According to IFI-06, there are times when a scholar bases his opinion on the past without making 
allowances for the changes that have taken place in the business environment: 
“Honestly there were Shari’ah issues. He used to explain to me from his perspective… he shows 
me the AAOIFI and he shows me the text, I know what it means, but for me I am sitting on the 
other side. I try to explain to him. I try to make him understand that there is no discrepancy to 
Shari’ah opinion. … he holds text on me. The text is history 1350 years…at the time, there were 
no companies that had working capital, nor companies’ capital’s that had rights issues or tier 
1 capital, tier 2 … what are the Shari’ah principles? Let’s understand the principles and we 
implement the principles on that basis. It was difficult.” 
That being said, although not all, there were some SSB members that did try to understand and assist to 
help find possible ways to conduct the investment as per Shari’ah, “There are Shaikhs …he understands. 
He gives you solutions…he gives and takes in dialogue” (IFI-06). 
 
Table 7.57 - Focused Coding 3 For Who Appoints the SSB? 
 
In some IFI (those that outsource the SSB function) it depends on the type of investment they are 
entering into, “It depends if it is a public company or if it is a big project, of course it [being the SSB 
members] is appointed by the AGM. But if it is a project by itself, usually the fund manager appoints 
them or the project manager, who is running the process or the clients. …Yes [to getting the client’s 
approval] if I am acting in a position on behalf of clients, I would tell them, hey listen we are appointing 
this and this and these are the fees, etc.” (IFI-05). It also depends on the location of the investment and 
investors because it is inappropriate to appoint SSB from a jurisdiction other than where the investment 
is based or to whom it is offered, as IFI-05 explains: 
“It depends on demographics. It depends where you are… Because you need to make sure that 
also these people you bring on board are accepted by the local community that you are in. 
Some of them, the people for example, if I do a project today and I have a fund in Dubai/GCC 
and all my Shari’ah Board are from Malaysia, people will not take a look at that”. 
  
Subtheme Depends on the investment 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-05 Depends on the investment 
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7.6.4 Shari’ah Risk 
 
Shari’ah risk is looked at from the perspective of what are the areas or possible matters that could affect 
the Shari’ah compliance of the transaction/project post-investment. 
 
Table 7.58 - Shari'ah Risk 
Interview 
Question What do you consider as Shari’ah risk for Islamic Private Equity (IPE)? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 No risk 
2 There is a risk of non-compliance 
Concluding 
Theme 
There are some matters that could affect the Shari’ah compliance of the 
investment 
 
Some IFIs had identified there being some form of risk or another, while one IFI could not foresee any 
post-investment risk, if initially the process of Shari’ah screening was done diligently. 
 
Table 7.59 - Focused Coding 1 For What Do You Consider as Shari'ah Risk For Islamic Private 
Equity (IPE)? 
 
In the opinion of one of the IFIs, if the initial work was done correctly, the IFI does not perceive there 
being any Shari’ah risk of deviating from the Shari’ah principles,  
“I don’t see it as risk. If the work was done correctly at the beginning, there is no risk. If you 
are given the guidelines and you started the correct way, I don’t see there being a problem. On 
the contrary, from the start your financing is correct, Shari’ah correct, the asset class you are 
dealing in is right, there are no restrictions. There are no Shari’ah preservation. Can’t see 
anything risk associated” (IFI-02). 
 
 
Subtheme No risk 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-02 No risk of Shari’ah non-compliance 
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Table 7.60 - Focused Coding 2 For What Do You Consider as Shari'ah Risk For IPE? 
 
Some IFIs thought that the risks from a Shari’ah perspective were with regards to maintaining the 
financial ratio (debt to equity), as IFI-05 explains, “But sometimes, what will happen is some ratios 
might change for some reason or another, the debt/equity ratio. The portion of non-halal revenue and 
all that, if these change, then you are in trouble”. While with others it is related to the underlying 
structure being Shari’ah compliant, especially those that are based on a conventional structure “you 
have to be careful that the structure is within the Shari’ah guidelines and more importantly is the 
essence of Shari’ah in that transaction. You can try to change a conventional investment into a Shari’ah 
compliant one, but the underlying investment could basically be far from Shari’ah philosophy”             
(IFI-08). Some also saw that the matter of halal is also a cause of Shari’ah risk because it depends on 
the size of the non-Shari’ah effect. Whether the amount of non-halal is relatively small in comparison 
to its value, as IFI-10 notes, “sometimes he [SSB member] accepts…They are saying this is very minor 
compared to the total size of the price, but may be would have to come up with some formula to make 
purification at the end, at the time of  exit”.	
	
When the IFI was questioned on the important Shari’ah principles, as per their responses (Figure 7.1 
below) the majority of the responses208 consider the prohibition of haram and only halal (60%), along 
with the prohibition of riba and gharar (60%), as the most important principles. This was followed by 
the principle of sharing in profit and loss (40%), along with the principle of fair and transparent and 
being aware of rights and obligations (40%). Enhancement of living and the welfare of community 
(30%), along with no unjust enrichment, equity and fairness to all (30%) followed suit. While clarity, 
disclosure of information and no manipulation ranked before the last (20%) and the principle of the 
transaction being real ranked last (10%). 
 
																																								 																				
208 The responses cover 10 of the 15 IFIs that were interviewed.	
Subtheme There is a risk of non-compliance 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-05, IFI-07 Risk in maintaining ratio 
IFI-05, IFI-08 Risk in business structure 
IFI-03, IFI-09, IFI-10 Risk in halal (where and what/type) investment 
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Figure 7.1 - IFI Perception on the Important Shari'ah Principles 
 
 
7.7 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The following section looks into whether there are any regulatory requirements, prior to and post- 
investment, in Islamic Private Equity/Private Placement (IPE) offering and the IFIs’ opinion on such 
regulations. 
 
7.7.1 Pre-Regulatory Requirements 
 
Table 7.61 below summarises whether the IFI have any pre-regulatory requirements when they offer 
IPE to investors. 
 
Table 7.61 - Pre-Regulatory Requirements 
Interview 
Question 
Are there any regulatory requirements on your institution with regards to 
promoting and selling IPE? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 There are pre-requirements 
Concluding 
Theme 
All jurisdictions have pre-regulatory requirements in some form or another. 
 
It depends on the jurisdiction where the IFI is located, and whether there are any pre-regulatory 
requirements that the IFI has to abide by prior to offering such investments to investors. When 
40%
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Abiding by Principle Profit and Loss (4 Counts)
Transaction real not based on uncertainty (1 Count)
Prohibition of Haram Halal only (6 Counts)
Prohibition of Riba and Gharar (6 Counts)
Fair-Transparent dealing-All partners aware (4 Counts)
Disclsoing information no manipulation (2 Counts)
No unjust enrichment-equity and fairness to all parties (3 Counts)
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approaching investors to invest in IPE, IFIs are required to approach accredited/sophisticated investors, 
and this requirement is taken as an expected fact on the type of investors that the IFI approaches. Some 
have to provide the regulator with a list of the investors post-investment and depending on the number 
of investors, if it is below a certain threshold, a list of potential investors would also need to be 
forwarded to the regulator prior to investing. IFI-12 explains: 
“There is the limited offer type, and there is the type that …won’t be offered to more than 200 
investors. And you cannot offer it to a non-sophisticated according to the [the regulation] …A 
limited offer is offering to 60 investors and you have to list down their names. If not a limited 
offer, you don’t have to list the names. But they all have to be sophisticated. After the offer, you 
have to keep and submit to [Regulator] the list of the people who subscribed, paid money and 
basically the amount subscribed the amount of shares, you have to send it to [Regulator]”. 
 
Although the type of investors was a given requirement, some IFIs still faced issues with regards to 
meeting them satisfactorily. It was not easy to determine whether the potential investor possessed the 
technical characteristic required by the definition. Whereby in most definitions the potential investor 
would need to have a certain wealth and to possess the ability to analyse financially. The IFI were able 
to determine the potential investor’s wealth (through proof of documentation), yet determining the 
investor’s analytical skills was difficult. As expressed by IFI-12: “It is very difficult to define 
sophisticated investors because they are wealthy individuals but they might not be sophisticated. When 
it comes to technical stuff… they define that someone who is able to analyse…and also who has a 
financial advisor… basically it is very difficult”. 
 
Table 7.62 - Focused Coding 1 For Are There Any Regulatory Requirements on Your 
Institution With Regards to Promoting and Selling IPE? 
 
Subtheme There are pre-requirements 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-01, IFI-07, IFI-09 Require license  
IFI-02, IFI-06, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-11, IFI-15 Approval on investment/SPV 
IFI-01, IFI-05, IFI-06, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-11, 
IFI-12, IFI-13, IFI-14, IFI-15 Approval on marketing documents/PPM 
IFI-03, IFI-15 Shari’ah Auditor/Shari’ah Board Approval 
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It depends on the jurisdiction whether a specific requirement for the prompting and offering of IPE is 
required or not. With some IFIs, if they had the appropriate license to offer such an activity, they were 
good to go ahead, and no other requirements were required, as IFI-07 notes, “I know you have to have 
license. So if you want to place investment you have a specific license…From the [Regulator] you have 
to apply for a special license, there is no requirement as such [for promoting and selling IPE 
specifically]”. 
 
While others, in addition to the license of an Islamic financial institution, it was required that they seek 
approval on the documents to be offered to investors, “On documents of course. We provide them with 
summary memo and the proposal investment, the proposal equity that would be offered to the investors 
and you get their approval. Yes, they have to see it [the offering document]. They [the Regulator] come 
up with some questions. They challenge some numbers. They challenge some assumptions as well” (IFI-
10). And in some jurisdictions, approval was also required on the investment itself, “The [Regulator] 
has to approve the PPM, before we use it, pre-approval. Even if we want to establish an SPV or a 
special purpose vehicle for the structure, even it has to be approved by [Regulator]” (IFI-08). In 
addition to certain jurisdictions, the IFI needs to submit the promoting documents and to have a waiting 
period. Upon which once it expires, if they have not heard from the regulator they can proceed with the 
offer, “In a Private Placement, usually they [Regulator], the no objection rule is, if you don’t hear from 
us within 10 days, please proceed with the offering. If they come back to you, that there is something 
you need to change, or basically they have comments. But after 10 business days, usually if they have 
no comments you just proceed with it” (IFI-12). 
 
Moreover, in certain jurisdiction, where the documents have to be approved, it is not the regulator that 
does the review, but the compliance officer that has been hired from an authorised list, “The compliance 
officer has to see it [the documents]. He has to see it. The way it goes, if there is an issue, he reports it. 
The way they [Regulator] put it, is that the compliance officer needs to follow the requirements of the 
[Regulator] and report. If you breach it, he [compliance officer] doesn’t tell me… he goes and reports 
it [to the regulator]. Sometimes he tells me, this is a breach, if you will remedy it. Or sometimes the 
breach is big, he just goes and reports it. Everything, invitation, document, PPM, everything. He [the 
compliance officer] is outsourced. They [the Regulator] have licensees and entities authorised by them 
so you hire from them, and you hire somebody and they become your clientele” (IFI-05). 
 
At times when the product is offered in more than one jurisdiction, where the document would be 
offered to investors in other jurisdictions, regulatory approval was required of the other jurisdiction, yet 
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it was not necessarily always obtained. Time was an essential factor, and at times, it was difficult to 
obtain the other jurisdiction’s approval, if the IFI was not one of their licensees, so the way around it 
was to get the interested investors to come across and sign in the country where the IFI was licensed. 
 
Furthermore, since the product to be offered is to be Shari’ah compliant, Shari’ah approval is required, 
in addition to having a SSB. As IFI-15 explains: “Part of it [the regulatory requirements] you have to 
be in compliance with Shari’ah,...You have to get approval for any product before you launch in the 
market. The Shari’ah board has to be there. There is a checklist… Shai’ah approval has to be there”.  
However, with regards to submitting the documents in full, it is not necessarily the case. At times a 
summary of the investment/document is submitted, and if the regulator requires further detail it will 
request it, as noted by IFI-15, “You have to submit the summary, but sometimes they [Regulator] ask 
for more information…”. 
 
7.7.2 Post-Investment Regulatory Requirements 
 
Table 7.63 below summarises whether IFI have any post-investment regulatory requirements, when 
they offer IPE to investors. 
 
Table 7.63 – Post-Investment Regulatory Requirements 
Interview 
Question 
Are there any on-going regulatory requirements with regards to disclosure and 
transparency that your institution needs to abide by, once the investment has 
been offered? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 There are post requirements 
2 There are no post requirements 
Concluding 
Theme 
In some jurisdictions there are post investment requirements, while in other 
there are not 
 
While nearly all jurisdictions had pre-regulatory requirements, not all had post regulatory 
requirements. 
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Table 7.64 - Focused Coding 1 For Are There Any On-Going Regulatory Requirements With 
Regards to Disclosure and Transparency That Your Institution Needs to Abide by, Once the 
Investment has Been Offered? 
 
Some post-investment requirements were for the investors and others were also for the regulator. It 
depends on where the investment is being offered, and on the jurisdiction of the investment. IFI-05 
notes, “There is requirement if the product is licensed by [licensee’s Regulator]. Depends on the product. 
Because if it is offshore, it is different. [Licensee’s Regulator] license you have to follow their 
requirement on the reporting, type of reporting. Usually it is to the investor and they [being the 
Regulator] get notified”. In addition, with regards to the investment, it also depends on whether it falls 
under a specific authority, whereby the requirements of that authority would need to be adhered to. 
Hence, if the investment company was an FI, then it would need to adhere to the licensed authority, and 
if the invested company was a listed company then it would have to meet the listing requirements. As 
IFI-11 notes, “So it depends which investment we are exposed to and which geography they are in”. 
 
The IFIs usually try and maintain post-regulatory requirements, which are basically guidelines on how 
to act with clients, “there are on-going regulations related to the treating client fairly, conflict of 
interest and ensuring compliance” (IFI-14). In some jurisdiction the requirements are as per those for 
funds209, “How can I deal with my clients? How can I report to them? And there is market conduct?” 
(IFI-13). 
 
Moreover, any changes/amendments to the terms and conditions of the investment to those stated in the 
approved document, the IFI would need to update and notify the regulator. IFI-14 notes, “They ask for 
any amendments, when we have the funds terms and conditions, and if the fund manager amends 
anything, any single material thing, we have to report it…just notify, and if they have questions they 
would come back to us… 15 working days”. 
 
																																								 																				
209 In some jurisdictions, such investments (pooling of funds/capital for investment into a project/real estate/company) fall 
under the fund regulations.	
Subtheme There are post requirements 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-05, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-13, IFI-14, IFI-15 To the investor 
IFI-05, IFI-03, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-11, IFI-12, IFI-13 To the regulator 
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Table 7.65 - Focused Coding 2 For Are There Any On-Going Regulatory Requirements With 
Regards to Disclosure and Transparency That Your Institution Needs to Abide by, Once the 
Investment has Been Offered? 
 
Some IFIs did not face any post-regulatory requirements when investing in IPE related investments, 
“No, not that I know of” (IFI-04); “There is not, post, nothing. I don’t think nothing at all [across other 
GCC jurisdiction]. Pre there was, but post nothing” (IFI-06); “…as an investment firm, there is no, to 
date, there is no need for like reporting. We do [report to investor]” (IFI-07). 
 
On the other hand, there were some IFIs that were not aware of whether the IFI faced any post-
regulatory requirements, since once the investment is done, the on-going matters are dealt with by 
another department, “I assume, yes. Because we haven’t done it... These questions are more related to 
our compliance department; they would know” (IFI-01); “Honestly I don’t know. The compliance might 
be able to answer” (IFI-02). 
 
Just a note on regulatory requirements: in recent years (2-3), due to the change in the financial 
environment/set up of some jurisdictions and to financial events that have taken place, some regulations 
have changed. Some changes were related to risk management and more layers have been added to 
procedures in addition to there being more regulatory bodies involved, as IFI-03 explains: “The 
regulator now forces upon me the risk, the compliance. You have Capital Market Authority, the Market, 
the Ministry of commerce, the Central Bank. You have more layers of regulations. Before it was the 
Central Bank and the securities market… ”. 
 
While in some jurisdictions, improvements were made to existing regulations by elaborating on existing 
regulations, and placing more emphasis on enforcing the regulations, as IFI-08 remarks: “I think 
[Regulator] has recently re-emphasised that aspect. So I believe it was there from the beginning, but it 
wasn’t enforced probably. Now, I feel from the communication, I see from the [Regulator], they are 
emphasising the fact that the content of those update [2014] should be achieving or checking certain 
boxes…”.  
 
Subtheme There are no post requirements 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04, IFI-06, IFI-07 There are no post requirements 
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7.7.3 IFIs’ Opinion on Regulations 
 
The following section looks into the IFIs’ opinion on IPE’s regulations, in addition to their opinion on 
capital adequacy, since it also has an affect when it comes to investing in IPE. 
 
7.7.3.1 IFIs’ Opinion on IPE Regulations 
 
Table 7.66 summarises the IFIs’ opinion on IPE regulations. 
 
Table 7.66 - Opinion on IPE Regulations 
Interview 
Question 
What is your opinion with regards to these regulations? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Have concerns about the regulations 
Concluding 
Theme 
The majority were in favour of the regulations, yet they had some comments 
 
Overall, the IFIs were in favour of the regulations and that they are being developed to international 
standards, with the opinion that: “I think that the regulatory body is put in place to safeguard the 
interests of everyone involved. From the regulator to the investor to the shareholders of the assets…” 
(IFI-11). Yet there were some observations that were made and that are summarised under Table 7.67 
below. 
 
Table 7.67 - Focus Coding 1 What is Your Opinion With Regards to These Regulations? 
 
Subtheme Have concerns 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-04, IFI-08, IFI-10, IFI-15 Need to be flexible, affects the business 
IFI-05, IFI-08, IFI-12 Time consuming 
IFI-06 Do not have capacity or experience to implement 
IFI-06, IFI-07, IFI-13, IFI-15 Not adequate, still needs developing/updating 
IFI-08, IFI-13 Require flexibility in implementation 
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Most IFIs are in favour of regulations. However, they have various concerns. Although it is good to 
have regulations, they are at times time consuming and not flexible enough which affects the business 
and hinders their access to the market. Also, they would like to see the support of the regulator in 
facilitating matters, “although I believe regulations are necessary and they have to be in place. But 
again it is creating a sort of barrier for smooth and easy access to the market. … we would need 
support … rather than more and more levels of regulations, which will eventually would become, it 
could reach a point that any investment you touch would become unprofitable” (IFI-08). In their opinion, 
in order to maintain risk, risk awareness is necessary and there should be more transparency and 
disclosure of the risk involved, “If companies ensure their investors are well informed and are aware 
of the risks. Ethically and even from investment point of view, it makes it a lot easier if the investor is 
aware, in case something goes wrong. Regulations should be to serve the investors and not to hinder 
them...I think protecting the rights of investors…Make sure that the company is transparent with them 
basically” (IFI-04).  
 
Even though quite a few of the IFIs mentioned that they are bombarded with regulations and requested 
flexibility in the implementation, “in applying it they [being the regulator] have to be flexible…in the 
implementation. Business nature is quite hard sometimes and the people are difficult …” (IFI-13). There 
are those that thought that some relevant regulations were not enough, as IFI-06 comments: “the deal 
by deal... if it is done properly then it is fine. But the problem it doesn’t have a lot of regulation. This is 
not really regulated. The CIS [collective investment schemes] is regulated; anything above that [private 
placements/offering that do not fall under CIS] is lost. Even GP/LP, I don’t think regulation is very 
tight”. In addition to those who thought that the regulations were lacking, especially in investments 
where the investor performs more of a passive role, as indicated by IFI-07: “… it is specific security 
created funds, then if you market those funds, then I would expect the same kind as on the asset 
management side, they have reporting guidelines… I think we should have the same regulation on the 
set up of that fund as well”.  
 
Furthermore, some also thought there were areas open to improvement. One of which is the 
independence of the Shari’ah scholars. By being on several boards, in addition to also being on the 
boards of retail and investment banks at the same time, Shari’ah scholars’ independence is questioned. 
Even though the scholar does not do it intentionally, information transfer from one institute to another 
can occur, especially during the review of products that are to be launched, as IFI-15 explains: 
“From Shari’ah point there needs to be real independence. For Shari’ah scholar, you can’t 
have 2 or 3 members in the same institutions. I [scholar] am in commercial bank and another 
[investment] bank, I know what product we are launching … I will do structure for each 
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product. … I will try to give my comments. Information from this bank transfers to the other 
bank through the scholar, whether intentionally or not intentionally, it is transferred ...”. 
 
The other area of improvement is with the governance of the SPV of the investment.    Proper/disciplined 
corporate governance of the SPV is important since it forms an important role in the set-up/structure of 
investing in IPE. It is generally where the funds collected from investors are pooled. And since the SPV 
is usually managed by the IFI that is collecting the funds, in addition to SPVs not always being reported, 
some form of control is required to mitigate any conflict of interest that could arise. It appears that at 
times funds that were collected for a specific investment, the IFI/the investment managing company 
would use the funds to invest in other investments (with the hope of generating extra returns), 
jeopardising the current/specific investment’s opportunity for development/success, as IFI-15 explains: 
“In an SPV you don’t report where you put all your money…. The board takes a decision to 
invest … They take the money from [Project-A] and invest it in [project-B]… The SPV is the 
management …the CEO is the chairman of the SPV... This is part of corporate governance. The 
[Regulator] should nominate or insist that the board of the SPV shouldn’t be the bank itself. 
Because always the bank will work for the best of his interest first, then the interest of the others 
[investors]”. 
 
However, it is suggested that although as a preventative and controlling matter, the regulator’s 
intervention is required; it should be more in the form of a supervisory role. Whereby to have rules in 
place that would help to keep in check those matters that are of concern, as IFI-15 notes, “they have a 
supervisory role, more than a management role... There should be a regulation and rules for policies 
that eliminate these things. To safeguard the interest of the investor”. 
 
7.7.3.2 IFIs’ Opinion on Capital Adequacy Regulations 
 
The capital of the IFI has an affect on the amount/percentage of capital that it can participate/enter in 
with regards to the investments it makes. It is the basis that determines the IFI’s exposure. Table 7.68 
below summarises the IFIs’ opinion on the regulations on capital. 
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Table 7.68 - Opinion of Capital Adequacy Regulations 
Interview 
Question 
What is your opinion on the regulations on capital? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 An acceptable control mechanism 
2 Restricts development 
Concluding 
Theme 
To some it helps to reduce the risk, while to others it restricts development 
 
Having regulations on capital has its pros and cons, some of which have been presented below. 
 
Table 7.69 - Focus Coding 1 What is Your Opinion on the Regulations on Capital? 
 
Some IFIs saw that there was a rationale in having restrictions on the capital, in that not everyone 
entering the market will try to launch investments, only those who are strong enough and capable with 
a good track record would be able to do so. As IFI-02 noted: “I think this is the rationale behind it… 
they try to cap the number of funds that are launched. And that the ones that do get launched, are highly 
weighted and reputable known institutions, and has a track record and has the capability to raise capital 
and has the know-how”. While others see that it helps to diversify risk, “capping this way [restriction 
on capital/exposure] minimising the risk, because we encountered some problems with some of the 
projects.... the project was doing well, and after the collapse and the crash [of the market]… Had we 
been within the cap or below, we would have minimised the loss” (IFI-10). Moreover, some also thought 
that it helps the financial institution to stay financially and sustainably healthy. 
 
Table 7.70 - Focus Coding 2 What is Your Opinion on the Regulations on Capital? 
 
Subtheme An acceptable control mechanism 
Interviewee  Remarks 
IFI-02, IFI-04, IFI-10, IFI-12, IFI-14 Reduces risk 
Subtheme Restricts development 
Interviewees  Remarks 
IFI-05, IFI-08, IFI-11, IFI-13 Restricts development 
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On the other hand, some IFIs saw that having restrictions on capital affected the progress and size of 
the transaction that an IFI can take on board. Whereas prior to the restriction, they were able to go for 
large size transactions, post restrictions they are unable to do so independently. IFI-08 notes: “If before 
we can easily go do the 40 to 50m ticket, now probably, I can only go the 20m so I have to seek a very 
small universe transaction, that is not necessarily the most profitable or the best one…or try to co-
invest, find another player, who is in a similar situation”. The restriction on capital also affects the 
overall contribution of the IFI regarding the progress and building up of the economy, in that there will 
be fewer investments and developing projects that they participate/contribute in, as IFI-13 remarks, “I 
think we need to increase the capital, to rebuild the countries. We need to increase it”. 
 
In addition, some IFIs thought that such regulation is inappropriate to suit all types of IFIs. The role of 
a retail bank (taking deposits) differs from that of an investment bank (that uses shareholders’ capital 
to invest), and as such, there should not be the same requirement on both. IFI-11 notes: “…Basel 3 is 
quite strict. It works on some models. We are not a retail bank. We are an investment bank. I think it 
doesn’t cater and segregate between the two. ...there shouldn’t be the same Basel 3 for all”.  
Furthermore, being an investment firm, although it is important to manage risk, having to maintain a 
certain amount of cash on the side, at all times, affects the financial institution’s ability to manoeuvre, 
as IFI-05 explains: “We are an investment boutique firm, sometimes it bothers us, because you have to 
always maintain cash. You cannot use it. You cannot do a lot of things. So, it depends on the business… 
sometimes the capital adequacy … it is risk management, but also it could tie your hand a little”. 
 
Moreover, with globalisation, in order to survive the IFI needs to be strong enough. IFI-15 notes, “my 
personal opinion, the Central Bank shall encourage the bank for merging, small player. Because now …, 
due to globalisation, unless you are strong you will not survive. So, I think Central Bank should think 
about encouraging, not forcing the banks, give them some incentives to merge. That merger and 
acquisition will build a strong institution that can survive in all crisis and all situations”  
 
7.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter covers the findings of the IFIs that were interviewed as part of this study. In trying to meet 
the research objectives, the questions of the interview revolved around the IFI’s investment approach 
to investors; the IFI’s post-investment relation with its investors; the due diligence the IFI undertakes; 
the level of transparency it maintains and the corporate governance it follows towards protecting the 
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investors’ rights. The questions also tried to seek the IFI’s Shari’ah governance system, through 
exploring whether the IFI had a mechanism for handling the Shari’ah compliant supervision aspect. 
And in order to be able to derive possible improvements, the current regulations were looked into, and 
the IFI’s point of view on them was sought. This was to seek their perspective (the business/industry 
perspective), which is an essential part when developing markets and regulations. 
 
Moreover, engaging in fair transparent transactions is one of the important characteristics of the 
Shari’ah principles, and from the interviews, there appears to be some issues that are related to 
transparency that could jeopardise the Shari’ah compliance of the IPE contract. In order for the IPE 
relationship to be Shari’ah sound, it is expected that the IFI/investment manager will perform his role 
in a transparent manner, without any exploitation or holding back information from his investor. The 
investor trusts the IFI with his funds and relies on its decision-making, by giving the IFI proxy, and in 
return expects openness and timely communication. It appears that issues related to the extent of the 
IFI’s openness with the investor, which in turn affects the investor’s rights need to be addressed. Issues 
such as: the way deals are structured in controlling voting rights; the different treatment among investors; 
how information is communicated to the investor pre- and post- and how funds are used appear to be 
some of the weaknesses that need to be dealt with.   
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Chapter Eight: 
 SHARI’AH SCHOLAR’S ROLE IN IFI INVESTING IN ISLAMIC PRIVATE 
EQUITY INVESTMENT: RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter reports the results of the semi-structured interviews conducted with 13 Shari’ah scholars 
(ShSc)210 who are members of Shari’ah Supervisory Boards’ of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) that 
invest in Islamic private equity/private placements from across the GCC.211 The results were analysed 
using content and thematic analysis. Initially, the responses were transcribed and translated by the 
researcher, after which the content analysis was carried out manually. No analytic software for coding, 
such as Nvivo, was used since the original transcripts were in Arabic. 
 
The data analysis first examines the general themes which are then further explained by focus coding 
and looking into the subthemes. Discussion on each subtheme is supported by the related quotations of 
interviewees.212  
 
8.2 TERMS OF REFRENCE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
The Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) is bound by its terms of reference that engages its members with 
the IFI. Hence, having clear terms of reference (TOR) and proper working procedures in place is at the 
core of the relationship between the SSB and the IFI. 
 
8.2.1 Terms of Reference 
 
This section examines the ShSc’s contractual agreement, appointment, responsibilities and working 
procedures and the responses received on those matters. 
																																								 																				
210 In presenting the results, the ShSc interviewed will be represented in code form (ShSc-01, ShSc-02, etc.) to preserve the 
confidentiality and the identity of the ShSc. While the Shari’ah scholars cannot be identified due to confidentiality, the basic 
characteristics of them are given in Appendix 4.  	
211 GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council countries.	
212 The quotations used were translated from Arabic to English by the researcher.	
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8.2.1.1 Contractual Agreement 
 
Table 8.1 below summarises the responses to whether the ShScs had signed an agreement upon being 
appointed as a member of the IFI’s SSB. It also looks into the details of their appointment if they were 
clearly stated in writing, whether it is in the agreement or in the internal procedures of the IFI. 
 
Table 8.1 - Shari'ah Scholar’s Contractual Agreement 
Interview Question Does the agreement of appointment that you signed clearly state the TOR 
regarding your mandates and responsibilities? I.e. have you signed an 
agreement with the IFI and are there procedures? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Contract existed 
2 No contract 
Concluding Theme Not all SSB had a contractual agreement with its IFI 
 
As all jurisdictions in the region do not require there to be a contractual agreement between the SSB 
members and the IFI itself, not all scholars had a contractual agreement with the IFIs where he was a 
member of their SSB. And since some scholars were on SSB across different jurisdictions, they could 
have signed with an IFI in one jurisdiction and not in another. 
 
Table 8.2 - Focused Coding 1 For Does the Agreement of Appointment that You Signed Clearly 
State the TOR Regarding Your Mandates and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme Contract exists 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-06 Contract in detail 
ShSc-09, ShSc-10 Contract and details in procedures 
ShSc-01, ShSc-07, ShSc-12 Varied in detail 
ShSc-01, ShSc-05, ShSc-11,  Varied: some had, some did not 
 
Some ShScs had a detailed contracted signed with the IFI, as noted by ShSc-06, “Contracts stating 
what are your powers, your responsibilities from a confidentially aspect, from the aspect of the things 
you undertake”. While others who had signed an agreement, the details of their responsibilities and 
obligations were not in the agreement but in the internal procedures, “For every Shari’ah supervisory 
board there is a procedure. And the procedures display the member’s responsibilities, the 
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committee’s213  responsibilities, the bank’s obligations and all the matters related to the Shari’ah 
supervisory board work, …in all the institutions without exception…the level of details varies from one 
institution to another, but the main issues, like number of meetings, the decision process, these are in 
all of them” (ShSc-10).  
 
In some institutions, the agreements covered the SSB mandates, role and responsibilities in detail, while 
in others not as much. It was those institutions whose regulators had specified (and in some a specimen 
is provided) and enforced such a requirement, and those are the ones with detailed agreements. While 
where such a requirement was not part of the regulatory requirement, the terms of reference were usually 
only outlined in the agreement. As explained by ShSc-12:  
“the level of detail varies. In some banks, under the supervision of the Central Bank, there is a 
certain level of detail. Since the Central Bank places upon them a specimen for the agreement 
which is very detailed. In other cases, agreements only summarise the main duties…while these 
are adequate they are not in such detail as in countries where central banks enforce a specimen 
contract”.   
It appears that the reason behind the matter of not signing an agreement goes back to the initial concept 
upon which the Shari’ah supervisory board was appointed. Initially, their role was to be considered as 
providing a voluntary service. However, over time, the work that the SSB performs, or is expected to 
perform, has developed as the industry developed, and their role/function can no longer be considered 
as a voluntary service. The specialisation required in performing the role of SSB has developed into a 
profession. As clarified by ShSc-05: 
“Initially when Shaikh X (may he rest in peace) first established the Shari’ah supervisory board 
in [Jurisdiction] he had the concept that this duty is to be performed as voluntary. And so, in 
such a case, we do not need a contractual agreement between the Shari’ah supervisory board 
and the institution…And that is why here in [Jurisdiction] the Shari’ah supervisory board are 
assigned and the board of directors decides on their terms. Even we do not know how much we 
take, because it is not determined [the remuneration is considered as a gift]. I don’t think it is 
right, because the Shari’ah supervisory board role is no longer a fatwa process or a calculation 
process; it is a specialisation, a profession…”.  
 
 
																																								 																				
213 The reference is to the executive committee that is a subset of the SSB. For more details, see section 7.3.1. on Shari’ah 
Member’s Performance-Function.	
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Table 8.3 - Focused Coding 2 For Does the Agreement of Appointment that You Signed Clearly 
State the TOR Regarding Your Mandates and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme No Contract 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-02, ShSc-03, ShSc-08  Only procedures 
ShSh-04, ShSc-13 No contract and no procedures 
 
In jurisdictions where the regulators have set an outline for the SSB, the procedures are set by the SSB 
as per the regulatory requirements and are endorsed by the Central Bank, as noted by ShSc-03: “In 
[Jurisdiction] ... It is left to the parties involved... we perform our role as per what is stated by the 
Central Bank, and as per the duties endorsed by the SSB itself as procedures and we perform 
accordingly. We prepare it [working procedures], but we have to have it endorsed by the Central 
Bank…”. While in jurisdictions where the SSB TOR is not clear, the SSB have tried to overcome them 
by having internal procedures as ShSc-05 notes, “In [Jurisdiction] the practice is still vague…and as 
such we do not have agreements…The SSB has prepared internal procedures, where it identifies the 
role and responsibilities of the SSB, and related parties... The board of directors has endorsed the 
procedures and they have been adapted. This at least compensates for this deficiency”.  However, not 
all procedures were detailed as confirmed by ShSc-11: “there are banks that have procedures that are 
of one page and those are of 10 pages”. 
 
ShScs have a preference for having some form of obligations, so that everything is clear among the 
parties and so they request it and have a preference to see it in the regulation for it to be obligatory, as 
expressed by ShSch-04: “today there are no agreements. In some institutions agreements used to take 
place at the request of the Shari’ah Board, meaning...we feel there needs to be a law…this is supposed 
to be the work of the Central Bank. It is supposed to determine [the duties and responsibilities of the 
Shari’ah board] and enforce it on the institution”. 
 
Though the preference is to have such a requirement in the regulation, it appears that it is not always 
followed. Some SSBs have taken on board and implemented procedures that they have drawn up and 
endorsed among themselves, as Shari’ah scholars, with regards to issuing fatwas. They do not have 
internal procedures and have not signed a contractual agreement with the IFI, even though it is a 
requirement. Based on the concept that the details (the SSB’s role and responsibilities) are in the 
regulations, and as such, this is more than sufficient, there is no need to have a signed agreement. The 
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understanding being that the regulation’s (the Law’s) power and status of enforcement is higher than a 
contractual agreement, as ShSc-13 explains:  
“We have an Ameeri Law issued by his highness the Ameer with regards to organising the 
Shari’ah boards and their powers and there are instructions issued by the [Regulator] on the 
duties of shari’ah boards… We don’t have an agreement. It is assumed that we have agreements, 
but we have instructions [being the Regulations] and the system [being the law] and they are 
stronger than the agreement. There are no internal procedures at IFI. We have endorsed 
resolutions from one of the forums that had taken place with regards to the fatwa procedures 
and how they are conducted214…”  
 
8.2.1.2 Appointment 
 
Appointment in general gives an indication on the line of reporting, or in reality who has the influence 
on those reporting, and to whom one is accountable. Overall, as part of the SSB’s function in the 
organisation chart, its line of reporting is to the general assembly, the shareholders, and the owners of 
the IFI. In order for the SSB to obtain and maintain independence, the SSB insists on certain matters, 
as ShSc-02 notes: “we always place a condition on the IFI that the SSB is appointed by the general 
assembly, and not the BOD. Secondly, we make sure that the organisational chart shows us as an 
independent party from the executive management. Thirdly, we insist that there is permanent Shari’ah 
supervision department. That it has employees, and submits its reports to the SSB and informs the 
executive management”.  
 
Table 8.4 - Shari'ah Scholar Appointment 
Interview Question Who do you (as SSB) usually report to? I.e. who appoints you and to whom 
do you report? 
Focused Coding Subthemes/remarks 
1 General Assembly by name 
2 General Assembly general approval 
Concluding Theme The SSB is appointed by the General Assembly 
 
																																								 																				
214 The following are the headings in the two-page procedure that was provided to the researcher: The adaptation of contract 
(relationship between the SSB and the SSB and the Fatwa process); Rules on IFI asking for another opinion from another 
SSB; Controls in prohibiting financial fatwas; Controls of consenting and permitting financial fatwas.	
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Generally, the SSB is appointed at the Annual General Assembly (AGM) by the shareholders of the IFI. 
However, the shareholders do not always appoint them by name, but leave it to the IFI’s senior 
management to select the members of the SSB.  
 
Table 8.5 - Focused Coding 1 For Who Do You (as SSB) Usually Report to? I.e. Who Appoints 
You and to Whom Do You Report? 
Subtheme General Assembly by Name 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-01, ShSc-02, ShSc-03, ShSc-04, ShSc-
05, ShSc-06 
General Assembly by name upon nomination 
by the BODs 
 
In most cases, the SSB is appointed by the General Assembly by name, “After the names are approved 
by the General Assembly, the board of directors are delegated to contract, so we sign [the contract] 
with the board of directors” (ShSc-05). 
 
However, although the appointment of the SSB is at the general assembly, the selection process is not 
completely independent. The shareholders base their selection on the nomination provided by the BODs, 
and this matter of nomination is a cause for concern for some of the SSB members. The concern being 
that at times this process of nomination of a scholar depends on how cooperative he is with the IFI and 
in approving their products, as expressed by ShSc-06:   
“For independence purposes, we follow the general assembly… but, what is currently 
happening, unfortunately, is that the board of directors are nominating. No doubt because most 
of the shareholders don’t know the scholar, so they [BOD] recommend and nominate and in 
the event of any dispute, it goes back to the general assembly to decide. But in some places, 
that this is not the case, and it is the BOD that are making the decisions [selecting the SSB 
members] …of course this is not right. Because you cannot have independence, you are 
threatened at any moment, if you did not approve this product; it means ma’salama [farewell]”.  
 
Even though the mechanism is better than it used to be, whereby the appointment was by the BOD and 
now it is the general assembly, there is still room for improvement. Since the shareholders rely most of 
the time on the BOD and very rarely question their decisions, the aspiration is to get the regulator to 
intervene more, so that the threat to independence is reduced. One scholar explains the reason for this 
is that it is in human nature that certain things do affect us unconsciously, even if it is not admitted, and 
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that it is important “…to make sure that no member is dismissed without providing a comprehensive 
and clear statement and the approval of the Central Bank, not just a notice. I don’t think have been 
treated in a satisfactory manner. Leaving it to every member and his conscientious [in that his Shari’ah 
decisions are not affected by the concern of being re-appointed]. And even though many members say 
that these things do not affect their independence … we are kidding ourselves” (ShSc-07). As such, the 
hope is to get the regulators to intervene, as expressed by ShSc-04: “in my opinion the Central Bank 
needs to have a role. Any Shari’ah member whose contract does not get renewed, needs to attend the 
general assembly and talk in front of the shareholders”. 
 
In some jurisdictions, the approval of the regulator is a must, as indicated by ShSch-13 “appointment 
is through the General Meeting of each bank and the approval of [Regulator], is a must”. 
 
Table 8.6 - Focused Coding 2 For Who Do You (as SSB) Usually Report to? I.e. Who Appoints 
You and to Whom Do You Report? 
Subtheme General Assembly General Approval 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-05, ShSc-06 General Assembly general approval no names 
selected 
 
The SSB member could be a member on several IFIs and in some jurisdictions he is appointed by name 
by the general assembly, while in other jurisdictions, the BOD selects him, after having been given the 
authorisation to do so by the general assembly. As ShSc-05 explains, “here in [Jurisdiction], the 
Shari’ah supervisory board is assigned by the AGM and the board of directors are authorised to decide 
and hire them.”  
 
The SSB, whether appointed directly or indirectly by the general assembly, the report that they produce, 
as part of the IFI’s Shari’ah compliance, is presented to them at year-end at the annual general assembly, 
“Usually the SSB submits it [the SSB report] to the general assembly through the board of directors” 
(ShSc-08). 
 
 
 
293		
8.2.1.3 Mandates and Responsibilities 
 
For the effective performance of the SSB, its mandates and responsibilities need to be clear and 
understood. The following section looks into the ShScs’ understanding of their mandates and 
responsibilities as members of the IFI’s SSB. 
 
Table 8.7 - Mandates and Responsibilities 
Interview 
Question 
What are your mandates and responsibilities? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Providing Sharia’h legal opinion and indirect follow-up 
2 Providing Sharia’h legal opinion and direct follow-up 
Concluding 
Theme 
Shari’ah legal opinion and follow-up on its implementation whether directly 
or indirectly 
 
In general, the main understanding of the SSB mandate is to give its Shari’ah opinion, i.e. Fatwa, in 
addition to there being an overall understanding of the requirement for a follow-up on the proper 
implementation of the Fatwa. Yet, where the responses differ is on whether the follow-up is performed 
directly or indirectly by the SSB. Whether the SSB conducts it itself, or assigns it to the Shari’ah 
department of the IFI, and the SSB supervises through the reports that the Shari’ah department produces. 
 
Table 8.8 - Focused Coding 1 For What are Your Mandates and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme Providing Sharia’h legal opinion and indirect 
follow-up 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-01, ShSc-02, ShSc-03, ShSc-04, 
ShSc-05, ShSc-06, ShSc-07, ShSc-08, 
ShSc-09, ShSc-10, ShSc-11, ShSc-13 
Giving Fatwa (legal opinion) and supervise audit 
 
The overall understanding from among the scholars is that the role of the SSB is to provide its Shari’ah 
opinion, Fatwa and supervision of its implementation. Their role is to respond to inquiries/questions 
and provide their Shari’ah opinion on the products/investments presented to them. In addition to 
following the issuing of a Fatwa, make sure that the Shari’ah department performs its role in the 
implementation. The Shari’ah department’s role is to pass the Fatwa on to the related department and 
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to follow-up on the proper execution of the Fatwa through performing an audit. As elaborated by        
ShSc-03: 
“We are divided into two divisions: the first is Fatwa or what we call the decision, and the 
second is supervision. The fatwa and taking decisions on related questions and agreements… 
and the other part, is the supervision which most of the time is executed by appointing 
supervisors [within the Shari’ah department], we supervise those supervisors... so it’s two 
parallel lines. Taking the decision and the following of the implementation and the soundness 
of the decision, both take place at the same time…”.  
Moreover, the Shari’ah department usually generates regular reports to the SSB on the extent of 
compliance of the IFI, as noted by ShSc-10:“the Shari’ah board…look at the reports either quarterly, 
semi-annually and annually is on the activities of the institution, and its compliance with Shari’ah 
board’s decisions.” Furthermore, the SSB reviews these reports for any violations or shortfall in 
compliance, which it then discusses with the Shari’ah department, as noted by ShSc-02: “we review 
these reports and if there is any shortfalls we call upon the department to discuss such shortfalls…”  
 
Even though in some instances the title of the SSB indicates that supervision is to be undertaken by the 
SSB member directly, due to the practice having always given such a role to audit, the SSB have not 
done so themselves. This was acknowledged by ShSc-13: “…in actual fact the board should perform 
the role of fatwa and the role of supervision, meaning audit. But from long ago there is a Shari’ah audit 
set-up that performs this role and raises its observations to the Shari’ah board.”  
 
It appears that the weight of following up on the implementation of the SSB’s decisions falls heavily 
on the internal Shari’ah department of the IFI, due to the fact that not all members of the SSB are 
available full time, and that the Shari’ah department is in contact on a regular daily basis with the IFI. 
Such a responsibility means it is important that the Shari’ah department is independent from the 
influence of the IFI’s senior management and employees. ShSc-06 confirms the importance of 
independence and explains the current set-up of the Shari’ah department: “…it is expected in every 
financial institution, that there is a supervision department, and internal Shari’ah department. This 
internal Shari’ah supervisor [member of the Shari’ah department] technically follows the Shari’ah 
board, but administratively is under the board of directors. He is the eye of the Shari’ah board and for 
this, he needs to be independent. The board of directors has no right to dismiss him without the Shari’ah 
board’s approval and justification”.  
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However, since the internal audit function itself is not independent from the IFI, some scholars consider 
that with the Shari’ah department supervisors/officers also falling administratively under the IFI 
management this affects their independence and as such their performance. The IFI’s management 
controls the appointment and salaries of those officers/supervisors, and as such, this has some effect on 
the employees. In that since, with such matters under the IFI’s management control, the employees of 
the Shari’ah department might be influenced in trying to keep on the IFI’s management’s right side, 
which could jeopardise the quality of the compliance/audit reports being generated. Therefore, the 
matter of independence remains a concern as expressed by ShSc-04: 
“In my opinion I consider it problematic that for the supervision to be in a strong position, 
administratively it should follow the board [the SSB]. This is my opinion. But, unfortunately, 
till today this does not exist in Islamic banks, overall… If you do not provide them with the 
sense of security, whether it is the members or the supervisors, how is he going to perform his 
role?”  
 
Table 8.9 - Focused Coding 2 For What are Your Mandates and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme Providing Shari’ah legal opinion and perform audit 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-12 Fatwa and perform audit 
 
While in most cases the scholars responded that their role in the audit aspect was supervision, one of 
the scholars stated otherwise. ShSc-12 claims to the SBB to be performing both roles: “The Shari’ah 
board member in all the boards performs fatwa and Shari’ah audit. Shari’ah audit that he submits to 
the general assembly. Which as per the terminology is known as external Shari’ah audit…we in the 
Shari’ah board that we have, the level of control in it, is high... Meaning the Shari’ah board audits all 
the authorised transactions to arrive at the information and provide its final decision on the extent of 
compliance to the general assembly. The Shari’ah board’s report is directed to the shareholders”. They 
were able to perform both roles (fatwa and audit) due to being a Shari’ah firm and had adequate staff 
to perform both roles, reducing reliance on the IFI internal Shari’ah department and enhancing 
independence, as ShSc-12 elaborated: “we as a Shari’ah board are a part of an advisory firm, we offer 
the service. As such, this part [the SSB’s reliance on the internal Shari’ah audit performed internally] 
does not exist, which is a weak point”. 
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8.3 SSB MEMBER’S PERFORMANCE AND INDEPENDENCE 
 
The skills, tools that the SSB member requires to perform and function efficiently and effectively, are 
examined in this section. The independence of the members and the SSB is an essential feature that 
cannot be compromised in order to maintain the credibility of its decisions and performance.  
 
8.3.1 SSB Member’s Performance-Function  
 
What the ShSc member requires or uses as a basis in order to perform his duties and obligations is 
summarised in Table 8.10 below. 
 
Table 8.10 - SSB Member's Performance-Function 
Interview Question How do you as a member of the SSB operate with regards to meeting your 
duties and responsibilities? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Having administrative competencies 
2 Following procedural systems 
Concluding Theme Mainly duties and responsibilities are being performed based on possessing certain administrative competencies and having procedural systems in place 
 
ShScs try to perform their duties and responsibilities as efficiently as they can because it affects their 
reputation. Their outcome and decisions made are usually based on the information provided and the 
documents presented to them by the IFI and its employees. There are times when the decisions made 
were not as proficient as they ought to be, due to not receiving adequate information at the time, as 
experienced by ShSc-06: “Employees sometimes do not provide you with a true picture of the matter, 
so you decide on something different to what you imagined. You provide your opinion on the information 
and image of the thing. Then after that, you discover that the matter was not like that. Now you can 
withdraw. You can eliminate, you can object on the structure”. There are also times when employees 
of IFI take up the initiative of introducing new products prior to obtaining the SSB’s approval, thinking 
that it is similar to a product already introduced, as ShSc-06 continues to explain: 
“Sometimes, some employees conjecture, and offer a product [without SSB approval], thinking 
that there is nothing wrong, from a conceptual point of view. But there could be one condition 
that damages everything and he offers it and then the Shari’ah board hears that there is a 
product that was launched. Or after offering it they put it forward to the SSB. He [the IFI’s 
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employee] is at fault. Now, either the IFI stops it, or amends it, if possible to amend, and 
reprimands the employee…”. 
 
Having said that, according to the ShScs, in order to be able to perform one’s duties, certain 
administrative skills are required, along with having procedural systems in place. Table 8.11 to           
Table 8.12 below cover this in more detail.  
 
Table 8.11 - Focused Coding 1 For How Do You as a Member of the SSB Operate With Regards 
to Meeting Your Duties and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme Having Administrative 
Competencies 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-02, ShSc-03, ShSc-05, ShSc-06, ShSc-11 Time management 
ShSc-02, ShSc-04, ShSc-06 Know-how/experience 
ShSc-07 Professionalism 
 
Most of the ShScs were able to meet their duties and responsibilities through proper time management 
of their own time, and some of them, through regular weekly meetings, as noted by ShSc-03: “Weekly 
meetings with supervisors and the relevant department in the department that we call the Shari’ah 
department, in addition to the regular reporting”. In addition to requesting to be provided with the 
documents for review ahead of time, to be able to prepare, as put forward by ShSc-07: “I have to do 
whatever I can to meet the responsibilities appointed to me. So, if there is a set meeting and there are 
agreements to be discussed in the meeting, I make sure that they send the agreements within adequate 
time, not two days before the meeting or at the Shari’ah board meeting, so as it’s a quick read. This 
doesn’t work”.  
 
Moreover, technology has contributed to the time management factor, in that it has facilitated 
communication and coordinating, for a smoother performance, “time management, and then the modern 
means of communication has now smoothened things. Instead of, for example, having to travel back 
and forth every week, they send you the agreements through e-mails, and you review it and send it back. 
Meaning the modern communication has reduced the load of work  (ShSc-05). 
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Some ShScs, in addition to handling their time efficiently, consider experience and knowledge to 
contribute greatly to their ability to perform. Due to experience, they are able to identify the weak areas, 
and concentrate on them during the review of documents. On this ShSc-02 claims: “When one has spent 
a long time in this area, he knows the areas of weaknesses in the agreements, where are the areas that 
need focusing on…we concentrate on the origins of the agreement, on what it is built on, the price, the 
underlying asset, the conditions required. Hence, even your reading to the agreement is reduced due to 
your experience ...”. ShScs have also benefited by being members of several SSB, whereby similar 
matters/products are sometimes discussed, and by reviewing and commenting on one SSB, the work is 
also done towards their input in the other SSB. Moreover, ShScs have also started to share work with 
newly established IFI. Those documents that are common in IFI, and on which the ShScs have reviewed 
and standardised a format, they share them with the newly established IFI. Regarding this ShSc-02 
confirms:  
“After a period of close to 45 years, many of its agreements have become normal, and new 
agreements are few. I wouldn’t say rare, but have become less. For example, after a bank is 
established, we bring them our agreements. We have read and approved them; we give it to 
them. How much effort have we saved them? And we do not have to review them. The bank 
discusses any changes it makes on them and not the whole agreement. This without doubt 
reduced a lot of time on us”. 
 
Over time, some ShScs have gained profound understanding and experience that has helped them to be 
able to attempt to resolve matters, and not only provide an opinion as experienced by ShSc-04: “The 
experience broadens the perspectives a lot on how to handle matters, and ways to deal with it. If you 
face a problem, you have to think, how you are going to resolve it. Meaning I do not stop at the problem 
and that’s it, I think how I can resolve it”. 
 
Some scholars, even with proper time management, and experience cannot see themselves being able 
to handle being on too many SSBs. As such, they have limited their Sharia’h board membership, as 
noted by ShSc-11 and ShSc-06 respectively: “Before I was on many Shari’ah boards, but now I have 
limited it to less than 10.” “Sometimes some people, without doubt, they have over 200 [SBB 
membership], they are to be asked about, how do they cope? Maybe by virtue of their long years of 
experience, the matter has become easy…But I do not see this capability in me”. While other scholars 
view it differently, and handle the matter of being on many boards as professionals and professional 
firms. The IFI prior to appointing them is aware of their multiple Shari’ah board seats and they are 
bound by the confidentiality agreement that they sign with the IFI. Furthermore, the SSB’s 
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responsibility is not a promotional one but is rather limited to Shari’ah products and its compliance as 
ShSc-07 explains:  
“I don’t think there is a problem [with being a member on several boards]. You have the legal 
institutions, financial audit institutions performing audit and it provides these services to more 
than one institution. The Shari’ah board’s role has nothing to do with marketing and promoting. 
The Shari’ah board’s responsibility is limited to the extent of the product and the working 
environment as whole being Shari’ah compliant or not, only within this framework”.  
 
However, ShSc-07 also notes that although the role the SSB member performs is a professional one 
(meaning a member can be on the SBB of several competing IFIs, in order to do it professionally and 
efficiently he would need to be solely dedicated to this role. “No doubt if a Shari’ah board member has 
a job commitment, meaning that for example he teaches at the university, and even if it is only one or 
two subjects in a term. And at the same time, he is a member, in let us say 60 Shari’ah boards, of course 
[on it affecting his performance-function adversely]”.  
 
Table 8.12 - Focused Coding 2 For How Do You as a Member of the SSB Operate With Regards 
to Meeting Your Duties and Responsibilities? 
Subtheme Following Procedural Systems 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-01, ShSc-08, ShSc-10, ShSc-12 As per approved working procedures 
ShSc-01, ShSc-02, ShSc-05, ShSc-13 As per setup established within SSB 
ShSc-01, ShSc-02, ShSc-03, ShSc-05,    
ShSc-12 
By standardisation of agreements and checklists 
for reviewing products 
 
Scholars perform their duties and responsibilities as per the agreed upon working procedures on: how 
matters are handled; how the review process is undertaken; how inquiries are put forward and how they 
are dealt with and so forth; with all those involved performing their expected role. The SSB tries to be 
involved right from the beginning of the process, as ShSc-13 comments: “it is necessary that all the 
transactions are presented to us from the beginning; from when they first start working on it until it is 
ended. All of it, we are with them step by step, until we place the controls and the standards and we 
look at it from a Shari’ah perspective only… And this is before the execution of the transaction and 
after the execution we also audit the transaction [through supervising the audit process]”. This is in 
addition to having to meet certain governance regulatory requirements, such as a number of meetings 
per year.   
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Some SSBs, in order to be able to implement the working procedures, have created an executive 
committee from within its members, that deal with urgent matters, undertake further research when 
need be for any inquiry or product/investment, review documents and coordinate with the IFI’s internal 
Shari’ah department. And in dealing with urgent matters, ShSc-02 explains: 
“We have setup an executive committee. Which, in reality, deals with the urgent, quick matters 
that the bank wants to make quick decisions on. …and no delays on their investment decisions. 
The executive committee, most of the time it looks into the urgent matters, and gives the opinion. 
After that, at the earliest Shari’ah board meeting, it puts forward its decision, the executive 
committee’s decision to the Shari’ah board for endorsement or amendment or to see what they 
see”.  
Moreover, any amendments that the SSB makes, at a later date (when they meet), after the executive 
committee has given its opinion, is not considered a contradiction nor does it affect its implementation 
to that date, as ShSc-02 goes on to elaborate:  
“We have a principle with the jurists, in the Islamic Shari’ah, the ijtihad [effort] is not 
invalidated by a similar ijtihad [effort]... So what went before [the period between the executive 
committee’s decision and the SSB meeting], goes as per the executive committee’s ijtihad. But 
what is forthcoming [post SSB meeting] goes, by the Shari’ah board decision”  
 
Furthermore, once the SSB has made a decision on an agreement/contract, it is taken as standard which 
the Shari’ah department uses as a base when reviewing the agreements that are submitted for the SSB’s 
approval. Agreements that are submitted to the Shari’ah department that are similar to previously 
submitted agreements are reviewed by the Shari’ah department and only the changes/differences are 
put forward to the SSB for their input. The Shari’ah department follows the same concept on all 
matters/transactions that the IFI considers entering into and puts forward for Shari’ah opinion, as ShSc-
01 explains: “When an institution is considering entering into a project, it from the start gets the 
Shari’ah department involved, at the least. The Shari’ah department sees if there are Fatwa/Shari’ah 
decisions around the subject, if it has been reviewed before or not. So if it is something new, then it has 
to be presented to the SSB, and so forth”. Such a process has reduced the load on the SSB as admitted 
by ShSc-02: “this has simplified a lot of things… we check that it has not been changed through 
Shari’ah supervision, in that all the agreements that the Shari’ah board has approved are the ones that 
are being used”. Similarly, the same concept applies to supervising a Shari’ah audit. Those performing 
the audit have a checklist upon which they base their review of product/investment compliance. 
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8.3.2 SSB Member’s Independence 
 
This section looks into the independence of the ShScs and how they try to maintain their independence, 
so as not to affect their performance and hence decision. 
 
Table 8.13 - SSB Member's Independence 
Interview Question In your association with the IFI as a member, how do you try and maintain 
your independence? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Treated as profession 
2 Through no association physically and mentally 
3 Provided in the regulation 
4 Self-consciousness 
Concluding Theme There are several factors that affect independence in relation to effective performance from authoritative, to professional to it being a self-control 
matter. 
 
The ability to maintain independence is based on some form of control or treatment of matters.             
Table 8.14 to Table 8.17 provides the various views of the scholars and their responses. 
 
Table 8.14 - Focused Coding 1 For In Your Association With the IFI as a Member, How Do You 
Try and Maintain Your Independence? 
Subtheme Treat it as a profession 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-01, ShSc-09 Maintaining confidentiality and independence 
 
Some scholars linked independence to the ability to be able to perform their role without transferring 
information from one IFI to another. They looked at it according to their ability to maintain 
confidentiality and compared it to other professions that deal with several competing organisations at 
the same time, as commented by ShSc-01: “Auditors provide services to several establishments and 
consultant provides services to several establishments. They all sign on to keep confidentiality”.  
 
Even though many see that maintaining independence is not easy, when the Shari’ah scholar is on 
multiple boards, not all see it as a concern, due to treating it as any other profession, as ShSc-09 explains: 
“There is no conflict, because I am only an independent member. My situation is like any external 
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advisory company...like E& Y, audit several banks. This does not affect that it audits this bank and this 
bank…. The same thing with the scholar… This does not intervene with his work, never.”  
 
Table 8.15 - Focused Coding 2 For In Your Association With the IFI as a Member, How Do You 
Try and Maintain your Independence? 
Subtheme No Association  
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-03, ShSc-06 No association physically and/or mentally 
ShSc-02, ShSc-05 No income association 
 
Some scholars consider that they attain their independence by not being associated or being 
disconnected from the IFI in some way or another: Physically and mentally. ShSc-12 explains this: 
“Independence has to be real. That the scholar is not an employee of the institution. He has not received 
any financial facility. Not a significant shareholder or a board member or so and so”. Moreover, he 
goes on to emphasise the importance of physical disassociation, to the extent of personal relationships 
and dealings: “also in his practice, has to also be independent, to be mentally independent. Meaning 
that he does not fall under, or place himself in position that tarnishes his independence; like personal 
relationships, through financial relationships and so forth”.  
 
The following figure presents the level of the interviewed ShSc’s association with the IFI on which the 
scholars were on their SSB. 
  
Figure 8.1 - Shari'ah Scholar's Association with the IFI 
 
7.69%
76.92%
15.38%
92.31%
23.08%
84.62%
On the BOD/Mang of IFI
Client of the IFI
Own shares in same IFI
Percentage
As
so
cia
tio
n 
wi
th
 IF
I
Shari'ah Scholar's Association with the IFI
No
Yes
303		
 
At the time of the interview, the principle of association was questioned in terms of whether the scholar 
was: on the BOD or part of the management; or if he was a client of the IFI or had ownership in the IFI. 
From the responses, it appears that with the exception of one scholar215, they are not part of the BODs 
or its management (92.31%-12 count). Not being on the BOD or management was taken as a set 
standard rule, taken up by the understanding of all the ShScs. For those that owned shares in the IFI         
(2 or 15.38%), their ownership was not of a significant amount (less than 5%). One of the scholars 
mentioned that even though it is not a significant percentage, he abides by the insider rules of reporting 
such ownership. While another stated that he has taken it as a rule not to own shares in the IFI that he 
is an SSB member of. Even though, according to him, the idea of ownership (less than 5%) creating a 
conflict of interest is not seen in such a way by all. According to him, there are two views on this: “One 
that does not consider owning shares (a non-controlling interest) in the IFI as conflict of interest and 
the other that considers owning shares (a non-controlling interest) in IFI a conflict of interest”          
(ShSc-05). Most of them (10 or 76.92%) were clients of the IFI since they need to have accounts with 
IFI, especially since they are preaching Islamic banking. However, in addition to having an account, 
some scholars have taken financial facilities from the IFI. Some from the same IFI that they are on, and 
in such cases have disclosed such a matter, and others make the effort when it comes to taking financial 
facilities, for it to be from another IFI to the one where they are on their SSB. 
 
Even though some think it affects the SSB’s performance, not having to be dependent on the 
remuneration as a source of income, along with having another job, it provides the scholar with 
independence and the ability to leave in the event he thinks it is affecting his performance. As ShSc-05 
explains: “first thing I am not an employee at the bank. And if I felt that there was any pressure, I would 
resign. Since I am a lecturer at the university, I do not have a problem. The one who has a problem is 
who is an employee. Not being an employee of the bank gives him strength with regards to being 
independent shari’ah board member, in my opinion. No one can impose their opinion on you”.  
 
Table 8.16 - Focused Coding 3 For In Your Association With the IFI as a Member, How Do You 
Try and Maintain Your Independence? 
Subtheme Given in the regulation 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-13 In line with law and Central Bank instructions 
																																								 																				
215 He is head of Internal Shari'ah Supervision and a member of SSB of the same IFI. He is also a member on another IFI’s 
SSB.	
304		
 
Some scholars draw their independence from the regulations, which when implemented provides them 
with it, “I do not have any connection with them [the financial institutions]. We have our full 
independence, backed by the law and the Central Bank’s instructions” (ShSc-13). 
 
Table 8.17 - Focused Coding 4 For In Your Association With the IFI as a  Member, How Do 
You Try and Maintain Your Independence? 
Subtheme Self-consciousness 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-03, ShSc-10 Reputation 
ShSc-04 Self-control 
 
With some scholars, it is a matter of trying to maintain reputation, “the scholar, like the institution has 
his reputation. He quickly loses his reputation if he falls into such a problem [not able to resist pressure]. 
The strength of the member and its importance and its status is derived from many things, the most 
important of which is independence” (ShSc-10). Furthermore, as ShSc-03 comments, to perform one’s 
duties and responsibilities effectively is a matter of being able to handle the duties that have been 
assigned as per the role to be performed, “if one can handle the assigned duties, he accepts, if he can’t 
[handle what is being assigned, due to added pressure], he decides on this matter. Because in return his 
contract will not be renewed. For it is annual relationship. The general assembly has the right not to 
renew”. 
 
While with others, maintaining independence is a self-conscious matter, as ShSc-04 notes: “This means 
questioning, what we call self-censorship. A responsibility in front of Allah before the people”. On this 
note, ShSc-07 comments that being self-conscious of one’s behaviour, is not sufficient to maintain 
independence, especially if performance is linked to remuneration and renewal with the IFI. He 
considers this can only be controlled by an authoritative third independent party: “This third party can 
only be governmental, central authority. To make sure that the Shari’ah board performs its duties with 
adequate freedom…to make sure a member is not disposed without a clear comprehensive statement 
and approval of the Central Bank, not only notification”. 
 
In addition to ShSc-07’s observation concerning independence, attention to the number of terms a 
scholar can be reappointed needs to be looked into. Since other than what was discussed above 
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concerning the member’s selection and appointment, the ShSc’s term is open, both regarding the 
number of terms he can serve along with the length of his terms. The number of terms that a scholar 
can be re-elected is open, there is no regulatory cap on the number of times a scholar can be re-elected, 
which can affect the scholar’s independence by being associated with an IFI for too long, “For us it is 
open, there is no limit imposed…” (ShSc-03). 
 
8.4 SHARI’AH COMPLIANCE AND SHARI’AH RISK 
 
As seen above, under the Mandates and Responsibilities section, an internal Shari’ah audit/review is 
performed mainly by the internal Shari’ah department of the IFI. All departments within the IFI 
undertake an audit, and depending on the importance of the department determines whether it is audited 
more than once a year. Usually the Shari’ah audit plan is reviewed earlier in the year with the SSB, and 
once agreed on, the Shari’ah auditors check on the executed transaction if they have been implemented 
as per the SSB’s decisions.  
 
The review is mainly performed on the basis of a sample taken depending on the size of the institution, 
the number of transactions, and the number of reoccurring mistakes but not less than the international 
standard of 10%, as ShSc-03 notes: “as the mistakes are reduced the percentage is reduced... depending 
on the mistakes that we encounter. For example, … you have checked there for one year and no mistakes, 
so now reduce the percentage to 40 or 30 or 20 depending on how comfortable we see the transactions 
are as per the rules and standards”.  
 
8.4.1. Shari’ah Compliance Reporting 
 
Shari’ah compliance is maintained through performing a Shari’ah audit. However, the results of the 
review/audit that is undertaken are not necessarily reported in the annual report that is presented to the 
shareholders at the general assembly. Table 8.18 below summarises whether Shari'ah compliance is 
reported or not and how. 
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Table 8.18 - Shari'ah Compliance Reporting 
Interview 
Question 
Have the SSB encountered any Shari’ah compliance issues? Have they been 
documented/reported? Have they been made available to shareholders, 
investors and local authorities? 
Focused Coding Subtheme/remarks 
1 Reported  
2 Not reported 
Concluding 
Theme 
Some non-compliance matters are reported while others are not and at times 
when they are reported it is in a general form. 
 
It appears that it is not always the case that the details of the outcome of the Shari’ah audit that is 
performed are reported. Although corrections of Shari’ah non-compliance matters are taken up, the 
disclosure of it mainly depends on the SSB’s policy on disclosure. 
 
Table 8.19 - Focused Coding 1 For Have They Been Documented/Reported? Have They Been 
Made Available to Shareholders, Investors and Local Authorities? 
Subtheme Reported if  
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-01, ShSc-04 Intentional  
ShSc-05, ShSc-07, ShSc-09 Significant effect  
ShSc-11 Continuously repeated 
ShSc-06, ShSc-08, ShSc-13 When reported, reported in general 
 
For some of the SSBs when non-compliance matters arise during the review, it is looked at from the 
aspect of whether it was an intentional mistake or not. If the IFI’s policy was not to violate the Shari’ah 
principles and the error that occurred was more due to an employee’s lack of understanding and 
improper procedures, it is usually rectified and not disclosed in the annual Shari’ah report. Any 
violations/non-compliance is reviewed and appraised to certain criteria or a colour coding scheme, as 
to whether they are reported in the annual report or not. As ShSc-04 explains: “the level of error, [as 
per the financial institution’s criteria] affects my appraisal. A mistake is what they call a big mistake, 
medium mistake, no mistake. So if it is very high, this means that if it generated profits, we purify it... It 
is mentioned [in the annual report] especially if high”.   
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Another instance where the SSB does report to the general assembly is when the IFI is not heeding to 
them and keeps repeating the mistake, so as a form of indirect reprimand, it discloses it, as noted by 
ShSc-11: “If the management overdid the matter or repeated the error it is written [in the report]. For 
example, we this time [reference to the last report produced] we found they repeated, so we put it in the 
report. So that the shareholders know and the faulted the management harshly”.  
 
However, when the reporting takes place on significant matters, it is not always in detail, but more often 
than not, it is in a general form. On that, the term ‘routine mistakes’ has been developed and used, so 
as to give the general idea of compliance having been undertaken, as ShSc-13 elaborates: “we derived 
this phrase’ we say: the Shari’ah board has reviewed the products, agreements and transactions and 
they were in accordance with the Shari’ah principles and rules, in whole. Why we say this. There is a 
difference in the language from when I say, ‘in whole’ and ‘as a whole’. As a whole means, all the 
transactions are correct; in whole means, two to three four mistakes, that is normal in all institutions”. 
 
Such non-compliance details are not always reported to the regulator either, yet it is accessible to them 
if they want to view/inspect it. This is confirmed by ShSc-06, “We don’t report it to the Central Bank, 
but it is available in the minutes. The minutes are assumed confidential, but the Central Bank can look 
at what it wants. Sometimes they ask”. 
 
In most institutions, violations are documented based on the severity of the violation, and some rank 
them into high, medium and low, while others colour code them (as mentioned above). There are no set 
ways of documenting non-compliance in addition to the criteria of ranking that is set which is subjective 
from one SSB/IFI to another. The way they are reported/documented and categorised varies from one 
institution to another. There is no set standard (set specimen) of such a non-compliance report, as there 
is with the conventional audit, as ShSc-09 notes: “Everyone and his way [in classifying compliance and 
documenting the audit]. Unlike the external auditors who have procedures that they follow 
internationally, we as Shari’ah auditors, have our own way. It can be developed, because we are still 
developing. So, you will find one Shari’ah auditor has his way in writing it, I write my report in different 
way, a third Shari’ah auditor might write it better then him”. 
 
 
308		
Table 8.20 - Focused Coding 2 For Have They Been Documented/Reported? Have They Been 
Made Available to Shareholders, Investors and Local Authorities? 
Subtheme Not Reported 
Interview with Remarks 
ShSc-02 No financial effect 
ShSc-03, ShSc-10, ShSc-12 Protecting reputation 
 
There are times when the SSB does not see the value of reporting a non-compliance matter, especially 
if it has not had a financial effect. It depends on the SSB’s policy on disclosure and reporting whether 
it does so or not. Reputation is usually a decision factor in the matter. Whether the reputation’s impact 
is greater than the financial impact. There are times when as per Shari’ah principles the violation is 
considered severe, yet its financial effect is much smaller and if reported would have a negative impact. 
In such instances the SSB would record it in the minutes of the meeting and would follow-up with the 
management so it is rectified but not necessarily report it in the annual report. Sh.Sc-03 rationalises: “it 
[SSB] forced the executive committee to follow-up and provide it with regular updates ‘til it is informed 
that it has been internally rectified, instead of putting it forward in the report, because this could open 
doors of inquiries.” Furthermore, non-compliance matters that occur are usually only reported to the 
general assembly when it is a significant matter, due to it being a public open meeting and the negative 
reputational effect it could have on the IFI, as ShSc-09 remarks: “You are now at the general assembly, 
meaning shareholders are sitting, ministry of commerce is present, the Central Bank is present, auditors 
are present, the press is present; so the meeting is open. So it can’t be that I expose them, unless it’s a 
major wrong doing”. 
 
8.4.2 Shari’ah Risk 
 
This section looks into the main Shari’ah principles that the Shari’ah scholars consider to be related to 
Shari’ah matters and that impose a risk on a transaction being non-Shari’ah compliant.  
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Figure 8.2 - The Shari'ah Scholar's Opinion on the Shari'ah Principles 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.2 above, of the 8 principles put forward to the scholars, they all (100%) 
agreed that ‘prohibiting in dealing in items which are haram and the requirement to deal only in halal 
items’ was the main principle. As ShSc-10 explains: “If a mistake occurred, for example that does not 
have an effect from the Shari’ah aspect, from the halal haram, but it violates, for example, the decision 
taken by the Shari’ah board [in implementation], in such incident, we can’t say that it violated Shari’ah. 
But we can’t leave the matter be, we record it in the minutes that this and this was noticed… after which 
follow-up and correction is taken”. Quite a few of them considered that the other principles were a 
means for deciding on the halal and haram principles. For example, disclosure, clarity of information 
and elimination of gharar are needed to be able to have a full picture, in order to determine whether it 
meets the halal principle, as ShSc-03 explains: “This is not important, as much as it is a ‘means’. The 
most important thing is halal and haram. Transparency is a means. How do I know the halal and haram 
without knowing the true facts? Deciding on a matter before being able to imagine it… the Shari’ah 
board is captive to the information that it is provided with”.  
 
The principle of ‘prohibition of Riba and Gharar’ scored 85%, and the principle of ‘Abiding by 
Shari’ah principles of clarity, and disclosing information, so as not to be manipulating’ scored 62%, 
“The most important that the IFI abides at a minimum, the red line, that can’t be forgiven with the issue 
of riba and gharar. The IFI in all cases must avoid riba and gharar in all its degree and forms. And 
then the other matters, depending on the strength of the institution and its size can be considered” 
(ShSc-07). With regards to clarity and disclosing of information, 8% considered that this is for the 
regulators. Furthermore, 15% considered that the abiding of the principle ‘requirement for fair and 
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transparent dealings to ensure all partners are aware of their rights and obligations’ is part the regulator’s 
role, and 8% considered it to be the IFI’s role, while 54% of the scholars held it to be a Shari’ah risk. 
 
Nine of the 13 scholars (69%) considered that the ‘transactions have to be real and be certain and not 
based on uncertainty or speculation’ as a Shari’ah risk. While one of the scholars considered that the 
matter of the transaction being real or not is a subjective matter, and depends on which school of thought 
is being looked at. Meanwhile, 62% of the scholars thought that the principle of ‘No unjust enrichment, 
equity and fairness to all parties’ could also affect Shari’ah. To this ShSc-01 commented: “if we hold 
by the Islamic Shari’ah principle, then Shari’ah contracts has within it that assures of this matter 
[referring to the no unjust principle]. If you’ve notice most of the Shari’ah principles are related to the 
lifting of gharar and jahalah between parties and transparency, for we are ahead of the west”. One of 
the scholars considered it as part of the IFI’s role, while another considers that in principle justice is 
required, and such a term/phrase is too wide and hence ambiguous to consider. 
 
With regards to the principle ‘the goal of the IFI is not limited to the maximisation of shareholders’ 
wealth, but also includes enhancement of the standard of living and welfare of the community’, the 
majority of the scholars that commented (46%) mentioned that this is too wide a Shari’ah principle and 
too much to impose on the IFI; it is more for the government. Only 15% considered it a matter to look 
into, and one scholar thought it was part of corporate governance and social responsibility. 
 
Moreover, six of the scholars (46%) were of the view that the principle of profit and loss is a 
characteristic in all investments, and others thought it is not a requirement for transactions to be Islamic. 
The sharing of loss and profit is only one of several ways of transacting in a Shari’ah way (Musharakah, 
Mudarabah, Wakala). Furthermore, there was also the understanding that risk-sharing is not Shari’ah 
related. The concept of risk sharing was not associated, and the scholars were defensive and asserted 
that if losses are incurred they are not due to it being a Shari’ah issue or that the SSB has anything to 
do with it. Shsc-9 clarifies, “Some people say you are the Shari’ah board and the bank lost because 
you the Shari’ah board closed on them in the transactions [in that the SSB’s Shari’ah decision placed 
restrictions on the investment/IFI]…I tell them I have no relationship, that the bank made profits, the 
bank made losses, I’m not related…”. 
 
While bearing these in mind, and in relation to the study, the link between the IFI and the investor is 
the agreement that they sign. This imposes emphasis on the content of the agreement and the causes or 
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effects of violation. And in Shari’ah, no agreement takes place without both parties being satisfied and 
in agreement. As such, it depends on the type of agreement that is signed and maintaining the conditions 
of the specific type of agreement, as to whether any Shari’ah risk is emanate or incurred. ShSc-10 
elaborates on this:  
“Agreements, are not valid if they [parties] aren’t satisfied… so being satisfied, is an important 
matter for the validation of agreements. And satisfaction is not achievable without knowledge; 
it is associated with knowledge...So the providing of information is something essential, and 
holding it back, is what spoils it. It is important to ensure the matters are in the text of the 
agreements, this issue…it [an incident/matter that occurred and is not meeting a clause in a 
contract or has been left out] is considered a deficiency, and is looked at … whether the 
contravention affects significantly its Shari’ah features, that it transfers the agreement from a 
valid agreement to void agreement, or it is just a violation and no harm has been inflicted on 
the others”. 
 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter presented the findings of the interviews conducted with ShScs that were on the SSB of the 
IFI that deal in Islamic private equity/private placements. In meeting the objective of the study, the 
organisational and work relationship of the SSB with its IFI is as to how Shari’ah function is undertaken 
and what could jeopardise its quality, was looked into. The findings present the scholars’ response right 
from being appointed to performing their duties, as part of a team/board, to the decisions made prior 
and post investment. It also looked into Shari’ah compliance and the outcome of the Shari’ah audit that 
is performed. In order to arrive at any weaknesses in the Shari’ah supervision system of the IFI 
governance system, the scholars’ concerns were also presented because this is an essential part when 
trying to improve the SSB’s role and hence, the Shari’ah supervision function of an IFI. 
 
From the interviews it appears that the operations of the Shari’ah supervision of the IFI can impose 
operational risk, which can affect the performance of the SSB function. There appears to be internal 
and external causes. Some of the internal causes, as seen from the findings of this chapter can occur due 
to the SSB having unclear roles and responsibilities. It can also be due to the lack of independence of 
both the SSB from the IFI (remuneration dependence) and those performing a Shari’ah audit internally, 
when administratively they fall under the IFI. Furthermore, the approval of products (before and in 
some cases after their launch), full transparency, and asymmetry of information from the employees of 
the IFI. In addition, along with there being no set standard for classifying Shari’ah compliance and 
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compliance process documentation, the lack of transparency in the reporting of non-compliance, and as 
such affecting accountability/responsibility. While the external causes appear to be the shortfall in the 
laws and regulations of the Shari’ah supervision function. In addition to the fact regulations vary from 
one jurisdiction to another, the matters mentioned above would need to be addressed. For example, 
independence/conflict of interest, Shari’ah audit, Shari’ah non-compliance reporting, standardisation 
of compliance process and classification are but a few that would need to be regulated and effectively 
enforced.  
 
The above causes could lead to compliance risk, which turns into Shari’ah risk. Moreover, from the 
interview findings with investors (see Chapter 6); the investors appear to be heavily relying on the SSB 
for product/investment approval, the ongoing Shari’ah compliance (supervision) and the effective 
function of the SSB and its members. Hence, in light of the above, these causes would need to be 
addressed to enhance investors’ trust and confidence in the IFI. 
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Chapter Nine: 
  CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter aims to synthesise the findings of the empirical part of the study (Chapters 6, 7 and 8) in 
light of the related theories and concepts discussed under the literature review chapters. In its attempt 
to explore the weaknesses in the relationship between investors and Islamic private equity firms216 in 
the GCC, the empirical part of the study followed a sequential exploratory research design, using the 
mixed model method for the collection of data (Saunders et al. (2009), as mentioned in Chapter 5. Such 
a method of data collection helps to explain and complement the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative approaches undertaken. In order to seek responses to the research questions related to the 
investors, questionnaires were used to obtain their views and to be able to standardise the results and 
interpretations. This was then followed by in-depth interviews with the financial institutions (FI) to 
obtain responses to the research questions related to the FI and these were followed by in-depth 
interviews with Shari’ah scholars (ShSc) to understand the issues related to Shari’ah compliance. 
Furthermore, since IPE is based on the conventional form of private equity, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
it was interesting to also seek the views of investors who invested in the conventional firms and to 
include their responses in the study and to compare their responses and experiences with those who 
invested in IPE. 
 
The relationship between the investor and the FI in private equity investment is one that is based on a 
contractual agreement between the principal (owner of funds/capital - investor) and the agent (managing 
and making the investment decisions - FI). However, since contracts cannot be complete, such a 
relationship is not without gaps and flaws. The main issues that arise in light of the principal-agent 
theory covered in Chapter 2 relates to the alignment of interest and information asymmetry leading to 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Furthermore, as seen in the chapter on regulations (Chapter 4), such 
a form of investment is beyond the main securities’/capital market authorities’ radar, as the investors 
involved are considered sophisticated investors, and are supposedly able to handle their decision making 
by themselves. As such, the study attempts to seek the investors’ awareness, familiarity and approach 
in investing in private equity, through seeking to explore the investors’ experience. Moreover, there are 
different forms of investing in private equity, yet the authority of control and managing of the 
investment is mainly in the hands of the FI, who controls not only the investment but also the flow of 
																																								 																				
216 Financial Institutions that invested in Islamic private equity/ private placement (including real estate projects).	
314		
information to the investor. Consequently, the study attempts to examine the FIs in their handling and 
operating of such a relationship. What is more, the only way the investors are able to appeal against the 
FI is by attempting to enforce the contract/agreement signed and to take legal action. However, this is 
not a route that many investors take to claim their rights (or losses), because the legal outcomes are not 
always in their favour. This is due to the fact that both parties have entered the agreement/investment 
on agreed terms, and hence, are expected to accept the outcome (Spindler, 2009). Moreover, Shari’ah 
forms of investment are also based on contracts and the relationship is handled as per the agreed terms, 
in addition to it having to meet Shari’ah compliant issues that have been covered in Chapter 3.  
 
Seeking to answer the research questions and contextualisation of the findings is undertaken under two 
broad themes: Transparency & Information and Shari’ah. Accordingly, in an attempt to respond to the 
research questions, the questions related to the two main parties in the relationship (investors and 
financial institutions/PE firms) will be discussed through the above themes. Moreover, under the 
Shari’ah theme, the ShScs’ responses will also be considered. In particular, the chapter first addresses 
research questions related to Transparency & Information, (Research Questions [RQ]: A.1 to A.5 in 
Figure 9.1) and then examines the questions that are related to Shari’ah (RQ: B.1 to B.4 of Figure 9.1).  
In addition, within each theme, the related regulatory requirement will be explored by addressing the 
research questions related to the participants’ (FI and investors) views on regulating the PE market   
(RQ: C.1 of Figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 - Research Questions 
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9.2 TRANSPARENCY AND INFORMATION 
 
According to Muller (2008), information asymmetry is the main cause of the principle-agent 
relationship in PE investments. Thus, the main factor contributing to eliminating information 
asymmetry is transparency and the communication of information. Hence, this section examines the 
responses of investors and Islamic financial institutions (IFI) analysed in Chapters 6 and 7 in seeking 
to respond to the research questions related to transparency and information. While the first part of the 
section summarises the main findings of the IFI’s handling of the pre-investment stage of investment 
followed by the main findings of how the investors deal with the pre-stage, the second part covers the 
post investment stage of both the IFI and the investors. At the end of each stage, any related regulatory 
requirements are noted. With regards to the investors, the responses of the three groups of investors 
(Islamic individuals, Islamic institutions and conventional) are reported, in a similar way as the results 
and analysis were presented in Chapter 6. 
 
9.2.1 Pre-Investment and Transparency & Information 
 
As mentioned above and in Chapter 2, the main concern to be addressed in the investment relationship 
is the asymmetry of information, which is affected by several factors that are mainly derived from the 
concept that the interests and risk appetites of both parties are different. One is risk averse and is seeking 
to maximise income (FI), while the other is risk neutral and is seeking to maximise returns (investor) 
(Guang-Ming, 2011 and Spindler, 2009).  
 
RQ-A.1. How do the FIs and the investors handle the pre-investment stage?  
 
9.2.1.1 Pre-Investment Stage 
a) Approach and Familiarity 
 
A.1.a What is the FI’s approach to the investment? 
 
From the findings in Chapter 7 of the interviews conducted with the IFI, it was apparent that the IFI 
approaches investors in stages. In line with Crémer’s (2010) assertions, at the outset of the relationship 
neither party knows one another and as the relationship progresses the gap between the parties narrows, 
and the parties become more familiar with one another. The IFI gets to know more about the investors, 
his understanding, investment interest, and risk appetite, which helps them in how they pitch the 
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investment to the investor (section 7.2.2). And at the same time, the investor gets to become more 
familiar with the IFI and the investment, develops confidence in the IFI and gets to enquire about the 
investments and to invest. The principal-agent model changes as the process of interest develops, as 
described by Waterman & Meier (1998), in that the asymmetry of information and goal conflicts are 
dynamic and not constant. 
 
A.1.a What is the investors’ approach to the investment? 
 
In order to attain the investors’ familiarity with the area of PE investment, especially since it was part 
of the IFI’s reasoning in taking the investment to the investor in stages, the investors’ understanding 
and familiarity with investing in PE was sought.  
 
The Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test in Table 6.3 shows that there is a significant difference in the familiarity 
of the three groups of investors. Specifically, there appears to be a difference in the level of 
understanding between the individual investor group and the conventional investor group. The effect 
appears to be large and they appear to be in opposite directions, implying that one group is more familiar 
than the other (Figure 6.2). The responses indicate that both the conventional and institution groups had 
specialised investors, with the conventional being more dominant which is reflected in their weighted 
scores (Table 6.3). As indicated in Chapter 3, Islamic private equity is based on the conventional system, 
and most of the structuring participants have a conventional background. As such, the results (of the 
level of familiarity of the individual investor (investing in IPE) and the conventional investor appear to 
be in line with Abdull Mutalip’s (n.d) thoughts on investors (investing in IPE) lacking the correct 
awareness with regards to Shari’ah requirements and principles. Furthermore, it is also reflected in the 
level of industry experience. According to Bose & Mcgee (2008), this could be due to the investors’ 
knowledge being shallow and that the understanding they have gained is mainly from networking, as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 3.  
 
Such an approach of testing the waters is the norm in most investments, as it provides an opportunity 
to both parties to be more familiar with each another. However, to the investor, other than the 
information he is provided with, the reputation and track record of the FI is important to him. This was 
commented on by many of them (management’s past performance and track record). However, access 
to such information is obtainable from the market and more accurate information on the FI’s reputation 
and past performance is more easily obtainable for those who are in the industry (whether directly or 
indirectly) than those outside the industry.  
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Concluding Remarks 
Although the results in Table 6.8 showed that conventional and institutions had more difficulty in 
obtaining market information, it should be noted that around 28% of the individual group of investors 
did not actually try to obtain market information. As stated by one of the FIs interviewed, although the 
investors are supposedly sophisticated, investment and finance is not necessarily their area of expertise 
(section 7.2.2). Hence, by the IFI approaching the investor in stages, a rapport is built between the 
parties and the investors are given the opportunity to become more familiar with the IFI and the 
investment. This helps to build confidence and works to the advantage of the investor, provided the 
information he receives is clear and transparent and all issues related to the investment are disclosed. 
 
With regards to the FI approach towards meeting the investors’ expectations, close to half of the 
investors thought it did, while around a quarter each reported it met a “Few” and “All” their expectations 
(Table 6.47). The responses show that all three groups of investors had similar responses with regards 
to the FI’s procedure and approach meeting their expectations. 
 
b) Presentations and Discussions  
 
A.1.b What is the information shared and discussed by the FIs with the investors prior to investing? 
 
The IFI in discussing and presenting to the investor, tries to keep matters simple for ease of 
understanding, avoiding any complex investment structures, so as not to lose the investors’ interest, 
through the complex investment set-ups (Chapter 7, section 7.3). On the other hand, these complex set-
ups correspond to various levels in the investment structure whereby each level has different 
voting/controlling rights (Chapter 7, section 7.3.2). The IFI’s intention, in trying not to overload the 
investor, is to place investors at the level where their interference is the least (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). 
The reason for the IFI holding back such information (complexity of the investment structure) is to 
maintain its (IFI) personal perspective of ownership of the idea and the decision control (Sapienza & 
Korsgaard, 1996). Both Spermann (1990) and Samm (2007) rationalise the IFI’s behaviour of not 
presenting and holding back on the investment set-up as the holding up of information and hidden 
intentions/information, as opposed to the reason of avoiding the investor getting confused. 
 
A.1.b What is the information shared and discussed by the investors with the FIs prior to investing? 
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Following Muller (2008), Kut and Smolarski (2006) and Zhang (2009), on the communication of 
information being a critical factor in private equity investment and the root of information asymmetry, 
the matters that the FI discusses while putting forward the investment to the investor were analysed. 
The findings showed that there was some statistically significant difference on Alignment of Interest, 
Governance, and Shari’ah compliance matters that were discussed (Table 6.14). With regards to 
Alignment of Interest, the findings revealed a large significant difference in the level of discussion 
between individuals and conventional investors (Figure 6.5). Such matters were discussed in more detail 
with the conventional investors than with individual investors. Furthermore, in discussing governance 
matters, the findings revealed a large significant difference in the level of discussion between 
individuals and conventional investors only (Figure 6.6). While there was a smaller difference (medium 
size effect) in the level of discussion with regards to Shari’ah matters between the institution investors 
and the individual investors (Table 6.14). With institutions being professionals, they are more aware of 
what to discuss, and it is expected that matters would be discussed in more detail with them. However, 
although the makeup of the conventional investors group is more conventional individuals than 
conventional institutions, the conventional investors group appears to be closer in strength in 
obtaining/discussing information than the institutions group. Their experience in investing in PE is 
reflected in the level of information being discussed. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that specialisation and greater familiarity (of institutions and conventional investors, as seen 
above, under approach and familiarity) affects the discussions on important matters of the relationship 
(alignment of interest and governance or control), as they have been taken in up in more detail with the 
investors that are more familiar and specialised. It is most likely that the investor himself brings them 
up in the discussions, rather than the FI raising them. These issues are related to the risk/returns of the 
investment affecting the incentive scheme of the IF and are of great importance. Consequently, 
following the theory (Chapter 2), the FI representative will do his best to seek the best terms possible 
for his institution. Moreover, from the understanding in Chapter 2, for the investor to give the FI direct 
control, the investors need to see that both (investor and FI) interests are aligned and one of the ways 
this is done is through discussing the control mechanisms that would place some control, which keeps 
a cap on the risk the FI can take up. As such, matters that could restrict the FI’s decisions will most 
likely be kept to a minimum during discussions, unless questioned by the investor. 
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Furthermore, with regards to meeting the investors’ expectations on Risk/Return (Table 6.47), just over 
a third responded “Some” and a quarter said “All”. Yet there were individuals (unlike the institutions 
and conventional) who said “None” of the investments had met their expectations on risk/return.  
  
c) Due Diligence and Documentation  
 
A.1.c What is the due diligence performed and documents prepared by the FI, prior to investing? 
 
The IFI due diligence process is performed in stages, based on their approach to the investor. As the 
investors develop interest, deeper due diligence is undertaken. This depends on the institution and area 
of investment and specialisation as to whether it is done internally or externally (Chapter 7, section 7.5). 
Moreover, since Islamic investing is based on the Shari’ah principles, it is inter-related with the Islamic 
economy (as deliberated by El-ashker & Wilson, 2006; Laldin, 2008 and Naqvi, 1981 in Chapter 3). In 
addition to the normal due diligence that is usually performed in the investment industry, the IFI was 
asked if social or environmental due diligence is performed. It appears that little consideration is given 
to environmental and social aspects. Instead, such due diligence is considered as a personal matter and 
is left to the individual (the investor). However, some consider (as commented on by one of the 
participants) such a matter to be an embedded attribute in being Shari’ah complaint (Table 7.41).  
 
Some form of documentation, put together based on the due diligence undertaken by the IFI, is then left 
with the investor for him to review and make his decision. From the IFI interviews, it appears that the 
Rate of Return (RoR) and the Date of Exit (Exit) were the two main pieces of information that investors 
were interested in when making their decision (Chapter 7, section 7.2.2). As such, many IFIs used this 
interest (of maximising returns) to their advantage and would state the RoR on the front of the 
documents they presented to the investors. Moreover, in line with similar behaviour to that discussed 
in the literature, individuals entered into a relationship based on trusting their friends’ decision making 
(Doney et al, 1998); while many investors got on board with the investment just because others they 
knew had done so (Chapter 7, section 7.2.2).  
 
A.1.c What is the due diligence performed and documents received by the investor, prior to investing? 
 
In addition to discussing matters, the FI provides investors with documentation on the investment when 
promoting an investment. Upon analysing the respondents’ experience in reviewing the documents, 
with regards to the simplicity of the language and the comprehensiveness (with regards to investors’ 
321		
rights) of the documents, the individuals found the documents simpler than the conventional and 
institutions (Table 6.11), yet the conventional found the documents more comprehensive than the 
individuals and institutions. The conventional investors found the documents easier than the 
institutional investors (Table 6.11). The institutions received documents related to investing in IPE and 
the conventional received documents related to CPE. While the greater portion of the conventional 
group is individuals, it was interesting to see from the weight scores that the conventional institutional 
investors found it both easier and more comprehensive than the conventional individual investors  
(Table 6.12). The results indicate that since the institutions are professional organisations, it is easier 
for them to understand the language of the documents.  
 
The type of information the investors relied on and were interested in was examined. Moreover, since 
in examining the theories underling the PE relationships, network and social relationship appear to play 
an important role, accordingly the questions in the questionnaire segregated between the weight given 
to Personal Sources of information and to impersonal sources of information.   
 
Some of the thoughts discussed in Chapter 2 considered culture and values to be embedded in the social 
relations, which in turn generate a certain acceptable level of behaviour (Granovetter, 1985 and Johnson 
& Droege, 2004). However, even though the responses from all groups appear to place a considerable 
portion of their decision making on personal sources, when looking at the outcome of the K-W tests 
there appears to be no significant differences with regards to Personal Sources of information among 
the three groups of investors. Moreover, although the results show no significant differences, it was 
interesting to see that the institutions group has a higher weight than individuals in basing their decision 
making on Personal Sources (Table 6.4). It appears that the institutional investor, being an institute and 
in the market, relies on networking to share information and to gain knowledge (experience of others), 
as suggested by Bose & Mcgee (2008). 
 
With regards to Impersonal sources, the responses indicate that conventional placed the greatest weight 
on Impersonal sources, which was confirmed by the K-W test (Table 6.6). The K-W test revealed a 
significant difference between institutions and conventional, with a moderately strong difference in 
behaviour towards Impersonal sources (Figure 6.3). This draws further attention to the fact that CPE 
popularity and existence/practice has been around longer than IPE (from discussions in Chapter 3), and 
as such the market participants are more experienced in the due diligence process and the importance 
of impersonal information.  
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The long-standing existence of the conventional market is also reflected in the weighted scores of the 
importance of environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters (Table 6.9). Although the K-W test 
revealed no significant differences, the weighted scores of the responses of conventional reflected that 
this group of investors gave a “Substantial Extent” of their consideration to ESG. While from the 
reflection on the literature on the Islamic economy and in line with the thoughts of El-ashker & Wilson 
(2006), Laldin (2008) and Naqvi (1981) on the communal and proper use of resources, it was expected 
that the other two groups who invested in IPE matters related to ESG would exceed the conventional.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that proper documentation is provided to the investors, with over 80% receiving a full set of 
documentation (Table 6.10). The question is how many of them really read the documents in detail? 
Although close to 71% responded that they had read the documents (Table 6.13), from the responses of 
the FI, they did not think that all investors read the documents. Many of them were more based on trust 
in the FI (Chapter 7, section 7.2.2). These comments by FIs appear to be reflected in the responses the 
investors provided, with around 61% of the investors basing it on information and trust together and 
about 27% basing it on information alone or 8% just on trust alone (Table 6.14).  
 
9.2.2 Transparency and Information on Pre-Investment Regulatory Requirements  
 
The PE market in most jurisdictions is considered an exempt (from regulation) form of investment and 
is undertaken privately by institutions with sophisticated/accredited investors (Chapter 4). Although the 
investors are considered accredited/sophisticated, it is an opaque market when it comes to the 
availability of information. To be able to make informative investment decisions, investors require 
quality rather than quantity of information. Furthermore, as understood from the above discussions, 
transparency and information play an important role in such an investment relationship. Hence, as 
asserted by Andnas & Chiu (2014) and Morris & Philippou (2012), for such a market to grow 
information needs to be available in a convenient and consistent format, with some form of oversight 
for it to function effectively. The following sections reveal the results with regards to any regulatory 
oversight in the pre-investment stage.  
 
RQ-A.2 What are the pre-investment regulatory requirements with regards to transparency and 
information? 
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a) Pre-Investment Requirements 
 
A.2.a What pre-investment regulatory requirements apply to the FIs? 
 
The pre-investment regulatory requirements were not the same across the GCC. They varied from just 
the need to have the proper activity licence to the need to seek the regulators’ approval on the documents 
to be used and approval on the investment vehicle. The one common pre-investment regulatory 
requirement was that such a form of investment was to be offered to sophisticated/accredited investors 
only (Chapter 7, section 7.7.1). However, their experience has shown them that this definition was not 
easy to verify and uphold as per the regulatory requirements. There are two features to the definition: 
one is wealth and the second is tech-know-how. FI had no issues with the ability to identify the wealth 
aspect by demanding bank and balance statements from investors. While the second aspect was a cause 
for concern to them because it was not easy to identify the investors’ financial technical know-how.  
 
A.2.a What pre-investment regulatory requirements apply to the investors? 
 
As seen from the above, the pre-regulatory requirement on investors was that the investors that can 
invest in such investments need to meet a certain wealth/income bracket and a technical level of know-
how. This was basically done by meeting the KYC requirements (for individuals) and entity verification 
(for institutions) that were placed by FI. However, about a third of the investors said that there were no 
regulatory requirements that they had been asked to meet, nothing. They were mainly individual and 
institution investors (IPE investors) (Table 6.46).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The pre-regulatory requirements across the GCC appear to vary, with the common one being the offer 
is to be made to a specific type of investors. The next requirement that applied to quite a few was the 
submission of the documents to be used in the offering. Moreover, they are required to assess the 
investors’ awareness of the requirements in the PE market and whether they knew about the regulations 
imposed on their investment counter-partners, which the investor is affected by indirectly.  Around 50% 
of the investors were fully aware and those dominantly were the institutional investors. There were 
more individual investors that were not aware than conventional investors (Table 6.44). The institutions’ 
awareness comes from them being in the professional market/sector, and hence they are more aware of 
regulatory requirements. With regards to conventional investors, CPE has been operating for a longer 
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time in the market than IPE and so the conventional investors appear to be more aware of the regulatory 
requirements imposed on their investing partners. 
 
9.2.3 Post-investment and Transparency and Information 
 
According to Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996), the FI can gain the trust and continuous financial support 
of the investors by reducing the asymmetry of information and maintaining a continuous flow of 
information. Thus, this section looks into the post-investment stage and the flow of 
information/communication between the FI and the investors. As per the discussion above on the pre-
investment stage, the section will also look at both the FI and the investors’ handling of this stage. 
 
RQ-A.3. How are the FIs/investors handling the post-investment stage? 
 
9.2.3.1 Post-investment  
a) Frequency and Format of Update 
 
A.3.a What is the frequency and format of update provided by the FIs? 
 
The frequency of reporting by the FI to the investor depended on various factors such as the type of 
asset of the investment, the availability and quality of information, and the need for additional funds 
(Chapter 7, section 7.4.2.1). In addition, in line with Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996), the process of 
collecting and collating the information is time consuming which in turn was reflected in how the FI 
saw the act of maintaining the flow of information. The interviews revealed that providing information 
once a year was the usual norm, while some reported providing it quarterly and semi-annually. 
Communication is usually maintained with the relationship officer and the investor, and in addition to 
reports, calls or visits are made.  
 
The reports covered the financial and operational performance for the period and some compared the 
performance to the market. Moreover, in reporting more emphasis and detail is given to favourable 
news, while communication of less favourable news is kept to a minimum (Chapter 7, section 7.4.2.2) 
to avoid loss of authority of the investment (Riordon (1990), and Aghion & Tirole (1997)). Furthermore, 
generally the information reported initially is the same to all groups of investors (whether institutions 
or individuals), and then depending on the request for further information from the investor, the FI 
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accommodates accordingly. However, this is not always the case when updating the investor after 
having exited an investment. Due to investors having entered the investment at a different price level, 
full transparency would only create more unfavourable behaviour and discontent for the investor 
(Chapter 7, section 7.4.2.2). The FI, in an attempt not to risk jeopardising the relationship (and possible 
loss of the investor’s interest), holds-up/holds-back some of the information on exit (Spermann, 1990). 
 
A.3.a What is the frequency and format of update received by the investors? 
 
Close to a quarter of the investors responded that FI kept in touch frequently, with the institutions 
scoring the highest, followed by conventional and then individuals (Table 6.28). Furthermore, with 
regards to the reports being in a standard format as mentioned by FI above, over 70% of the respondents 
thought that the method of reporting was standard and consistent for comparison. Yet, they thought that 
the information was not enough and they would need to go back to the FI for more information and 
clarifications (Figure 6.14). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The FIs initially provide minimum information and when asked provide further details. With regards to 
institutional investors, due to the licensing/legal structure it has certain requirements to meet and 
disclosures to make, so the FI provides them with the additional information more frequently. 
Additionally, the FI appears to be selective to whom visits for updates are made (Chapter 7, section 
7.4.1). It is to the FI’s advantage to maintain such relationships (institutions and selective investors) so 
as to maintain their participation in current and future investments (Chapter 7, section 7.4.2.2). 
Moreover, it appears that the FI keeps the information being communicated to a minimum, due to the 
fact that it is time consuming and is an overload for the FI’s staff handling the matter. Although the 
investors appear to have placed a considerable amount of trust in the FI, the FI’s voluntary cooperation 
and provision of sufficient information is lacking. This does not appear to be in line with Kim & 
Mauborge (1998) and Baker et al. (1999), whereby the principle of trusting and committing to invest is 
expected in return for receiving voluntary cooperation from the FI (agent). 
 
b) Decision Making Involvement and Maintaining Investors’ Interest 
 
A.3.b How is the decision making on conflicts of interest matters maintained by the FI? 
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Overall, investors’ involvement in the post-investment phase is kept to a minimum. As the FI is taking 
up the management of the investment and has proxy, usually the FI only goes back to the investors 
when strategic/material decisions need to be made and are outside the terms and conditions of the 
Private Placement Memorandum (PPM)/offering document they had initially provided the investor with. 
According to Sapienza & Korsgaard (1966), such behaviour is expected by the FI, since he is the owner 
of the investment idea, seeks the freedom to make decisions with the least interference and to have real 
control (Aghion & Tirole, 1997). However, not all investors are treated equally with regards to their 
restrictions on voting and decision making. Those investors that are taken on at the first level of the 
investment structure (the SPV) have no voting rights compared to those that are taken on board at the 
investee company level who do.217 For those investors who have been able to acquire high stakes of 
ownership without their ownership/stake being diluted (by the FI spreading the ownership across 
various investment vehicles), their ownership rights places them on a level on the investment structure 
where they are able to have some voting power (Chapter 7, section 7.3.2).  
 
A.3.b How is the decision making on conflicts of interest matters maintained by the investor? 
 
Ideally, the investors would need to, either initially or later in the investment, give proxy to the FI and 
transfer the real authority to the FI (Aghion & Titole, 1997). However, close to half of the investors 
said that signing a proxy at the time of subscription and signing the agreement was optional (Table 
6.22). In such a situation, the investor is placing his trust in the expertise and competence of the FI. This 
is with regards to the investors who were not among those that were offered board seats; other than the 
investors mentioned above (under 9.2.3.1.b and FI’s decision making involvement), where the FI treated 
some investors differently and gave them some involvement in the decision making.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Both in the conventional PE set-up and in the Islamic PE set-up in the form of Mudarabah, the investors 
usually play a passive role and the day-to-day management is left to the FI/GP (Chapters 2 and 3). 
Hence, the taking of proxy by the FI is expected. However, this is based on the fact that the investor has 
discussed and agreed on certain terms that are fair to both parties. As can be seen above (9.2.1.1.b), 
with regards to limitations of details on discussions undertaken and to below (9.5.a), with regards to the 
																																								 																				
217 Some investors (with greater negotiation power) were taken on board directly onto the investment company and not on the 
SPV entity that pooled the funds. And hence, had board seats on the investment company and voting rights (more of the 
shareholder’s agreement than a subscription agreement).	
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ability to negotiate, agreements appear to be drawn up more favourably towards the FI (Chapter 6, 
section 6.4.3). 
 
9.2.3.2 Transparency & Information Post-Investment Regulatory Requirement 
 
Flow of information post-investment appears to be an important factor in maintaining a healthy 
relationship, builds confidence and enhances further flow of capital in the PE market, as seen from the 
discussion above and in prior chapters. As such, this section analyses the responses related to any 
regulatory requirements to disclosure of information post-investment. 
 
RQ-A.4 What are the post-investment regulatory requirements with regards to transparency & 
information? 
 
9.2.4 Post-investment 
b) On-going Requirement 
 
A.4.a What post-investment regulatory requirements apply to the FI? 
 
Post-investment regulatory requirements on the FI depend on the jurisdiction. Some had none, some 
related to treating investors equally and fairly and in other cases the regulator had to be notified of any 
changes to the original terms and conditions set in the documentation. While some jurisdictions 
followed the funds regulations and market conduct rules. Moreover, regulations appear to be in the form 
of principles/guidelines and more recently, some regulators have been paying attention to provide more 
details on those guidelines (Chapter 7, section 7.7.2). These post-requirements do not appear to be very 
different to other international markets and private equity investments. The private equity market until 
the crisis of 2008/2009 was a market that was left to its players. The international standard setting bodies 
and regulators only made some changes after the financial crisis, and much of this is on private equity 
buy-outs and hedged funds (Chapter 4, section 4.3).  
 
A.4.a What regulatory requirements apply to the investors? 
 
In PE, once the contractual agreement is signed, the FI managing partner takes control and runs the 
investment/project. As such, in general, the investor takes a passive role, and there are no requirements 
on him. Hence, there are no post-investment requirements on investors. However, what concerns the 
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investor post-investment and where he is affected is whether there exists an effective mechanism for 
taking up any breaches to the agreement that may occur. His concern lies in the effective enforcement 
of the regulations, when it comes to any misconduct from the part of the FI.  With regards to the 
regulations on FI having been enforced, the individual and conventional investors responded that they 
were “Somewhat” enforced, while there were a large number of institutional investors that thought they 
were “Fully” enforced. Moreover, just under half of the individual investors had “No Idea” as to whether 
the regulatory requirements were enforced effectively on FI (Table 6.45). With regards to the investor 
testing the enforcement system on breaches to the agreement, the experience shared was not a positive 
one. The investor was de-incentivised for taking the matter to arbitration, due to the high administrative 
fees, just to hear the case prior to taking it up (Chapter 6, section 6.8.3.1).  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Internationally, the PE market drew some regulatory attention, after the 2008/2009 financial crisis. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, some regulatory organisations, international standard setting bodies and industry 
associations have come out with some form of requirements/guidelines on the FI (mainly with regards 
to transparency and information disclosure/communication). These guidelines are international and not 
easily integrated into the regional/local market, without being taken up directly within the 
region/domestic regulator or industry association (Andenas & Chiu, 2014). As can be seen above, it 
appears that there is no standard and consistent flow of information requirements in the regional 
regulations that deal with investing in PE or an effective/satisfactory legal/arbitration system that caters 
for any violations to the contract. 
 
9.5 Investors’ Views on the Investment Relationship 
 
Before moving on to examine the issues and concerns in investing in PE with regards to transparency 
and information, as the investor is the party in the relationship that is greatly affected/impacted by 
transparency and communication of information, their views on their relationship with the FI were 
studied. Their views on the contractual relationship and thoughts on FI behaviour were also assessed, 
in addition to their going forward intention in continuing to investing in PE. The following section 
summarises the investors’ views on the above matters. 
 
RQ- A.5 What is the investors’ view on the investment relationship with the FIs? 
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a) The Contractual Relationship 
 
A.5.a What is the investors’ view on the contractual relationship? 
 
Trust in IFI 
According to Beccra and Gupta (1999), when evaluating trust in a relationship two things need to be 
considered: the difference in attitudes of the other party and the evaluation of the other party in the 
relationship. In evaluating the investors’ level of trust in the FI, the K-W test showed there to be no 
significant differences among the groups of investors. On the other hand, many individual investors 
stated that they are entering the investment based on their trust in the IFI (Chapter 6, section 6.2.2). This 
is reflected in the individual group scoring a higher weight on basing their decision on trust (partially 
or fully) than the other groups of investors. Furthermore, with regards to the investors’ views on trust 
in the IFI meeting their expectations, close to two thirds of the responses were between “Some” and 
“Few” (Table 6.47). 
 
Negotiation and Agreed Process 
Investors and the FI bond together in the type of contract/agreement they sign, as discussed in Chapters 
2 and 3. Furthermore, as part of the trust building process, FI’s willingness to perform some changes in 
the contract demonstrates to the investor that the FI is seeking mutual interest rather than self-interest 
(Das and Tag, 1998). Moreover, the optimal contract, according to Harris & Raviv (1979) discussed in 
Chapter 2, depends on the ability to monitor and when drawn-up is based on two parts: one on 
monitoring the agents’ behaviour and the other is on payoffs to the agent based on the monitoring 
outcome. As such, the study looked into the investors’ ability to negotiate prior to signing the agreement 
and whether the process of handling conflict of interest matters was documented and agreed upon.  
 
With regards to the ability to negotiate, the chi-square test of homogeneity revealed a significant 
difference in the portions of those who were and were not able to negotiate, prior to signing                   
(Table 6.20). In comparing the group of investors, there was a difference, of a large size effect, between 
the individuals and the conventional (Figure 6.12). The difference between the institutions and 
conventional groups of investors was not significant. Nevertheless, among the three groups of investors, 
the conventional group appears to have had the greater ability to negotiate (Table 6.19 and Table 6.20). 
Overall, negotiation was on reducing the fees and with some the yield. However, the ability to negotiate 
further terms such as board seats, valuation and exit, appear to have been in the hands of large size 
investors. The investment bracket of 10m+ scored the highest bracket of investors being given the 
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opportunity to negotiate (Table 6.21). This is in line with Perrow (1986) and Saam (2007) who maintain 
that power is the intervening variable in looking into solutions to agency problems. However, Saam had 
a wider scope than Perrow, in addition to power acting as an intervening variable, the principal also 
possesses a greater power base than the agent. This was not the case here; for although power (size of 
investment/commitment) had an effect, not all investors (principals) possessed such ability/power to 
negotiate (Table 6.21). 
 
Based on the “participation model” of Rawls (2005), fairness in a relationship is achieved by both 
parties creating and agreeing on a process of decision making and in handling matters of conflict of 
interest that might develop later on in the investment tenure. This builds trust (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998) 
in the relationship and whatever the outcome is, good or bad, it is accepted by the principle, in addition 
to reducing the need to monitor by the principal (Sapienza & Koesgaard, 1996). Accordingly, investors 
were asked if the FI had established a clearly documented process with regards to dealing with conflict 
of interest matters/decisions that may arise later during the investment term. The Pearson chi-square 
test revealed a statistical difference, with a large size effect (Table 6.26). Although, pair-wising no two 
groups were significantly different (Figure 6.13), most of the positive responses with regards to there 
being a documented process were by conventional investors followed by institutions and lastly 
individuals (Table 6.24). 
 
b) The FI Communication of Information 
 
A.5.b What is the investors’ view on the FI’s communication of information? 
 
Reason for Holding Back of Information 
With regards to the reasons for FI not getting in touch regularly, the K-W test revealed there to be a 
statistical significance in information advantage. Investors considered that the main reason for the FI 
not getting in touch as frequently as they would like is due to the fear of the FI jeopardising its 
Information Advantage (Table 6.29). As explained by Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996), in addition to 
enjoying the power of information advantage, if the practice of regular information does not exist, then 
the FI is not penalised for a delay in reporting or in not fully reporting negative news. It was also 
interesting to note that two investors considered the reason for such a hold back as a shortfall in the 
operational competency of the FI and there being no incentive for the FI to report, due to having received 
its fee upfront. 
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Effect on Investor in Receiving Information 
In line with Sapienza & Korsgaard (1996), the majority of investors considered that regular reporting 
by the FI would enhance their trust in the FI and nearly half of the investors considered that it would 
reduce the investors’ need to monitor, and close to a third were willing to inject further capital             
(Table 6.30).  
 
c) Investment Expectations Going Forward 
 
A.5.c What is the investors’ future investment plan? 
 
Based on the investment meeting the investors’ expectation of the risk/return, there was a statistical 
significance in the investor with no plan to continue to invest and plans to continue (Figure 6.19).  
Moreover, the most favoured form of investment going forward is direct equity investment, followed 
by indirect equity investment (Table 6.49). Preference for such forms is because it provides them with 
some control in seeing where their investments (funds) are going rather than wanting to get involved in 
the management. 
 
9.2.5 Key Transparency & Information Issues  
 
This section looks into the key issues in PE investment with regards to transparency and information. 
 
RQ-A.6 What are the issues of concern in the framework of PE with regards to transparency and 
Information? 
 
The key issues are viewed from the points of those related to the investment set-up and from the view 
of information and disclosure. They are the outcome of responses obtained from the interviews of both 
the FI and investors. 
 
a) Key Issues in the Investment Set-up 
 
A.6.a What are the transparency and information issues with regards to the investment set- up? 
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Structure, FI Management, Alignment of Interest and Fees 
Usually when investing in PE, one party provides the capital while the other party manages the 
investment. They are bought together through a contact/agreement, and according to Fama and Jenson 
(1983), in order to reduce conflict of interest that might arise through the managing agent, there is to be 
a separation between ownership and control. However, such a separation could prove to be costly in the 
PE form of investment. Nevertheless, it appears at times it is an area that the FI are exploiting through: 
having several levels in the structure, different treatment in alignment with their interest, the amount of 
fees charged and when fees are taken. Such matters appear to be affecting the investors’ confidence, as 
reported by their responses to the key issues. The K-W test on the key issues of the IFI-GP management 
was statistically significant (Table 6.51). 
 
Valuation, Price, Liquidity and Exit 
As PE is outside the public market, the value and price of an investment is in the hands of a limited few 
(as one investor described it as being a “black box”), and this affects investment as well as exit decisions. 
Exiting investment is an important factor in PE as through it both parties, especially the investor, make 
gains. High prices placed upfront, at the start of the investment, make it difficult to attain an acceptable 
exit price when it comes to exiting. This in turn affects the liquidity in the market, due to the low 
investment turnaround. More than 70% of the total investors considered valuation and liquidity were 
important key concerns (Table 6.51). 
 
Governance of the Investment Structure 
In setting up the investment structure, at times a vehicle is created to hold the pooled funds (so they are 
not on the books of the IFI) (Chapter 3). One of the purposes of this segregation is to keep the investors’ 
fund/capital at arm’s length from that of the IFI’s. However, in doing so, the running and managing of 
the SPV is not reported along with the activities of the IFI (Chapter 4). For the benefit of guarding the 
investors’ interest/capital, some form of regulation is required in the governance and reporting of the 
SPV. As per the concern stated by an IFI interviewee, the governance of the SPV218 needs to be 
addressed, as currently it is the IFI management that is governing the management and the board of the 
SPV, which is open to conflict of interest behaviour (Chapter 7, section 7.7.3).  
  
																																								 																				
218 It appears that AAOIFI is working on developing a standard on SPVs. For as per the AAOIFI’s website, under the 
Standards Under Development page, among the standards under development is: Shar’ah Standard on SPV. 
http://aaoifi.com/standards-under-development-3/?lang=en (accessed 13/4/2017).	
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Furthermore, in structures where the investor has a passive role, which appears to be in most PE 
investments, the regulations with regards to the conduct of the relationship between the investor/LP and 
FI/GP are lacking and need to be developed (Chapter 7, section 7.7.3). 
 
b) Key Issues in Information and Disclosure 
 
A.6.b What are the transparency and information issues with regards to information and disclosure? 
 
Transparency and Investor Communication 
Having clear transparent agreed upon mechanisms of decision making along with maintaining 
information flow is crucial in PE investment, as it builds confidence between the parties and strengthens 
relationships. The increase in confidence reduces the need for the investor to have control because trust 
and control supplement one another in a partnership (Das and Tag, 1998), as well as reducing the need 
to monitor, as seen above (9.5.b). Moreover, more than 70% of the total investors considered 
transparency and investor communication were important key concerns (Table 6.51). 
 
The main areas that the investors were interested in receiving information/reports on were: information 
on the investment plan and exit strategy, information on the financials and valuation of the investment, 
and market/economy/industry/sector performance for comparison purposes (Table 6.51). 
 
Disclosure and Reporting Requirement 
The results of the IFI interviews on the regulatory requirements on pre-and post-PE investment (Chapter 
7) in the documents that are presented/reported to the investors are not clearly available, or standardised 
(or as a minimum) across the GCC. This is not much different from the overseas markets. Currently, it 
appears that the industry association, outside the region, are trying to fill this gap by providing their 
members with guidelines of the format of disclosure and reporting. An industry association in GCC 
appears to be following suit, but do not seem to be as dynamic in its progress as its counterparts overseas 
(Chapter 3, section 4.3).  
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9.3 SHARI’AH 
 
As the study is on IPE, the Shari’ah related issues are important. Hence, awareness of Shari’ah and 
views on how Shari’ah compliance is maintained were sought from the IFI and the investors who 
invested in IPE (individuals and institutions). Furthermore, what constitutes Shari’ah risk and how 
Shari’ah compliance was adhered to was also viewed. Moreover, due to Shari’ah being a specialised 
area, the Shari’ah scholars’ (ShSc) views were also taken. The following section analyses the outcome 
of the responses of all three.  
 
9.3.1 Shari’ah Awareness 
 
From the understanding of the literature review in transacting as per Shari’ah principles (of mu’amalat) 
there are 6 main principles, of which three are more towards the community as a whole and three are 
when dealing among one another (Chapter 3, section 3.2). When dealing with one another, the dealing 
needs to be real and based on transparency, equality and risk sharing. Furthermore, there are also 
Shari’ah principles that include prohibitions in the Islamic transactions (haram, gharar, and maisir). 
Hence, the participants (investors, IFIs and ShScs) identified important Shari’ah principles as per their 
understanding, in addition to what they foresaw as being Shari’ah risk, in order to be familiar with the 
participants’ level of Shari’ah awareness. 
 
RQ-B.1 What is the IFI’s/IPE investors’/ShScs’ level of Shari’ah understanding? 
 
a) Important Shari’ah Principles 
 
B.1.a What are the important Shari’ah principles for IFIs? 
 
The majority of the IFIs viewed that dealing only in Halal products along with prohibition in dealing 
in Riba and avoidance of Gharar were the top two Shari’ah principles. While clarity of disclosure of 
information and for the transaction to be real ranked the lowest, lower than enhancement of living and 
welfare of the community (Figure 7.1). Only a quarter viewed transparency in dealing and profit and 
loss as important. They appear to understand the Shari’ah principles from an Islamic economic 
perspective only, with little association to the Shari’ah principle of mu’amalat (Chapter 3, section 3.1.2). 
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B.1.a What are the important Shari’ah principles for IPE investors? 
 
The majority of individuals thought that abiding by the principle of profit and loss and the prohibition 
of Riba and Gharar were the top two important principles, while for the institutional investors it was 
dealing in Halal only and the prohibition of Riba and Gharar. For both groups of investors, the 
disclosure of information and no manipulation scored lower, and more with the investors than 
institutions, yet this was not as low as the IFIs ranking on the principle (Figure 6.14). Similar to the IFI, 
their understanding of the Shari’ah principles appears to be more associated with the principles as a 
whole (economy perspective) rather than with those associated with the transaction/mu’amalat.  
 
B.1.a What are the important Shari’ah principles for ShScs? 
 
All ShScs agreed that dealing in Halal was the most important principle. The next in the rank was the 
prohibition of Riba and Gharar. Disclosure of information ranked lower, yet not as low as the 
enhancement of living and welfare of the community (Figure 8.2). The understanding appears to be that 
the other principles such as disclosure of information transparency are a form of verifying the halalness 
of the product. A clear transparent picture is required to be able to make a sound Shari’ah decision. The 
other principles related to mu’amalat (transparency, disclosure, real ownership) (Chapter 3,                
section 3.1.2) followed the above ranking. The concept of profit and loss was viewed as being only one 
of the forms of Shari’ah investment, in addition to the view that if any losses were incurred, it was not 
necessarily due to it being a Shari’ah investment. They did not see or associate it, as to also mean risk 
sharing in the investment (Chapter 3, section 3.3.1). Hence, the principle was ranked low.  The social 
community principle was last, and even though the social principle is encouraged, its role is considered 
beyond the responsibility of the financial institutions and more as the state’s responsibility.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The FI and the investors appear to agree on the importance of prohibiting Riba and Gharar, in 
agreement with the ShScs, and the IFIs seem to see the importance of the Halalness. However, it appears 
that both the IFI and investors do not associate disclosure of information and transparency with being 
contributing factors to the product/investment being Halal, as do the ShScs. Moreover, the principle of 
profit and loss sharing ranked top with investors, but was not as high with the IFI, and even less with 
the ShScs. It appears that the principle of profit and loss sharing to them is not associated with the 
sharing of risk (Chapter 3, section 3.3). In equity investment, risk and revenues are shared, and it is 
based on the sharing of risk rather than the transfer of risk. It appears from the responses that the 
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investors can associate more with the concept than the IFIs. Moreover, the view that the ShScs have of 
the social principle could be a reason for the low interest of IFI and IPE investors in ESG seen above 
(section 9.2.1.1.c). The ShScs appear to be more inclined to Al-Gazali and Al-Shatibi individualistic 
view of Maqasid Shari’ah rather than towards Ibn-Qayyim’s holistic (including society) Maqasid 
Shari’ah view (Chapter 3, section 3.1.1). Furthermore, in line with their thoughts, and the ranking of 
the social community welfare principle, they appear to be more inclined towards the understanding of 
Shari’ah compliant rather than Shari’ah based (Chapter 3, section 3.6.5).   
 
c) Shari’ah Risk 
 
As per AAOIFI, the Shari’ah risk is the risk of non-compliance with the Shari’ah rules and principles 
and the risk of violating the terms of the agreement/contract (Chapter 4, section 4.5.2). The participants’ 
views on Shari’ah risk were addressed by what risk they foresee that can affect the Shari’ah compliance 
of an investment. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the importance of an investment/product being 
Shari’ah compliant to investors, in addition to seeking what they foresaw as Shari’ah risk, their 
opinions on how important it was to be Shari’ah compliant were sought. 
 
B.1.b What are the Shari’ah risks to IFI?  
 
With regards to IFI, the main Shari’ah risk is the risk of the product/investment being and remaining 
halal post-investment, which in turn affects the income (amount of purification). In addition to being a 
halal investment activity, maintaining the debt/equity ratio and the investment structure were also seen 
as areas of Shari’ah risk (Chapter 7, section 7.6.4). There were no concerns about the possibility of 
breaching the terms of the agreement, or a shortfall in the treatment of the investor. These matters were 
not considered to be a Shari’ah risk. 
 
B.1.b What are the Shari’ah risks to IPE investors? 
 
The Shari’ah risks that the IPE investors foresaw appear to be related to the governance of their 
relationship with the IFI, of which concealing and shifting of funds, alignment and conflict of interest, 
and risk shifting are some (Chapter 6, section 6.5.5). While over half of the investors considered 
Shari’ah risk as important, it was interesting to see a few investors did not foresee any Shari’ah risk 
once the investment was judged as Shari’ah compliant in the pre-investment stage (Table 6.36). 
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B.2.b What are the Shari’ah risks for ShScs? 
 
The ShScs stressed the importance of maintaining the validity of the agreement, since it is the link in 
the investment relationship. To which, information and transparency are the contributing factor to 
clarity and to the coverage of all the terms and conditions that are acceptable to all parties (Chapter 8, 
section 8.4.2). Furthermore, the quality of their decision/fatwa is only as good as the information put 
forward to them. The ShScs base their decision on the information and documentation provided to them 
by the IFIs and its Shari’ah department/team, and thus, their decisions are based on the IFI’s employees’ 
level of transparency and disclosure. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that both the IFIs and the investors see Shari’ah risk as being compliant with the Shari’ah 
rules and regulations only and maintaining the terms of the contract was not mentioned. While it is an 
important factor to the investor, the possibility of not considering it as part of the Shari’ah risk could 
be due to the lack of comprehensive understanding of the Shari’ah principles and to the limited 
practice/ability they have had in negotiating. This is reflected in the investors’ limited knowledge of 
their rights and entitlements. However, the SSB did consider maintaining the terms of the 
agreements/contracts as an important risk, reflecting the understanding of IPE being based on 
contractual relationships. 
 
9.3.2 Shari’ah Compliance 
 
This section looks at the views of the IFI, IPE investors and ShScs on Shari’ah compliance and how 
Shari’ah compliance is maintained. 
 
RQ-B.2 How is Shari’ah compliance maintained? 
 
B.2.a How is Shari’ah compliance maintained by IFI? 
 
Following the AAOIFI’s governance standards, Shari’ah compliance is maintained by seeking the 
Shari’ah Supervisory Board’s involvement, either directly or indirectly. The IFI, directly through the 
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IFI Shari’ah co-ordinator or indirectly through the IFI Shari’ah department/team, liaise and follow-up 
with the SSB for approval/report. Documents are prepared and submitted for the SSB’s approval and 
certification before entering an investment. Once investment takes place, internal Shari’ah review 
reports are produced based on reports received from the related IFI’s departments and/or meetings 
undertaken with related parties in the IFI for follow-up on the investments. 
 
   B.2.a How is Shari’ah compliance maintained by IPE investors? 
 
Although investors invested in IPE as a Shari’ah investment, the due diligence into the Shari’ahness of 
the investment/product was not highly ranked (Table 6.16). Having the SSB 
certification/pronouncement, and a governance process system, as per AAOIFI’s governance standards 
(Chapter 4, section 4.5.2) was sufficient and no further work/inquiry is considered necessary. The same 
reliability/dependence applied to post-investment Shari’ah compliance. Since the IFI has an SSB and/or 
also the company they invested in (investee company), then it is expected that a Shari’ah compliance 
review will be performed by either or both. The majority of investors were aware that an SSB oversaw 
the investment and relied on the SSB/Shari’ah audit report of the investee company or the IFI’s SSB 
for the Shari’ah compliance of their investments (Tables 6.38 and 6.39). 
 
B.2a How is Shari’ah compliance maintained by the ShScs? 
 
The SSB provide their approval of the investment product at the outset of the investment, then through 
reviewing the internal Shari’ah reviews/reports that the IFI generates through the IFI’s Shari’ah 
department or Shari’ah representative, the SSB issues the Shari’ah annual review report (AAOIFI        
GS-2 and GS-3). Not all non-Shari’ah compliance is reported in the report; especially once the FI has 
rectified it, so as not to tarnish the reputation of the IFI (Chapter 8, sections 8.2.1.3 and 8.4). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
It appears that the investor relies on the SSB and both the SSB and the IFI depend on the IFI’s Shari’ah 
team’s review for Shari’ah compliance. Thus, it all depends on the effective performance of the IFI’s 
Shari’ah team/member. The results indicate that complete independence in the generated review/report 
does not appear to exist. This leads to the importance of the independence of the Shari’ah 
compliance/review report to ascertain the quality of the review undertaken and to reduce any possible 
bias.  
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9.3.3 Regulations Related to Shari’ah Compliance 
 
In investing in IPE, it is important that the investment is Shari’ah compliant throughout the term of the 
investment. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, both the AAOIFI and IFSB mention the requirements 
of the Shari’ah review/audit to be performed to ensure Shari’ah compliance. However, the IFSB 
guidelines are considered general guiding principles and AAOIFI standards are not compulsory in all 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, even though abiding to either AAOIFI or IFSB is not compulsory for all 
IFIs, the study has used these as a benchmark for the required Shari’ah regulations/ requirements. Thus, 
this section looks into the IFI’s and ShScs’ (SSB members) input towards the requirements in 
maintaining Shari’ah compliance. 
 
RQ-B.3. What are the Shari’ah regulatory requirements?  
 
a) Shari’ah Compliance Report 
 
B.3.a What are the Shari’ah investment requirements that apply to IFI?  
 
The IFI should ensure that the investment/product is Shari’ah compliant at all times. As such, prior to 
entering an investment the IFI is required to make sure that the investment is in line with Shari’ah. 
Hence, the SSB’s approval on the investment is sought, by performing all the due diligence/background 
necessary on the product/investment and forwarding all the related documents to the Shari’ah 
department/representative member for the SSB’s approval. Although AAOIFI in its standards 
encourages the IFI to be transparent with its stakeholders (GS-6.4/4) and IFSB promotes publishing the 
details of Shari’ah opinions so as to increase awareness (IFSB-3.56), at times the pronouncements 
produced in the documents offered to investors are brief and lack details (Chapter 7, section 7.6.2.1).  
 
Once entered into the investment, the IFI must have a mechanism by which it follows-up on the 
investment to ensure its Shari’ah compliance (Chapter 7, section 7.6.2). IFIs that have a Shari’ah 
department/team perform regular (quarterly) reviews on the extent of the IFI’s Shari’ah compliance. 
For IFIs that do not have a Shari’ah department/team the review is usually undertaken by an IFI 
employee (usually from the investment or legal team) who produces a report after the review. These 
reviews/reports are then submitted to the SSB and IFI management. At times the responsibility is 
outsourced (usually in smaller FIs/PE firms) and they undertake the above task (Chapter 7,                  
section 7.6.2.2). 
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B.3.a What are the Shari’ah regulatory requirements that apply to SSB? 
 
The SSB is required to provide its Shari’ah opinion (Fatwa) on an investment/product prior to the IFI 
promoting or entering it. Once it receives the relevant information from the IFI’s Shari’ah team/member, 
the SSB studies this and accordingly issues its pronouncement (Chapter 8, section 8.2.1.3). Once the 
IFI enters the investment the SSB is required to ensure that the IFI maintains Shari’ah compliance of 
its investment. As such, the SSB219 liaises with the relevant Shari’ah person in the IFI with regards to 
the planning and undertaking of the review. Then the review is performed by the Shari’ah person/team 
who submits the outcome to the SSB, which then reviews the report. The SSB then produces the SSB’s 
Shari’ah annual review report based on the outcome of the accumulated reviews, which is then included 
in the IFI’s annual report (Chapter 8, section 8.4). One ShSc noted that due to them being a firm, they 
are well equipped and it is the members of the Shari’ah firm that conduct the SSB review, rather than 
depending on the IFI’s Shari’ah team review. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
The Shari’ah pronouncement that is made available to the investor is brief and lacks details, which does 
not assist the investor in becoming familiar with the Shari’ah aspect of the investment/product (Chapter 
7, section 7.6.2.1). Furthermore, both (Shari’ah quarterly review and Shari’ah annual review/audit) of 
the on-going compliance Shari’ah review reports initially appear to be performed by the same internal 
party/ies, which could defeat the purpose (of cross checking) placed by the requirement of obtaining 
both the IFI’s and the SSB’s views. Although the responsibility, as per the standards, of maintaining 
Shari’ah compliance falls on the IFI, the purpose of having an independent SSB to oversee the Shari’ah 
governance of compliance is to add assurance by providing an independent supervision/opinion on the 
extent of Shari’ah compliance. The SSB base their opinion on reviews performed by an internal IFI 
member, but if he is under the supervision of the SSB, this raises some questions about the extent of the 
independence and quality of such a report. Such concerns also came up in the literature review by Grais 
& Pellegrini and Hamza (Chapter 4, section 4.5.2) as well as from participants during the interviews.  
 
9.3.4. Issues of Concern in the Framework of IPE with Regards to Shari'ah 
 
This section examines other key issues in IPE investment with regards to Shari’ah. 
																																								 																				
219 For those with a sub-executive committee, then it is the SSB’s sub-committee that liaises with the IFI’s Shari’ah 
responsible person.	
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RQ-B.4 What are the issues of concern in the framework of IPE with regards to Shari’ah? 
 
The key issues are viewed from the points of those related to the investment set-up and from the view 
of information and disclosure. They are the outcome of responses obtained from the interviews with 
IFIs and ShScs. They are the views of IFIs, since they are the party that the regulations are applied 
to/practiced by in undertaking PE investment. This is in addition to the views of ShScs because they 
have to ensure the Shari’ah practices and implementation are maintained. 
 
a) Key Issues in the Investment Set-up 
 
 B.4.a What are the Shari’ah issues with regards to the investment set-up? 
 
SSB Independence 
As the role of the SSB is an independent form of supervision, its independence is crucial. Although the 
SSB’s appointment is approved by the shareholders, they are usually based on the recommendation of 
the IFI’s board of directors. Moreover, re-election of the ShSc members is open with no restriction on 
the number of terms an SSB member can be re-appointed (Chapter 7, section 7.6.3.2). This longevity, 
through continuous re-appointment of the same SSB member, along the IFI’s board/management’s 
continuous nomination, affects the true independence of the SSB and its work, because as noted above, 
not all non-compliance matters are reported, especially if they are resolved prior to the date of the report 
(Chapter 7, sections 7.7.3/7.6.3.2 and Chapter 8, section 8.6.3.2). The AAOIFI Governance Standards 
(5) also refer to this matter as a matter of concern. However, the suggestion of the standard is to rotate 
at least one SSB member every 5 years (Chapter 4.5.2). Yet this was not mentioned by any interviewee, 
implying that it does not appear to be observed, even in cases where the AAOIFI standards are 
obligatory. Moreover, in some jurisdictions, recently a cap on the term an ShSc can serve at an IFI has 
been introduced (Chapter 4, section 4.6), yet no mention of this was bought up in the interviews. Hence, 
it appears that enforcement of those adopting the AAOIFI standards or the recent requirements, in 
addition to regulations on the terms of reference and appointment of the SSB still need to be addressed.  
 
b) Key Issues in Information and Disclosure 
	
B.4.b What are the Shari’ah issues with regards to information and disclosure? 
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Independence and quality of the Shari’ah review/opinion 
As mentioned above, investors rely on the SSB’s report/opinion for the investment being and 
maintaining Shari’ah compliance, which emphasises the importance of the report/opinion generated. 
However, in performing their duties, the SSB relies heavily on the work of the IFI’s Shari’ah 
team/member, which in turn jeopardises the quality of independence. As per the AAOIFI Governance 
Standards (1.14), it is the responsibility of the SSB to provide an independent opinion based on their 
review of operations of the IFI, and among the documents that are to be examined is the internal audit 
report. Hence, by basing its opinion on the internal Shari’ah review reports, this gives rise to whether 
the SSB’s opinion report is comprehensive and independent as per the Standards. Moreover, even 
though the IFI’s Shari’ah team/member is supervised by the SSB, they fall under the IFI’s management 
and administration, which could have an effect on the quality of the information they provide (Chapter 
7, section 7.6.1 and Chapter 8, section 8.2.1.3). On a similar note is the concern expressed about the 
shifting of funds between investments (between SPVs) (Chapter 7, section 7.7.3.1). While in complying 
with Governance Standard (4) attention is to be given to the imperative monitoring of RIAs (since they 
are off the balance sheet) to ensure that the funds are invested in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement220 (Chapter 4, section 4.5.2). Hence, this raises the question of whether such matters are 
reported and bought to the attention of the SSB by those performing the review.221 
 
9.4 REGULATING PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 
 
Reducing agency conflict, uncertainty, transparency and investor protection are important matters that 
cannot be ignored in PE, and especially in IPE for it to be Shari’ah compliant (Chapter 3). Regulation 
in the PE market is not given as much attention as in the public equity market. Although many might 
think it does not have much of a systemic risk, this was not the thoughts of the investors. The investors’ 
views were that indirectly the performance of the PE market affects the financial sector and eventually 
ripples out in the economy. Since it is another form of liquidity in the market parallel to banks and 
exchanges, and as quite a few large institutions (such as pension funds) invest in these investments, 
both market liquidity and public savings are affected (Table 6.47).  
 
																																								 																				
220 Earlier this year (Feb. 2017), the AAOIFI announced it was working on an exposure draft on the External Shari’ah Audit. 
This could contribute to resolving the issue/concern; however, its success would depend on the effective implementation of 
the standard. 	
221 Consideration is to be given that it could also be related to audit/accounting matters, an area that the ShScs are not 
necessarily knowledgeable about. This is an area to be considered for further study/research.	
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Furthermore, as per the de Larosiére Report conducted after the financial crisis of 2008 (Chapter 4), 
regulations are required to extend to all financial entities that have a direct or indirect systemic impact. 
Thus, some form of regulation is required. However, the regulation required is to provide for a flow of 
consistent, comprehensive information so that the investor can make informative decisions and to limit 
the FI’s risk taking. The regulatory interference should not be too much, yet it must enhance market 
efficiency (McCahery & Vermeulen, 2012). 
 
As such, the next section presents the views on regulating the PE industry of both parties involved, the 
IFI and the investors.  
 
RQ- C.1 What are the views on regulating the PE market? 
 
a) IFI Views on Regulating PE Market 
 
C.1.a What is the IFI’s view on regulating PE market? 
 
Overall, the IFIs appear to be in favour of regulations, however, up to a level that does not hinder market 
access, or that are too time consuming so as not to affect business. There are some regulations that are 
coming out which are set in line with international standards. Although it is good to be in line with the 
standards, there needs to be flexibility in the introduction and implementation of these regulations. 
Furthermore, the regulators are to take more of a supervisory rather than a management role            
(Chapter 7, section 7.7.3).  
 
The FIs were also asked about their views on capital adequacy, as it has an effect on their equity 
participation in the investment. Generally, the view is that it is not suitable for their form of investment 
(it is more suitable for retail banks). The cap imposed affects their ability to manoeuvre. However, one 
of the IFIs (from experience) was of the opinion that the restrictions set by capital adequacy are a 
positive form of control mechanism to maintain risk taking (Chapter 7, section 7.7.3.2). 
 
b) Investors’ Views on Regulating PE Market 
 
C.1.a What is the investors’ view on regulating the PE market? 
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The majority of the investors were of the view that regulations covering both pre- and post-investment 
would be beneficial for the PE market (Table 6.49). They were also of the same opinion as IFI, in that 
the regulations should be balanced and not affect the business. Some investors were of the view that 
provided a proper, effective legal system is available to deal with post-investment matters, regulatory 
emphasis is only required in the pre-investment stage. Furthermore, as stated by an investor, it cannot 
be assumed that the regional investors possess the proper risk assessment knowledge, which is also a 
reason for the need to regulate the PE industry (Chapter 6, section 6.8.3).  
 
The general opinion is to have either the regulator regulating both stages or for both the regulator and 
the industry to regulate together. The institutions were more in favour of both regulating, while the 
conventional and individuals were more towards the regulator regulating (Table 6.50). Those who were 
in favour of the industry being involved was due to the fact that the industry association will be more 
aware of the business risks involved. However, some of them also thought that there will need to be 
some form of supervision of the industry association. This is due, in addition to communicating (to the 
market), to there being regulatory support and to enabling enforcement. There is also a need to reduce 
“regulatory capture” (Chapter 4), in line with Gunningham & Sinclair’s (1998) views. This is to prevent 
the industry from supporting their interests over those of the investors. While those who were for the 
regulators emphasised the need for qualified and able to monitor regulators (staff), with the capability 
for effective enforcement, in line with Parker et al.’s (2000) views (Chapter 6, section 6.8.3.2). 
Furthermore, nearly half of the investors were of the view that the compliance with regulations should 
be obligatory, while just over a third thought that it should be more on a comply or explain basis (Table 
6.51), especially when it is supposed to be the private market, in addition to not everyone understanding 
the Islamic principles and some explanation being needed at times (Chapter 6, section 6.8.3.3). 
 
Furthermore, more than 80% of the investors had the opinion “Agreed” to “Very Much Agree” on 
having an investors’ advisory committee that represents the investor in the investment and meets 
regularly with the IFI (Table 6.55). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In line with the changes that are happening in the market following the financial crisis, both the IFI and 
investors are in favour of some form of discipline/regulation in the PE market. In line with the overseas 
markets, there appears to be some interest in the “Smart Regulation” (Chapter 4, section 4.2.3.3), and 
introducing the Industry Associations (IA) in having a role in providing guidelines. This latter addition 
is interesting, and could serve the purpose of adding publicity to the equation. Involving the IA promotes 
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the availability of information and the expected form of reporting, reducing lack of awareness to 
investors and costs to FI. In line with Naurin’s (2007) views, through publicity, transparency is made 
available and in turn promotes accountability. However, no mechanism is effective without the 
availability of sanctions and effective enforcement. Moreover, in an attempt for the IA to standardise 
information reporting and documentation, it needs to take into consideration the individual investors’ 
needs and not only institutions’ perspectives (Alim, 2014).   
 
9.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The chapter attempted to answer the research questions and meet the research objectives by analysing 
the main results of the findings of the investors, the IFIs and the ShScs involved in the relationship of 
investing in IPE. The findings were cohered and compared to the findings of the related theories covered 
in the literature review. The approach taken was based on the two main themes: Transparency & 
Information and Shari’ah. Following the discussion of the findings of each theme, the chapter looked 
into the relevant regulations and the key issues that were conveyed through the findings. Emphasis on 
the two themes is due to the type of relationship under study. Transparency plays an important factor in 
the relationship between the investor and the FI. Such a relationship follows the agency-principle 
affiliation, where in such a relationship the transparency, flow and timing of information is imperative 
to a successful outcome. It builds trust between the parties, in addition to reducing conflict of interest. 
Shari’ah is important since the study is on Islamic equity finance and a review of the Shari’ah aspect 
and more so the Shari’ah compliance is imperative.  
 
The main findings reveal key issues related to the flow of information, and governance of the investment 
structure, governance of the IFI management, ability to negotiate, independence of Shari’ah supervision 
and review, and post-enforcement system are some of the key issues that would need to be 
addressed/strengthened to enhance the investors’ confidence, induce improved investor rights and 
contribute to the growth of the Islamic equity financing/investment market. In making sense of the 
mixed method of analysis conducted, certain matters and investors’ preferences were identified. Overall, 
the investors (those who plan to continue to invest in private equity), with the current investment, 
regulatory and professional environment, prefer the direct/indirect equity method of private equity. This 
is because this form of investment allows them to know where and how their money is invested. While 
Regulators with their regulations, in making sense of interpreting the investment market pre-crisis 
period, appear more towards the pooling of funds, collective investment schemes and limited 
partnership form of investment. Hence, displaying divergence from the investors’ preferred form of 
future investment in private equity. Notwithstanding the above, some current movements/approaches 
346		
of updates in the regulations/supervision, appear to be in alignment with the display of the greater need 
for disclosure and SSB independence. Great details in the guidelines, recently (post-crisis), in some 
jurisdictions, have been added to the information the FI is to provide its private investors. In addition 
to the recent step taken by most of the GCC jurisdictions, in recognition of the need for SSB 
independence and accordingly updating the regulatory requirements to be implemented in 2018-2020 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.6). However, greater benefit would resonate in benefiting from the opinions 
expressed on regulating the PE market, because enhancement of the enforcement and legal system post-
investment is paramount to gaining confidence, developing the players’/stakeholders’ professionalism 
and the growth of the private equity market. Moreover, the findings seem to suggest developments, 
enhancement and supervision could be delegated to or in liaison with industry associations, in acting as 
standard setting and regulatory agencies. 
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Chapter Ten: 
CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The aim of the study was to explore the relationship between the investor and the IFI investing in Islamic 
private equity/placement and to identify the area of weakness in relation to transparency, Shari’ah and 
regulation, with the objective of strengthening the relationship, and enhancing the investor’s rights, 
through the identification and putting forward recommendations to the related parties that have a hand 
in developing the relationship: the IFI and the regulatory authorities in the GCC region. To achieve the 
above objective, investors were surveyed using a questionnaire and IFI and Shari’ah scholars were 
interviewed. The responses were then analysed and contextualised with the theory.  
 
In summarising the findings, the FI approached investors in stages, giving them an opportunity to be 
familiar with the investment, because not all investors, although considered to be sophisticated are 
experts in investment and finance (especially the individuals). Specialised investors (institutions and 
conventional), unlike the less specialised, could discuss important matters in more detail, which 
contributed to their decision making. While many of the investors had based their decisions on trust in 
the FI and the information/documentation provided. It appears that FI voluntary cooperation in 
providing sufficient information to investors post-investment was not in proportion to the trust that the 
investors placed on the FI. In addition, the regulatory requirements did not assist in that matter because 
it appears that there are no standard or consistent flows of information requirements in the regional 
regulations that deal with investing in PE nor is there an effective/satisfactory legal/arbitration system 
that acted as a deterrent.  
 
With regards to the Shari’ah aspect of investing in IPE, both the investors and the FI saw not abiding 
by Shari’ah rules and principles as being non-compliance. The importance of meeting the terms of the 
agreement/contract was not reflected as being an element of Shari’ah compliance and hence was not 
considered part of Shari’ah risk. However, the ShScs thought otherwise. Shari’ah compliance is 
maintained through Shari’ah reviews and reports. The results indicate that complete independence in 
the generated review/report does not appear to exist. Both the SSB and the IFI depend on the IFI’s 
Shari’ah team’s review for Shari’ah compliance. Furthermore, from the assessment of their views on 
the Shari’ah principles, the FIs and ShScs were more inclined in their understanding towards Shari’ah 
compliant investment than Shari’ah based investment.  
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The key issues identified from the research are recapitulated in this chapter, to form the basis of the 
recommendations and matters to be dealt with going forward. In addition, this chapter highlights the 
research’s limitations and provides suggestions for future research.  
	
10.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR IFIS 
	
Islamic finance emphasises using risk-sharing modes of financing and IPE is one of the organisations 
that uses this mode. The intention in undertaking the study was to improve the relationship between the 
IFI and the investor. To look into the investor’s experience pre- and post-investment in dealing with the 
IFI and to identify the issues of concern. In order to contribute towards developing and growing the 
relationship, and in turn to encourage the growth of Islamic equity financing (IEF). The study draws 
the following outcome and provides suggestions for the IFI to review and develop, if they aspire to 
improve the relationship and to increase equity investment business. 
 
10.2.1 Transparency, Information and Investor Communication Recommendations 
  
The relationship between the two parties is an economic relationship that is greatly influenced by social 
behaviour, where trust is a major player. The investor’s confidence in the IFI, during the period under 
study (2003-2014), was stained, which affected the investor’s trust in the IFI. The weakness in the 
disclosure system has left the investors feeling manipulated. The lack of transparency in the layering of 
the investment structure, and the difference in treatment has not contributed to the alignment of interests. 
The IFI needs to work on enhancing voluntary transparency. IFIs need to improve on the institution’s 
flow and quality of information and the disclosure mechanism towards its investors. And instead of 
providing the bare minimum, so as to be in control and avoid the investor’s involvement, to provide 
clear, transparent detailed updated progress reports. The investor’s main interest is not in directly 
managing the investment but to know where and what is happening with their money. Investors are 
seeking clear standardised detailed information. Information on the investment plan, exit strategy, 
financial information and investment valuation, in addition to comparative market and industry 
information.  
 
Producing an acceptable format of reporting might initially be costly, yet over time would be worth the 
investment. IFIs can form an Islamic private equity association, or even through the current associations 
(Banking Association or the MENA Private Equity Association) efforts can be made to provide 
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guidelines on the format of the reports to be reported to investors, for all their members in the 
industry/market to use and for investors to know what to expect. This will contribute to lowering of the 
costs that the IFI might have incurred if produced alone, in addition to contributing towards increasing 
the availability of IPE market information. Furthermore, making more information available by industry 
association also contributes towards developing investors’ knowledge. Investors, although they have a 
high net worth, are not necessarily familiar or knowledgeable about the IPE and/or in finance. Hence, 
by making such information available, both the IFIs and investors would benefit. IFI’s costs will reduce 
and creditability would increase. While the investor’s awareness will broaden and in turn this will reflect 
in the investment decision process and in preserving their rights. Furthermore, publicity and availability 
of information can assist in achieving accountability, and will contribute towards reputation building.  
 
The IFI need to reconsider the setting of a high initial price when offering to the investor. The initial 
high price has two main negative outcomes: the first is that the high price entails the fees, which gives 
an indication to the investors (even if it is clearly disclosed), the signal of the misalignment of interest 
of the IFI to that of the investor. Taking a large fee at the outset is not seen as part of the services earned, 
but more of ‘I have taken my gains, and I am not concerned what happens next.’ The other is that by 
setting a high price (due to the high embedded fees) it becomes difficult to seek an acceptable exit price 
because the bar has been set too high. This in turn does not benefit both parties. Neither party is able to 
generate a return, nor to enter into a newer investment by both parties. 
 
10.2.2 Governance of the Investment 
	
In such a relationship, it is mostly believed that one party will always seek self-interest. In order to 
minimise this and to develop and enhance the ties, arrangements are required to be taken up, to maintain 
balance in the relationship. The IFI needs to provide investors with the ability to negotiate at the time 
of agreement. Investing in IPE is a form of contractual agreement and the investor needs to feel this. 
By offering a take it or leave it investment opportunity, the wrong picture of IPE is being reflected. The 
IPE concept of sharing in the risk, as well as the profits, rather than transferring of the risk, is not 
detected/experienced. Moreover, at the initial stage of entering the relationship, the IFI needs to agree 
and document, with the investor on a process, a mechanism that the IFI would take up in dealing with 
conflict of interest matters. This displays the willingness of the IFI to seek the investor’s interest and to 
share in the risk and decision making.   
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Meeting the demands of many investors is not an easy task, as such, a representative person(s), from 
the investors (Investors Advisory Committee-IAC)), appears to be an acceptable idea among the 
investors. The IFI and investors/IAC can agree on the outcome on the matters/issues that are to be 
subject to consent and decision taking/vote. Upon which, both parties would be in agreement as to when 
the investor would be approached. The IFI would do so through meeting with the IAC, and so would 
reduce the effort and time in having to go to the investors individually, while at the same time having 
gained the investors’ trust.  
 
10.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORS  
 
The concept that the private market would discipline itself, and would be able to resolve a conflict of 
interest without any regulatory hand, is starting to be questioned. The opaque flow of market 
information, along with the shortfall in awareness has demonstrated otherwise. Following the study, the 
implication is the need for regulatory intervention in the areas of information and Shari’ah governance. 
 
10.3.1 Transparency, Information and Investor Communication Recommendations 
 
All six GCC countries apply the AAOIFI standards to varying degrees222, and as such when it comes to 
the IFI dealing with mudarabah and musharakah (shari’ah private equity forms), they are treated as 
restricted accounts (investments of investors’ funds for specific projects) and are treated off the balance 
sheet of the IFI. In such an equity investment, both the fund mobilisation (the investor and IFI) and fund 
utilisation (the IFI and the entrepreneur/project) is based on profit sharing, and there is no liability on 
the IFI to return the investor’s initial funds invested (other than in the event of negligence on the part 
of the IFI). No liability and off balance sheet status gives rise to a potential conflict of interest, making 
the availability of market information essential to the investors/stakeholders. Furthermore, restricted 
profit sharing investment accounts and PE funds require the establishment of a company (SPC), under 
the commercial law, where the regulations on such companies are limited. Hence, increasing the need 
to monitor the performance and disclosure of such investments. 
 
Regulatory supervision appears to be necessary to ensure discipline in the market. While disciple is 
required to preserve investors’ rights, the market should not be imposed with too much regulation.  
																																								 																				222 At the date of this review, AAOIFI standards in Bahrain, and Oman are a mandatory regulatory requirement, while in 
Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE they are voluntary.	
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Specifically, regulation on IFI to provide information to investors is required. The information has to 
be consistent, comprehensible and to some extent standardised. This is information that meets the needs 
and overcomes the risks associated with all stakeholders involved (investors as well as IFIs) and the 
investment (exposure). Furthermore, there should be clear rules and regulations that are explicit rather 
than implicit made available by the regulators. These should be less ambiguous and easily accessible to 
all.   
 
The proposal of including an external organisation to assist the regulator in implementation appears to 
be gaining interest. Regulatory authorities and industry associations could develop/provide 
documents/guidelines as templates, which will enhance the economies of scale and reduce costs to 
participants. Should the regulators take up the proposal of introducing a third party into the supervision 
framework, a supervisory mechanism on the regulatory representative agent by the regulator would be 
required, to ensure equal treatment to participants/stakeholders.  
 
Regulators in steering the IFI conduct towards strengthening the availability of information need to 
ensure the availability of information is from two perspectives. First, the perspective of what 
information is required to be available to the investor and second, that it is made available to the investor. 
By making clear what information is to be disclosed and publically available, the investor himself will 
be more aware of his rights and entitlement. When to what information is to be made available, is 
disclosed through the supervisory process directly or indirectly, the investor’s confidence and long-term 
stability in the market is enhanced.  
 
Investors’ ability to have a say in the investment being sought by investors is not being experienced. 
Moreover, the concept of the risk sharing form of investment by participating in IPE is not being sensed 
either. Hence, it is recommended that regulators provide the power of negotiation among the parties. 
Currently, it is more one-sided, and the IFI has command of the agreement. To develop the concept of 
IPE as an investment whereby risk and returns are shared, then both parties need to come to an 
agreement. IFIs, as institutions will seek every opportunity to reduce risk, and to increase their returns. 
Hence, if it can do so without negotiating, it will do so. It is recommended that regulators place 
requirements (of which the investor is also aware) to open the door to negotiation to take place between 
the parties. In order to maintain the IFI’s stability, the regulators can restrict certain matters (or place 
parameters) from negotiation.  
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10.3.2 Shari’ah Governance of the Investment 
 
In Shari’ah compliant private equity, regulations and discipline to uphold and maintain Shari’ah 
compliance in line with the Islamic principles is very important (more than the conventional private 
equity). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the issue of independence is an important matter that 
regulators need to consider. This is independence of the SSB and/or the IFI’s Shari’ah team and the 
Shari’ah review/compliance audit report. 
 
Investors rely highly on the opinion and review of the SSB. As the situation stands today, complete 
independence of the SSB members is questionable, even among the SSB members themselves. The 
SSB was a setup put forth initially as part of the IFI organisational structure as an independent board. 
However, such independence is being questioned which places risk on the quality of the SSB role and 
purpose. Some regulators have recently, been moving towards creating a central Shari’ah Board (SB) 
at the Central Bank. In instances where the SB role is to perform the function of SSB for all IFIs, this 
would be a good step towards resolving the matter, yet not completely. There will still be Shari’ah 
scholars and Shari’ah compliance officers at the IFI level, who will be performing Shari’ah reviews 
and making Shari’ah decisions. Indications from the study have been for regulators to consider 
disassociating the Shari’ah scholars’/Shari’ah compliance officers’ remuneration from the IFI, to 
achieve effective independence. Some suggestions have been towards outsourcing the function, yet that 
would not resolve it completely, because the IFI would still be indirectly paying for their services.  
 
The recommendation is to establish an organisation that provides these services. An organisation that 
is funded by the membership fees that the IFI pays on an annual basis, and in return such services of 
SSB members and Shari’ah compliance officers are made available. This setup would contribute 
towards developing other related matters too. Both Shari’ah and financial/auditing know-how skills 
would be developed by the organisation, ensuring availability of the appropriate persons/skills/expertise. 
The framework can also work on unifying the TOR, role and responsibility of the SSB function in line 
with the guidelines suggested by AAOIFI or IFSB. Furthermore, the external Shari’ah audit/review can 
be performed, resulting in an independent Shari’ah report. The quality of conducting/undertaking a 
compliance review and generating a compliance report would be developed and standardised among 
the industry players. This would also apply to the pronouncements of SSB, whereby, detailed Shari’ah 
certification on the investment would form part of the information and documentation provided to 
investors. This will also have an indirect positive effect on the managing of the SPV, where the funds 
are pooled. The independent report/review performed on the extent of Shari’ah compliance would 
enhance the quality of the report and confidence of the investors.  
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Furthermore, to complete the chain of Shari’ah governance, and in line with the concept of IPE 
investment being a contractual agreement, an effective supervision and enforcement system is required. 
It has been suggested that supervision within the regulators, as well as the legal enforcement system 
needs enhancement. The desire is not for regulations on the availability of information and the ability 
to have a say alone, but to ensure they are enforced and that the consequences may result from                  
non-compliance. 
 
10.4 LIMITATIONS 
 
In undertaking the study several challenges came about that could have limited the outcomes of the 
study. Some of which are the following: 
 
1. The study was focused on the GCC region only, and thus the findings cannot be generalised 
and do not necessarily reflect those outside the region. 
 
2. The study was on the relationship between the investor and the FI, and the views of the parties, 
investors and FI were obtained, along with the members of the SSB, with regards to their 
contributing role in Shari’ah compliance. However, although the PE market is not much of a 
regulated market, the regulator’s perspective on the subject could have added another 
dimension to the study. This was not taken up due to time and word count constraints, and is 
an area for further study. 
  
3. In relation to the collection of data, the regulations in the GCC regions are continuously 
changing and developing and they are changing at different paces in the region under study. 
Although the researcher made all efforts to examine all the regulations related to PE, there 
might have been some that are related to the study which the researcher did not come across. 
Consequently, this would have some effect on the literature review, the basis of the analysis 
and the comparisons of the regulations available. 
 
Furthermore, in dealing with the existing regulations (those the researcher reviewed), there 
were different terminologies used among the GCC in relation to the same subject, which made 
it difficult at times to identify the regulation. In this regard, it is recommended that the GCC 
regulators consider unifying the terms in accordance with the GCC standard rules being 
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developed by the Gulf Cooperation Council, in preparation for the integration of the GCC 
financial markets, as per the Economic Agreement.223 
 
4. Time was a factor that placed constraints from two aspects. One was in seeking participants to 
participate. Searching for the appropriate and eligible participants (whether it was an investor 
or an IFI or a ShSc), required a lot of time, due to the sensitivity of the topic (private 
investment). Not only in seeking, but also in obtaining input; in some cases, the turnaround 
between the approach and receiving a response in acceptance or returning the questionnaire 
was quite long. As such a time-cap was used, after which, the researcher would move to the 
next set of sample/data collection. The second time constraint was due to the researcher working 
during the time of the study. This placed a constraint on the time given to the research and data 
collection. 
 
5. Following on from the above point, the size of the sample was not large enough to conduct 
parametric statistical tests, which are considered to be more robust and powerful tests. 
 
6. The constraint in finding appropriate eligible participants limited the ability to arrive at an 
acceptable number of diversified investors from across the GCC, and hence, analysis of the 
findings specifically by country was not possible.  
 
7. In exploring the relationship between the investor and the IFI investing in IPE, the researcher 
tried to gain the rare opportunity of being able to access private investors, and to obtain as much 
information on their experience pre- and post-investment as possible. This could perhaps have 
hindered performing an in depth analysis of all the areas generated from the findings/results of 
the study, due to the time and word count limitations. 
 
8. The word count set by the thesis requirements limited the areas in which certain outcomes could 
be covered and expanded on. 
 
 
																																								 																				
223 The economic agreement provides for the integration of financial markets in the GCC states and to unify their respective 
policies and regulations; to the development of local, inter-foreign and intra-GCC investments, and for the provision of a 
transparent and stable investment environment. 
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10.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Following the study, a few areas and matters have surfaced where further research would benefit and 
contribute towards the development of the Islamic equity investment market. Some of which are: 
 
1. This thesis is one of the first in-depth research studies on Islamic private equity. Islamic equity 
investments are usually looked at from the aspect of an investment instrument/tool. The study 
shows that the relationship between investors and the IPE is a contractual agreement, and as 
such it is recommended that future studies are performed to explore the underlying contractual 
details. In particular, research studies on PLS contracts, as applied in IPE, can be undertaken. 
This will assist in further understanding the requirements of the parties involved, and will 
provide suggestions to improve and protect the rights of the parties in the relationship.  
 
2. The dual components of an Islamic financial contract are governance rules and legal 
responsibilities. Accordingly, following on from the above point, the legal and dispute system 
of resolving legal matters related to such contracts would also benefit the development of the 
Islamic equity investment market. The research touched on this slightly as it was a matter of 
concern raised during the study, but was not taken up in detail, due to the scope of the thesis 
and the word count limitation. 
 
3. Further research can be undertaken to seek the regulators’ views. They play an important part 
towards enhancing the relationship under study and their input would assist in assessing the 
extent of implementing the above recommendation, in addition to contributing with further 
recommendations and solutions to improve the relationship between the investor and the IFI 
and the IPE market. 
 
4. An area of further research is the capital adequacy requirement and its effect on the IFI’s 
participation in investing and contributing towards the development of IEF in general, and in 
investing/financing Musharkah transactions in particular. The current research touched briefly 
on the IFI’s capital adequacy with regards to determining the IFI’s participation in investing 
along with investors in the IPE investment. From the responses, the current capital adequacy 
requirements are not suitable for investment in financial institutions’ activities because it 
restricts their ability to invest. This in turn is expected to have an effect on the IFI’s ability to 
invest in financial instruments such as Musharakah, a form of investment currently not 
undertaken as desired by the industry.  
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5. The current study viewed the effects of transparency and information on the relationship 
between the investor and the IFI investing in IPE. Further research can be conducted on the 
effects of transparency and information on other areas of IPE investment, such as their effect 
on the performance of the investment. 
 
10.6 EPILOGUE 
 
Good Islamic principles that encourage information adequacy, equal bargaining power, efficient 
coordination, preserving rights and social solidarity are required to be maintained. It appears that rules 
governing the Shari’ah private equity market operators are to be considered with the objective of 
steering the stakeholders’ conduct towards strengthening the availability of information associated with 
such a market and enhancing compliance and enforcement through the regulatory development of 
greater oversight, in coordination with the industry to gain depth and trust in such a market. 
 
Furthermore, the objective of this researcher was and is not fault finding. The aim was and is to study 
a form of investment that was mushrooming (had a lot of interest) and then began to languish. To 
understand this promising industry more, it is essential to study and reflect on the upsurge and down 
surge of this venture, in the hope of emerging with findings that would contribute towards a better 
understanding of the reasons for the shortfalls and subsequently be able to find ways to develop and 
enhance a relationship, a partnership that if looked after can contribute significantly to the development 
of an economy and to the Islamic finance industry in particular. 
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Appendix 1: Investor’s Documents 
 
Investors Investing in IPE Information Sheet: 
 
	
	
	
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
I am part time PhD candidate at the Durham University Business School, United Kingdom.  The purpose of this 
study is to explore the relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity firms in the GCC. As 
empirical study is a key part of my PhD dissertation, I am conducting a survey of investors and private equity 
firms.  
 
The questionnaire aims to provide insight into the investor’s experience in Islamic private equity and provide 
information and recommendation on how the relationship between the investor and the Islamic private equity firm 
can be strengthened in terms of transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation.  Therefore, I request you to kindly choose 
and answer the questions that correctly reflect your experience, as it will effect the results of the study. 
 
You will be provided with the questionnaire before hand and then arrangements will be made for an interview at 
your convenience and time to go through the questionnaire and discuss related issues. Should you have any 
questions and or concerns regarding this study/questionnaire, you may e-mail me at:                                                      
m.a.al-mannai@durham.ac.uk .  A written summary of the outcome of the study will be made available to 
interested participants following the end of the thesis. 
 
Ethics and rights of the respondents 
 
While presently studying part time for my PhD, I currently am an employee of the Central Bank of Bahrain (where 
I am a Head in the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate).  
 
I wish to stress to you that any information you give to me will be purely used for the purpose of research related 
to my PhD thesis.  It will not under any circumstances be shared with or used by the Central Bank of Bahrain.  
 
I also wish to stress to you that any information you give me will be kept strictly confidential at all times.  
Furthermore, the information provided will be used anonymously in my thesis and I will not use your name or 
any other details that would result in your identity being known.  
 
The interviewee has the right not to answer any question for any reason. 
 
The project has been given advisory approval by the Durham University Business School Sub-Committee for 
Ethics. 
	
Thank you in advance for your co-operation, and you answering all questions is extremely important and highly 
appreciated. 
 
Durham Islamic Finance Programme 
Business School 
For Researcher Use Only: 
Case Identification No.: 
Date:       /       /201….   
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Questionnaire to Investors Investing in IPE: 
	
	
Part	A-	Investor	Profile:	
	
A.1.		You	are	an	investor	in	Islamic	private	equity	as	a:	(Please	tick	and	indicate	if	more	than	one)	
			High	net	worth	individual	 													Financial	Institution	 	 			Insurance/Takaful	Company								
			Asset	Manger	 	 													Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	 			Government	Entity		
			Endowment	 	 													Pension	Fund		 																		Family	office	
			Consultant/Advisor																												Other	-Specify:		
	
A2.	Please	specify	your	domicile:	(Please	tick)	
			Bahrain	 			Kuwait	 			Qatar	 			Oman	 			Saudi	Arabia	 			UAE	
	
A.3.	Your	investments	in	Islamic	private	equity	are/were	carried	out	through:	(Please	tick)	
			Direct	equity	investment	(partnership)	
			Indirect	equity	investment	(pooling	into	co-investment	vehicle-SPV)	
			Private	equity	funds	of	funds	
			Limited	partnership	(LP)	
	
A4.	Year	of	most	recent	investments	in	Islamic	private	equity:	(Please	tick)	
		2003-2005	 		 		2006-2008	 	 		2009-2011	 	 		2012-2014	
	
A.5.	Country,	allocation,	type	and	form	of	Islamic	private	equity	investment:	(Please	fill)	
Country	 %	Allocation	 Type	
Start-up	(SP),	Capital	growth	(CG),	
Other	(O)-Specify	
Form	
Musharaka(MK);	Mudaraba	(MD)	
Wakala	(WK);	Other	(O)-Specify	
Bahrain	 	 	 	
Kuwait	 	 	 	
Qatar	 	 	 	
Oman	 	 	 	
Saudi	Arabia	 	 	 	
UAE	 	 	 	
Other	–	
specify:	
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A.6.	Number	of	Islamic	private	equity	investments	made	in	the	last	10	years?		(Please	tick)	
Number	of	
Investment(s)	
Amount	Invested	(in	US$)	
	
Management	
Fees	paid	(%)	
(Please	fill)	
				1-2	 	Less	100,000		100,000-1m			1m-5m				5.1m-10m									10m+	 	
				3-4	 	Less	100,000		100,000-1m			1m-5m				5.1m-10m									10m+	 	
				5+	 	Less	100,000		100,000-1m			1m-5m				5.1m-10m									10m+	 	
	
A.7.	How	familiar	are	you	with	Islamic	equity	financing?		(Please	tick)	
			Somewhat	Familiar	 			Familiar	 							Very	Familiar	 			Specialized	
			
	
Part	B-Investor	Approach	to	Investment:	
	
B.1.	What	are	the	three	most	important	source	of	information	used	prior	to	investment?		
1.	
2.	
3.	
			None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
	
B.2.	Please	indicate	how	much	information	is	based	on	impersonal	sources	in	comparison	to	personal	sources,	
when	deciding	to	invest?	(Please	tick)	
	 None			
at	all	
Slight	
Extent	
Certain	
Extent	
Considerable	
Extent	
Substantial	
Extent	
Great			
Extent	
Impersonal	sources						
(e.g.	documents,	reports,	
press	releases)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Personal	Sources												
(e.g.	Calls/meetings	of	
Islamic	Financial	Institution	
(IFI)-General	Partner,	
personal	network)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	
B.3.	What	were	the	impersonal	sources	upon	which	investment	decision	was	based	on?		Please	provide	up	to	3	
and	comment.	
1.	
2.		
3.	
			None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
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B.4.	What	were	the	personal	sources	upon	which	investment	decision	was	based	on?	Please	provide	up	to	3	and	
comment.	
1.	
2.	
3.	
	
			None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
	
B.5.	How	easily	was	it	to	obtain	market	information	on	Islamic	Private	Equity	market?	(Please	tick)	
 With	Difficulty	  Somewhat	Difficult					 Somewhat	Easy	 			 Easy	  Didn’t	Try	
	
	
B.6.	In	promoting	the	Islamic	economy	and	Islamic	finance,	do	environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)	
issues	effect	your	investment	decisions?	(Please	tick)	
 None	at	all		 	  Slight	Extent	 	 	  Certain	Extent	
 Considerable	Extent	  Substantial	Extent	 	 	  Great	Extent	 	
	 	
	
Part	C-	Investor-LP	and	Islamic	Financial	Institution-Private	Equity	Agreement:	
	
C.1.	Were	you	provided	with	a	full	set	of	documents	by	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution-GP	(offering	document,	
term	sheet,	and	subscription	form/agreement)	prior	to	investing?	(Please	tick)	
 Provided	with	full	set	of	documents	
 Provided	with	term	sheet	and	subscription	form/agreement	only	
 Provided	with	subscription	form/agreement	only	
 Other-Specify:	
	
C.2.	 Do	 you	 read	 the	 offered/provided	 documents	 or	 do	 you	 rely	 on	 the	 Islamic	 Financial	 Institution	 (IFI)	
promoting	the	investment	offer?	(Please	tick)	
 Read	the	offered/provided	documents	personally	
 Have	experts/advisors	read	and	provide	me	with	feedback	
 Rely	on	the	promoting	IFI	information	provided	during	meeting	(based	on	trust)	
 Rely	on	network/relationships	only	(through	friends	and	associates)	
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C.3.	Were	the	following	principles	discussed?	Were	they	clear	or	misleading?	
(Please	tick	the	appropriate	response	for	each)	
	 In	Detail	 Some	
Detail	
Briefly	 Please	circle	
one	
Not	
Discussed	
	Alignment	of	interest		 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Governance	of	investment	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Transparency	and	Disclosure	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Investment	plan	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Exit	and/or	Redemption	
strategy	
	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
On-going	reporting/update	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Rights	and	Obligations	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	 	
Shari’ah	non-compliance	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	  
Risk	factors	 	 	 	 Clear/Misleading	  
	
C.4.	Benchmark	for	considering	information	prior	to	investment	as	being	sufficient	was	based	on:			(Please	tick)	
 A-Information	provided		  B-	Trust	in	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution/GP	
 Both	A	&	B		 															 Other-	Specify: 	
	
	
C.5.	If	response	to	C.4.	was	based	on	Information,	what	source	of	information?	(Please	prioritize	answer	with	1	
being	most	important)		
Current	events	 	 	 													−−   Investment	prospects	&	opportunity	 	 −−	
Financial	performance	(historical	&	projected)	−− Management	Team	stability	&	experience	 −−	
Investor	protection	&	clear	investment	rights			−− Related	underlying	risk	issues	&	mitigation	 −−	
Regulatory	requirements	&	obligations															−− Investment	terms	&	conditions	 															−−	
Shari’ah	pronouncement	 	 														−− Alignment	of	interest	&	transparency	 	 −−	
Applicable	Law	 	 	 					 −− Investment	consultant	recommendation	 −−	
Policies	&	procedures	for	valuations	and	Fees				−− Family	&	friends	 	 	 	 −− 
Personal	experience	in	Islamic	private	equity					−−	  
	Other-Specify:	
	
C.6.	If	response	to	C.4.	was	based	on	Trust,	how	much	trust?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selcetion)	
 High	 		 High-Medium	 			 Medium	 										 Medium-Low	 										 Low	
Explain:		
	
C.7.	Are	you	satisfied	with	the	agreement/contract	signed?		(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Fully	Satisfied	  Fairly	Satisfied	  Satisfied	  Somewhat	Satisfied				 Not	Satisfied	
Explain:	
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C.8.		Were	you	offered	the	opportunity	to	be	able	to	negotiate	any	of	the	contractual	clauses	in	the	
investment	contract	that	was	offered?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 No		  Yes	 Explain:		
	
	
C.9.	How	did	you	find	the	language	of	the	agreement/contract	signed?		
(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)  
Simple,	easy	to	understand		 Complex	(not	easy	to	understand	what	was	happening)	 	
Comprehensive	enough	to	protect	rights	and	adequate	covenants	to	address	conflict	of	interest	
Not	comprehensive	enough	to	protect	rights	and	no	adequate	covenants	to	address	conflict	of	interest	
	
C.10.	Was	subscribing	and	signing	of	the	agreement	independent	of	signing	a	proxy	to	the	Islamic	Financial	
Institution?		
Signing	a	proxy	was	optional	and	not	a	condition	of	subscribing	and	signing	of	the	agreement		
Subscription	and	signing	of	the	agreement	was	conditional	to	signing	a	proxy		
Other-Specify:	
	
C.11.	How	was	your	capital/investment	participation?			
(Please	tick	and	if	more	than	one	investment	please	tick	for	each)	
	
Investment(s)	
	
One	off	injection	of	capital	
Multiple	injection																																	
(draw	down	capital/capital	call)	
1	 	 	
2	 	 	
3	 	 	
4+	 	 	
 
 Other-Specify:	
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C.12.	How	much	was	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution	(IFI)-	(GP)	participation	in	the	investment?					(Please	tick)	
(If	the	IFI-GP	participated,	please	state	percentage	and	if	more	than	one	investment	please	provide	for	each)	
Investment(s)	 Participated	%	 Did	not	Participate	 Don’t	Know	
1	  −−	%	 	 	
2	  −−	%	 	 	
3	  −−	%	 	 	
4+	  −−	%	 	 	
	
	
	
Part	D-Monitoring:	
	
D.1.	How	do	you	manage	your	relationship	with	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution	(GP)?		
(Please	tick;	if	more	than	one	investment	please	provide	for	each	and	explain	selection)	
Investment(s)	 No	
relationship	
Manage	 Explain	
1	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	
4+	 	 	 	
 
 Other-Explain:	
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D.2.	Were	you	permitted	to	vote	on	key	issues?		(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected;	if	more	than	
one	investment	please	provide	for	each)	
	
	
Investment(s)	
Vote	on:	
Amendments	
to	the	
agreement	
and/or	
investment	
strategy	
Vote	on:	
Dissolution	of	
the	partnership	
before	the	
termination	of	
the	investment	
period		
Vote	on:	
Extension	of	
the	
investment	
period	
Vote	on:	
Issues	of	
conflict	
of	
interest	
Vote	on:	
Removal	of	
the	
investment	
manager	
	
Vote	on:	
Other-	
(Please	
Explain	
Below)	
	
Not	
Permitted	
to	Vote	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4+	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Other-Explain:	
	
	
D.3.	Did	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution	(GP)	establish	and	implement	a	clearly	documented	and	defined	process	
which	 facilitates	 investor	 consultation	 after	 investment,	 regarding	 matters	 relating	 to	 conflict	 of	 interest?	
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
	No	 	 	Yes	 	 Explain:		 	
	
	
D.4.	When	it	comes	to	investing	in	Islamic	private	equity,	what	are	the	risks	that	are	of	concern	to	you?		(Please	
tick)	
	None	 	 	 	Have	risks	that	are	of	concern,	they	are:	(Please	state	in	order	of	priority)		
	
	
	
	
	
D.5.	Were	those	risks	in	D.4.	addressed	in	the	documents	provided	to	you?	(Please	tick)	
	
	No	 	 	Yes	
	
D.6.	What	is	your	definition	of	shari’ah	compliant?	
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D.7.	How	important	is	shari’ah	risk	to	you?	(Please	tick)	
 Very	Important	 		 Important		  Somewhat	Important	  Not	Important	
	
D.8.	What	 is	your	understanding	of	what	happens	when	the	 Islamic	equity	 investment	 is	no	 longer	Shari’ah	
compliant?	
	
	
	
D.9.	In	pursuit	of	the	investment	being	compatible	with	the	principles	of	Shari’ah,	in	your	point	of	view,	which	
is/are	the	most	important	principle	or	principles?		(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)		The	principle	
of:		
 Abiding	by	principles	of	profit	and	loss	sharing	
 Transaction	have	to	be	real	and	be	certain	and	not	based	on	uncertainty	or	speculation	
 Prohibition	in	dealing	in	items,	which	are	Haram	and	the	requirement	to	deal	only	in	Halal	items	
 Prohibition	of	Riba	
 Requirement	for	fair	and	transparent	dealings	to	ensure	all	partners	are	aware	of	their	rights	and	
obligations 
 Abiding	by	shari’ah	principles	of	clarity,	and	disclosing	information,	so	as	not	to	be	manipulating.		
 No	unjust	enrichment,	equity	and	fairness	to	all	parties	
 The	goal	of	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution	is	not	limited	to	the	maximization	of	shareholders	wealth,	but	
also	includes	enhancement	of	the	standard	of	living	and	welfare	of	the	community	
	
D.10.	How	do	you	make	sure	that	the	investment	is	maintaining	Shari’ah	compliance?	
	
	
	
	
	
D.11.	Are	you	aware	if	the	investment	is	overseen	by	a	Shari’ah	board?	(Please	tick)	
 Fully	Aware	 	  Somewhat	Aware	 	  Not	Aware	 																 No	Idea	
	
D.12.	During	your	experience	in	Islamic	private	equity	investment,	have	you	thought	that	the	whole	
investment	venture	process	at	any	time	had	been	perceptive	to	Ethical	and	or	Legal	issues?	(Please	tick	and	
explain	selection)	
 Unethical	Issues	 	  Illegal	Issues	 	  Both	 	  None	
	
Explain:		
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D.13.	On	average,	how	often	does	your	Islamic	Financial	Institution	(GP)	get	in	touch	with	you	after	having	
invested	the	capital/fund?	(Please	tick	and	state	frequency	if	Frequent	is	selected)	
 Frequent	 	 	 	  Occasional			 	  None	  
(State	Frequency:	 	 					) 
	
D.14.	If	response	to	D.13.	is	None	or	Occasional,	what	do	you	think	is	the	reason	that	the	GP	does	not	provide	
continual	timely	feedback	on	the	investment?	Such	action	will:				
(Please	prioritize	answer	1	to	5,	with	1	being	the	first	reason)	
 Jeopardies	the	GP’s	informational	advantage	−−	 	 			 Endanger	their	position			−−	
 Undermine	their	authority	 −−	 		  Too	costly		−−	 				 Other	–Specify:		−−	
	
D.15.	The	information/feedback	that	you	received:	(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)	
 Reduces	the	need	to	monitor	  Enhances	the	trust	in	the	GP	
 You	are	willing	to	inject	more	capital/reinvest	in	the	venture/investment	
	
	
Part	E-Reporting	requirements:	
	
E.1.	 Is	the	reporting	feedback	a	provision	 in	the	main	formal	agreement/contract	signed,	or	part	of	 informal	
agreement	made	with	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution-GP?	(Please	tick)	
 Part	of	the	formal	agreement/contract		  Part	of	the	informal	agreement/contract	
 Other-specify:	
	
E.2.	How	did	you	find	the	methodology	of	reporting	of	performance	and	progress	of	investment/project?	(Please	
tick)		  Standardized	
 Standardized	and	consistent	allowing	for	comparing	performances	
 Not	standardized	(differs	every	time)	
	
E.3.	Have	you	needed	to	or	wanted	to	go	back	to	the	GP	with	questions	or	further	information?		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection) 
	No	 	 	Yes	 	 Explain:		
	
	
E.	4.	Can	the	information	received	be	easily	analyzed	with	the	industry	performance?	(Please	tick)	
 Easily	Analyzed	  Somewhat	Easy	 		 Not	So	Easy		 	 Not	At	All	Easy		
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E.5.	What	information	would	you	like	to	see	being	reported?	
	
	
	
	
	
Part	F-Regulatory	requirements:	
	
F.1.	Are	you	aware	if	the	Islamic	Financial	Institution	(GP)	had	any	regulatory	requirements	to	meet?	(Please	
tick)	
 Fully	Aware	 	  Somewhat	Aware	 	  Not	Aware	
	
F.2.	What	regulatory	requirements	were	you	asked	to	abide	by/to?	
	
	
	
	
	
F.3.	Do	you	think	that	regulatory	requirements	were	enforced	effectively?	(Please	tick)	
 Fully	Enforced	  Somewhat	Enforced	  Not	Enforced	  No	Idea	
	
Part	G-Going	Forward:	
	
G.1.	Do	you	think	that	private	equity	investment	has	public	consequences?	Do	you	think	that	it	has	an	indirect	
systemic	impact?	Due	to:			(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)	
Is	another	form	of	providing	finance/liquidity	to	the	market	parallel	to	banks	and	market	exchanges	
Shortfall	of	investor	protection	and	investor	losses	could	have	an	impact	on	liquidity	in	the	market	
Investor	losses	(from	pension	funds	and	insurance	companies)	may	be	indirectly	born	by	individual	savers	
and	the	wider	public	
All	the	above		
None
Other-Specify:	
	
G.2.	 Do	 you	 think	 that	 regulating	 the	 agreement/contract	 and	 information	 disclosure	 (prior	 and	 or	 post	
investment)	would	be	beneficial	for	the	growth	of	the	Islamic	private	equity	industry?	(Please	tick	and	explain)	
G.2.i.		To	regulate	pre-investment	would	be:	
Beneficial	to	Industry	 Not	beneficial	to	Industry	 										Unsure	 No	Idea	 	
Explain:	
	
369		
	
G.2.ii.		To	regulate	post-investment	would	be:	
Beneficial	to	Industry	 Not	beneficial	to	Industry	 										Unsure	 No	Idea	 	
Explain:	
	
	
	
G3.	Who	do	you	think	should	regulate?		(Please	tick	and	explain)	
	
G.3.i.	Pre-investment	to	be	regulated/supervised	by:	
 Regulator	 		 Industry	Associations									 Both								 None   Other-Specify:	
Explain:	
	
	
G.3.ii.	Post-investment	to	be	regulated/supervised	by:	
 Regulator	 		 Industry	Associations									 Both								 None   Other-Specify:	
Explain:	
	
	
	
G.4.	How	should	they	regulate?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Obligatory	Compliance						 Comply	or	Explain	Basis					 None							 Other-Specify:		
	
Explain:	
	
	
G.5.	Are	you	aware	of	any	industry	associations?	(Please	tick)	
 Yes	  No		 	No	idea	 If	yes,	provide:	 Name	of	Association(s):		
	
G.6.	Are	you	a	member?	(Please	tick)		
 Yes	  No		 	No	idea	 If	yes,	provide:	 Type	of	Membership(s):		
	
G.7.	Do	you	make	use	of	their	guidance?	(Please	tick)		
 Yes	  No		 	No	idea	 If	yes,	provide:	 Type	of	Guidance(s):		
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G.8.	What	do	you	 think	of	having	an	 Investors	 (LP)	Advisory	committee	 that	 represents	 the	 investors	 in	 the	
investment,	 to	 voice	 investors	 and	 focus	 on	 substance	 and	 efficiency	 issues;	 meet	 with	 Islamic	 Financial	
Intuitions	(GP)	regularly	to	discuss	time-sensitive	matters	of	importance?		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Very	Much	Agree	  Somewhat	Agree	  Agree	  Not	Agree	 Rather	be	Independent	
Explain:	
	
	
G.9.	What	 are	 the	 key	 issues	 facing	 Islamic	private	equity?	 (Please	prioritize	answer,	with	1	being	 the	most	
important	and	please	provide	explanation	each).	
 Priority	 Explain	
Economic	environment −−	 	
Valuation −−	 	
Fees/Alignment	of	interest −−	 	
IFI-GP	management	approach −−	 	
Liquidity	  −−	 	
Transparency	&	investor	
communication	
−−	 	
Regulations −−	 	
Others,	Specify:	 −−	 	
 
 
G.10.	Did	the	investment	in	Islamic	private	equity	meet	your	expectations?	(Please	tick	the	appropriate	response	
for	each)	
	 All	 Some	 Few	 None	
Meet	expectation	on	procedures/approach	 	 	 	 	
Meet	expectation	on	risk/returns	 	 	 	 	
Meet	expectation	on	shari’ah	purposes/compliance	 	 	 	 	
Meet	expectation	on	Islamic	Financial	Institution/General	
Partner-Tust	
	 	 	 	
	
G.11.	Going	forward	do	you	expect	to	continue	to	invest	in	Islamic	private	equity	form	of	investment?	(Please	
tick	and	explain	selection)	
Plan	to	Continue	 	 Undecided	 	 No	Plans	to	Continue	
Explain:	
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G.12.	Going	forward	you	preference	to	investing	in	Islamic	private	equity	investment	would	be:		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Direct	equity	investment	(partnership)	 
 Indirect	equity	investment	(pooling	into	co-investment	vehicle-SPV)	
 Private	equity	funds	of	funds	  Limited	partnership    	Other	
Explain:		
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Investors Investing in CPE Information Sheet: 
 Information Sheet 
	
	
	
	
Dear Participant, 
 
I am part time PhD candidate at the Durham University Business School, United Kingdom.  The purpose 
of this study is to explore the relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity firms in the 
GCC. As empirical study is a key part of my PhD dissertation, I am conducting a survey of investors 
and private equity firms.  
 
The questionnaire aims to provide insight into the investor’s experience in Islamic private equity and 
provide information and recommendation on how the relationship between the investor and the Islamic 
private equity firm can be strengthened in terms of transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation.  Therefore, I 
request you to kindly choose and answer the questions that correctly reflect your experience, as it will 
effect the results of the study. 
 
You will be provided with the questionnaire before hand and then arrangements will be made for an 
interview at your convenience and time to go through the questionnaire and discuss related issues. 
Should you have any questions and or concerns regarding this study/questionnaire, you may e-mail me 
at: m.a.al-mannai@durham.ac.uk .  A written summary of the outcome of the study will be made 
available to interested participants following the end of the thesis. 
 
Ethics and rights of the respondents 
 
While presently studying part time for my PhD, I currently am an employee of the Central Bank of 
Bahrain (where I am a Head in the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate).  
 
I wish to stress to you that any information you give to me will be purely used for the purpose of research 
related to my PhD thesis.  It will not under any circumstances be shared with or used by the Central 
Bank of Bahrain.  
 
I also wish to stress to you that any information you give me will be kept strictly confidential at all times.  
Furthermore, the information provided will be used anonymously in my thesis and I will not use your 
name or any other details that would result in your identity being known.  
 
The interviewee has the right not to answer any question for any reason. 
 
The project has been given advisory approval by the Durham University Business School Sub-Committee for 
Ethics. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation, and you answering all questions is extremely important and highly 
appreciated. 
Durham Islamic Finance Programme 
Business	School	
For Researcher Use Only: 
Case Identification No.: 
Date:       /       /201….   
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Questionnaire to Investors investing in CPE: 
	
Part	A-	Investor	Profile:	
	
A.1.		You	are	an	investor	in	private	equity	as	a:	(Please	tick)	
 High	net	worth	individual	 										 Financial	Institution	 	  Insurance	Company																									
 Asset	Manager	 	 										 Sovereign	Wealth	Fund	  Government	Entity		
 Endowment	 	 										 Pension	Fund		 															 Family	office	
 Consultant/Advisor												 										 Other	-Specify:		
	
A2.	Please	specify	your	domicile:	(Please	tick)	
 Bahrain	  Kuwait	  Qatar	  Oman	  Saudi	Arabia	 				 UAE	
	
A.3.	Your	investments	in	private	equity	are/were	carried	out	through:	(Please	tick)	
 Direct	equity	investment	(partnership)	
 Indirect	equity	investment	(pooling	into	co-investment	vehicle-SPV)	
 Private	equity	funds	of	funds	
 Limited	partnership	(LP)	
	
A4.	Year	of	most	recent	investments	in	private	equity:	(Please	tick)	
2003-2005	 		 	2006-2008	 	 	2009-2011	 	 	2012-2014	
	
	
A.5.	Country,	allocation,	and	type	private	equity	investment:	(Please	fill)	
Country	 %	Allocation	 Type	
Start-up	(SP),	Capital	growth	(CG),	
Other	(O)-Specify	
Bahrain	 	 	
Kuwait	 	 	
Qatar	 	 	
Oman	 	 	
Saudi	Arabia	 	 	
UAE	 	 	
Other	–	
specify:	
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A.6.	Number	of	private	equity	investments	made	in	the	last	10	years?		(Please	tick)	
Number	of	
Investment(s)	
Amount	Invested	(in	US$)	
	
Management	
Fees	paid	(%)	
(Please	fill)	
 	1-2	 	Less	100,000					100,000-1m					1m-5m						5.1m-10m										
10m+	
	
 	3-4	 	Less	100,000					100,000-1m					1m-5m						5.1m-10m										
10m+	
	
 	5+	 	Less	100,000					100,000-1m					1m-5m						5.1m-10m										
10m+	
	
	
	
A.7.	How	familiar	are	you	with	equity	financing?		(Please	tick)	
 Somewhat	Familiar		  Familiar	 				 Very	Familiar	 Specialized	
	
			
Part	B-Investor	Approach	to	Investment:	
	
B.1.	What	are	the	three	most	important	source	of	information	used	prior	to	investment?		
1.	
2.	
3.	
	None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
	
	
B.2.	Please	indicate	how	much	information	is	based	on	impersonal	sources	in	comparison	to	personal	sources,	
when	deciding	to	invest?	(Please	tick)	
	 None			
at	all	
Slight	
Extent	
Certain	
Extent	
Considerable	
Extent	
Substantial	
Extent	
Great			
Extent	
Impersonal	sources						
(e.g.	documents,	
reports,	press	releases)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Personal	Sources												
(e.g.	Calls/meetings	of	
Islamic	Financial	
Institution	(IFI)-General	
Partner,	personal	
network)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
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B.3.	What	were	the	impersonal	sources	upon	which	investment	decision	was	based	on?		Please	provide	up	to	3	
and	comment.	
1.	
2.		
3.	
None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
	
B.4.	What	were	the	personal	sources	upon	which	investment	decision	was	based	on?	Please	provide	up	to	3	and	
comment.	
1.	
2.	
3.	
	
None	at	all.	(Please	explain,	using	the	space	above).	
B.5.	How	easily	was	it	to	obtain	market	information	on	Private	Equity	market?	(Please	tick)	
 With	Difficulty	  Somewhat	Difficult					 Somewhat	Easy	 			 Easy	  Didn’t	Try	
	
B.6.	In	promoting	the	economy	and	finance,	do	environmental,	social	and	governance	(ESG)	issues	effect	your	
investment	decisions?	(Please	tick)	
 None	at	all		 	  Slight	Extent	 	 	  Certain	Extent	
 Considerable	Extent	  Substantial	Extent	 	 	  Great	Extent	 	 	
	
	
Part	C-	Investor-LP	and	Financial	Institution-Private	Equity	Agreement:	
	
C.1.	Were	you	provided	with	a	full	set	of	documents	by	the	Financial	Institution-GP	(offering	document,	term	
sheet,	and	subscription	form/agreement)	prior	to	investing?	(Please	tick)	
 Provided	with	full	set	of	documents	
 Provided	with	term	sheet	and	subscription	form/agreement	only	
 Provided	with	subscription	form/agreement	only	
 Other-Specify:	
	
C.2.	Do	you	read	the	offered/provided	documents	or	do	you	rely	on	the	Financial	Institution	(FI)	promoting	the	
investment	offer?	(Please	tick)	
 Read	the	offered/provided	documents	personally	
 Have	experts/advisors	read	and	provide	me	with	feedback	
 Rely	on	the	promoting	FI	information	provided	during	meeting	(based	on	trust)	
 Rely	on	network/relationships	only	(through	friends	and	associates)	
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C.3.	Were	the	following	principles	discussed?		(Please	tick	the	appropriate	response	for	each)	
	 In	
Detail	
Some	
Detail	
Briefly	 Not	
Discussed	
	Alignment	of	interest		 	 	 	 	
Governance	of	investment	 	 	 	 	
Transparency	and	Disclosure	 	 	 	 	
Investment	plan	 	 	 	 	
Exit	and/or	Redemption	strategy	 	 	 	 	
On-going	reporting/update	 	 	 	 	
Rights	and	Obligations	 	 	 	 	
Risk	factors	 	 	 	  
	
	
C.4.	Benchmark	for	considering	information	prior	to	investment	as	being	sufficient	was	based	on:			(Please	tick)	
 A-Information	provided		  B-	Trust	in	the	Financial	Institution/GP	
 Both	A	&	B		 	 	  Other-	Specify: 	
	
	
C.5.	 If	 response	 to	C.4.	was	based	on	 Information,	what	 source	of	 information?	 (Please	 select	and	prioritize	
answer	with	1	being	most	important)		
Current	events	 	 	 				 		−− Investment	prospects	&	opportunity	 		 			−−	
Financial	performance	(historical	&	projected)				−− Management	Team	stability	&	experience	 				−−	
Investor	protection	&	clear	investment	rights						−− Related	underlying	risk	issues	&	mitigation	 				−−	
Regulatory	requirements	&	obligations																		−− Investment	terms	&	conditions	 	 				−−	
Alignment	of	interest	&	transparency	 	 			−−	 Applicable	Law	 	 	 	 				−−	
Investment	consultant	recommendation						 			−−	 Policies	&	procedures	for	valuations	and	Fees			 				−−	
Family	&	friends	 	 	 	 			−−	 Personal	experience	in	private	equity					 				−− 	  
	Other-Specify:	
	
C.6.	If	response	to	C.4.	was	based	on	Trust,	how	much	trust?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 High	 		 High-Medium	 			 Medium	 										 Medium-Low	 										 Low	
Explain:		
	
C.7.	Are	you	satisfied	with	the	agreement/contract	signed?		(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Fully	Satisfied	  Fairly	Satisfied	  Satisfied	  Somewhat	Satisfied				 Not	Satisfied	
Explain:	
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C.8.		Were	you	offered	the	opportunity	to	be	able	to	negotiate	any	of	the	contractual	clauses	in	the	
investment	contract	that	was	offered?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 No		  Yes	 Explain:		
	
	
C.9.	How	did	you	find	the	language	of	the	agreement/contract	signed?		
(Please	tick)  
C.9.i. 
Simple,	easy	to	understand		 Complex	(not	easy	to	understand	what	was	happening)	 	
	
C.9.ii. 
Comprehensive	enough	to	protect	rights	and	adequate	covenants	to	address	conflict	of	interest	
Not	comprehensive	enough	to	protect	rights	and	no	adequate	covenants	to	address	conflict	of	interest	
	
C.10.	Was	subscribing	and	signing	of	the	agreement	independent	of	signing	a	proxy	to	the	Financial	
Institution?		
Signing	a	proxy	was	optional	and	not	a	condition	of	subscribing	and	signing	of	the	agreement		
Subscription	and	signing	of	the	agreement	was	conditional	to	signing	a	proxy		
Other-Specify:	
	
C.11.	How	was	your	capital/investment	participation?			
(Please	tick	and	if	you	have	more	than	one	investment	please	tick	for	each)	
	
Investment(s)	
	
One	off	injection	of	capital	
Multiple	injection																																	
(draw	down	capital/capital	call)	
1	 	 	
2	 	 	
3	 	 	
4+	 	 	
 
 Other-Specify:	
	
	
	
	
	
	
378		
C.12.	How	much	was	the	Financial	Institution	(FI)-	(GP)	participation	in	the	investment?					(Please	tick)	
(If	the	IFI-GP	participated,	please	state	percentage	and	if	you	have	more	than	one	investment	please	provide	
for	each)	
Investment(s)	 Participated	%	 Did	not	Participate	 Don’t	Know	
1	  −−	%	 	 	
2	  −−	%	 	 	
3	  −−	%	 	 	
4+	  −−	%	 	 	
	
	
Part	D-Monitoring:	
	
D.1.	How	do	you	manage	your	relationship	with	the	Financial	Institution	(GP)?		
(Please	tick;	if	you	have	more	than	one	investment	please	provide	for	each	and	explain	selection)	
Investment(s)	 No	
relationship	
Have	
relationship/Manage	
Explain	
1	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	
4+	 	 	 	
 
 Other-Explain:	
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D.2.	Were	you	permitted	to	vote	on	key	issues?		(Please	tick	and	if	you	have	more	than	one	investment	please	
provide	for	each)	
	
	
Investment(s)	
Vote	on:	
Amendments	
to	the	
agreement	
and/or	
investment	
strategy	
Vote	on:	
Dissolution	
of	the	
partnership	
before	the	
termination	
of	the	
investment	
period		
Vote	on:	
Extension	of	
the	
investment	
period	
Vote	on:	
Issues	
of	
conflict	
of	
interest	
Vote	on:	
Removal	of	
the	
investment	
manager	
	
Vote	
on:	
Other-	
(Please	
Explain	
Below)	
	
Not	
Permitted	
to	Vote	
1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
3	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
4+	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
 
Other-Explain:	
	
	
D.3.	Did	the	Financial	Institution	(GP)	establish	and	implement	a	clearly	documented	and	defined	process	which	
facilitates	investor	consultation	after	investment,	regarding	matters	relating	to	conflict	of	interest?	(Please	tick	
and	explain	selection)	
	No	 	 	Yes	 	 Explain:		 	
	
	
D.4.	When	it	comes	to	investing	in	private	equity,	what	are	the	risks	that	are	of	concern	to	you?		(Please	tick)	
	None	 	 	 	Have	risks	that	are	of	concern,	they	are:	(Please	state	in	order	of	priority)		
	
	
	
	
	
D.5.	Were	those	risks	in	D.4.	addressed	in	the	documents	provided	to	you?	(Please	tick)	
	
	No	 	 	Yes	
	
D.6.	On	average,	how	often	does	your	Financial	Institution	(GP)	get	in	touch	with	you	after	having	invested	the	
capital/fund?	(Please	tick	and	state	frequency	if	Frequent	is	selected)	
 Frequent	 	 	 	  Occasional			 	  None	  
(State	Frequency:	 	 					) 
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D.7.	 If	response	to	D.6.	 is	None	or	Occasional,	what	do	you	think	is	the	reason	that	the	GP	does	not	provide	
continual	timely	feedback	on	the	investment?	Such	action	will:				
(Please	prioritize	answer	1	to	5,	with	1	being	the	first	reason)	
 Jeopardies	the	GP’s	informational	advantage	−−	 	 			 Endanger	their	position			−−	
 Undermine	their	authority	 −−	 		  Too	costly		−−	 				 Other	–Specify:																					−−	
	
	
D.8.	The	information/feedback	that	you	received:	(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)	
 Reduces	the	need	to	monitor	  Enhances	the	trust	in	the	GP	
 You	are	willing	to	inject	more	capital/reinvest	in	the	venture/investment	
	
	
Part	E-Reporting	requirements:	
	
E.1.	 Is	the	reporting	feedback	a	provision	 in	the	main	formal	agreement/contract	signed,	or	part	of	 informal	
agreement	made	with	the	Financial	Institution-GP?	(Please	tick)	
 Part	of	the	formal	agreement/contract		  Part	of	the	informal	agreement/contract	
 Other-specify:	
	
E.2.	How	did	you	find	the	methodology	of	reporting	of	performance	and	progress	of	investment/project?	(Please	
tick)		
 Standardized	and	consistent	allowing	for	comparing	performances	
 Not	standardized	(differs	every	time)	
	
E.3.	Have	you	needed	to	or	wanted	to	go	back	to	the	GP	with	questions	or	further	information?		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection) 
	No	 	 	Yes	 	 Explain:		
	
	
E.	4.	Can	the	information	received	be	easily	analyzed	with	the	industry	performance?	(Please	tick)	
 Easily	Analyzed	  Somewhat	Easy	 		 Not	So	Easy		 	 Not	At	All	Easy		
	
E.5.	What	information	would	you	like	to	see	being	reported?	
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Part	F-Regulatory	requirements:	
	
F.1.	Are	you	aware	if	the	Financial	Institution	(GP)	had	any	regulatory	requirements	to	meet?	(Please	tick)	
 Fully	Aware	 	  Somewhat	Aware	 	  Not	Aware	
	
F.2.	What	regulatory	requirements	were	you	asked	to	abide	by/to?	
	
	
	
	
	
F.3.	Do	you	think	that	regulatory	requirements	were	enforced	effectively?	(Please	tick)	
 Fully	Enforced	  Somewhat	Enforced	  Not	Enforced	  No	Idea	
	
Part	G-Going	Forward:	
	
G.1.	Do	you	think	that	private	equity	investment	has	public	consequences?	Do	you	think	that	it	has	an	indirect	
systemic	impact?	Due	to:			(Please	tick	and	more	than	one	can	be	selected)	
Is	another	form	of	providing	finance/liquidity	to	the	market	parallel	to	banks	and	market	exchanges	
Shortfall	of	investor	protection	and	investor	losses	could	have	an	impact	on	liquidity	in	the	market	
Investor	losses	(from	pension	funds	and	insurance	companies)	may	be	indirectly	born	by	individual	savers	
and	the	wider	public	
All	the	above		
None
Other-Specify:	
	
	
	
G.2.	 Do	 you	 think	 that	 regulating	 the	 agreement/contract	 and	 information	 disclosure	 (prior	 and	 or	 post	
investment)	would	be	beneficial	for	the	growth	of	the	Islamic	private	equity	industry?	(Please	tick	and	explain)	
G.2.i.		To	regulate	pre-investment	would	be:	
Beneficial	to	Industry	 Not	beneficial	to	Industry	 										Unsure	 No	Idea	 	
Explain:	
	
G.2.ii.		To	regulate	post-investment	would	be:	
Beneficial	to	Industry	 Not	beneficial	to	Industry	 										Unsure	 No	Idea	 	
Explain:	
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G3.	Who	do	you	think	should	regulate?		(Please	tick	and	explain)	
	
G.3.i.	Pre-investment	to	be	regulated/supervised	by:	
 Regulator	 		 Industry	Associations									 Both								 None   Other-Specify:	
Explain:	
	
	
G.3.ii.	Post-investment	to	be	regulated/supervised	by:	
 Regulator	 		 Industry	Associations									 Both								 None   Other-Specify:	
Explain:	
	
	
	
G.4.	How	should	they	regulate?	(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Obligatory	Compliance						 Comply	or	Explain	Basis					 None							 Other-Specify:		
	
Explain:	
	
	
G.5.	Are	you	aware	of	any	industry	associations?	(Please	tick)	
 Yes	  No		 	 If	yes,	provide:	 Name	of	Association(s):		
G.6.	Are	you	a	member?	(Please	tick)		
 Yes	  No		 	 If	yes,	provide:	 Type	of	Membership(s):		
G.7.	Do	you	make	use	of	their	guidance?	(Please	tick)		
 Yes	  No		 	 If	yes,	provide:	 Type	of	Guidance(s):		
	
G.8.	What	do	you	 think	of	having	an	 Investors	 (LP)	Advisory	committee	 that	 represents	 the	 investors	 in	 the	
investment,	to	voice	investors	and	focus	on	substance	and	efficiency	issues;	meet	with	Financial	Intuitions	(GP)	
regularly	to	discuss	time-sensitive	matters	of	importance?		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Very	Much	Agree	  Somewhat	Agree	  Agree	  Not	Agree	 Rather	be	Independent	
Explain:	
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G.9.	What	are	the	key	issues	facing	private	equity?	(Please	select	and	prioritize	answer,	with	1	being	the	most	
important	and	please	provide	explanation	each).	
 Priority	 Explain	
Economic	environment −−	 	
Valuation −−	 	
Fees/Alignment	of	interest −−	 	
IFI-GP	management	approach −−	 	
Liquidity	  −−	 	
Transparency	&	investor	
communication	
−−	 	
Regulations −−	 	
Others,	Specify:	 −−	 	
 
G.10.	Did	the	investment	in	private	equity	meet	your	expectations?	(Please	tick	the	appropriate	response	for	
each)	
	 All	 Some	 Few	 None	
Meet	expectation	on	procedures/approach	 	 	 	 	
Meet	expectation	on	risk/returns	 	 	 	 	
Meet	expectation	on	Financial	Institution/General	Partner-
Trust	
	 	 	 	
	
G.11.	Going	forward	do	you	expect	to	continue	to	invest	in	private	equity	form	of	investment?	(Please	tick	and	
explain	selection)	
Plan	to	Continue	 	 Undecided	 	 No	Plans	to	Continue	
Explain:	
	
	
G.12.	Going	forward	you	preference	to	investing	in	private	equity	investment	would	be:		
(Please	tick	and	explain	selection)	
 Direct	equity	investment	(partnership)	 
 Indirect	equity	investment	(pooling	into	co-investment	vehicle-SPV)	
 Private	equity	funds	of	funds	  Limited	partnership    	Other	
Explain:		
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Consent Form to IPE & CPE Investors: 
	
CONSENT FORM 
	
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVESTOR AND PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS IN 
THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COUNTRIES 
 
Muna AlMannai, PhD candidate, Durham University Business School 
            
	 	 	 	 	 	 																							 		
	 																																																																																		Please	tick		
				Yes										No	
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided in                                                         
the Information Sheet on the above study. 
2. I have had the opportunity to ask questions, and I have received 
satisfactory answers to all my questions. 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw                                                             
at any time or not to answer any question without the need to justify                                                               
my postion, and without prejudice.  
 
4. I understand that my name (and the name of my company, where 
applicable) will not be published, but what will be published will be the 
analyzed results in anonymous form. 
5. I agree to take part in the study.  
6. I agree to the interview being audi recorded.  
7. I understand that interview tapes and transcripts will be anonymised and 
will be held in strict confidence and in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act (1998).  
8. I agree to the use of anyonymised quotes in publications.  
 
Name of interviewee/person making consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)    
 
 
Signature:       Date: 
 
Name of Research/person taking consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
    
Signature:       Date:
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Appendix 2: Islamic Financial Institution’s Documents 
 
IFI Information Sheet: 
	
	
 
Dear Participant, 
 
I am part time PhD candidate at the Durham University Business School, United Kingdom.  The purpose of this study 
is to explore the relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity firms in the GCC. As empirical study is 
a key part of my PhD dissertation, I am conducting a survey on investors and private equity firms.  
 
The questions aim to provide insight into the investor’s experience in Islamic private equity and provide information 
and recommendation on how the relationship between the investor and the Islamic private equity firm can be 
strengthened in terms of transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation.  Therefore, I request you to kindly answer the questions 
that correctly reflect your experience, as it will effect the results of the study. 
 
Arrangements will be made for an interview at your convenience and time to seek your input to some questions and 
discuss related issues. Should you have any questions and or concerns regarding this study/questions, you may e-mail 
me at m.a.al-mannai@durham.ac.uk.  A written summary of the outcome of the study will be made available to 
interested participants following the end of the thesis. 
 
Ethics and rights of the respondents 
 
While presently studying part time for my PhD, I currently am an employee of the Central Bank of Bahrain (where I 
am a Head in the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate).  
I wish to stress to you that any information you give to me will be purely used for the purpose of research related to my 
PhD thesis.  It will not under any circumstances be shared with or used by the Central Bank of Bahrain.  
 
I also wish to stress to you that any information you give me will be kept strictly confidential at all times.  Furthermore, 
the information provided will be used anonymously in my thesis and I will not use your name or any other details that 
would result in your identity being known.  
 
The interviewee has the right not to answer any question for any reason. 
 
The project has been given advisory approval by the Durham University Business School Sub-Committee for Ethics. 
Thank you in advance for your co-operation, and you answering all questions is extremely important and 
highly appreciated. 
 
 
Durham Islamic Finance Programme 
Business School 
For Researcher Use Only: 
Case Identification No.: 
Date:       /       /201….   
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IFI Interview Questions: 
The Relationship between the Investors and the Islamic Financial Intuitions in the GCC investing 
Private Equity 
 
Questions to be addressed to Islamic Financial Institutions carrying out Islamic private equity/private 
placement, including real estate (IPE) 
 
Introduction 
 
A. Islamic Financial Institution Profile 
 
1. What type of IFI are you? 
• Investment bank offering Islamic Private Equity (IPE) 
• Private equity firm 
• Other: Specify 
 
2. Where are you located? 
3. What is the sector/industry of your investments concentration? 
4. What is the capital of your institution? 
5. What is the size of the assets under management of your institution? 
 
B. Investment Approach 
 
1. How do you approach your potential investors? How do you decide which investor to approach? 
2. What do you provide the potential investor with when approaching them for investment? 
3. What is usually discussed during meetings and presentations?  
4. Does the institution’s representative promoting the investment have education and or training in 
Islamic financial products and contracts? 
5. What steps are taken to ensure that the investor is well informed? 
 
C. Post Investment Relationship 
 
1. How is communication maintained between the institution and the investor, post investment?  
2. What is the frequency of the information provided to the investor? 
3. What information is provided to the investor and how? 
4. Do visits take place to update the investor? Or is it just made through reporting? 
5. If visits are made, who from within the institution makes the visits? 
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D. Due Diligence, Transparency and Governance  
 
1. Does you Due Diligence (DD) process cover the following: 
Due Diligence Yes No 
Financial DD   
Legal DD   
Regulatory DD   
Investment & Risk DD   
Shari’ah DD   
Commercial DD   
Management DD   
Macro-environment DD   
Social impact DD   
Other DD (Specify):   
 
2. How do you evaluate your risks? 
3. What is the process of deciding on the level of your institution’s investment participation? 
4. What are the criteria used by the institution to make investment decisions? 
5. What do you consider as being transparent? How do you know that it is maintained without 
any biasness, and disclosing favourable information verse unfavourable information? 
6. How do you maintain the protection of investors’ rights?  
7. You are managers and most of the time are given or take proxy, how do you maintain 
investors’ rights and deal with mitigating conflict of interest? 
8. How do you maintain keeping to the business and the investment plan? 
9. When given proxy, do you ever go back to the investor on any decisions to be made? If yes, 
when do you go back to the investor?  
10. On exit, how is it conveyed to the investor? What detail is the investor provided with?  
 
Details Yes No 
Full sale and exit price received by IFI   
Only the amount the investor is entitled to   
 
E. Shari’ah Compliance 
 
1. Is there a Shari’ah department or a unit within the institution? 
2. Is there a Shari’ah Compliance Officer? What is his/her role? 
3. What do you consider as shari’ah risk for IPE?  (Please select, more than one can be selected). 
	
In pursuit of the investments being compatibility with the principles of Shari’ah-from your point of view- 
which is/are the most important principle or principles:   The principle of: 
a. Profit and loss 
b. Transaction to be real and certain and not based on uncertainty or speculation 
c. Prohibition in dealing in items, which are Haram and the requirement to deal only in Halal items 
d. Prohibition of Riba and gharar 
e. Fair and transparent dealings to ensure all partners are aware of their rights and obligations 
f. Clarity and disclosure information, so as not to be manipulating.  
g. No unjust enrichment, equity and fairness to all parties 
h. Enhancement of the standard of living and welfare of the community in addition to the 
maximization of shareholders wealth.  
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4. What is the institution’s process of monitoring the consistency of maintaining  its Shari’ah 
compliance, how does it mange any Shari’ah compliance risk that may arise over time? 
 
F. Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) Role 
 
1. What is the Shari’ah governance system of your institution? 
 
2. What are the types of reports produced by the institution’s Shari’ah governance system? 
 
	
3. What is the process in which the Shari’ah consultation and approval is obtained at your institution 
for: 
• Initiation and idea generation Stage 
• Finalization pre-launch stage  
 
4. How is the SSB updated after the launch of the offer is closed? 
5. What is your Institution’s key on the independence of the SSB members? 
6. Are any of the SSB members: 
 
 Yes No 
On the board of directors of the institution   
On of the institution’s board committees   
A Client of the institution   
A Shareholder of the institution   
 
 
Do you have 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Reporting to 
who 
 
Main Responsibilities 
Internal Shari’ah compliance 
unit/department (independent from the 
business unit/department) 
    
Internal Shari’ah review/ audit 
unit/department 
    
Shari’ah Supervisory Board     
Outsourced: (Specify)     
Other: (Specify)     
Shari’ah Governance Type of Report 
Produced 
Frequency Who is distributed to 
Internal Shari’ah 
compliance 
unit/department  
   
Internal Shari’ah review/ 
audit unit/department 
   
Shari’ah Supervisory 
Board (SSB) 
   
Outsourced: (Specify) 	 	 	
Other: (Specify) 	 	 	
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7. Who appoints the SSB members? The BOD or the AGM? 
8. What is the appointment term (length of appointment) of the SSB members? 
9. Is there a set number of appointment terms that a SSB member can serve? 
10. If yes to D.10. : How many consecutive terms can the SSB member serve? 
11. If response to D.1. was “Outsourced” then: Is there a different SSB for every IPE investment or it 
is the same?  
 
G. Regulatory Requirements 
 
1. Are there any regulatory requirements on your institution with regards to promoting and selling 
IPE? 
2. Are there any on-going regulatory requirements with regards to disclosure and transparency that 
your institution requires to abide by, once the investment has been offered? 
3. What is your opinion with regards to these regulations? 
4. What are the regulations on capital? And what is your opinion on them? 
 
General 
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IFI’s Consent Form: 
CONSENT FORM 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVESTOR AND THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COUNTRIES INVESTING IN 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Muna AlMannai, PhD candidate, Durham University Business School 
         
                               
                                                                       Please tick  
    Yes          No 
9. I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided in the 
Information Sheet on the above study. 
10. I have had the opportunity to ask questions, and I have received satisfactory 
answers to all my questions. 
11. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at 
any time or not to answer any question without the need to justify my postion, 
and without prejudice.  
 
12. I understand that my name (and the name of my company, where applicable) 
will not be published, but what will be published will be the analyzed results 
in anonymous form. 
13. I agree to take part in the study.  
14. I agree to the interview being audi recorded.  
15. I understand that interview tapes and transcripts will be anonymised and will 
be held in strict confidence and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998).  
16. I agree to the use of anyonymised quotes in publications.  
 
Name of interviewee/person making consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)    
 
 
Signature:       Date: 
 
Name of Research/person taking consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
   
Signature:  	 	 	 	 	 Date:
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 ﻋﺰﯾﺰي اﻟﻤﺸﺎرك، 
 
ﺜﻤﺮﯾﻦ ﺘأﻧﺎ طﺎﻟﺒﺔ دﻛﺘﻮراة ﺑﺪوام ﺟﺰﺋﻲ ﺑﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ درھﺎم ﻛﻠﯿﺔ إدارة اﻷﻋﻤﺎل ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة، وﺗﮭﺪف ھﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ إﻟﻰ اﺳﺘﻜﺸﺎف اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺴ
اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺎت واﻻﻛﺘﺘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﯿﺠﻲ. وﺑﻤﺎ أن اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﯾﺒﯿﺔ ﺗﺸﻜﻞ ﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﻓﻲ ﺆواﻟﻤ
 ﺔ.ﯿﺟﺰءا ًرﺋﯿﺴﺎ ًﻣﻦ أطﺮوﺣﺔ اﻟﺪﻛﺘﻮراة اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻲ، ﻓﺄﻧﺎ أﺟﺮي ﻣﺴﺤﺎ ًﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﯾﻦ واﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻨﯿﺔ وأﻋﻀﺎء ھﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ آﻟﺸﺮﻋ
  
ء ﺣﻮل ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﯾﻦ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎل اﻻﺳﺘﺜﻤﺎر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺎت واﻻﻛﺘﺘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ  وﺗﻮﻓﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت وﺗﮭﺪف اﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ إﻟﻰ إﻟﻘﺎء ﻣﺰﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻀﻮ
 وﺗﻮﺻﯿﺎت ﺣﻮل ﻛﯿﻔﯿﺔ ﺗﻘﻮﯾﺔ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ واﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺎت اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ، ﻓﯿﻤﺎ ﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﯿﺔ
 ﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻻﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﯾﻌﻜﺲ ﺗﺠﺮﺑﺘﻜﻢ ﺑﺪﻗﺔ ﻟﻤﺪى ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮھﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ.واﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ واﻻﻧﻈﻤﺔ. ﻟﺬا أرﺟﻮ اﻟﺘﻔﻀﻞ ﺑﺎﻻﺟﺎﺑ
 
و أ ﺳﯿﺘﻢ اﻟﺘﺮﺗﯿﺐ ﻹﺟﺮاء ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺬي ﯾﻨﺎﺳﺒﻜﻢ ﻷﺧﺬ إﺟﺎﺑﺘﻜﻢ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ وﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ أﻣﻮر ذات ﺻﻠﺔ. ﻓﺈذا ﻛﺎن ﻟﺪﯾﻜﻢ أﯾﺔ اﺳﺘﻔﺴﺎرات
ﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﯿﺘﻢ ﺗﻮﻓﯿﺮ ﻣﻮﺟﺰ   la.a.m-ku.ca.mahrud@iannamﯾﺪي اﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ ﺗﺤﻔﻈﺎت ﺑﺸﺄن ھﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ، ﯾﻤﻜﻨﻜﻢ إرﺳﺎﻟﮭﺎ إﻟّﻲ ﻋﺒﺮ ﻋﻨﻮان ﺑﺮ
 ﻋﻦ ﻧﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎرﻛﯿﻦ اﻟﺮاﻏﺒﯿﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻻﻧﺘﮭﺎء ﻣﻦ ھﺬه اﻷطﺮوﺣﺔ.
 
 ﻣﺒﺎدئ أﺧﻼﻗﯿﺔ وﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﺸﺎرﻛﯿﻦ:
 
ﻮراة، ﻓﺈﻧﻨﻲ أﻋﻤﻞ ﺣﺎﻟﯿﺎ ً ﻟﺪى ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺒﺤﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰي )ﺣﯿﺚ أﺷﻐﻞ ﻣﻨﺼﺐ رﺋﯿﺲ ﺑﺈدارة ﺑﯿﻨﻤﺎ أدرس ﺣﺎﻟﯿﺎ ً ﺑﺪوام ﺟﺰﺋﻲ ﻟﻨﯿﻞ درﺟﺔ اﻟﺪﻛﺘ
 ﻣﺮاﻗﺒﺔ اﻷﺳﻮاق اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ(.
 
وأود أن أؤﻛﺪ ﻟﻜﻢ ﺑﺄن أﯾﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﻘﺪﻣﻮﻧﮭﺎ ﻟﻲ ﺳﻮف ﯾﺘﻢ اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﮭﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻟﻐﺮض اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺨﺎص ﺑـﺄطﺮوﺣﺔ اﻟﺪﻛﺘﻮراة اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﻲ، وﻟﻦ ﯾﺘﻢ 
 أو اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﮭﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻣﺼﺮف اﻟﺒﺤﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﻤﺮﻛﺰي.ﺑﺄي ﺣﺎل ﻣﻦ اﻷﺣﻮال ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺘﮭﺎ ﻣﻊ 
  
 ﻢﻛﻤﺎ أود أن أؤﻛﺪ ﻟﻜﻢ ﺑﺄن أﯾﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﺰودوﻧﻨﻲ ﺑﮭﺎ ﺳﺘﻈﻞ ﻣﺤﻔﻮظﺔً ﻗﯿﺪ اﻟﺴﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﺘﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻞ اﻷوﻗﺎت، ﺑﺠﺎﻧﺐ أن اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﺔ ﺳﯿﺘ
 ﻛﺸﻒ ھﻮﯾّﺎﺗﻜﻢ.اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﮭﺎ ﻣﺠﮭﻮﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺼﺪر ﻓﻲ أطﺮوﺣﺘﻲ وﻟﻦ أﺳﺘﺨﺪم اﺳﻤﺎءﻛﻢ أو أﯾﺔ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﯿﻞ أﺧﺮى ﻗﺪ ﺗﻔﻀﻲ إﻟﻰ 
 
 وﻟﻠﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﺬي ﯾﺘﻢ إﺟﺮاء اﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣﻌﮫ اﻟﺤﻖ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺪم اﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ أي ﺳﺆال ﻷي ﺳﺒﺐ ﻛﺎن. 
 
 وﻗﺪ ﺣﺼﻞ اﻟﻤﺸﺮوع ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻮاﻓﻘﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺸﺎرﯾﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﻠﺠﻨﺔ اﻟﻔﺮﻋﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﺒﺎدئ اﻷﺧﻼﻗﯿﺔ ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ درھﺎم ﻛﻠﯿﺔ إدارة اﻷﻋﻤﺎل.
 
 ﺗﻔﻀﻠﻜﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﺮد ﻋﻠﻰ ﻛﺎﻓﺔ اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﻏﺎﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷھﻤﯿﺔ وﯾﻠﻘﻰ ﻣﻨّﻲ أﺳﻤﻰ آﯾﺎت اﻟﺘﻘﺪﯾﺮ. أﺷﻜﺮﻛﻢ ﻣﺴﺒﻘﺎ ًﻟﺘﻌﺎوﻧﻜﻢ وأﺟﺪ
 
 
 ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ درھﺎم ﻟﻠﺘﻤﻮﯾﻞ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ 
 ﻛﻠﯿﺔ إدارة اﻷﻋﻤﺎل 
	 :ﻓﻘط اﻟﺑﺎﺣث ﻗﺑل ﻣن ﻟﻼﺳﺗﺧدام
  :اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ رﻗم
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 اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ واﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ دول ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون اﻟﺨﻠﯿﺠﻲ
  اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺎت واﻻﻛﺘﺘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔاﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﻓﻲ 
	
 اﻟﺗﻲ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺎت اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﮭﯾﺋﺎت اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻋﻠﻣﺎء إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣوﺟﮭﮫ اﻷﺳﺋﻠﺔ
  .اﻟﻌﻘﺎري اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎر ذﻟك ﻓﻲ ﺑﻣﺎ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ واﻻﻛﺗﺗﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻣﻠﻛﯾﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺗﺳﺗﺛﻣر
	
	  . ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﯿﮫ:ا
	 اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ؟ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺎت ﻣن ﺑﺄي ﻋﺿو اﻧت ھل. ١
	 ﺗﻘﯾم؟ أﯾن. ٢
	 ﺑﻌﺿوﯾﺗﮭﺎ؟ ﺗﺗﻣﺗﻊ اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﻣﺟﺎﻟس ﻋدد ﻛم. ٣
	 إﻟﯾﮭﺎ؟ ﺗﻧﺗﻣﻲ اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ أﻋﺿﺎء ﻋدد ﻛم اﻟﻣﺗوﺳط، ﻓﻲ. ٤
	 :أﻧت ھل اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ، اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻌﺿو. ٥
  	 .....و اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﺑﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﻋﺿو ﻧﻌم ﻻ
  .أ 	 اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ إدارة ﺑﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﻋﺿو  
  .ب 	 اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ إدارة ﻣﺟﻠس ﻟﺟﺎن ﺑﺈﺣدى ﻋﺿو  
  .ج 	 اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﻋﻣﯾل  
	  .د 	 اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﻣﺳﺎھم  
		 ب. ﻧﻄﺎق اﻟﺼﻼﺣﯿﺎت واﻟﻤﺴﺌﻮوﻟﯿﺎت :
	 ﻟك؟ اﻟﻣﺗﺎﺣﺔ اﻟﺻﻼﺣﯾﺎت وﻧطﺎق وﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﺎﺗك ﻣﮭﺎﻣك ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﻟﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﻌﯾﻧك ﻋﻘد ﻧص ھل.١
	 وﺻﻼﺣﯾﺎﺗك؟ ﻣﮭﺎﻣك ﺣدد.٢
	 واﺿﺣﺔ؟ اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ورﻓﻊ ﻟﻠﻣراﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﮭرﻣﻲ اﻟﺗﺳﻠﺳل وھل واﺿﺣﺔ؟ ﺗﺷﻐﯾﻠﯾﺔ إﺟراءات ھﻧﺎﻟك ھل.٣
				 ﺗﻘﺎرﯾرھﺎ؟ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﺗرﻓﻊ ﻟﻣن.٤
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	 :ﺑﺎﻵﺗﻲ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ اﻟواﺿﺣﺔ واﻻﺟراءات واﻟﻠواﺋﺢ اﻻﻧظﻣﺔ ﺗﺗوﻓر ھل.٥
  	 ب ِ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ واﻟﻠواﺋﺢ اﻟﻘواﻋد ﻧﻌم ﻻ
  .أ  اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﺎت ﻋﻘد  
  .ب  اﻟﻘرار اﺗﺧﺎذ وﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﻣﺣﺎﺿر اﻟﺗدوﯾن  
 ﻋﻠﻰ( اﻟﻣﻧﺗﺞ) اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات طرح ﯾﺗم أن ﺑﻌد واﻟﻣﺗﺎﺑﻌﺔ، واﻟﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﻣراﺟﻌﮫ ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺎت  
  .ج 	 اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ واﺳﺗداﻣﮭﺎ ﺗواﻓﻘﮭﺎ ﻣن ﻟﻠﺗﺄﻛد اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣرﯾن،
	  .د 	 وأﻧواﻋﮭﺎ اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر  
 اﻻﺣﺗﻔﺎظ ﺗﺣﺎول ﻛﯾف اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ، اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺿو وﺑﺻﻔﺗك اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ، اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼﺗك ﺧﻼل ﻣن. ٦
	ﺑﺎﺳﺗﻘﻼﻟﯾﺗك؟
  ﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﺎﺗك؟ ﺿوء ﻓﻲ ﻣﻧك اﻟﻣطﻠوﺑﮫ اﻟﻣﮭﺎم ﺑﺄداء ﺗﻘوم ﻛﯾف ﺷرﻋﯾﺔ، رﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻌﺿو. ٧
	  ﺷرﻋﯾﺔ؟ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﻣن ﻷﻛﺛر ﻣﻧﺗﺳب ﻛﻌﺿو اﻟﻣﺧﺗﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﻣﮭﺎم ﻣﺗطﻠﺑﺎت ﺑﯾن ﻣﺎ اﻟﺗوﻓﯾق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻌﻣل وﻛﯾف. ٨
  اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﺔ ﻣﮭﺎم ھﯿﺌﺔ ت.  
	 وﺟﮫ؟ أﻛﻣل ﻋﻠﻰ وﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﺎﺗك ﺑﻣﮭﺎﻣك اﻟﻘﯾﺎم أﺟل ﻣن ﺑﮭﺎ ﺗزوﯾدك ﯾﺗم اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻧوع ﺣدد. ١
  	 : اﻻﺗﻲ ﺗزوﯾدي ﯾﺗم ﻧﻌم ﻻ
  أ.  اﻹﻓﺻﺎح ﻣﺳﺗﻧدات  
  .ب 	 اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻧدات  
  .ج 	 اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎر/اﻟﻣﻧﺗﺞ ﻋن ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت  
  .د 	 اﻟﻣﺧﺎطر ﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﺗﻘرﯾر  
  .ﺎھ 	 اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﻲ اﻟﺗدﻗﯾق ﺗﻘرﯾر  
  .و 	 اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺗواﻓق ﺗﻘرﯾر  
  .ز 	 واﻟرﻗﺎﺑﯾﺔ اﻟﻘﺎﻧوﻧﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻧدات  
	  .ح 	 أذﻛرھﺎ: أﺧرى  
 وطﻠب اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺗﺣت اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎر ﻣﻘﺗرح ﺣول واﻟﺗﻘﺻﻲ اﻟﺑﺣث ﻣن ﺑﺎﻟﻣزﯾد ﺗﻘوم ھل ﺳﺑق، ﻣﺎ إﻟﻰ ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ. ٢
				 ذﻟك؟ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺛﺎل أذﻛر اﻷﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ؟ اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ وﺗواﻓﻘﮭﺎ ﺷرﻋﯾﺗﮭﺎ ﻣن ﻟﻠﺗﺣﻘق أﺿﺎﻓﯾﺔ ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت
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	 :اﻻﺗﻲ ﺑﻣراﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﻘوم ھل. ٣
  	 :ﺗراﺟﻊ اﻟﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﻧﻌم ﻻ
  .أ  اﻟﻣﻘﺗرﺣﮫ( اﻟﻣﻧﺗﺞ) اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات  
  .ب 	 طرﺣﮭﺎ ﺑﻌد( اﻟﻣﻧﺗﺞ) اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات  
  .ج 	 اﻻﺗﻔﺎﻗﯾﺎت/اﻟﻌﻘود  
  .د 	 اﻷﺳﺎﺳﻲ واﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟﺗﺄﺳﯾس ﻋﻘد  
  .ﺎھ 	 واﻹﺟراءات اﻻﻧظﻣﺔ  
  .و 	 وﺧﺎرﺟﮭﺎ اﻟﻌﻣوﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﯾزاﻧﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺗﺿﻣﻧﺔ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت  
  .ز 	 اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﻲ اﻟﻣدﻗق ﺗﻘرﯾر  
	  .ح 	 اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ ﺑﺎﻟﺗواﻓق اﻟﺧﺎص اﻟﺗﻘرﯾر  
	 اﻟﻣراﺟﻌﺔ؟ ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﺗﺷﺗﻣل ﻣﺎذا ﻣراﺟﻌﺔ، ﺑﻌﻣﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﻘوم ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ. ٤
	 اﻟﻣراﺟﻌﺔ؟ ﺑﻌﻣﻠﯾﺎت ﻗﯾﺎﻣﮭﺎ ﻛﯾﻔﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﯾود أﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﺗﻔرض ھل. ٥
	 ﺗوﻓﯾرھﺎ؟ ﯾﺗم وﻟﻣن اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ، اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﺻدرھﺎ اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر أﻧواع ﺣدد. ٦
	 اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر؟ ھذة ﺑرﻓﻊ ﺗﻘوم اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﺟﮭﺔ ﺗﺣدﯾد ﻣﻊ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ؟ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ﻟﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾﻣﮭﺎ ﯾﺗم اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر أﻧواع ﺣدد. ٧
	 اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ؟ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ ﺗواﻓﻘﮫ ﻣن ﻟﻠﺗﺄﻛد اﻟداﺧﻠﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﻲ اﻟﻣدﻗق ﺗﻘرﯾر ﺑﻣراﺟﻌﺔ اﻟﮭﯾﺋﺔ ﺗﻘوم ھل. ٨
	
  ج. اﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻖ ﻣﻊ ﻣﺒﺎدئ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ:
/ اﻟﻣﺑدأ -اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻧظرك وﺟﮭﺔ ﻣن– ﺣدد اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ، اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ وﺗواﻓﻘﮭﺎ اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات ﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ ﺳﻌﯾﺎ ً . ١
  اﺟﺎﺑﮫ ﻣن اﻛﺛر اﺧﺗﯾﺎر ﯾﻣﻛﻧك      :اﻻﺗﻲ ﻣن آھﻣﯾﺔ اﻷﻛﺛر اﻟﻣﺑﺎدئ
	 ....ﻣﺑدأ  
	 .واﻟﺧﺳﺎرة ﺑﺎﻟرﺑﺢ اﻻﻟﺗزام. أ
  .ﺻورﯾﺔ وﻟﯾﺳت ﻓﻌﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﺗﻛون أن. ب
  . اﻟﻣﺣرﻣﺔ اﻷﺻﻧﺎف ﻓﻲ اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل وﺗﺣرﯾم ﻓﻘط، اﻟﺣﻼل ﻓﻲ اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل. ج
  .واﻟﻐرر اﻟرﺑﺎ ﺗﺣرﯾم. د
  . وواﺟﺑﺎﺗﮭم ﺑﺣﻘوﻗﮭم اﻟﺷرﻛﺎء ﻛﺎﻓﺔ وﻋﻲ ﻟﺿﻣﺎن اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت ﻓﻲ واﻟﺷﻔﺎﻓﯾﺔ اﻟﻌدل. ه
  .اﻟﺗﻼﻋب ﻟﺗﺟﻧب ﻟﻠﻌﻣﻼء اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻋن واﻻﻓﺻﺎح اﻟوﺿوح. و
  . اﻟﻣﺣرم اﻟﺛراء ﺗﺟﻧب ﻣﻊ اﻷطراف ﻟﻛﺎﻓﺔ واﻟﻣﺳﺎواة اﻟﻌدل ﺗﺣﻘﯾق. ز
  . اﻟﻣﺳﺎھﻣﯾن ﺛروات زﯾﺎدة ﺟﺎﻧب إﻟﻰ اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ، ورﻓﺎة اﻟﻣﻌﯾﺷﺔ ﻣﺳﺗوى دﻋم. ح
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 ﺗواﻓق ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗؤﺛر أن اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻌﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﺧﺎطر اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ إﺧطﺎر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﺗﻌﻣل ھل. أ.٢
         اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ؟ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات
   اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات إﻧﺣراف ﺗﺑﯾن ﺣﺎل ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ إﺧطﺎر ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﺗﻌﻣل أﯾًﺿﺎ وھل. ب.٢
   اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ؟ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ ﻣﺑﺎدئ ﻣﻊ ﺗواﻓﻘﮭﺎ ﻣﺳﺎر ﻋن
	 اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ؟ ھذه ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ ھﯾﺋﺔ دور ھو ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﻘﺑﺎت، اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ ﻣواﺟﮭﺔ ﺣﺎل ﻓﻲ. ٣
 ﺑﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت/اﻻﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎرات ﺑﺗواﻓق ﺗﺗﻌﻠق ﻋﻘﺑﺎت أﯾﺔ ﻟﮭﺎ ﺗﻧﺗﻣﻲ اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﮭﯾﺋﺎت ﻣن أي واﺟﮭت ھل. ٤
	 اﻟﺳﺎﺑﻘﺔ؟ اﻻﻋوام اﻟﻌﺷرة ﻓﺗرة ﺧﻼل اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﺔ
	 ﺑﺷﺄﻧﮭﺎ؟ ﺗﻘﺎرﯾر رﻓﻊ/  ﺗوﺛﯾﻘﮭﺎ ﺗم ھل( ٤.ج) رﻗم اﻟﺳؤال ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻧﻌم اﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻛﺎﻧت إذا. ٥
	 اﻟﻣﺣﻠﯾﺔ؟ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﯾﺔ واﻟﺳﻠطﺎت واﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣرﯾن ﻟﻠﻣﺳﺎھﻣﯾن اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر ﺗوﻓﯾرھذه ﺗم وھل. ٦
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 ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﻤﻮاﻓﻘﺔ ﻧﻤﻮذج
  اﻟﺨﻠﯿﺠﻲ اﻟﺘﻌﺎون ﻣﺠﻠﺲ دول ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺣﻮل اﻟﺪﻛﺘﻮراة ﺑﺈطﺮوﺣﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ
  اﻟﺨﺎﺻﺔ واﻻﻛﺘﺘﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻤﻠﻜﯿﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮ اﻟﺘﻲ 
	
  دﻛﺗوراة طﺎﻟﺑﺔ -اﻟﻣﻧﺎﻋﻲ ﻣﻧﻰ
	 اﻷﻋﻣﺎل إدارة ﻛﻠﯾﺔ درم ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ 
  																						 	 	
 اﻟﺧﺎﻧﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻹﺷﺎرة ﺧﻼل ﻣن اﻷﺗﯾﺔ، ﻟﻠﺑﻧود ﻋدﻣﮫ ﻣن اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﺗﻘدﯾم اﻟﻛرام اﻟﺳﺎدة ﻣن ﯾرﺟﻰ 	ﻧﻌم 	ﻻ
	 (:ﻻ) أو( ﻧﻌم)ب ﻟذﻟك اﻟﻣﺧﺻﺻﮫ
 
	
 ،"اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﺣول ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت: "ﺑﻌﻧوان اﻟورﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻘدﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﻋﻠﻰ اطﻠﻌت ﻗد ﺑﺄﻧﻧﻲ أؤﻛد. ١ 	
	 .ﻣﺣﺗواھﺎ وﻓﮭﻣﻣت
	
	 .ﺣوﻟﮭﺎ اﻟﻣرﺿﯾﺔ اﻹﺟﺎﺑﺎت وﺗﻠﻘﯾت أﺳﺋﻠﺗﻲ ﻟطرح اﻟﻔرﺻﮫ ﻟﻲ أﺗﯾﺣت ﻗد. ٢ 	
	
 أي ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟرد ﻋدم وﻓﻲ أﺷﺎء، وﻗﺗﻣﺎ اﻻﻧﺳﺣﺎب ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣرﯾﺔ ﻟﻲ وأن طوﻋﯾﺔ، ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺗﻲ أن أﺗﻔﮭم. ٣ 	
	 .اﻟﻣﺑررات ﺗﻘدﯾم ودون ﯾطرح، ﺳؤال
	
 ﻣﺎ وأن ﻣﻧﮭﻣﺎ، أيٍ  ﻧﺷره ﯾﺗم ﻟن( ﯾﻧطﺑق أﯾﻧﻣﺎ) ﻟﮭﺎ أﺗﺑﻊ اﻟﺗﻲ اﻟﻣؤﺳﺳﺔ واﺳم اﺳﻣﻲ ﺑﺄن أﻓﮭم. ٤ 	 	
	 .ﻣﺟﮭول وﺑﻣﺻدر ﻟﻠدراﺳﺔ اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾﻠﯾﺔ اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ ھﻲ ﺳﺗﻧﺷر
	
  .اﻟدراﺳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرﻛﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أواﻓق. ٥ 	
	
  . اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺗﺳﺟﯾل ﻋﻠﻰ أواﻓق. ٦ 	
	
 ﺑﻣوﺟب وذﻟك اﻟﺗﺎﻣﺔ، اﻟﺳرﯾﺔ ﻗﯾد ﺣﻔظﮭﺎ ﺳﯾﺗم واﻟﻣﺧطوطﺎت اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺗﺳﺟﯾل أﺷرطﺔ ﺑﺄن أﺗﻔﮭم. ٧ 	
  . 8991 ﻟﻌﺎم اﻟﻣﺗﺣدة اﻟﻣﻣﻠﻛﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت، ﺣﻣﺎﯾﺔ ﻗﺎﻧون
	
 ﻛﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﺗﻘﯾد أن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﻧﺷورة، اﻟﻣواد ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣن اﻗﺗﺑﺎﺳﺎت اﺳﺗﺧدام ﻋﻠﻰ أواﻓق. ٨ 	
  .اﻟﻣﺻدر ﻣﺟﮭوﻟﺔ
 
	 :اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ ﻗدم واﻟذي اﻟﻣﺷﺎرك اﺳم
  :اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ        :اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ   
		 :اﻟﻣواﻓﻘﺔ اﺳﺗﻠم واﻟذي اﻟﺑﺎﺣث اﺳم
	 :اﻟﺗوﻗﯾﻊ        :اﻟﺗﺎرﯾﺦ  
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Shari’ah Scholars Information Sheet-English Version: 
	
	
	
 
Dear Participant, 
 
I am part time PhD candidate at the Durham University Business School, United Kingdom.  The purpose of 
this study is to explore the relationship between the investors and Islamic private equity firms in the GCC. 
As empirical study is a key part of my PhD dissertation, I am conducting a survey on investors and private 
equity firms.  
 
The questions aim to provide insight into the investor’s experience in Islamic private equity and provide 
information and recommendation on how the relationship between the investor and the Islamic private equity 
firm can be strengthened in terms of transparency, Shari’ah, and regulation.  Therefore, I request you to 
kindly answer the questions that correctly reflect your experience, as it will effect the results of the study. 
 
Arrangements will be made for an interview at your convenience and time to seek your input to some 
questions and discuss related issues. Should you have any questions and or concerns regarding this 
study/questions, you may e-mail me at m.a.al-mannai@durham.ac.uk.  A written summary of the outcome 
of the study will be made available to interested participants following the end of the thesis. 
 
Ethics and rights of the respondents 
 
While presently studying part time for my PhD, I currently am an employee of the Central Bank of Bahrain 
(where I am a Head in the Capital Markets Supervision Directorate).  
 
I wish to stress to you that any information you give to me will be purely used for the purpose of research 
related to my PhD thesis.  It will not under any circumstances be shared with or used by the Central Bank of 
Bahrain.  
 
I also wish to stress to you that any information you give me will be kept strictly confidential at all times.  
Furthermore, the information provided will be used anonymously in my thesis and I will not use your name 
or any other details that would result in your identity being known.  
 
The interviewee has the right not to answer any question for any reason. 
 
The	project	has	been	given	advisory	approval	by	the	Durham	University	Business	School			Sub-Committee	
for	Ethics.	
	
Thank you in advance for your co-operation, and you answering all questions is extremely important and 
highly appreciated. 
Durham Islamic Finance Programme 
Business School 
For Researcher Use Only: 
Case Identification No.: 
Date:       /       /201….   
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Shari’ah Scholars Interview Questions- English Version: 
 
Questions to be addressed to Shari’ah Scholars on Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) of Islamic 
Private Equity/private placement, including real estate investments (IPE) 
 
A. Shari’ah Scholar Profile: 
 
1. Are you a member of Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB)? 
2. Where are you located? 
3. On how many SSB are you a member? 
4. On average how many members are on the SSB that you are a member of? 
5. Are you (as member of SSB): 
   A member of SSB and Yes No 
On the board of directors of the institution   
On one of the institution’s board committees   
A Client of the institution   
A Shareholder of the institution   
 
B. Terms of Reference (TOR) and Responsibilities: 
 
1. Does the agreement of appointment that you sign, clearly state the TOR regarding your mandates and 
responsibilities? 
2. What are your mandates and responsibilities? 
3. Are there well-defined operating procedures and a clear line of reporting?  
4. Who do you (as SSB) usually report to?  
5. Are there clear set process, rules and by-laws related to the following? 
 Rules & By-Laws on Yes No 
Conduct of meeting   
Decision making process and recording   
Review process for on-going products/investments once offered to investors   
Reports made and their submission   
 
5. In your association with IFI as a member of SSB, how do you try and maintain your independence?  
6. How do you as a member of the SSB operate with regards to meeting your duties and responsibilities 
(or TOR)? 
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C. Function of SSB: 
 
1. What information are you provided with in order to perform your duties and responsibilities? 
 
Provided with Yes No 
Disclosure documents   
Financial statements   
Product/investment information   
Risk assessment report   
Internal Shari’ah audit report   
Shari’ah compliance report   
Legal & Regulatory documents   
Other: Specify   
 
2. Do you request additional information when performing your duties? Examples? 
3. Does the SSB review the following: 
Review Yes No 
New Products/Transactions   
Developed Products/Transaction once 
launched 
  
Contracts/Agreements   
Memorandum and articles of association   
Policies and procedures   
On Balance Sheet & Off Balance Sheet 
transactions 
  
Internal Shari’ah audit report   
Shari’ah compliance report   
 
4. When a SSB performs a Review what does it involve? 
5. Have there been any restrictions by the IFI on the SSB review? 
6. As SSB what reports do you produce? And whom are they submitted to? 
7. As SSB what reports are provided to you? And by whom from within the institution? 
8. Does the SSB perform its own review on Shari’ah compliance of IFI or it relies on the auditor’s review? 
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D. Shari’ah Compliance: 
 
1. What do you consider as shari’ah risk for IPE?  (Please select, more than one can be selected) 
   Abiding by principles of Shari’ah 
   Transaction have to be real and be certain and not based on uncertainty or speculation 
   Prohibition in dealing in items, which are Haram and the requirement to deal only in Halal items 
   Prohibition of Riba and gharar 
   Requirement for fair and transparent dealings to ensure all partners are aware of their rights and 
obligations 
   Abiding by shari’ah principles of clarity, and disclosing information, so as not to be manipulating.  
   No unjust enrichment, equity and fairness to all parties 
   The goal of the Islamic Financial Institution is not limited to the maximization of shareholders’ wealth, 
but also includes enhancement of the standard of living and welfare of the community 
 
2. Are you (SSB) informed of any Shari’ah compliance risk matters?  
3. What is your (SSB) role when the management of IFI encounters hindrance from shari’ah principles 
during the implementation of the investment? 
4. Have you (SSB) encountered any Shari’ah compliance issues in the last  year or so?  
5. If yes to D.4.:  Have they been documented/reported?   
6. If yes to D.4.: Have they been made available to shareholders, investors and local authorities?  
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Shari’ah Scholars Consent Form- English Version: 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INVESTOR AND THE ISLAMIC FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION IN THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COUNTRIES INVESTING IN 
PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
Muna AlMannai, PhD candidate, Durham University Business School 
          
                               
                                                                       Please tick  
    Yes          No 
17. I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided in the 
Information Sheet on the above study. 
18. I have had the opportunity to ask questions, and I have received satisfactory 
answers to all my questions. 
19. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at 
any time or not to answer any question without the need to justify my postion, 
and without prejudice.  
 
20. I understand that my name (and the name of my company, where applicable) 
will not be published, but what will be published will be the analyzed results 
in anonymous form. 
21. I agree to take part in the study.  
22. I agree to the interview being audi recorded.  
23. I understand that interview tapes and transcripts will be anonymised and will 
be held in strict confidence and in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998).  
24. I agree to the use of anyonymised quotes in publications.  
 
Name of interviewee/person making consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)    
 
 
Signature:       Date: 
 
Name of Research/person taking consent: (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
    
Signature:    	 	 	 Date:	 	
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Appendix 4: Participating Islamic Financial Institution’s and Shari’ah Scholar’s Profile 
 
 
 
Islamic Financial Institution’s Profile 
Islamic Financial 
Institution (IFI) Location Type Capital 
IFI-01 Qatar Private Equity Firm U$1m-100m 
IFI-02	 Kuwait Investment Firm U$101-500m 
IFI-03	 Kuwait Investment Firm U$101-500m 
IFI-04	 Kuwait Investment Firm U$1m-100m 
IFI-05	 UAE Investment Bank U$1m-100m 
IFI-06	 Bahrain Investment Bank U$101-500m 
IFI-07	 UAE Private Equity Firm US$501-1bn 
IFI-08	 Bahrain Investment Bank U$101-500m 
IFI-09	 Oman Investment Bank U$1m-100m 
IFI-10	 Bahrain Investment Bank US$501-1bn 
IFI-11	 Bahrain Investment Bank U$101-500m 
IFI-12	 Saudi Arabia Investment Firm U$1m-100m 
IFI-13	 Saudi Arabia Investment Firm U$101-500m 
IFI-14	 Saudi Arabia Investment Firm  U$101-500m 
IFI-15	 Bahrain Investment Bank U$101-500m 
 
 
Shari’ah Scholar’s Profile 
Shari’ah 
Scholar (ShSc) 
Location Number of Shari’ah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
Academia/ 
Independent 
ShSc-01 Bahrain 10+ Independent 
ShSc-02	 Kuwait 5-10 Academia 
ShSc-03	 Kuwait 5-10 * Independent 
ShSc-04	 Kuwait 5-10 * Academia 
ShSc-05	 Kuwait 5-10 Banks*** Academia  
ShSc-06	 UAE Less than 5 Banks*** Academia 
ShSc-07	 Bahrain 5 Locally Independent  
ShSc-08	 Bahrain 5 Independent 
ShSc-09	 Bahrain 5-10 Independent 
ShSc-10	 Saudi Arabia 10+ Academia 
ShSc-11	 Qatar 5-10 Independent 
ShSc-12	 Kuwait 10 + Independent 
ShSc-13	 Qatar 5-10 Independent 
*On SSB of the main IFI and its overseas branches and companies the IFI owns 100%. 
***Reference is to being a member on SSBs of IFIs, they could also be members of SSBs in other sectors.  
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